Selected Writings of Saint Augustine
through them, what else do we have but "grace upon grace returned"? 29
Man was, therefore, made upright, and in such a fashion that he could either continue in that uprightness—though not without divine aid—or become perverted by his own choice. Whichever of these two man had chosen, God's will would be done, either by man or at least concerning him. Wherefore, since man chose to do his own will instead of God's, God's will concerning him was done; for, from the same mass of perdition that flowed out of that common source, God maketh "one vessel for honorable, another for ignoble use"';3° the ones for honorable use through his mercy, the ones for ignoble use through his judgment; lest anyone glory in man, or—what is the same thing—in himself. CHAPTER xxv (104, 105, 106, 107)
4. The Free Choice of the Will, Book II
God therefore made all natures, not only those that were to persevere in virtue and justice, but those too that in future were to sin. He made them, not so that they should sin; but, whether they willed to sin or not to sin, to be the ornament of the universe. For if there were no souls in the created universe of such quality that they could, if they willed not to sin, attain to the highest in the order of creation; could also, if they chose to do wrong, be made weak and fall—if this quality of creature were not made— something would be lacking to creation, by the absence of which, the stability of things and connected order would be out of harmony.
29 Cf. John 1:16. 30 Rom. 9:21.
Natures of this quality are the most excellent and holy and sublime creatures of the celestial or supercelestial powers, whom God alone rules, to whom the whole world is subject. Without the offices of these just and perfect creatures the universe cannot be. Again, if creatures did not exist, which might choose to sin or not to sin, the order of the universe would not be less, though even so, something would be wanting. Rational human souls then in their work are unequal to these higher creatures: but by reason of nature (spirit) they are equal. Than which yet there are many lower grades; and yet the grades of all creatures constituted by the supreme God are to be praised.
That therefore is the nature of the more sublime office, which not only if it existed not, but also if it chose to sin, would make less the order of the universe. This is the nature of lower energy, which only on condition that it did not exist, not on condition of its doing wrong, would detract from the (integrity of) the universe.
To that former (spirit) nature is given the power, its own proper work, of holding all things (in order), which power cannot be wanting to order. And this nature does not therefore persevere in good will because it was given this work, but therefore was it given because by Him who gave it, it was foreseen to persevere.
And yet (this spirit nature) holds not all things by its own majesty, but by allegiance to Him and obeying the order of Him from whom and by whom and in whom are all things that are made.*! To this (spirit nature) not sinning was given the power most eminent indeed of containing all things, yet not to it alone, but with it, to that nature that was foreknown to sin in future. For spirit natures surely have a way of uniting forces without mass accumulation, and of disuniting without diminution: so that the former would not be aided in the ease of its action when the latter was united with it; nor was its action more difficult, when the other by sin gave up its work. For spiritual creatures can be united or disunited, not by reason of space or bulk of bodies, but by harmony or by differ-
81 Rom. 11:36.
ence of affections, though individually they may have bodies assigned.
But in the lower and mortal bodies the soul, after sin, rules not its own body in order, in all things according to its will, but as the laws of the universe permit. And such a soul is not therefore inferior to a celestial body, to which body, even earthly bodies are subordinate. For the cloth garment of a condemned slave is much inferior to the garment of the well deserving slave, who is in the high esteem of his master. But the slave himself is more worth than any precious garment because the slave is a man.
This therefore (the pure spirit nature), loyal to God, and in a celestial body, by angelic power also beautifies and rules a body of earth, as He orders, whose design the spirit nature sees in ways that cannot be described. But the other (human spirit) burdened by a mortal frame, with difficulty regulates the very thing within, by which it is weighed down; and yet, so far as it can, it beautifies: but upon other things, lying without, it acts as it can from without by energy that is much impaired. CHAPTER 11
Hence we gather logically that nothing would have been wanting to the perfect ornament of this lowest level of corporeal creation if that spirit nature had not chosen to sin. Because that which can govern the whole can also govern a part; but that which has less power can not therefore govern what is more ample. Thus a perfect physician can cure a skin infection also; but it follows not that he who can take care of a skin infection can therefore heal the whole man.
The sure reasoning then, if it is examined, by which it is made evident that there must be a creature that would not sin, a creature, that is, that has not the will to sin, that same reasoning also pronounces this—That that creature abstains from sin by free will; and that, not forced, it does not sin; of its own choice it sins not.
However, even though that spirit creature should sin (though it has not sinned as God foresaw that it would not sin); yet if it should sin, God's power of indescribable might would be sufficient to rule this universe, so that, giving to all things what is fitting and right, He would permit nothing in his whole created empire to go wrong, or to be out of order. Because, whether by no power created for this He ruled the world, or if all the angelic nature had revolted against his laws by sin, He would still rule the world most fittingly and in complete order by force of his own majesty. And it follows not that there was ill will to the spiritual creature (in Him) who made also the corporeal creature far less excellent than even the spiritual creature that sins—He made this corporeal creature in such bounteous goodness that no man reasonably looking upon the earth and sky and all visible natures, governed in their own proper planes, formed and fixed in order—no man, so reasonably looking, can believe that the maker of all is other than God; no man that will not confess that He is to be praised beyond our power to express. Or, if there is no more excellent ordering of things than that in which angelic power by the excellency of its nature and the goodness of will rules in the disposition of the universe, even though all Angels had sinned, they could not be the cause of a defect of power to the Creator of Angels for the right ruling of His own empire.
For the goodness of God, or the power of God would not be lacking, as if by defect or by difficulty, to create others to take the place which the former by sin had left. Nor could the spirit creature, if it were made reprobate for its demerits, in what number soever, prevent the ordinance which excludes those who have deserved condemnation. Whithersoever, therefore, our consideration turns itself, it finds God to be praised beyond the power of human expression—God the All-Good Maker and the All-Just Ruler of the World.
Finally, leaving the contemplation of the beauty of things to those who can see by divine appointment; and, not trying, by means of words, to direct to things unspeakable those who can not see; yet, on account of talking men or weak men, or unbelieving men, let us work out this very important problem by way of a short abridgment.
CHAPTER 12
The Human Condition and Its Remedy 183
Every nature that can be made less good is itself good: and every nature when it is depraved is less good. For either depravity hurts it not, then it is not depraved; or, if it is depraved, then depravity hurts it: and, if it hurts, then it makes the good of it somewhat less, and leaves it less good. For if it deprives it completely of all good quality, whatever remains of it can not now be depraved, because there will be no good quality in it, by the taking away of which, depravity can hurt. But that which depravity can not hurt, can not be depraved.
Furthermore, the nature which can not be depraved (or corrupted) is incorruptible. That nature, therefore (which is most unreasonable to say) is by corruption made incorrupt. Wherefore, what is most truly said, follows—all nature in so far as it is nature, is good. For if it is a nature incorruptible, it will be more excellent than a corruptible nature: but, if it is corruptible, then, just so long as it is a subject of corruption, it becomes less good—it is beyond doubt (objectively) good. But every nature is either corruptible or incorruptible. Therefore every nature is good. I call nature here what is usually named substance. Every substance therefore either is God, or from God; because every good either is God, or is from God.
These things being proved and established as the beginning of our reasoning, note what I shall say—Every rational nature, created with free choice of will, if it perseveres unto the enjoying of the supreme and changeless good, is beyond doubt to be praised: and every rational nature that tends to persevere is also to be praised: but every one that perseveres not, and is unwilling so to act as to persevere, in so far as it is not there (in the enjoyment of the supreme and changeless good), and so far as it does not act to be there, is to be blamed.
If therefore the rational nature which is made is to be praised, no one doubts that He is to be praised who made it. And, if (the creature) is reproached no one doubts that in the reproach of the thing made the Maker is praised. When therefore we reproach the rational creature, because it has not the will to enjoy the supreme and changeless good, that is, its Creator, we most assuredly, praise Him.
How great the good therefore, and how much beyond expression is He to be declared good by all tongues, how much to be studied above all thought, how much to be praised, who is the Creator of all, without the approving of whom we can neither be praised nor blamed. For we can be blamed because we remain not in Him, only for this one reason—Because our great and first and supreme good is to remain in Him. Whence then is this, but from the fact that He is the unspeakable good? What then can be found in our sins for the reproach of Him, when the reproach of our sins is meaningless, unless it is in praise of Him?
Then again, in things themselves that are blamed, the object of blame is not the person, but the fault. But the fault of no one is blamed but of that one whose nature is good—the object of praise. For either what you blame is according to nature, then it is not a fault; and you are to be corrected, so that you may know rightly what is to be blamed, rather than that which you wrongly blame: or, if it is a fault that you blame, then it must be contrary to nature, so that it can rightly be blamed.
For every vice (or fault), from very fact that it is vice (or a fault) is opposed to nature. For if it does not hurt nature it is not a fault; but, if it is therefore a fault because it hurts nature, then it is a fault just because it is opposed to nature.
If however a nature is impaired, not by its own fault, but by fault of another, it is wrongly blamed: then we must find out whether that nature, by whose fault another nature could be spoiled, was or was not impaired by its own fault. But what is the fact of being impaired other than the fact of being spoiled by fault?
Furthermore, the nature that is unspoiled is without fault; but that, by the fault of which another nature is spoiled, surely has fault. That nature therefore by whose fault another nature can be spoiled, is first faulty in itself, and earlier (in order of time and of logic) it is spoiled by its own fault. From which it follows that every fault is opposed to nature—opposed to the nature even of that thing to which the fault belongs.
Wherefore, since in anything whatsoever, nothing is blamed but fault, and a fault is because it is opposed to the nature of that thing of which the fault is, it follows that the fault of no thing is rightly blamed, but that thing, the nature of which is praised. For what rightly displeases you in a fault is only because it spoils what pleases you in nature. CHAPTER 13
This also remains to be seen—Whether it can be said truthfully that any nature is spoiled by the fault of another nature with no addition of its own fault. For if the nature which approaches to spoil another nature by its fault, finds nothing that can be spoiled, it does not spoil that nature. But, if it does find (what is spoilable), it works the spoiling of it by reason of its own united fault. For the more powerful is not spoiled by the less powerful, if he has not the will to be spoiled. But, if he has a will to be spoiled, then he begins to be spoiled by his own fault before he is spoiled by fault of another. For the same reason equal by equal nature can not be spoiled, if it has not the will to be spoiled. For any nature whatsoever that approaches with fault to spoil another nature without fault, by that very fact approaches not as equal, but as less strong, by reason of its own fault. But if the more powerful spoils the less strong, it is either by the fault of both, if it is by the wrong will of both, or it is by fault of the stronger, if that is of such outstanding nature, that even when it is faulty, it outranks the less strong which it spoils.
Who indeed would reproach the fruits of the earth because men use them not well; and spoiled by their own faults, they spoil the fruits by misusing them to excess: while yet it would be the note of a crazy man to hold: that the nature of man, even spoiled by fault, is not more, excellent and more powerful than any unspoiled fruits?
Again it may be that a nature more powerful spoils one less strong, and that this is the fault of neither one, if, that is, we call that fault which deserves blame. But who will presume to blame the man who seeks from his fruits nothing other than the supplements of nature; or, seeking the same fruits, because they are spoiled in the use of his food? Usually indeed such use is not said to be a spoiling, because spoiling is peculiarly a term of fault. This too can be noted in other things; because generally a more potent nature, in the process of supplying its wants, spoils one that is lower, whether in the order of justice, where fault is proved, from which rule the Apostle has said: If any man spoil the temple of God, him will God destroy;** or in the order of changeful things, one absorbing the other, in accordance with most fitting laws, given to every part of the universe, in proportion to the native energy of each one.
Thus if the sun by its glare were to spoil the eyes of some one, in the measure of nature too weak for the light, the sun is not to be thought of as changing the eyes to supply their want of light (power), or to act by reason of any fault of its own. Nor, again, are the eyes themselves to be blamed, because they so yielded to their owner as to be opened against the light, and (by consequence) are impaired for light itself (in normal use).
Of all spoilings therefore, that spoiling only is to be blamed, which is faulty. Others are not even to be called spoiling; or surely (because they are not faulty), they can not be deserving of blame. For blame itself, because it corresponds to fault only, that is, it is fitting and due to fault, is believed to have drawn from that fact the structure of the word, so that vituperatio is built up from vitium.
But a fault, as I had begun to say, is not bad for any other reason than that it is opposed to the nature of the thing itself, of which it is the fault. Whence it is clear, that that same thing whose fault is blamed, is praiseworthy by reason of its nature. So that we may acknowledge that absolutely the very blaming of faults is the praise of nature, that is, or those natures whose faults are blamed.
Truly because a fault is opposed to nature, so much is added to the malice of faults as is taken away from the integrity of natures. When therefore you blame a fault, you are logically praising that, the integrity of which you desire: But to what does integrity belong, but to nature? For nature complete, not only merits no blame, but, in its
821 Cor. 3:317.
own kind, is worthy of praise. What therefore you may have seen wanting to the perfection of nature you call a fault; bearing witness evidently, that that pleases, which, by blaming its imperfection, you would have to be perfect.
CHAPTER
If therefore the blaming of faults suggests the beauty and the worth of those very natures of which they are faults, how much more is God, the Maker of all natures, to be praised, even in the faults of those natures—because from Him they hold the fact that they are natures; and, so far are they faulty, as they depart from the art of Him by whom they were made; and blame is found in them rightly just so far as the one who blames sees the art by which they were made, so that he may blame in them what he does not see there (departure from the standard).
And if the art by which all things are made is this—The supreme and changeless wisdom of God, that truly and supremely is, as it is. See, then, whither that tends which departs from it. What defect, then, would be worthy of blame, if the voluntary defect were free from blame?
Mark now, I ask, whether you would blame rightly that which is as it ought to be. I think not. But you would blame rightly what is not as it ought to be. But no one owes what he has not received. And to whom does one owe?
And the things which are delivered in settling accounts are delivered to the one who had kept the account. And anything of credit to rightful successors, is paid to those who by right succeed to the creditors. Otherwise it would not be a payment, but a release or a surrender, or whatever else those transactions are called.
Wherefore of all temporal things which are placed in this order of things, so that the future can not succeed to the past without making it less, in order that the whole beauty of all times may be completed—in all this order of things it is more unreasonable for us to say that things ought not to fail. For so much as they have received, so much they do, and so much they return to Him, to whom they owe the fact that they are in so far as they are.
The Human Condition and Its Remedy
He indeed who is discontented because these things fail ought to take note of his own speech, this very sentence which makes the complaint, if he judges it to be fair and proceeding from prudence. If someone is delighted by one particle of speech so far as it refers to sound, and wiil not have it pass on to give place for the rest, so that a sentence may be built up by passing and succeeding parts, such a one will be judged to be a quality of mind peculiarly unsound.
In those things therefore which fail or are deficient because they have been given limited being only, so that all in proper order may complete integral time, no one finds fault or blames defect or failure. Because no one can say
(reasonably): "It ought to remain," while, in fact, it can not pass the proper limits given to it.
In rational creatures, however, in whom all beauty, whether they sin or do not sin, is terminated in ways most fitting; either there are no sins, which is most unreasonable
(in the face of facts—for he sins at any rate, hypothetically, who condemns as sins, things that are not sins); or sins are not to be blamed, which is not less absurd. Things that are not rightly done are praised (in process of this sophistry), and the whole attention of the human mind begins to be unsteady, and human life is subverted. On the other hand that which is done rightly, as it ought to be done, will be blamed, and a damnable, or to speak less harshly, a miserable habit of mind, will begin its course— or, again, if reason, fundamentally right, compels, as it does compel us to blame sins and whatever is rightly reproached, then it is reproached just because it is not as it ought to be. Ask, now, what a nature that is sinful ought to do—you will find the answer—right action. Ask to whom this is due—you will find the answer—God, from whom nature received the power to do right when it wills so to do; from Him too it holds the fact that it is unhappy, when it does not right, that it is happy, when it does right.
The soul is not permitted not to pay its debt (of right action), because no one rises superior to the laws of the Almighty Creator. Either the soul gives back what it has received by the right using of it, or it pays back by losing what it was unwilling to use rightly. Therefore, if it does not give back by doing justice, it will give back by suffering misery, because in one term and the other is expressed this word—debt (moral obligation). What has been said could also be expressed in this way: If he pays not by doing what he ought, he will pay by suffering what he ought.
But these two are not separated by any interval of time, so that one may do what he ought not at one time, and suffer what he ought at another time. The universal beauty is not marred by even a point of time, so that the dishonor of sin is (in God's design) never without the just adornment of its penalty. But whatever is now sanctioned by law unseen is kept unto future judgment for manifestation, and for the (full) sense of unhappiness. For as he, who wakes not, sleeps; so, whosoever does not what he ought, without interval (of time), suffers what he ought; because the beauty of justice is so great that no one can depart from it but to (his own) unhappiness. In all failures therefore (of the rational creature), either they did not receive beyond the fact that they fail, and there is no fault
(of the Creator); just as in their being, while they receive no more than what they are, there is no fault: or they have not the will to be, that which, if they did will, they received so that they could be (willing): and because that is good (the object of the will), if they will it not, it is guilt. CHAPTER 15
But God owes nothing to any one, because He is over all things without recompense. And if some one shall say that something is owing to the merits of men; there surely was no obligation that they should be: Man then was not, to whom anything could be owing. And yet what merit is it to be converted to Him from whom you have your being; so that by Him you may be better from whom you have the very fact what you are?
What then do you put forward so that you may demand what is owing; since, if you are not willing to be converted to Him, it is not loss to Him, but to you, He is loss, without whom, you would not be—He by whom you are so made, that unless you return to Him that which from Him you are, you will be, not nothing, but you will be not happy? All things therefore are owing to Him. First, whatsoever they are, is owing, in so far as they are natures. Then, the natures which have received the power to will, owe what, if they will they can be, better; and that, by will, they ought to be. No one therefore is guilty from that which he has not received: but, from the fact that he does not what he ought to do, he is guilty. But, if one has received a free will and sufficient power, he owes the right use of the free will.
But when one does not what he ought to do, it is no fault of the Maker, and it may be His praise; because he who owes suffers, and in the fact that he is blamed for not doing what he ought, He, to whom it is due, is praised.
If then you are praised in seeing what you ought to do, since you see this obligation only in the immutable truth (the natural light of reason), how much more is He to be praised who commands you to have a right will; and has given you the power (to choose); and permits not the wrong choice of the will to go unpunished? "If then (it is objected) everyone owes what he has received, and man is so made that he sins necessarily, then he owes this fact that he sins. Therefore when he sins, he does what he ought to do."
But, saying this is impious, if no one is forced by his own nature to sin; and no other nature forces him. For no one sins, when he experiences that which he wills not. Indeed, if he suffers according to justice, he sins not in that which unwillingly he experiences; but in that he sins which he has done willingly, which, if he did not will, he would not experience according to justice. But, if unjustly he suffers, how does he sin? For, not the suffering of a thing contrary to justice, but the doing of something contrary to justice is sin. But, if no one is forced to sin, whether in accord with his own nature, or constrained by the nature of another, it follows that he sins by his own will.
If you, then, would attribute this to the Maker, you will excuse the sinner (his fault): who, if he is defended rightly, has not sinned, because he has done nothing beyond what is instituted by the Maker: there is nothing therefore that you can attribute to the Maker (by way of a fault). Let us therefore praise the Maker, if the sinner is justly defended, he is not a sinner: Therefore praise the Creator. But if the sinner can not be defended, then he is a sinner in just so far as he has turned himself from the Creator— therefore, praise the Creator.
I find not therefore, and altogether I affirm that it cannot be found, how our sins can be attributed to our Creator and our God; because I find that He is to be praised, not only in the fact that He punishes sin, but that sins then are facts when we turn away from his truth.
E. I accept and most heartily approve, and I agree that it is altogether true that in no way can it be shown that our sins can be attributed rightly to our Creator.
Vi GRACE