Chapter I. Of Predestination. Based on the ninth chapter of Romans
The Third Part of the Common Places of Peter Martyr.
In which is treated the causes and general means whereby we are brought into the possession of Christ and of salvation, and concerning the effects of Christ remaining in us.
Chapter I.
Of Predestination.
Based on the ninth chapter of Romans, towards the end of the chapter.
Lest in disputing our talk might stray too far, which might easily come to pass in so large a field of God's predestination, the tract whereof is very intricate, all that we mind to say, we will divide into four principal points. That is to say, I will first diligently search out the nature and definition thereof. Secondly, what are the causes of it; for nothing can perfectly be known, which is not known by causes.
Thirdly, what are the effects which predestination brings forth in men; for there are many things which by their effects are most plainly understood and perceived. Lastly, whether the power or force thereof be such that it brings unto men necessity; and whether it either takes away or hinders the liberty of the will of man; and whether it may be altered or changed. These parts being diligently discussed, we will then make an end of this discourse. And yet I will not promise to speak all that were to be spoken on this matter; for there are infinite things that come to mind when considering this
matter: only those things will I touch at this present, which shall seem most necessary and are in greatest controversy; which being so compacted, it shall not be hard for others to gather elsewhere to themselves much more matter. But before we go to the definition of predestination, I am to dispatch two matters. The one is, whether it stands with true Christian religion either to dispute or to preach of predestination; lest that if it be not lawful, we should seem to do wickedly. The other, inasmuch as the Logicians teach that the question, whether a thing be or no, naturally goes before that question whereby is demanded, what a thing is; that we break not that order, let us first consider whether there be any predestination or no; to the end we may afterward the more safely define it.
As touching the former question, this is to be understood: that there are sundry elections of God. For there are some which serve for the executing of some certain office, as to a kingdom, or to an apostleship; and others there are, unto eternal life. And these elections are sometimes separated asunder; for it happens oftentimes that he who is chosen unto a kingdom is not straightway chosen unto eternal life: which also happens of the apostleship, as in Judas. However, sometimes they are joined together; so that whereas we speak of temporal election, we may also understand that the same is meant of the eternal. And after this sort Paul says that he was called to be an apostle and severed from his mother's womb, namely to the apostleship and preaching of the gospel: and yet together therewithal he understands that he was predestined to eternal salvation. Christ also said that he had chosen his disciples to go and to bring forth fruit, and that their fruit should remain: and yet together therewithal, He commands them to be of good comfort, for that their names were written in heaven. There is therefore between these elections a great difference; and there is also between them a great conjunction: so that oftentimes the one is taken for the other.
So Paul, by his wonderful wisdom, transferred unto spiritual things those temporal things which seem to be prophesied of Jacob & Esau in Genesis and Malachi.
2. Now, as for this latter election, I see there have been many who have judged this disputation is not meet to be touched. Whose reasons, Prosperus, and Hilarius, bishop of Orleans, sometimes disciple unto Augustine, do plainly declare in the two epistles which are prefixed unto the books of the predestination of saints. These epistles were written upon this occasion: when Augustine, writing against the Pelagians, touching the grace of Christ, had often in his books urged many things of predestination, many of the brethren in France, and not of the meanest sort, were sore troubled and wonderfully offended. For they affirmed that by this doctrine, is taken away from such as are fallen, an endeavor to rise again: and to such as stand, is brought a slothfulness. For they judged that diligence should be in vain to either part when as by the predestination of God it was already determined of them that, being reprobate, could not be restored again; and that they, being elect, could by no means fall away: and yet could not keep a constant and firm course, for as much as they were uncertain of their predestination. Therefore, seeing by this doctrine, industry is taken away, and only a certain fatal necessity doth remain, it is much better that this matter be left unspoken of. They add moreover, that it is superfluous to dispute of that which cannot be comprehended. For it is written; "Who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been his counselor?" So that their judgment was that it should be taught that God of his goodness would have all men to be saved: but in that all men are not saved, it hereof cometh because all men will not be saved, & this (say they) is a safe doctrine.
But on the other side, this doctrine of predestination taketh away all the force and use both of preachings, and also of admonitions and corrections. For if there be appointed a certain number of the elect, which can neither be diminished nor increased, then shall preachers labour in vain. For if the determination of God be immovable, then shall there be an unsearchable confusion between the elect and the reprobate; so that none of this sort can go to the other, nor none of these others pass over to them. And so in vain and unprofitable shall be all the labour and travel of such as are teachers. This doctrine also seemed unto them new; because the old fathers had written as touching this matter, either nothing at all, or very little; or else entreated of it after another sort. And for as much as, even unto
Augustine's time, the church had without this doctrine defended the doctrines of faith against heretics, they also could even then be content to want it: for they affirm that such as teach this do nothing else but call men back to an uncertainty of God's will: which is nothing else but to drive men unto desperation. All these things were objected unto Augustine; which if they were true, then should we rashly and without advisement take in hand the treatise of this matter. But the reasons, with which Augustine defendeth himself, may also maintain our purpose: wherefore those things which we intend in this place to speak of, we will briefly gather out of two books of his; the one whereof is entitled, De bono perseverantiae: in which book, in the 14th, 15th, and 20th chapters, he confutes those objections, which we have now made mention of; the other is entitled, De correptione & gratia; where in the 5th, 14th, 15th, 16th chapters he treats of the self-same thing.
3. First of all, he marvels that those men should think that the doctrine of predestination should subvert the profit and commodities of preaching; especially, seeing Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles, and preacher of the whole world, does in his epistles, both oftentimes and
also plainly and purposely urge that doctrine; as in the epistle unto the Romans, unto the Ephesians, and unto Timothy; yea and he says, that Luke also in the Acts of the apostles, and Christ himself in his sermons, makes mention thereof. For Christ saith: "Whom my father hath given me, those can no man take out of my hand"; and, that "Many are called, and few are elected." And in the last day, he says, that "He will answer unto the godly, Come ye blessed of my father, possess ye the kingdom, which was prepared for you from the beginning of the world." And, "He giveth thanks unto the father, for that he had hidden those things from the wise men, & revealed them unto babes; because it was his pleasure so to do." In another place also; "I know (saith he) whom I have chosen." Again; "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you." And if Christ and the apostles, have in their sermons oftentimes made mention hereof; no man
(saith he) ought to doubt, that this doctrine is against the fruit and commodity of preaching. He affirms also, that it follows not, that although our will, salvation, and good works, depend on the will and appointment of God; therefore we should cast away all our diligence, endeavor, and care. For Paul, when he had said, that God worketh in us both to will and to perform; yet ceased not to give good counsel.
And when he had written unto the Philippians, that God who had begun in them, would accomplish the work, which he had begun, that they might be blameless in the day of the Lord; in which words he attributeth unto God both the beginning and success of good works: yet in the self-same epistle, he wonderfully exhorteth them unto holiness.
Christ also commanded his apostles to believe, and yet on the other side he saith; that no man can come unto him, but he whom the father shall draw. He also saith; He which hath ears to hear, let him hear. And yet God saith in the scriptures, that he would give them a heart from above to understand, eyes to see, & ears to hear.
Wherefore these things are not repugnant one to the other; namely, that the appointment of good works lies in God, and that the gift of them is to be hoped for at God's hands only; and that we also must put our care and endeavour to live uprightly and godly: for as we have before said, the holy scriptures teach both. Moreover, if for this cause, we should deny predestination, seeing after the self-same manner, the fore-knowledge of God is certain, and cannot be deceived; shall we therefore deny, that God fore-knoweth all things, if peradventure there be some which may be offended with this doctrine? And in his book De bono perseverance, the 15th chapter, he bringeth an example which happened in his time. He saith, that in the same monastery that he was in, was a certain man of a loose life, who when he was admonished of his fault, was accustomed to say;
Such a one shall I be, as God hath fore-known me. And when he so spake (saith Augustine) he spake indeed the truth; but although his judgment was true, yet became he every day worse & worse: at the last also he saith, that he returned to his old vomit; howbeit (saith he) what manner of one he shall in time to come be, God only knoweth. Though this man abused the truth, yet will not therefore any godly man deny, that God fore-knoweth all things. And that this fore-knowledge of God, is no let unto good works, Christ declared, when he commanded his disciples to pray, when as yet in the meantime, he plainly told them, that God knew right well what they had need of. So then, fore-knowledge of God doth not call us back from desire to pray: for the things profitable and necessary, which God hath decreed to give us, he hath decreed to give them by this mean.
They also are deceived, which think that this doctrine is an unprofitable doctrine; yea, their sight is but small, and they understand not the profit thereof. Unto the godly it is very profitable, to the end they should not put any confidence, either in themselves,
or in any other men; but should fixe all their whole heart and confidence in God alone. Which thing undoubtedly, none can truly and from the heart do, but those which are fully persuaded, both that their salvation, and also their good works depend not upon themselves, but of God. No, we cannot acknowledge the gifts of God, except we understand from what fountain they spring. But that fountain is the free purpose, and mercy of God, given unto them, whom he hath elected before the constitution of the world. He which seeth not this, seeth not the goodness of God towards him. By this doctrine may men be brought, not to glory in themselves; but in the Lord: which they cannot do, that ascribe unto their own free will that little, whatsoever it be; for the which they say they are chosen of God: for they have in themselves whereof to glory. Over this, the scriptures will have us to be mortified, and to behave ourselves lowly; which thing, nothing more easily bringeth to pass, than doth this doctrine.
The certainty also of salvation, which we defend, is by no other means made more manifest. And in the latter epistle to the Thessalonians, Paul willeth us for this cause, to give thanks unto
GOD, that we are elected of God: but this can we not do, unless this also be wholly made plain and known unto us. Neither without this doctrine can the grace of God be sufficiently defended against the Pelagians; for they taught, that the election of God cometh by our merits. Free justification also should perish, except we be rightly taught of predestination. Seeing therefore this doctrine, being soundly understood, is unto so many things so profitable, no man ought to count it unfruitful: and since it is set forth in the holy scriptures, it cannot undoubtedly be called a new doctrine.
4. But if the fathers, before Augustine's time, have not so diligently spoken of it, it ought not to be marvelled at: for the occasions wherefore doctrines were the more diligently discussed, and searched out, were new heresies which often sprung up in the
church. And for that before Pelagius time, no man had spoken against the grace of God; there was no need, that any man should defend it: but when there arose up a new error, it was necessary, that this doctrine should the more diligently be examined. And yet did not the fathers, which were before Augustine, always leave this thing unspoken of. For Augustine himself proveth that, in the 19th chapter of his book De bono perseverance. Ambrose upon Luke saith, that God could, if he would, of undevout persons make devout. And again he saith, that God calleth them, whom he vouchsafeth; and whom he will, he maketh religious. These things writeth he upon that place, wherein it is written, that the Samaritans would not receive Christ.
He citeth also Gregorius Nazianzenus, who saith; that God granteth that the faithful both believe the blessed trinity, and also confess it.
But whereas they quarrel that this doctrine is very obscure, and cannot be understood; but rather bringeth men to be uncertain of the will of God, he answereth; that indeed it is an obscurity unsearchable, if any man go about to seek out reasons of the judgments of God, why (other men being rejected) this or that man is chosen. But if so much be taught of predestination, as the holy scriptures do set forth unto us; those things are not so obscure, but that they might be manifest enough unto our faith.
Neither counsel we, that when a man does anything, he should deliberate with himself of predestination; but rather refer himself unto the will of God, expressed in the scriptures: and that everyone also ought to have trust, that by predestination he is not excluded.
Neither is this any let to preaching, that the number of the elect (as it is in very deed) is certain and immovable. For by preaching, we do not go about to translate men from the number of the reprobate into the number of the elect: but that they which pertain to the elect, might by the ministry of the word be brought unto their appointed end: which self-same ministry, as unto the one it is profitable, so
unto the other it brings destruction, and takes away from them all manner of excuse. But whether predestination and election unto salvation may be said to pertain unto all men; so that God will have all men to be saved, we will afterward in his due place speak of.
However, in the meantime Augustine wills us not to conceal the truth touching predestination; because thereupon hangs danger, lest by misunderstanding thereof, corrupt doctrine might be confirmed.
Neither are those, which are of capacity, to be defrauded, for their sakes which are not able to attain unto it.
And inasmuch as out of this doctrine, many consolations may be had, it is indifferently to be set forth, both to the learned, and to the unlearned; although not always after one manner. For, unto some, milk is meet; and unto others, strong meat. And this self-same thing may so aptly be treated of, that it may satisfy both the learned and unlearned. Which Augustine himself did wisely accomplish, who not only disputed of this matter against the Pelagians very sharply; but also in his homilies and familiar sermons plainly and expressly handled the self-same thing unto the people; What (saith he) is more profound than the saying of John; In the beginning was the word? Or than this other; The word became flesh? In which sentences many may fall, and perniciously err; and yet notwithstanding, we must not cease to set it forth both to the learned and unlearned; but yet using therein a sundry kind of speech. We ought not so to preach predestination unto the people of God, as to say; Whether thou doest this, or doest it not, thou canst not alter the determination of God: and if thou be elect, whatsoever thou doest, thou canst not be removed from salvation: for these speeches easily hurt weak and unlearned men. It is the part of an unskilful or rather malicious physician, so foolishly and unaptly to apply a medicine, which is otherwise good, that it may be hurtful unto health.
But to set forth this doctrine profitably, and with fruit; the ends and commodities which we have before spoken of, ought to be regarded.
And let all our speech be directed to this, namely that they, which are of Christ, ought not to put confidence in their own power and strength, but in God; and that they ought to acknowledge his gifts, and to glory in God, and not in themselves, and to have feeling of the grace & mercy that is given them, and that they are freely justified by Christ. Let them understand also, that they are predestinate, to be made like unto the image of the Son of God, into the adoption of children, & to walk in good works; lastly, to testify to them the assurance of God's good-will towards them. Further, everything hath his ears or handles, whereby a man may most aptly hold it; which if it should be taken by any other way, or part, will either fall from the hand, or else hurt him that taketh it. This have we gathered out of those books of Augustine, which we before cited; wherein he answereth to the objections of Hilarius and Prosperus.
Now rest two doubts to be dissolved; first, that they say, that we appoint a certain fatal necessity; secondly, that they think that men by this means are brought to desperation. As touching the first, if by fate or destiny they understand a certain force influent from the stars, and an impregnable connection of causes, by which God himself also is restrained; we (and that not without just cause) will utterly renounce the name of fate. But if by that name they understand the order of causes, which is governed by the will of GOD, then cannot that thing seem to be against piety; although in my judgment I think it best, to abstain from that name, least the unlearned sort should think, that we approve the feinings of the Ethnics. Of this matter hath Augustine excellently well written in his fifth book De civitate Dei, the eighth chapter; Neither by this predestination, are the natures of things changed, as touching necessity, and hap; as in the treatise of providence we have declared:
nay rather, by the effect of predestination, that is, by grace, we are made free from sin, and made servants unto righteousness; which servitude is holy, and in the Lord worthy to be embraced. And so far is it off, that by predestination our hope should be broken or diminished, as even by it, it is most strongly confirmed. For Paul in the eighth chapter of his epistle to the Romans, when he had said;
Hope confounds not: and had added, that Unto them that love God, all things work to good, confirmeth the same by predestination. For whom God hath fore-known (saith he) those hath he predestinate: and addeth afterward; Who shall separate us from the love of God?
Shall tribulation? Shall anguish, &c? And immediately; Neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, &c. Wherefore we are not by this doctrine driven to desperation, but rather much more confirmed in hope, and by it is received great comfort. And undoubtedly, it is much more safe to commit our salvation to the care and providence of God, than to our own judgment. For we, as we are changeable, would every day, and every hour, destroy ourselves. But our salvation, forasmuch as it lieth in the hand of God, is most safe and sure. And to conclude, there is nothing that more advanceth the glory of God, than doth this doctrine: wherefore we ought not to fly from this doctrine of predestination. And especially, seeing it is a certain part of the Gospel, which must not be received in part, but fully and wholly; and thus much as touching the first part proposed in the beginning.
In the other part we are to consider, whether there be any predestination; lest we seem to go about to set forth and define a thing feigned and imagined: not that ever any have been, which openly, and of purpose, durst deny the predestination of God; but for that there have been some, who have laid such grounds, as those being granted, predestination cannot stand. For some say, and amongst them especially Pighius, that In God is neither anything
past, or to come; and therefore, he presently, that is, always predestinates and fore-knows. And he says, that We are herein deceived, that we think, that God already, before, and in times past, hath predestinated some. Whereof are gathered many absurdities;
Unto God (saith he) all things are present, therefore he always foreknows, and predestinates: and thereupon inferreth, that it lies in every man to be fore-known of God, what manner of one he is; and that it is in our power to be predestinate, to be even such as we ourselves will be. But this saying strays far from the truth: for although in God, there be no courses of times, neither with him is anything past, or to come; yet that creature, whom God fore-knows and predestinates, is not without beginning. Wherefore, seeing it is not coeternal with God the Creator, it followeth of necessity, that God predestinated the same, before it was brought forth: for predestination is of the number of those actions of God, which have respect to another thing. So as we must not fly the eternity of God; for in it men have no participation with God the Creator.
This may be better and more plainly understood by considering the past. Therefore, let us say this: Certain men are now dead and gone, but to God all things are present; wherefore GOD now predestinates them, and now it is also in their power, how to be predestinated.
Here there is none so blockish, but that he sees the absurdity: for they are not now predestinated, seeing they are already come to an end; neither does it lie in their power, either that the thing, which they have now received, be not at all, or how it ought to be. And if their reason is so weak, touching the time past, how can it be firm of the time to come? But let us leave this argument, which nevertheless is most strong; and let us weigh what the scriptures say. Does not Paul affirm of those twins; Before they were born, or had done either good or evil, that it was said; The elder shall serve the younger? And to the Ephesians, does he not say, that We were predestined before
the foundations of the world were laid? These places and many others such like, most manifestly declare, that these men are predestinate before they begin to have their being; which thing he that takes from us, does therewithal take away from us one great comfort, which we receive of this, that we know that we are predestinate of God unto glory, before all eternity. But let us consider to what end Pighius does thus wrest these things; forsooth to this end, to confute this; that our doings are determined and appointed of God, before they are done. For then he thinks, that the freedom of man's will should perish, and men should be left under necessity.
This evil he thinks may thus be remedied, if we say, that God does all things presently. But he should have remembered, that in the prophets, and other scriptures, many prophecies are read, wherein things were determined and appointed, how they should be done before they were done. What shall we say here? Shall we think that those prophecies did not precede those things which were to come?
Christ says, that It behoves that the scripture should be fulfilled: wherefore these fond imaginations are to no purpose. These men study only, with their lying inventions, to make dark a thing plain and manifest, as the fish stirs the mud to hide and save itself.
Pighius also goes on further, and says, that The providence of God has not prefixed unto men the time or kind, either of life or death; yea rather (he says) that there have been many, which as touching the providence of God, might have lived longer, if they had not either by negligence, or intemperance shortened their life. For if these things were so determinate (he says) a murderer, when he kills a man, may be excused; because he has executed the will of God. Verily
I wonder that a man being a divine, could let such an old wives tale once come out of his mouth. As though the murderer, when he slays a man, has respect to the pleasing of God. This only he regards, how he may play the thief, or accomplish his hatred or enmities: for how
could he know, that this is the will of God, seeing God has in his laws commanded the contrary? Does he think, that Judas can be excused of his wicked treason, because he had heard the Lord foretell his mischievous act? Or shall Pharaoh therefore be excused, because
God had foretold that his heart should be hardened? Wherefore it is a foolish thing to bring in an excuse of sins, by reason of the determination which we affirm to be in God. But Pighius adds also another argument; If our doings (he says) should in such sort be determined by God, then should all our care, diligence, and endeavour be taken away: for what might it profit (he says) to avoid thievish and dangerous journeys, or sailings in the winter, or surfeitings, or unwholesome meats, if both the kind, and time of death, and such other like, be already certainly appointed of God?
Here comes to my mind, that which Origen has in his second book against Celsus, where he makes mention of a subtle argument tossed between them which disputed of fate or destiny. A certain man gave counsel to a sick man, not to send for the physician; because (he says) it is now already appointed by destiny, either that thou shalt recover of this disease, or that thou shalt not. If it be thy destiny that thou shalt recover, then shalt thou not need the physician; if it be not thy destiny, the physician shall nothing help thee: wherefore, whether destiny has decreed, that thou shalt recover, or not recover, the physician shall be called in vain. Another by the like argument dissuaded his friend from marriage. Thou wilt marry (he says) a wife to beget children; but if it be thy destiny to have children, thou shalt have them without a wife; if it be not thy destiny, then will it thereunto nothing profit thee to marry a wife: so that whatsoever destiny has decreed, thou shalt in vain marry a wife. Thus did they deride and scorn fate or destiny: for they intended to show, in what absurdities men should fall, if they would defend fate.
Contrariwise, they which defended destiny thus dissolved these reasons; and showed, that those reasons should not trouble men.
Wherefore they said, that the sick man might thus have made answer; Nay rather, if by fate it be appointed that I shall recover, I will send for the physician, because he professes to restore health to the sick; that by his industry I may attain unto that which destiny has decreed. And that other, which deliberated as touching the marriage of a wife, they imagined thus to answer; If it be appointed that I shall have children forasmuch as that can come by no other means, but by the coupling of man & woman, I will marry a wife, that destiny may take place. Let Pighius also think, that these answers may serve against him; for him also do the holy scriptures openly reprove. For unto the life of Hezekiah were added 15 years, & to the captivity of Babylon were prescribed 70 years. And Christ says, that All the hairs of our head are numbered; and that Not so much as a sparrow shall light upon the ground without the will of God.
8. That also is childish, which he adds; namely, that our prayers should be in vain, if the events of things were certainly appointed. Of these things we have spoken in another place; that God has not only decreed what he will give unto us, but also has determined means whereby he will have us to attain unto them. So Christ says, that God knows what we have need of, and yet nevertheless admonishes us to pray. This is nothing else than to lead away a man from the providence of GOD: for that providence is not new, but an eternal disposition of things. Unto the death of Christ, both the place, and time, and manner, were prescribed and revealed in the foresight of the prophets; and that it could not otherwise come to pass, Christ himself says; Mine hour is not yet come. And that which was true in Christ, how can it be denied in others? We grant that in the stars are long before seen the reasons and causes of winds, showers, tempests, fairness of weather, and dryness; and shall we not affirm those
causes to be in God, who infinitely comprehends more things than heaven does? And the scriptures do not only speak manifestly of that which we a little before rehearsed, as touching the twins, that Before they were born, or had done good or evil, it was said; The elder shall serve the younger: & Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated: but also spoke it also of the time to come; I will have mercy, on whom I will have mercy. Also; Not of works, but of him that calleth, that the purpose should remain according to election. And in Deuteronomy, it is written; He chose their seed after them. Unto David was appointed a posterity, even to the coming of Christ; and when he had committed sin, it was told him, that The sword should not depart from his house; and that his wives should openly be deflowered by the nearest of his blood. And of Jeremiah, it is written; Before that I framed thee in the womb, I knew thee. Christ says, that The elect also should be deceived, if it were possible: and, That as many as were given him of his father, no man should be able to pluck out of his hand. And in the Acts, we read; They believed, as many as were ordained to eternal life.
God also is compared with a potter, who undoubtedly, before he begins to work, casts in his mind what kind of vessel he will frame.
And a little before; Whom he foreknew, those also has he predestinated, to be made like unto the image of his son.
Predestination is set in the former place, and afterward follows the conformity to the image of the son of God. And in the Acts, we read, that The Jews took Christ, and crucified him; according to the foreknowledge and determinate counsel of God. What need we any more testimonies? Paul to the Ephesians says, that We were elected before the foundations of the world were laid. These things sufficiently declare that we are not deceived, when we teach that the foreknowledge and predestination of God, do before all eternity go before those things, which are foreknown and predestinate: and that
unto this determination this is no let, that in God's action, there is nothing either past or to come. By these things, which we have brought out of the holy scriptures, it is very manifest, that there is a predestination of God: which will appear, even by those things, which we will afterward make mention of. Now in the meantime, it shall be confirmed by a reason, and that such a reason, as doubtless in my judgment, may seem to be a demonstration. The end whereunto we are made, far surpasses nature; for that by our own power and strength, we cannot attain unto it: so that we have need of God, to prepare us, and to lead us unto it. Therefore Paul says to the Corinthians; The eye has not seen, nor the ear has not heard, neither has ascended into the heart of man, the things that God has prepared for them that love him. Wherefore, seeing that of necessity, we must by God be brought unto the end, this cannot be done by chance, or rashly; but by the counsel of God, which was appointed and determined, even from before all worlds.
9. Now, seeing that there is no let, but that we may come to the definition of predestination, I think it best to begin with that, which the Logicians call Quid nominis, that is, what the word signifies. The Greeks call predestination προορισμός, of this verb προορίζω, which signifies To determine and appoint before; for ὅρος is Terminus, that is, A bound or a limit: so as the elect are separated asunder from them that are not elect. The Latins called this Praedestinatio. For to destinate is nothing else but firmly in mind to determine, and constantly to appoint anything, or by some firm decree of the mind to direct a thing to some purpose. But predestination, which we speak of, may be taken two manner of ways: either as touching the bringing of it to the effect, as that Paul going to Damascus was converted to Christ, and by that means separated from the unbelievers: or in respect it is with God from eternity, before men are born. Of this, Paul writing to the Galatians, says, that He was set
apart to preach the Gospel, from his mother's womb, long before he was converted. And to the Ephesians also he says, that We were predestinate before the foundations of the world were laid. And to the Romans, of the twins, he says; Before they had done either good or evil, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. And we at this present speak of this eternal predestination of God: wherefore the other is nothing but a declaration of this predestination; therefore predestination may be taken both commonly and properly.
But forsomuch as God does all things by an appointed counsel, and nothing by chance or fortune; undoubtedly whatever he creates or does, he appoints it to some end or use. After this manner, neither the wicked, nor the devil himself, nor sins, can be excluded from predestination: for all these things God uses according to his will.
Wherefore Paul calls wicked men vowed to utter damnation σκεύη ὀργῆς, that is, The vessels of God, upon whom he makes open his wrath. And Solomon in his Proverbs says, that God made all things for himself, and the wicked man also for the evil day. And of Pharaoh it is said; Even to this end have I raised thee up, to show my power in thee. Yes, if predestination be thus taken, then it shall be common to all things. Neither shall this word signify anything else than the eternal ordinance of God, touching his creatures, unto some certain use of his. But the holy scriptures do not much use this word; but concerning the elect only, although in the 4th chapter of the Acts we read; They assembled together, to do whatsoever thy hand and counsel had predestinated to be done. Which words yet, if they be referred unto the death of Christ, & unto the redemption of mankind, pass not the bounds of election to salvation. But if they have a respect unto those also, which assembled together against the Lord, they comprehend likewise the reprobate.
But now let us judge by the scriptures, as they for the most part use to speak. Wherefore the School-divines also affirm, that The elect only, and not the reprobate, are predestinate. That opinion will we also at this present follow: not because of that reason, which they bring; for it is a reason very weak, as we shall afterward declare in due place: but because I see the scriptures so speak for the most part.
Wherefore in this treatise, under the name of predestination, we will comprehend the saints only. And for that cause I think Augustine entitled his book De praedestinatione sanctorum, that is; Of the predestination of saints, which signifies the decree of God, whereby the saints are appointed to the communion of salvation: and unto predestination, by Antithesis or contrary position, is set reprobation.
Thus far as touching the word.
10. Now, before we come to the true and proper definition, we must suppose certain things, of which the first pertaineth to the foreknowing of God, which (as Paul testifieth) is joined together with predestination; For whom he hath foreknown (saith he) those hath he predestinated. And although in God, all things are one and the self-same; yet because of our capacity and understanding, those things that are attributed unto him, are by some manner of way to be distinguished. So as we must understand, that the knowledge of God extendeth further than his prescience: for his knowledge reacheth not only to things present, past, and to come; but also to those things which shall never come to pass; whether they be possible, (as men speak) or impossible: howbeit this prescience pertaineth but unto those things which shall come to pass: so that prescience requireth a will, which goeth before; for there is nothing which shall come to pass, except God will have it so: for otherwise he would let it.
Wherefore God fore-knoweth those things, which he will have come to pass. Further, God does not also predestinate all those, whom he fore-knoweth; for he fore-knoweth the reprobate, whom he knows
shall be damned. But even as the prescience of God hath joined with it his will, and yet notwithstanding pertaineth to the knowledge or understanding of God: so contrariwise predestination, although it cannot be without fore-knowledge; yet it properly pertaineth unto the will: which thing Paul declares to the Ephesians, when he teaches; that We are predestinate according to purpose, by the power whereby God worketh all things, according to the decree of his will.
By these things we may, after a sort, see how predestination is joined with fore-knowledge, and how it differeth from it.
Now let us see what it hath common with providence, or wherein it differeth from the same. This it hath common with providence; that either of them requires knowledge, and is referred unto the will, and that either of them has a respect unto things to come. But herein they differ; for that providence comprehends all creatures: but predestination, as we speak of it, pertains only unto the saints, and unto the elect. Besides this, providence directs things to their natural ends; but predestination leads to those ends which are above nature: as is this; To be adopted into the Son of God; To be regenerate; To be endued with grace; To live well; and last of all, To come unto glory.
Wherefore we do not say that brute beasts are predestinate; for they are not capable of this supernatural end: neither are angels now predestinate; for they have already attained unto their end. But predestination has a respect unto things to come. Whereas we said that providence pertains to all things; that may thus be proved, because nothing is hidden from God: otherwise, he should not be most wise. And if he knows all things, either he governs all those things, or else he abjects the care of many of them. If he abjects the care of anything, he therefore does it, either because he cannot, or because he will not take upon him the care of those things. If he cannot, then is he not most mighty; if he will not, then is he not most good. But to deny that God is most wise, most mighty, and most
good, were plainly to deny him to be God. So then it remains that God's providence is over all things, which the scriptures in infinite places, most manifestly testify. For they teach that the care of God extends even unto the leaves of trees, even unto the hairs of the head, even unto sparrows.
Providence may thus, by the way, be defined; Providence is God's appointed, immovable, and perpetual administration of all things.
When I speak of God, I mean that he is endued with great authority, and that he is mighty. Administration signifies that his government is not tyrannous; but quiet, gentle, and fatherly. For tyrants violently oppress their subjects, and refer all things to their own commodity and lust. But God violently presses no man, neither by this government gets any commodity unto himself; but only communicates his goodness unto creatures. And this administration extends unto all things; for there is nothing free from it, neither can endure without it. It is called appointed; because it is joined with most excellent wisdom: so that it admits no confusion. It is immovable because the knowledge of this governor is not deceived, neither can his power be made frustrate. It is also perpetual because
God himself is present with the things: for neither did he, when he had created things, leave them unto themselves: nay rather, he himself is in them, and perpetually moves them; For in him we live, we move, and have our being. And thus much of providence.
Unto these things fate is also like, which word, if (as we have before said) it be taken for a certain inevitable necessity, which depends of the power of stars, the fathers have not without just cause abstained.
But if it signifies nothing else, but a certain connection of second causes, which is not carried rashly or by chance, but is governed by the providence of God, and may at his will be changed; I see no cause why the thing itself should be of any man rejected. However, because
there is danger that error might sometimes creep in; Augustine thinks it best that we utterly refrain from that word. We ought also to remember that the love, election, and predestination of God, are so ordered in themselves, that they follow one another in a certain course. First, to the knowledge of God are offered all men not being in happy estate, yea rather being needy and miserable; whom God of his pure and singular mercy loves, those he cares for, and puts apart from others whom he surpasses, and embraces not with his benevolence; and they by this separation are said to be elected: and those so elected are appointed to an end.
11. Augustine in his book De praedestinatione sanctorum, the twelfth chapter, thus defines predestination; that It is a preparation of grace.
And in the twelfth chapter, he says; that The same is a foreknowledge, and a preparation of the gifts of God, whereby they are certainly delivered, which are delivered: but the rest are left in the mass or lump of perdition. In another place, he called it, The purpose of mercy. The master of the sentences, in the first book, distinction 40, defines it to be a preparation of grace in this world, and of glory in the world to come. These definitions I reject not; however, because they comprehend not the whole matter, I will (as near as I can) bring another definition more full. I say therefore, that predestination is the most wise purpose of God, whereby he has from the beginning, constantly decreed to call all those, whom he has loved in Christ, to the adoption of his children, to justification by faith, and at the length to glory through good works, that they may be made like unto the image of the Son of God: and that in them may be declared the glory and mercy of the creator. This definition (as I think) comprehends all things that pertain to the nature of predestination; and all the parts thereof may be proved by the holy scriptures.
First, we take purpose for the general word; for that word is common both to predestination and reprobation. Paul unto the Ephesians says; that We are predestinate according to the purpose of God. And in the epistle to the Romans, he says, that The purpose might abide according to election. But what this purpose is, we understand by the first chapter unto the Ephesians. For there it is thus written, that God hath predestinate us according to his good pleasure. By these words it is manifest, that that is called his good pleasure, which Paul afterward called purpose. And that this purpose pertaineth unto the will, those things which afterward follow, do declare; By whose power (saith he) God worketh all things according to the counsel of his will. But by this will, we ought to understand that will which is effectual, which they call consequent; whereby is brought to pass, that the predestination of God is not frustrate. This purpose we call most wise because God does nothing rashly or by chance, but all things with most great wisdom. Therefore the Apostle joined predestination together with fore-knowledge, saying; Whom he hath foreknown, those hath he predestinate. [The purpose of God from the beginning.] This is therefore added because predestination is no new thing; neither such (as many fain) that goeth not before things, or ever they be done. Paul saith in his later epistle to Timothy; Which hath called us with his holy calling, not according to our works; but according to his purpose & grace, which was given to us in Christ
Jesus before the world was. Here we manifestly see, that with the predestination of God, is joined the eternity of times. And unto the Ephesians, We are said to be elect, before the foundations of the world were laid: whereby he has constantly decreed. By these words, we are taught that the predestination of God is immutable; for Paul saith in the latter epistle unto Timothy; The foundation standeth firm; the Lord knoweth who are his. And in the eighth chapter, when the apostle would teach, that hope makes not ashamed, & that they which had an assured hope should be saved, he brings a proof
thereof by predestination, saying; Whom he hath foreknown, those also hath he predestinate. And he adds; Who shall separate us from the love of God? Shall tribulation? Shall anguish? &c. And James says, that With God is no changing nor variableness. And in Isaiah,
God crieth; I am God, and am not changed. And in the epistle to the Romans the 11th chapter, where is treated of predestination, Paul saith; The gifts and calling of God are without repentance. But whereas God in Jeremiah the 18th chapter says; that He would change his sentence, which he had threatened unto many nations, so that they would repent; that is not to be understood of predestination, but of those things which are foretold shall come to pass, by that will of God, which they call the will of the sign: namely, when by his prophets he declares unto men, either what their sins have deserved, or what hangeth over their heads by reason of natural causes.
12. [Whom he hath loved in Christ]. This we add, because whatsoever God gives, or decrees to give, that He gives, and will give, through Christ. And as we have oftentimes alleged, Paul to the Ephesians says that We are elected and predestinated in Christ; for he is the prince and head of all the predestinate, yea, none is predestinate, but only to this end, to be made a member of Christ. [To call into the adoption of children.] So Paul in a manner everywhere speaks, & especially in the first chapter to the Ephesians, for there he says that We are predestinate, to the adoption of children. And that calling follows straightway after predestination, those words which we have already alleged do declare; Whom he hath predestinated, those also hath he called. [To justification by faith.] That unto calling is adjoined justification, Paul by these self-same words teaches; Whom he hath called, those also hath he justified. [Unto glory, by good works.] This also Paul teaches in the self-same place; Whom he hath justified
(saith he) those also hath he glorified. And that this glory shall follow
by good works, and that we are predestinate unto those good works, that place unto the Ephesians, which we have already often cited, manifestly proves. For first he says; that We are predestinate, that we should be holy & blameless before God. Afterward he says, that God hath prepared good works, wherein we should walk.
[That they may be made like unto the image of the son of God.] This image indeed is begun in us by regeneration when we are justified; and in them that are of full age, it grows daily to perfection by good works, and is fully finished in the eternal glory. But in infants, this likeness has place, while that it is begun by regeneration, and is finished in that last glory. However, in them, for want of age, good works are not required. [That in them might be declared the mercy and goodness of the Creator.] This is the last end of predestination, shadowed unto us by Paul in the similitude of the potter, which has power to make one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour: so God has prepared his vessels to glory, that in them he might declare his glory. By this definition, we gather that God has predestinated unto the elect, not only glory but also good works; that is, means whereby he will have his elect come unto glory. By this, we may see how foully they are deceived, which live wickedly; and yet in the meantime boast that they are predestinate. For the scriptures teach that men, according to the predestination of God, are not brought unto glory by wicked acts and naughty deeds, but by a virtuous life and manners. Neither are they to be listened to, which cry out;
However I live, the predestination of God shall have its effect. For this is utterly to be ignorant of what predestination is, and impudently to go about to abuse it.
13. Now that we have severally, after this manner, examined this definition by its parts; let us gather thereout certain things not unprofitable. First this, that predestination is a work of God, and is
to be placed in the purpose of God: for although men are said to be predestinate, yet we must not appoint predestination in them. So likewise, things are said to be perceived, & known; when as yet in them is neither knowledge nor perceiving, but only in the man that knows them. Wherefore, even as we can foresee either rain, or cold, or fruit, before they come; so God predestinates men, who as yet have no being. For of relatives some are such, that of necessity the one cannot be but together with the other; as a father and a son: and some there are, whereof the one may be, although the other be not at the same time with it; as the former and the latter, knowledge and the thing to be known. Predestination therefore is referred unto this latter kind of relatives; which predestination yet, forsomuch as it is
(as we have said) in the mind of him that predestinates: those things, whereto the predestinate are directed, namely grace, justification, good works and glorification, are in them which be predestinate: for these have no place, but in the saints. But in that we have put the effects of predestination, in the definition thereof; it is not to be marvelled at: for this definition cannot be given, unless the correlatives (as they call them) be also expressed. Predestination is indeed defined, but of necessity there must be expressed and declared the ends, unto which men are by it directed. And therefore they are joined with foreknowledge; because God knows both the beginnings, and means, and ends of our salvation. This moreover is to be known, that when of the fathers (as sometimes it happens) predestination is called foreknowledge, that then it signifies, not only knowledge but also approbation: which (as we have declared) pertains unto purpose. Wherefore we did what we could, to speak properly, to the end these things should not be confounded. Lastly is to be considered also, how in predestination, are knit together the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, which are his most chief properties. Purpose, which comes of his goodness, is placed in the will of God. Foreknowledge declares a wise preparation; for the will
purposes nothing, which is not beforehand known. Lastly, when it comes to be put in execution, then is power present.
14. And now, because things contrary pertain to one and the selfsame knowledge; and the one of them serves much to the knowledge of the other; even as we have defined predestination, so also will we define reprobation. I said before, that I was of the same mind that the Schoolmen are; namely, that the reprobate are not predestinate: not because I judged their reasons to be so firm, but because the scriptures use so to speak for the most part. This is their reason, because predestination directs not only to the end, but also to the means which lead to the end. But inasmuch as sins are the means, by which men are damned; they say that God cannot be named to be the cause of them. Undoubtedly, if we will speak uprightly and properly,
God cannot be said to be the cause of sins, whom yet we can in no wise utterly exclude from the government and ordering of sins: for he is the cause of those actions, which to us are sins; although as they are of God, they are mere justice: for God punishes sins by sins.
Wherefore sins, as they are punishments, are laid upon men by God, as by a just judge. Besides, it is God who withdraws his grace from men; which being withdrawn, it cannot be chosen, but that they must fall. And inasmuch as through his agitation or stirring up, all we both live and move; doubtless all the works which we do, must needs in a manner be done by his impulsion. Although thereof follows not, that he should pour into us any new naughtiness: for we have naughtiness abundantly enough of ourselves, both by reason of original sin; and also because the creature, if it is not helped by God, of itself it declines without measure and end, to worse and worse.
Furthermore God, and that undoubtedly by justice, ministers unto the reprobate, and unto the wicked, occasions of sinning; and wonderfully bends the hearts of men, not only to good, but also (as
Augustine says) by his just judgment to evil. Yes, also he uses the malice of men, will they or nill they, unto those ends, which he has purposed unto himself. And the holy scriptures do not hesitate to say, that God delivers men into a reprobate sense, and makes them blind, and seduces them; and many other such things: and yet for all this, he cannot be truly called the cause of sins, seeing we have the true cause of sins sufficient in ourselves. So as that reason of the Schoolmen is not firm, neither does it cleave to a very sure foundation. However, I therefore separate the reprobate from the predestinate; because the scriptures nowhere (that I know of) call men that shall be damned predestinate. Which sentence, though I saw no reason why, yet would I judge is to be followed; because of the authority of the word of God. However, I think that the holy scriptures so speak; for that (as we have before said) predestination has a regard unto those ends, unto which we cannot by nature attain: such as are justification, good life, and glorification: by which God exalts us far above all strength and power of nature. But the sins, for which we are damned, although they are not excluded from the government of God; namely, after that manner, as we have already declared; yet do they not pass the strength of our nature: for every man of himself is prone enough to sin.
15. Wherefore reprobation is the most wise purpose of God, whereby he has before all eternity, constantly decreed without any injustice, not to have mercy on those whom he has not loved, but has overlooked them; that by their just condemnation, he might declare his wrath towards sins, and also his glory. The former parts of this definition are already declared, when we defined predestination, even unto that part [without any injustice:] which part is therefore added, because God does injury unto no man; although he bestows not his mercy upon some: for he is not bound unto any man by any law; neither is he compelled of duty, to have mercy upon any man.
Wherefore God answers in the Gospel; Is thine eye wicked, because I am good? Is it not lawful for me to do with mine own what I will?
The self-same has Paul taught by the power of the potter. And yet he affirms, that there is not therefore any injustice in God; for here is treated of mercy, and not of justice. And unto Moses was answered in Exodus; I will have mercy, on whom I will have mercy, &c. I will not have mercy on them, &c. By those words is signified, that all men are of their own nature in misery: for mercy is bestowed upon none, but upon them that are in misery. Out of this misery God delivers some; and those he is said to love: other some he overlooks, and them he is said to hate; for that he has not mercy on them, that by their just condemnation he might declare his anger & also his justice against sins. The damnation of these men is said to be just, because it is laid upon them for their sins. And yet we ought not hereby to infer, that sins foreseen, are the cause why any man is reprobate: for they bring not to pass, that God has purposed, that he will not have mercy; however they are the cause of damnation, which follows in the last time; but not of reprobation, which was from the beginning.
The last end of reprobation is the declaration of the mighty justice of God, as Paul has taught; namely, that These vessels are prepared unto wrath: because GOD would show in them his power. And God answers of Pharaoh; Even unto this end have I raised thee up, that I might show in thee my power. A nearer end is damnation, which as it is just, so also is it allowed of God. And yet the nearest end are sins; for God commanded that the people should be made blind, that they should not understand, that they should not hear, Least peradventure (saith he) they may be converted, and I should heal them. For sins, although as they are sins, they are by God in his laws condemned; yet as they are just punishments, they are by him laid upon the ungodly for their ill deserts. But we must not stay in these nearer ends; we must go further, that we may at the length come to
that end, which Paul has set forth; namely, that The justice of God should be declared. And thus much hitherto as touching the first article.
16. Now let us come to the second, wherein must be sought the cause of predestination. Forsomuch as predestination is the purpose or will of God, and the same will is the first cause of all things, which is one and the self-same with the substance of God; it is not possible, that there should be any cause thereof. However, we do not therefore deny, but that sometimes may be showed some reason of the will of God: which although they may be called reasons, yet ought they not to be called causes, especially efficient causes. But that in the scriptures are sometimes assigned reasons of the will of God, may by many places be gathered. The Lord saith, that He therefore did lead about the children of Israel through the desert, rather than through shorter passages, through which he could have led them; because they should not suddenly meet with their enemies. Adam also was placed in paradise to husband it, & keep it. And God testified, that He would not then expel the Canaanites out of the land of Canaan; because they had not as yet filled the measure of their sins. However, although (as we have said) the scriptures use sometimes to bring reasons of the will of God; yet no man ought to take upon him, to render a certain reason of that certain will of God, but that which he has gathered out of the scriptures. For (as we are dull of understanding) so we might easily usurp our own dreams, instead of true reasons.
But that there are final causes of the predestination of God, we deny not: for they are expressly set down by Paul, and especially when he citeth that of Pharaoh; Even to this end have I stirred thee up, that I might show upon thee my power: but of the elect he saith, that God would in them show forth his glory. The material cause also, may
after a sort be assigned. For men, which are predestinate; and those things which God hath decreed to give unto the elect by predestination, as are these; calling, justification, and glorification; may be called the matter, about which predestination is occupied.
This moreover is to be noted, that the end may sometimes be taken as it is of us in mind and desire conceived; and then it hath the consideration of an efficient cause: for being so conceived in the mind, it forceth men to work. Sometimes also it is taken, as it is in the things; and as we attain unto it after our labours: and then properly it is called the end, because the work is then finished, and we are at quiet, as now having obtained the end of our purpose. But we therefore put this distinction, that if at any time we should be asked, Whether God do predestinate men for works or no? We should not rashly, either by affirming, or by denying, give hasty sentence: for the ambiguity is in this word [For] how it is to be understood. For if good works be taken, as they are in very deed, and are wrought; because God predestinateth us to this end, that we should live uprightly, as we read in the epistle unto the Ephesians; to wit, that We are elected to be holy and immaculate: and, that God hath prepared good works, that we should walk in them; As touching this sentence or meaning, the proposition is to be affirmed. But if that word [For] be referred unto the efficient cause, as though the good works, which God foresaw we should do, are as certain merits and causes, which should move God to predestinate us; this sense is by no means to be admitted.
It is possible indeed, that the effects of predestination may so be compared together, that one may be the cause of the other: but they cannot be causes of the purpose of God. For calling, which is the effect of predestination, is the cause that we are justified; justification also is the cause of good works; and good works, although they be not causes, yet are they means, whereby GOD
bringeth us unto eternal life. However, none of all these is the cause, or the mean why we are chosen of God. As contrariwise, sins are indeed the causes why we are damned; but yet not why we are reprobate of God. For if they were the cause of reprobation, no man might be chosen. For the condition and estate of all men is alike; since we are all borne in sin. And when at any time Augustine saith, that Men are justly reprobate for their sins; he understandeth, together with reprobation, the last effect thereof: namely damnation.
But we may not so speak, if by reprobation, we understand the purpose of God not to have mercy; for that purpose is no less free, than the other purpose of showing mercy.
17. These things being now thus declared, we will assign reasons why we deny that good works foreseen are the causes of predestination.
The first is, because the scriptures nowhere so teach: but of so weighty a matter we ought to affirm nothing without the holy scriptures. However, I know that certain have gone about to gather this sentence out of the second epistle to Timothy, where it is thus written; In a great house are vessels of gold, silver, and wood: and if any man shall cleanse himself from these, he shall be a vessel to honour, and fit for every good work. Hereby they conclude that certain are therefore destined to be vessels of honour; because they have cleansed themselves from the filthiness of sin, and from corrupt doctrine. And because they are here said to have power to perform this; they say that it lies in every man to be predestinate of God unto felicity. But these men make no good collection; for the meaning of Paul in that place is thus to be taken. He had said before; The foundation standeth firm, The Lord knoweth who are his. As if he should have said; Men may sometimes be deceived, for they oftentimes judge those to be godly, which are furthest off from godliness. In which words he reproved Hymenaeus and Philetus; for a little before he had spoken of their perverse doctrine: for they
taught, that the resurrection was done already. Wherefore Paul would not that men should be judged, as they appear to be at the first sight: for God hath in this world, as it were in a great house, vessels, some of gold, some of silver, some of wood, and some of clay: and he knoweth best which of these are to honour, and which are to dishonour. But we which know not, nor do understand the secretnesse of his will, can judge of them but only by the effects; that whosoever is clean from corrupt doctrine, and liveth godly, the same is a vessel unto honour.
Neither doth this place prove that men can cleanse themselves, or make themselves vessels of honour: for as Paul hath taught us, in the Epistle to the Romans; It is God only, which bringeth this to pass: for he, as it were a potter, hath power of one and the self-same mass or lump, to make one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour.
Wherefore this place interpreteth the other. And therefore, we ought not to gather more of those words of Paul, than that such cleansing is a token, whereby we judge of the worthiness, or of the unworthiness of the vessels in the church. It is God, which knoweth truly what manner of one every man is, and his foundation standeth firm; for it cannot be deceived: but we can judge of others, only by certain tokens and effects. And this is it, which Christ admonisheth; By their fruits ye shall know them. Neither do they rightly understand the Apostle, which by these words (If a man keep himself clean from these things) teach, that it lieth in our will, to make ourselves vessels of honour. For the strength of our free will is not proved by conditional propositions, so that we should thus infer: The holy scriptures teach, that if ye shall do this, or that; or if ye shall believe, ye shall have salvation; wherefore, we can of ourselves believe, or live godly. Such conclusions are weak: for God, in another place teacheth, that He will make us able to walk in his ways. Precepts therefore, and exhortations, and conditions, are to that end added; that we should
understand what is required at our hands, and what manner of persons they shall be, which pertain unto God, and shall obtain eternal life.
Wherefore we ought not out of these places to gather, what our own power and strength is able to do. But it is easy to declare, why men that are purged of God, are notwithstanding said to purge themselves. For God worketh not in men as stocks and stones; for stones are moved without sense and will. But God, when he regenerateth men, so cleanseth and reneweth them, that they themselves both understand those things which they do, and also above all things desire and will the same, after they have once received a fleshy heart for their stony heart. So then, after they are once regenerate, they are made workers together with God; and of their own accord they bend themselves to holiness, and unto pureness of life. God by Moses commanded the Israelites to sanctify themselves: and yet in another place he manifestly testifieth, that it is he, which sanctifieth the people. And Paul unto the Corinthians saith, that Christ was made unto us, wisdom, righteousness, redemption, and sanctification. God also commandeth us to believe; and yet the scriptures elsewhere testify, that Faith is the gift of God.
18. By all these things, therefore, it is very manifest how little this place maketh for our adversaries, whichever way they turn themselves. Besides all this, the scriptures do not only teach that predestination is not of works foreseen, but also plain contrary. For Paul pronounceth of those twins; Before they were born, or had done either good or evil, it was said; The elder shall serve the younger:
Also; Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated; that it should not be of works, but of him that calleth. Wherefore he denieth that either the love or hatred of God cometh of works. But they are worthy to be laughed at, which cavil; that Paul indeed excluded works already
done, but not those which are to be done. For they see not, that Paul in this place goeth about to remove all manner of difference from those two brethren; that we might fully understand that they were altogether like as touching themselves. For when he declared that they were born of one father and mother, that they were brought forth also both at one burden; his meaning tended to no other end, but unto this; by their equality to show that the election of God is free, so that it lay in him to elect the one and to reject the other. But if the difference were left only in works foreseen, then should Paul in vain have put so great an equality. Wherefore Paul speaketh generally; Not of works. In which words he comprehendeth, as well works to be done, as works already done. And that we might the more surely understand this, he addeth; But of him that calleth.
Wherefore Paul sendeth us unto God, and not unto works.
And if a man diligently mark all those things which follow in that chapter, you shall see that the apostle draweth those things, which he teacheth of predestination, to these principal points; namely unto power: for he saith; Hath not the potter power? Unto purpose or good pleasure; for unto the Ephesians he useth both words. Unto will; for he saith, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. Unto mercy or love; for he saith, It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that hath mercy. Also;
Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. Seeing Paul, what cause soever either here, or in any other place he giveth of predestination, reduceth the same to these four principal points; can we doubt of his meaning? Or shall we take upon us to give sentence otherwise? But as touching works, he speaketh not so much as one word, wheresoever he entreateth of this matter; but only to exclude them.
Further, consider this, that there is nothing more against the scope and meaning of Paul, than to put works foreseen to be the causes of predestination: for by that means, works should be the causes of
justification: but that doctrine the apostle doth by all manner of means oppugn.
And hereby I prove this reason to be firm, because the apostle maketh predestination the cause of calling, and calling the cause of justification. Wherefore if works be the causes of predestination, they shall also be causes of justification. For this is a firm rule among the Logicians; Whatsoever is the cause of any cause, is also cause of the effect. Further, no man can deny, but that good works proceed of predestination; for We are said to be predestinate, that we should be holy & blameless. And; God by predestination hath prepared good works, in which we should walk. And Paul himself confesseth, that He obtained mercy, to the end he should be faithful. Wherefore if works be the effects of predestination, how can we then say, that they are the causes thereof; and chiefly those kind of causes, which are called efficient causes? For that use of free will is nothing worth, which they so often brag of; as though we have it of ourselves, and not of the mercy of God. For Paul saith, that It is God which worketh in us both to will and to perform. And God in Ezekiel saith; I will take away from them their stony heart, and will give them a heart of flesh.
We cannot (saith Paul) think any good thing of ourselves, as of ourselves. And if we had in ourselves that good use, which they speak of, what should let, but that we might glory thereof? Undoubtedly the Lord saith; No man cometh unto me, unless my father draw him.
And Jerome against the Pelagians, very well writeth, that they which are said to be drawn, are by that word signified, to have been before froward, resisting, and unwilling; but afterward GOD so worketh, that he changeth them. This self-same thing also, doth the nature of grace prove: for Paul saith; that The remnants might be saved, according to the free election of grace, which is to say, according to free election; for so is the genetive case after the Hebrew phrase to be resolved.
19. Further, in the definition of predestination, in the first place, we have put this word purpose; which, seeing it signifies nothing else (as we have taught out of the epistle unto the Ephesians) but the good pleasure of God, thereby it evidently appears that we may not elsewhere seek the cause of predestination. Moreover, works cannot be the causes of our calling, and much less of our predestination: for predestination goes before calling. And that works are not the causes of calling, it is declared by the epistle unto Timothy; God hath called us (saith Paul) with his holy calling, not by our works, but according to his purpose, & the grace which we have in Christ before the world was. Hereby it most manifestly appears that works are not the causes of our calling. Yea, neither are works the causes of our salvation; which yet were far more likely: for by good works God bringeth us to felicity. But Paul to Titus saith, that God hath saved us, not by the works of righteousness, but according to his mercy. Further, what needed Paul after this disputation to cry out; O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How vnsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out? For if he would have followed these men's opinion, he might with one poor word have dispatched the whole matter, & have said; that some are predestinate, and othersome rejected, because of the works which God foresaw should be in both of them. Those men Augustine in mockage, called sharp-witted men, which so trimly and so easily saw those things that Paul could not see.
But say they, The Apostle in this place assoils this question. But it is absurd so to say, especially, seeing that he brought it in of purpose; and the solution thereof served very much unto that which he had in hand. And how (in God's name) can he seem not to have assoiled the question, when he reduced that even unto the highest cause; namely, unto the will of God, and therewithal shows, that we ought not to go any further? When God had appointed limits, at the foot of the
mount Sinai; if any man had gone beyond those limits, he was by the law punished. Wherefore let these men beware, with what boldness they presume to go further than Paul would they should. But they say, that the apostle here rebuketh the impudent. Be it so, but yet this rebuking is a most true solution of the question: for Paul by this reprehension prohibits us not to inquire anything beyond the mercy and will of God. If these men understand such a solution, as man's reason may resolve upon, I will easily grant, that the question is not so assoiled: but if they seek that solution, which faith ought to embrace and to rest upon, they are blind, if they see not the solution.
20. But let us see what moved these men to say that works foreseen are the causes of predestination. Undoubtedly that was nothing else but to satisfy man's judgment; which yet they have not attained unto.
For they have nothing to answer concerning an infant, which being grafted into Christ, dies in his infancy; for if they will have him to be saved, they must needs confess that he was predestinated. But forasmuch as in him follows no good works, God doubtless could not foresee them; yea rather, this he foresaw; that he should by his free will do nothing. But that is more absurd, which they object, that God foresaw what he would have done if he had happened to live longer: for man's judgment will not so be satisfied. For reason will complain that some men are overhyped and rejected for those sins which they have not done, and especially in that respect that they should have committed those sins if they had lived. For civil judges punish not any man for those faults which they would have committed if he had not been letted: and that God is nothing moved with those works which men would have done, Christ plainly declares when he entreated of Corosaim, and Bethsaida, and Capernaum; If (saith he) the things which have been done in thee, had been done in Tyre and in Sidon, they had doubtless repented, and those cities had been at this day remaining, Behold, God foresaw that these nations would
have repented if they had seen and heard those things which were granted and preached unto these cities. Seeing therefore that they perished, it is manifest that God in predestinating follows not those works which men would have done if they had lived.
Neither yet ought any man to gather out of this saying of Christ that they by themselves, even by the power of free will, could have repented; for repentance is the gift of God. But the meaning of that place is that unto these men God used not those means whereby they might have been moved. These men suppose that even by nature itself there is a difference in men which the election of God follows.
Neither consider they that all men are born the sons of wrath: so that as touching the mass or lump from whence they are taken, there cannot be put in them any difference at all: for whatsoever good comes unto us, that same without all doubt comes from God, and from grace. And that in the nature of men is not to be put any difference, the apostle declares: for when he would show that one of the two brethren was taken, and the other rejected by the free will of God; first he used an example of Isaac and Ismael: but since in these two it might be objected that there was some difference, for that the one was born of a free woman, and the other of a handmaiden: afterward he brought two brethren that were twins, Jacob and Esau, which had not only one and the self-same parents; but also were brought forth both at one time, and in one and the selfsame birth.
And as touching works, there was no difference at all between them: for as the apostle saith; Before they had done either good or evil, it was said; The elder shall serve the younger. Again; Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. What need was there that Paul should so diligently allege these things, but to make these two brethren therein equal in all points, as touching nature? Which had been to no purpose, if still there had remained so much difference in works foreseen. So then it follows that whatsoever difference is in men, the
same depends only on the will of God: for otherwise we are all born under sin.
21. Further, if there should be anything of ourselves which might move God to predestinate us, that should chiefly be faith. For Augustine also, when he was yet young, and was not so well and thoroughly acquainted with this question, thought that God in predestination and reprobation has a respect unto faith and unto infidelity: which opinion, both Ambrose and Chrysostom embraced before. But this in very deed cannot be attributed, no not unto faith; for faith also comes of predestination. For it is not of ourselves, but is given of God; and that not rashly, but by his determinate counsel: which may be easily proved by many places of the scriptures. For Paul unto the Ephesians writes; By grace ye are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God, least any man should boast. And again in the same epistle; Charity and faith from God the father, through Jesus Christ. And in the epistle unto the Romans; As God hath divided unto every man the measure of faith.
And unto the Corinthians; I have obtained mercy, that I might be faithful. Unto the Philippians; Unto you it is given, not only to believe in Christ, but also to suffer for his sake. In the Acts; God opened the heart of the woman that sold purple, that she might give heed unto those things which were spoken of Paul. And in the 13. chapter; They believed, as many as were ordained unto eternal life.
Christ also saith in the Gospel; I confess unto thee, O father of heaven and earth, that thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto infants: even so, O father, because it hath so pleased thee. And in another place; Unto them
(saith he) I speak in parables, that when they hear, they should not hear; and when they see, they should not see: but unto you it is given to understand. And unto Peter he said; Blessed art thou Simon
Barjona, for flesh and blood hath not revealed this unto thee. And
there are many other testimonies in the holy scriptures, whereby is proved that faith is given and distributed by God only; so as it cannot be the cause of predestination: and if faith cannot, works can much less.
22. Moreover, no man can deny but that the predestination of God is eternal: for Paul to Timothy saith; that God hath elected us before the world was. And unto the Ephesians; Before the foundations of the world were laid. But our works are temporal, wherefore that which is eternal cannot come of them. But they use to cavil that those works, in whose respect we are predestinated, are so to be taken, as they are foreseen of God; and by this means they cannot seem to be temporal. Be it so, take them in that manner; yet can it not be denied but that they are after predestination: for they depend of it, and are the effects thereof, as we have before taught. Wherefore after these men's doctrine, that which cometh after should be the efficient cause of that which went before; which, how absurd it is, every man may easily understand. Further, the efficient cause is, of his own nature, more worthy, and of more excellency than the effect; specially in respect it is such a cause. So then, if works be the causes of predestination, they are also more worthy, and of more excellency than predestination. Over this, predestination is sure, constant, and infallible; how then shall we appoint that it dependeth upon works of free will, which are uncertain, and unconstant, and may be wrested to and fro, if a man consider them particularly? For men are alike prone unto this or that kind of sin, as occasions are offered: for otherwise, if we will speak generally, free will before regeneration can do nothing else but sin, by reason of the corruption that cometh by our first parents.
So as, according to the mind of these men, it must needs follow that the predestination of God, which is certain, dependeth of the works
of men, which are not only uncertain, but sins also. Neither can they say that they mean as touching those works, which follow regeneration: for those (as we have taught) spring of grace and of predestination. Neither do these men consider that they, to satisfy man's reason, and to attribute a liberty (I know not what) to men, do rob God of his due power and liberty in election: which power and liberty yet the apostle setteth forth, and saith; that God hath no less power over men than hath the potter over the vessels which he maketh. But after these men's opinion God cannot elect, but him only, whom he knoweth shall behave himself well: neither can he reject any man, but whom he seeth shall be evil. But this is to go about to overrule God, and to make him subject unto the laws of our reason. As for Erasmus, he in vain speaketh against this reason: for he saith, that It is not absurd, to take away from God that power which he himself will not have attributed unto him; namely, to do anything unjustly.
For we say, that Paul hath in vain, yea rather falsely set forth this liberty of God, if he neither have it, nor will that it should be attributed unto him. But how Paul hath proved this liberty of God, that place which we have cited, most manifestly declareth. They also to no purpose object unto us the justice of God; for here is treated only of his mercy. Neither can they deny but that they, by this their opinion, do derogate much from the love and good will of God towards men. For the holy scripture, when it would commend unto us the fatherly love of God, affirms, that He gave his son, and that unto death, and at that time when we were yet sinners, enemies, and children of wrath. But they will have no man to be predestinated, which hath not good works foreseen in the mind of God. And so every man may say with himself; If I be predestinated, the cause thereof dependeth of myself. But another, which feels truly in his heart, that he is freely elected of God for Christ's sake, when as he of
himself was all manner of ways unworthy of so great love, will without all doubt be wonderfully inflamed to love God again.
23. It is also profitable unto us that our salvation should not depend on our works. For we oftentimes waver, and in living uprightly are not constant. Doubtless, if we should put confidence in our own strength, we should utterly despair: but if we believe that our salvation abides in God, fixed and assured for Christ's sake, we cannot but be of good comfort. Further, if predestination should come unto us by our works foreseen, the beginning of our salvation should be of ourselves; against which opinion, the scriptures everywhere cry out: for that would be to raise up an idol in ourselves.
Moreover, the justice of God would then have need of the external rule of our works. But Christ says; Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you. Neither is that consideration in God, which is in men, when they begin to favor a man, or to love a friend: for men are moved by excellent gifts, wherewith they see a man adorned; but God can find nothing good in us, which first proceeds not from him. And Cyprian says (as Augustine oftentimes cites him) that we therefore cannot glory, for that we have nothing that is our own: and therefore
Augustine concludes that we ought not to part stakes between God and us, to give one part to him, and to keep another unto ourselves, to obtain salvation: for all wholly is without doubt to be ascribed unto him. The Apostle, when he writes of predestination, has always this end before him, to confirm our confidence, and especially in afflictions; out of which he says that God will deliver us. But if the reason of God's purpose should be referred unto our works, as unto causes, then could we by no means conceive any such confidence: for we oftentimes fall, and the righteousness of our works is so small as it cannot stand before the judgment seat of God. And that the Apostle, for this cause chiefly made mention of predestination, we may understand by the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.
For when he described the effects of justification, amongst other things he says, that we by it have obtained the adoption of children, and that we are moved by the spirit of God, as the sons of God; and therefore with a valiant mind we suffer adversities: and for that cause every creature groans and earnestly desires, that we at length be delivered; and the spirit itself makes intercession for us. And at the last he adds; That unto them that love God, all things work to good.
And who they be, that love God, he straightway declares; Which are called (he says) according to purpose. These will Paul make secure, that they should not think that they are hindered when they are exercised with adversities: because they are foreknown, predestinated, called, and justified. And that he had a respect unto this security, those things declare, which follow; If God be on our side, who shall be against us? Who shall accuse against the elect of God? First by this method is gathered, that the adversaries err much, supposing that by this place they may infer, that predestination comes of works foreseen: for Paul, before that gradation, wrote these words; To them that love God, all things work to good: as though foreknowledge and predestination, whereof he afterward makes mention, should depend of that sentence.
And to this sense they cite that of the Proverbs of Solomon; I love them that love me. Neither consider they (as we have said) that Paul in this place, intends to declare who they are, unto whom it is given to love God, and to whom all things work to good. And those (he says) are they, which by predestination are chosen of God. And as touching Solomon, we also confess, that those who love God, are again loved of him. But this is now in question, whether the love of God, whereby he embraces us, do spring or grow from our love? This does John by express words declare in his epistle; He has not (says he) first loved us, because we have loved him. The second thing, that we gather of these words of Paul is, that the predestination of God (if
it be of this force, to confirm us, touching the good-will and love of God towards us) cannot depend on our works: for our works are both weak and of very small righteousness. Again, this is to be considered, that Paul concealed not those causes, which might have been assigned; for he expressly sets down, that the mercy and justice of God may appear. But when he comes to the efficient cause, he will have us so fully to stay ourselves on the will of God, that he compares
God to a potter, and us to clay: in which comparison he shows that there is nothing which we ought further to inquire.
I know that the adversaries say, that that comparison is brought only to repress the malepertness of the demander: not that the matter on both parts is so indeed, for that God elects men by works foreseen.
But if it so be, how then by this similitude shall the mouth of murmurers be stopped? For they will say, If the justice of God requires this, that election be of works foreseen, what needed Paul to say; Before they had done good or evil, it was said, The elder shall serve the younger? Jacob have I loved, & Esau have I hated. Again,
Not of works, but of him that calls, that election might abide firm, according to the purpose? And why is this similitude of the potter brought, seeing the thing itself is far otherwise; and neither does God as a potter, all things after his own lust, neither are we as clay utterly without difference? Doubtless by this their reason the malapert questioner is not repressed: nay rather, there is offered an occasion of reproach; for that the similitude, which is brought, serves not to the purpose.
There is also another sentence of Paul unto the Ephesians, whereby this our saying is greatly confirmed; for when he had said, that We are predestinated according to the purpose of God, he adds; By the power whereof he works all things, according to the counsel of his will. But if it were so, as these men imagine, God should not work all
things according to his will, but according to the will of another. For, as we should order our works, so should he moderate his election; and that is to be led by another man's will, and not by his own. This same thing testifies Paul to the Corinthians, saying; God has chosen the foolish, weak, and vile things of this world, to confound the wise, mighty, and noble. Look brethren (he says) upon your calling; Not many wise, not many mighty, not many noble. And in the self-same epistle, when he had described the former estate of the elect, and had reckoned up a great many and grievous sins, at the length added;
And these things were ye, but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified.
And unto the Ephesians; Ye were (he says) once without God, without hope in the world. These things prove that the calling and predestination of God do not depend on our merits. But as Augustine writes unto Simplicianus; God overleaps many philosophers, men of sharp wit, and of notable learning. He has also overleaped many, who if a man has a respect unto civil manners, were innocents, and of life good enough. Neither is this to be marvelled at; for if God to this end predestinates, to make manifest the riches of his mercy; that is sooner accomplished if he bring to salvation those who both resist more; and by reason of their deserts of life, are further from him, than if he should elect those, whom man's reason may judge more fit.
Hereof it came, that Christ gathered the flock of his disciples out of sinners, Publicans, and base men: neither disdained he to call unto him, thieves and harlots. In all which men, what consideration (I beseech you) was there to be had unto merits? Paul also writes unto the Corinthians; We preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews indeed an offence, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them, that are called, both Jews and Gentiles, Christ the power of God, and wisdom of God. We see also in this place, whence the apostle fetches the difference, when he affirms, that some think well of Christ preached, and some ill; for all this he says comes wholly of calling: for he says;
But unto the called. As if he should have said; They which are not called, have Christ for an offence, and for foolishness; but they which are called, do both follow him, and also embrace him for the power and wisdom of God. In the prophets also, when God promises that he will deliver his people, he says not that he will do it for their works or merits sake; but I will do it (he says) for my name's sake. From this reason Paul departs not; for he shows that God by predestination will make open the riches of his glory, that all men might know how little the Jews had deserved this election of God; that the nations being overleaped, they alone should be counted for the people of God.
Which thing Stephen expounds in the Acts of the apostles, when he says; that They had ever resisted God, and had always been stiffnecked. What good works then did God see in them, to prefer that nation before all other nations? Ezekiel notably describes, how God looked upon the people of the Jews at the beginning; namely, as upon a naked damsel, and on every side polluted, and shamefully bedaubed in blood; I passed by (says the Lord) and when I saw thee in that case, I had compassion of thee.
25. Further, let us remember what is the scope of the apostle in the epistle to the Romans: for if we will judge uprightly of controversies, we must not cast our eye off from the scope. The endeavour of the apostle was that he might by all manner of means commend the grace of Christ. And this purpose can nothing more hinder than to affirm that the predestination of God; that is, the head and fountain of grace, comes of the works of men. And if it is counted a fault in Orators, if in their oration they perchance rehearse things which would much hinder the cause that they took in hand; how can we suspect that the Holy Ghost persists not in that which he began, but speaks things strange from that which he purposed? Neither can we make any other reason of the members than of the head, which is
Christ Jesus. Seeing, therefore, that no man can doubt but that the
Son of God did freely take upon him man's nature; (for if the question should be asked, why rather he, than any other man, took flesh of the virgin Marie? There can no other reason be given, but that it so pleased him. For as touching works, any other man, born of any other virgin, might have had them, no less than he who was born of Marie. For whosoever had had the Godhead, as Christ had; truly he should have done the self-same works which Christ did.) Seeing therefore that that humanity was taken of the Son of God freely, and of the pure and mere mercy of God: even after the self-same manner, whosoever are the members of Christ, are chosen freely, and without any merits of works. Finally, all those reasons which prove that justification consists not of works; the same also prove that predestination depends not of works.
Now rests to declare whether Christ and his death may be said to be the cause of predestination. Here we answer, that Christ and his death are the principal and chief effect of predestination. For amongst those things which are of God given unto the elect is Christ himself, and the fruit of his death. For whatsoever is given unto us by this way, and by this conduit, as it were, is derived unto us from God.
And inasmuch as it is certain that the effects of predestination may so be compared together, as one may be the cause of the other; but unto none of them agrees to be the beginning of predestination: therefore we deny that Christ, as touching his humanity or death, is the cause of our predestination, although he be the beginning and cause of all good things which come unto us by the purpose of God.
26. I am not ignorant that there have been some who have gone about to reconcile together the sentences of the fathers, with this most true doctrine, which we have now by many reasons proved. For they say that the fathers, when they write that predestination is of works foreseen; by the name of predestination, do not understand
the work or action of God, whereby he elects or predestinates any man; but rather the end and certain means: and that as touching them, nothing can let, but that works may be causes. For it is without all doubt certain, that the last damnation comes of works, as the cause: and good works spring of faith, as from their head or fountain.
I see indeed that the intent of these men is not to be discommended, which labour to apply the sentences of the fathers unto the truth, as much as is possible; but yet that which they avouch to be true, cannot
I affirm. For there are certain sentences of the fathers so hard that they can by no means be drawn to this meaning: for they, to defend the liberty of our will, will not have all things to depend on the predestination of God; and of purpose say, that all wholly is not of God, but somewhat also is required of us. And they expressly write that God elects some; because he foresaw that they would believe.
They have also here and there many other such like sayings; so that I by no means can see how their sentences can agree with our doctrine in this point. However, Augustine fully agrees with it; Jerome also disagrees not from it, although oftentimes in many places, he agrees with Origen and others: but against the Pelagians he highly commends the sentence of Augustine touching this matter, and exceedingly allows his writings against this heresy. Seeing therefore that Augustine oftentimes used this argument against the Pelagians, it must needs be that the same very well pleased Jerome now being old. And Cyprian, as we have before said, manifestly writes that There is nothing ours: wherefore it follows of necessity that it is all of God. But however it be, there is no need that we should now dispute much as touching the fathers. As in all other things which belong unto faith; so also in this question we must give sentence according to the scriptures, not according to the fathers. And this self-same thing even the fathers themselves required at our hands, which I in alleging of arguments have performed to my power.
27. Amongst the latter writers, Pighius, being forced by the vehemency of the scriptures, grants unto us that works are not causes of predestination. For he confesses that it consists freely and of the mere mercy of God, with a respect (says he) to works, I think; lest he should seem to have striven so much in vain. But if predestination be free and depends on the mere will and mercy of God, as the scriptures testify; why did this man, of his own head, imagine this new respect of works? For the holy scripture, and especially Paul, utterly excludes works from this matter. But Pighius, the more to betray that his lewd desire of contending, brings certain arguments, which make nothing at all to this matter; That which in the blessed virgin, the mother of God, happened (says he) touching election, ought in others also to take place; But she was not predestinated freely, but because of her humility, for she sang,
Because he hath regarded the humility of his handmaiden; Wherefore the self-same thing ought to happen in others. I marvel how this man saw not that there is a great difference between αιδοῐα and ταπεῑνοϕροσῐνῐ: for αιδοῐα is a virtue, which the Latins call
Modestia; that is, modesty, whereby men have a lowly moderate opinion of themselves: the opposite to which virtue is pride, or arrogance. But ταπεῑνοϕροσῐνῐ is a vileness and baseness, which comes unto men, either by reason of poverty, or by reason of base blood; or for other like things.
Wherefore, the blessed virgin rejoiced and praised God; for that He had advanced her to so great an honor, whereas she otherwise was base, obscure, and unworthy. For she was not (as this man dreams) a setter forth of her own merits and virtues; to say that she was therefore elected of God because she had deserved it through her modesty. And if you diligently consider the course of that song, you shall easily see that she ascribes all her good things unto God; "Thy mercy" (says she) "is from generation to generation:" and she adds,
"He hath remembered His mercy:" afterward with mercy she joins the promises; "As He spake" (says she) "unto Abraham our father."
But why did not this good fellow see that the image of our predestination is to be set rather in Christ than in the virgin? But Augustine says that the humanity of Christ was predestinated and taken altogether freely and utterly, without any respect of good works.
28. They object also unto us the words of the Lord to Samuel; for He, when He should anoint one of the sons of Jesse to be king over Israel, and had first brought before him Eliab the eldest, the Lord said unto him, "This is not he whom I have chosen; have no respect to the tallness of stature. For men see those things which appear outwardly, but I behold the hearts." Lo, (says Pighius) this place teaches that God is moved by the perfection of the heart, and not by outward properties. But in that history is not treated of the eternal predestination of God, whereby He has elected us unto perpetual felicity; there it is treated only of the exalting of a man unto a kingdom. Wherein God has set forth unto us a notable example that when we will commit any office or function unto a man, we have chiefly a respect unto the ability and skillfulness which is required for the execution of that office; according to which doctrine Paul also to Timothy sets forth unto us what things are to be required in him who should be chosen an elder or a bishop. God Himself also, in the Old Testament, has at large described of what conditions he ought to be, whom He would have to be appointed a king. Unto which sense
Peter also seems to have had respect, who, when two were set before him, of which the one was to be placed in the room of Judas, he called upon God the searcher of hearts; for that He only knew the mind and heart of him whom He would have to be chosen. And yet ought we not to think that God finds in men that heart which He has a respect unto; He rather changes and makes meet those whom He
will appoint unto any office; as we know He did in Saul, of whom we read that he was so changed that he became utterly another man. For whereas before he was but simple and rude, he was afterward able to prophesy amongst the prophets: which, for that it was new and strange, gave an occasion for this proverb; "What! Is Saul also among the prophets?"
Pighius moreover alleges that from this our doctrine will follow that men will seek the causes of their damnation, not in themselves, but in God; which is both absurd and wicked. But let this man consider how this may be inferred from our doctrine; for we teach that every man is subject unto sin, and therefore deserves damnation. Neither ever said we unto any man that he has not in himself a most just cause of his damnation; yea, we both are, and always have been persuaders of all men, that when they will take in hand anything, they take counsel nowhere else but from the will of God revealed: that is, out of the holy scriptures, and not of the secrecy of God's predestination. And yet does it not therefore follow that by this form of teaching, there is no use of the doctrine of predestination: for unto it must we then chiefly have a respect when we are tossed with adversities; and when, through the very force of afflictions, we feel that our faith is weakened in us. This taught Paul in the eighth chapter of the epistle to the Romans, and therefore he added, "If God be on our side, who shall be against us? Who shall separate us from the love of God? Shall tribulation, or anguish?" So then this doctrine is not to be left, as though no man can apply it unto himself; it must rather diligently be kept, till opportunity shall serve to use it. Neither is it a point of arrogancy, but of spiritual wisdom, for a man to use it to himself when need requires.
29. Moreover, Pighius falsely says that those things which we speak are against the goodness of God: as though it should seem unjust
that God should elect unto himself a certain few; and in the meantime overlook infinite others. For this might show (says he) some cruelty in God; especially if we say that He is offended before anything is committed against Him. But it is meet (says he) that the purpose of God should be reasonable; and yet of His justice, no other reasons can be given but only the works of them who are predestinated: neither can the justice of God be defended by any other means. Those things indeed bear a goodly show, but they do not much to overthrow what we have proved. For first, to treat of the goodness of God; there is no creature that can seem to be void of it: for God perpetually bestows many good things, yes, even upon the wicked; for He makes His sun to rise upon the good and upon the evil, and rains upon the just and upon the unjust. And although He does not equally distribute unto all men, yet He cannot therefore justly be accused: for Christ answers in the Gospel; "May I not do with mine own what I will?" If Pighius thinks it unfit that out of many, few be chosen; he picks this quarrel, not against us, but against God: for the scriptures manifestly teach that "Many are called, but few are chosen": and that of many nations, only the people of the Jews were taken of the Lord to be His particular people; and that even in that people, although the number of them were such as might be compared with the sand of the sea, yet a remnant only should be saved. Against those testimonies so manifest, how can Pighius contend? Do we not also see that in things natural, things that are most excellent are always most rare? For there is great plenty of common stones; but of precious stones there is wonderful great scarcity: unprofitable herbs grow everywhere, whereas corn (for the most part) is dear. And why God will have it to be thus, He Himself best knows; we may perhaps suppose that He therefore does it, that the gifts of God to men might be the more commended. For we are so blockish that we never wonder at those things which are customarily done. But these are nothing but man's
conjectures. But since God has not rendered a reason of His counsel, herein I think it is not our part to be too curious in seeking it.
This only will I add; that God is not only good and bountiful towards us, but also that in Him cannot be found so much as one show or token of cruelty: for this is the nature of cruelty, to rejoice in the punishments of other men, and chiefly when innocents are afflicted.
For to take pleasure, namely, because you see justice exercised against the wicked, or to be sorry if you see them live happily, can neither be ascribed unto envy nor unto cruelty. For in the prophets, and especially in the Psalms, we see many such affects: which doubtless pertain unto zeal, that is, zeal; and not unto cruelty or envy. And although the purpose of God be reasonable, yea, even reason itself, yet the reasons are not to be sought for in those who are elected; for they lie hidden in the most deep wisdom of God. Thither does Paul call us back when he cries out; "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments? And how unsearchable are His ways? Who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been His counsellor?" Paul by those words teaches nothing else but that God indeed, by reason of His manifold and infinite wisdom, wants not reasons, but that they are unto men unsearchable; for they are not by Him revealed. I wonder also that Pighius would complain of violating the justice of God; for that Paul objects unto himself, and yet changes not his mind. Neither is it any marvel; for as Paul himself testifies, all this whole matter pertains unto mercy, and not unto justice. Wherein notwithstanding (as Augustine teaches) we may very well defend that God does nothing unjustly: for whatever He gives unto the elect, He gives it of His own, and not of another man's; and whatever He requires of the reprobate, He justly and by most good right requires it. These things had not Pighius objected unto us if he had diligently weighed with himself the Antithesis, which Paul has put between our
works and the purpose of God. For he says; "Not of works, but of Him that calleth, that election might abide according to the purpose."
30. He thinks also that it is absurd that the predestination of God should be made so free; for by that means, he supposes that there is laid a necessity upon men, and all consideration of blame is taken away. But this argument pertains to our fourth article, where we will treat of this necessity. However, I marvel how this could come into his head, that the consideration of sin is taken away if there is granted a necessity. As though (forsooth) any man can avoid original sin; and yet it does not thereof follow that such a sin is no sin. He adds moreover that we cannot avoid but that we must make God an accepter of persons. But if he had considered that this fault is then committed when we are moved to distribute or to give judgment by such circumstances and conditions, which make nothing at all to the cause, he would never say thus: for this cannot have a place in God.
For he found not those circumstances and conditions in men but put in them even such as himself will; so as no man can object unto him that as touching election, he has not attributed unto his person that which was convenient or agreeable: for God is the author of all persons and of all comeliness.
But he says, the care and endeavor to live uprightly is taken away. As though we by this doctrine do make men worse and do open a window to licentiousness and dissolute life. But how strange and false these things are, I suppose it is thereby manifest; for that we always teach that predestination belongs not only to the end but also to the means. For we are predestinated not only unto felicity but also unto good works; namely, that we should walk in them and be made like unto the image of the Son of God. The wicked regard not these things, and also without this doctrine live wickedly: but the godly, for
that they have confidence that they are predestinated, labour by holy works to make their calling sure. And unto them by this doctrine is opened a window unto modesty, unto patience in afflictions, unto gratitude, and unto a singular love towards God. But take away this doctrine, and there is made open not a window but an exceeding wide gate to pride, to ignorance of the gifts of God, to uncertainty, and doubting of salvation in adversities, and the weakening of our love towards God.
31. Moreover, these men say further that this makes very much against us; for that nothing can light under predestination or reprobation but that which God wills: but that God should will sins is to be counted for a most absurd and blasphemous doctrine. They say moreover that God cannot justly punish if we commit those things which he himself both wills and works. But this must we of necessity say if we affirm that not only our ends but also our means to the ends depend on the purpose of God. To satisfy this doubt, first let them remember that it cannot be denied but that God after a sort wills, or (as some other say) permits sin. But forasmuch as that is done without any coercion of our mind, therefore no man, when he sins, can be excused. For he willingly and of his own accord commits those sins for which he ought to be condemned; and has the true cause of them in himself: and therefore has no need to seek it in God.
Further, this is no good comparison which these men make between good works and sins. For God so works in us good works that he ministers unto us his grace and spirit, whereby these works are wrought; for those are the grounds of good works: which grounds we have not of ourselves. But sins he so governs and after a sort wills that yet notwithstanding, the grounds of them, that is, the flesh, and our corrupt and naughty nature, are not in God but in us. Wherefore, there is no need that they should be poured into us by any outward mover.
And God is said after a sort to will sins; either for that when he can, he prohibits them not; or for that by his wisdom he directs them to certain ends; or for that he suffers them not to burst forth but when, and how, and to what uses he himself will; or finally, for that by them he will punish other sins. But these add that God by no means wills sin: for so it is written in Ezekiel; "As truly as I live," saith the Lord,
"I will not the death of a sinner, but rather that he be converted and live." But we answer that the prophet in that place, treats not of the mighty and hidden will of God and of his effectual will: for God by that will works all things which he will both in heaven and in earth.
But he treats of that will which they call the will of the sign: for no man can by those signs and tokens which are expressed in the law gather that God wills his death or condemnation. For the Lord commanded his law to be published unto all men, he hath unto all men set forth those things which should be profitable and healthful, lastly, he upon all men indifferently pours great benefits; wherefore by this will, which we call the will of the sign, he wills not the death of a sinner: yea rather, he provokes them to repentance. But as touching the other will, which they call the will of his good pleasure, if by it he would have no man perish, then doubtless no man could perish: and there is no will so perverse, as Augustine saith, which God (if he will) cannot make good. Then according to this will, he hath done all things whatsoever he would. This is a ready and plain interpretation, which if our adversaries admit not; but will needs contend, that the words of the prophet are to be understood of the mighty will of God and of his will of good pleasure: then will we answer, that that sentence pertains not universally unto all sinners but only to those which repent. And they are the elect and predestinated, unto whom, God as according to his purpose, he gives faith and calling, so also gives he repentance. And therefore, whichever sense they follow, they shall never out of those words
conclude that God utterly and by no means wills the death of sinners or sin.
But they object certain words out of the first chapter of the Book of Wisdom, where it is written: "God rejoices not in the destruction of the living." But if (say they) he by any manner of means wills sin or the punishment thereof, he cannot be said not to rejoice: for he rejoices in that which he will have to be done. First, I answer that that book is not in the canon, and therefore the authority thereof may be refused. But admit that that book were canonical, yet do those words make nothing against us: for he, whoever he was, that was the author of that book, meant nothing else but to remove from God that naughtiness of nature whereby wicked men take pleasure in evil things. And yet it was not his meaning that God punishes wicked acts against his will: for otherwise, whoever be that author under the name of Solomon, he should be against the true Solomon. For he in his Proverbs, under the person of wisdom, thus writes of the ungodly and unbelievers: "I also laugh in your destruction." In which words is declared that God with this laughing, that is, with a cheerful mind, administers justice.
As touching the words of Ecclesiasticus, which are written in the fifteenth chapter, that "No man ought to say of God, 'He hath deceived me,'" in which place the Latin translation hath, "Me implanavit." Unless we will have that place to be manifestly repugnant with many other places of the scripture, in which God is said to have deceived the people by false prophets, and to have commanded that Ahab the king should be deceived, and to have made blind the heart of the people, lest they should see; we must needs after this manner expound those words: that "No man ought to lay the fault in God," as though he would excuse himself. Ahab, if he was deceived, justly deserved to be deceived; for that he contemned
the true oracles of God and delighted himself in false prophets. The infidelity also and impiety of the people of Israel caused the vengeance of God, and blindness to come upon them; so that when they were deceived, they could by no means be excused. Our adversaries also seem somewhat to be offended, for that we affirm that men have in themselves the cause of sins; that is, a corrupt and naughty nature. For in that first chapter of the Book of Wisdom, the generations of the world are said to be good and not to have in them
"a deadly medicine." This is true indeed, so it be understood of the first constitution of things, and chiefly of the creation of man, which was created of God in a good estate: but afterward, through his fall, he spilled both himself and his posterity.
33. Pighius moreover cavils against our doctrine, as though we stir up men to hate God. For Christ thus speaks of Judas; "Woe be unto that man, it had been better for him never to have been born." He being rejected and a reprobate, it must needs follow that he hated
God; seeing God first hated him. And inasmuch as the number of the reprobate is the greater number, every man (say they) might easily suspect that he is one of that number; and so it should come to pass that many should detest God. But we answer that Christ said well, that "It had been better for that man, that he had not been born." For every one of us ought rather and more gladly either to have never been, or to be brought to nothing, than that by committing sin, we should offend God. Wherefore Christ said truly and plainly that "It had been better for Judas that he had never been born." However, simply and as touching God, it had not been better: for by him, both the counsel of God concerning our redemption was fulfilled; and also by the punishment which was laid upon him, both the justice and power of God appeared the more plainly.
And it is vain that they say that many fall into suspicion of their reprobation: for out of the holy scriptures, no man can gather any effectual arguments of his reprobation. And if God will sometimes reveal it by a certain secret judgment, it cannot be drawn to a common rule. In our time indeed it happened that a certain man in Italy called Francis Spiera inwardly felt that God had imposed this evil upon him: but this in my judgment was done to the terror of others. For he, after that he had, at the beginning, known the truth of the Gospel and openly confessed it, being brought to Venice before the Pope's legate, publicly abjured it. Afterward, being stricken with a grievous wound of conscience, he persuaded himself that he had sinned against the Holy Ghost; by means whereof, he was thrown into so great a desperation that he would never afterward admit any consolation, though notable and godly men were about him, which exhorted him to have a good hope in Christ and his death. And he would say that these things served well to be spoken unto others, but unto him they nothing at all prevailed: for that he knew most assuredly that he had sinned against the Holy Ghost, and that there was no remedy left to deliver him from damnation; and so remaining in this desperation, he died.
God would in this man, by a certain singular and unaccustomed dispensation, fear away others from the like wickedness and impiety.
However, this neither usually happens, as far as we can gather from histories, nor can any man, by the holy scriptures, see this desperation. And perhaps God did not do this to Spiera, but the devil
(whose bondslave he was), having now renounced godliness, suggested this; to the end he might drive him to utter desperation. So then we must make a distinction (as we before admonished) that either we speak of them that are utterly without all feeling of piety, or else of the godly and of them that are now called. If you talk of strangers, they either nothing regard these counsels of God, or else
they are already in despair of themselves: if we mean of the godly, they will not suffer themselves any long time to be tormented with this suspicion; for that they now see themselves called and faithful, and therefore are justified: all which things persuade them to have a confidence, and to hope that their names are entered in the roll of the elect.
34. Lastly, Pighius imagines that we speak things absurd because we teach that men were first in a mass marred and corrupted with original sin before they were predestinated by God: as though we would justify the purpose of God when yet notwithstanding we, in the counsel of predestination, put condemnation and eternal infelicity before sins and our corrupt nature; and so we justify that which is first by that which comes after. He adds also that by this means, as touching the purpose of God, even by our own doctrine, the end is first appointed, and those things also which bring unto the end. Wherefore, inasmuch as original sin is one of the means whereby we are condemned, it cannot, as we imagine, go before reprobation; when it falls and is comprehended under it as a mean unto eternal condemnation. But these things show that this man understood not what we say. Neither Augustine nor we ever said that original sin went before predestination, seeing predestination is before any time was; and Adam fell in time. Neither is it so absurd as he imagines that sins should fall under reprobation, not indeed as the cause thereof; but as the cause of condemnation and of eternal misery. And whereas he says that if it were so, it should follow; that God wills sins. Now we have declared how this is to be answered.
Neither can he deny but that God uses sins, which are continually committed, to those ends which he himself has appointed. And inasmuch as this is not done of him rashly but by his determinate counsel; how can it be that after a sort sins are not comprehended under reprobation?
Now if he contends that God after one sort wills and is not the cause of sins and good works; we also affirm the same. But yet in the meantime, let him cease to count it for a thing absurd that as well the end as the means either of predestination or of reprobation are comprehended under the purpose of God, though after a diverse manner. And as touching original sin, we also affirm that it goes not before predestination or reprobation; but of necessity follows it: for that God would not produce men out of any other stock or matter but out of the progeny of Adam; by means whereof, we are all born infected with the spot of corruption. And inasmuch as this was not hidden from God, therefore Augustine and we also with him say that God from everlasting purposed to have mercy on those whom he loved and not to have mercy on others whom he loved not: so that if they, who want that mercy which is bestowed upon others, do lead their life in original sin; and when they are come to age, and to the use of reason, do add unto it many other sins, then are they justly and worthily damned. And this may effectually be said to repel those who perhaps presume to lay the cause of their damnation not upon their own faults but upon God. Wherefore original sin goes before the birth of all men, so that you have a respect unto every particular man: it also goes before the damnation of all the wicked, although it could not be before the eternal purpose of God, but only as touching foreknowledge.
35. These things being as we have declared them, as they are in no case absurd, even so may they well be perceived; if we depart not from the sense of the Scriptures: which sense, how much in this place
Pighius overpasses, by means of his own fond invention, I will in few words touch. He makes many degrees or acts in the mind of God, which he orders in themselves; not by distinction of time, but of nature: and therefore, such acts he calls signs; and yet he had not that out of the holy Scriptures, but borrowed it from Scotus. In the
first sign (he says) God appointed to bring forth all men to eternal salvation, which they might have fruition of together with him, and that without any difference; and over them he would have Christ to be the head, whom he thinks also should have come in the flesh, although the first man had not sinned. In the second sign, he says, that God foresaw the fall of man, by reason whereof it was not now possible that men should come unto salvation, that is, unto the end, which God had purposed in himself when he decreed in the beginning to create man. However, that the matter might go forward, he says, that God did put in the third sign, remedies in Christ; namely, of grace, and of the Spirit, and such like, whereby might be helped those who would receive them, and those forsaken who should refuse them. Lastly, in the fourth sign, for that he foresaw that many would embrace these aids, and would use them well and effectually, he therefore predestinated them to salvation: but others, whom he saw would reject these benefits of God, he adjudged to utter destruction. This he speaks concerning them that are of full age. But inasmuch as by this fond imagination, he could not satisfy as touching infants, that perish before they can have the use of free will, he patches thereto another fable; namely, that they, after the judgment, shall be in this world happy, with a certain natural blessedness, wherein they shall continually praise God and give thanks unto him, for that their estate so tolerable. So this man feigns a doctrine, which he cannot prove by any one word of the Scripture.
For how attributes he unto God, that he in the first sign decreed those things, which should not have success; namely, that all men should enjoy felicity? It is the point of a wise man, I will not say of God, to decree or will those things, which shall take no effect. Let him also bring forth some oracles of God, to declare unto us, that the Son of God should have taken upon him man's flesh, though man had not sinned: but he shall nowhere be able to show any such thing,
seeing the holy Scriptures everywhere testify unto us, that he was given for our redemption and for the remission of sins: which also might have taught him, if he had considered, that original sin went before all the effects of predestination, creation only excepted. Seeing
Christ was to this end predestinated and given unto us, that we might have a remedy of our falls; of all which falls original sin is the head and principal: and he had not taken upon him human flesh, if there had been no sin committed. He, without the Scriptures also, imagines, that it lies in the power of our free will to receive the remedies being generally set forth; when as this is the most absolute gift of God. And that which he last of all brings; namely, of the natural felicity of children, is not only avouched besides the Scripture, but also is plainly against it; which teaches that all perish in Adam, unless they be renewed by the mediator. But to perish, or to die, how repugnant it is with felicity, all men easily understand. And besides that, he has not on his side one of all the fathers, who dared imagine any such fond devises. Neither can I be persuaded that Pelagius himself, if he were alive again, would more diligently colour his opinion, than this man has painted it and set it forth.
That which we have hitherto proved regarding predestination: namely, that it does not depend on works foreseen; the same thing also we affirm of reprobation: for neither does it depend on sins foreseen; so that by reprobation, you understand not extreme damnation, but that most deep eternal purpose of God, of not having mercy. For Paul writes alike of Esau and Jacob; Before they had done any good or evil, it was said; The elder shall serve the younger; Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated, that it should not be of works, but of him that calls. And Pighius labours in vain to have this sentence of Paul understood of one of them only; seeing the apostle joined them both together, under one and the self-same condition.
Which he more manifestly afterward declares, saying; He has mercy
on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens. Further, if sin were the true cause of reprobation, then should none be elected; seeing
God foreknows that all men are defiled with it. The very which thing Augustine proves unto Simplicianus.
37. But now we will treat of the third article, to see what are the effects of predestination, and of reprobation: and we will be the briefer, for that those things which shall be spoken have much light of that which is already spoken. The first effect therefore of predestination is Christ himself; for the elect can have none of the gifts of God unless by our Saviour they are given unto them. Then also let there be put those effects which Paul describes in the 8th chapter to the Romans, when he says; Whom he foreknew, those also has he predestinated; whom he has predestinated, those also has he called; and whom he has called, those he has justified; and whom he has justified, those has he glorified. Whereby it is evident that calling also, and justification, and glorification, are the effects of predestination; whereunto also may be added conformity to the image of the Son of God, seeing that Paul reckons it up as an effect of predestination. Let good works also be added, seeing that God is said to have prepared them for us to walk in. Then follows the certainty or confirmation of our salvation. Lastly, is the declaration of the riches of the glory of God, which end Paul manifestly mentions in the 9th chapter to the Romans: and to the Ephesians he writes; That we might be to the praise of his grace and glory.
But as touching reprobation, if it be compared unto the first man; God from everlasting decreed to produce him, that by free will and certain grace given unto him, he might have stood, if he would: and God could have given unto him greater grace, so that he could not have fallen, but he would not. But whether Adam were of the number of the reprobate or of the predestinate cannot be gathered out of the
holy Scriptures; although all the fathers, in a manner, consent that he was saved, and therefore pertained to the number of the predestinate. But other men, which were reprobated, were offered unto God in a mass of perdition, and utterly corrupted: for God decreed to produce them, not elsewhere, but out of the seed of Adam.
And inasmuch as by his free purpose, he would not bestow his mercy on many, which is utterly to refuse, thereof followed rejection; whereby they were left in their native sin. Further, inasmuch as God does not suffer his creatures to be idle, they also are perpetually pricked forward to work: and because they were not healed, they do all things according to their corrupt nature; which although they seem sometimes to be beautiful works, yet before God they are sins.
Moreover, according as their wicked acts deserve, God many times punishes in them sins by other sins; as unto the Romans; Many are said to have been delivered up into a reprobate mind, because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God.
But yet as touching the sin of the first man, this is to be considered, that sin could not be said to have been the punishment of another sin; for if it were the first sin, it had not any other sin before it: and that God utterly willed not that sin, it cannot be said, for against his will, how could it be committed? And he saw that he would fall, if he were not confirmed with his spirit, and with a more plentiful grace: he helped him not, neither put he to his hand to keep him from falling. Moreover, the devil, if God had otherwise willed, durst not have tempted him. Furthermore, he had appointed by him, to declare his goodness and severity. He gave the occasion, when he set a law, which he knew should not be kept; and also in giving him a wife which should entice him; and finally, the occasion itself, which as a subject or matter, sustained the privation of uprightness, could not without the power and might of God, have been produced.
Wherefore it is evident, that God after a sort willed that sin, and was
somehow the author of it, although it were not a punishment of sin going before. But contrariwise, he is said not to have willed it, and not to have been the author of it; for that he prohibited it, punished it, and did not absolutely will it, but for another end: neither suggested he of himself, nor inspired the lewdness: but the will of Adam, not being letted by a more mighty grace, of his own accord declined from uprightness. There is also brought out of Isaiah an effect of reprobation; namely, that he will make blind and gross the heart of the people, that they should not understand. And God oftentimes, either by himself, or by evil angels, sends cogitations, and offers occasions, which if we were upright, might be taken in the best part: but inasmuch as we are not renewed, we are by them driven unto evil; afterward justly and worthily follows damnation for sins: and finally, the declaration of the power and justice of God, is the last effect of reprobation, and all these things follow reprobation; although God, as we have before declared, is not altogether the cause of all these things.
But because all the benefits of God, which are given unto the predestinate, are referred unto grace, as to their head and fountain: therefore let us see whether that principal effect of God's predestination, be as some have imagined, set forth of God common to all men: for if it were so, then should all men be predestinated, and it should lie in their own power, or in their own hands (as the saying is) to be predestinated, so that they would receive grace when it is offered. We in no wise say that grace is common unto all men, but is given unto some; and unto others, according to the pleasure of God, it is not given. And to confirm this matter, we allege these places of the scripture. In the 6th of John it is said; No man cometh unto me, unless my Father shall draw him. And I wonder that the adversaries should say that all men are drawn of God, but all men will not come. As if a man should say, No man can challenge to
himself learning or good arts, which is not endued with reason and wit: and yet does it not thereof follow that though all men have reason and wit all men should attain good arts, seeing that besides those principles, study and will are required. So say they, All men are drawn of God; but besides the drawing of God, there is required that we be willing and assent; for otherwise we are not brought to Christ.
But doubtless it cannot be that in all those propositions, which are spoken with an exception, that exception should belong to all men.
For Christ said to Pilate; Thou should not have power against me, unless it were given thee from above. Shall we therefore take upon us to say; that unto all men was given power against Christ? And when as it is written; That No man shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, unless he be born again by water and the Spirit; shall we therefore infer that all men are born again of water and the Spirit? And when the Lord saith; Ye shall not have life in you, unless ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink his blood, shall we take it that all men eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Lord? And if this ought not so to be, why will these men, when we say; No man cometh unto me, unless my Father draw him, thereof infer that all men are drawn unto the Father?
Verily, if a man consider the course of the text, he shall see that this sense cannot stand. After that he had made mention of the eating of his flesh, and of the drinking of his blood: the Jews were by reason thereof offended, and the disciples went their way: upon occasion whereof Christ said; No man cometh unto me, unless my Father draw him: which he ought in no case to have said, if he had meant to reprove only them of infidelity. He should not doubtless have made mention of the Father, as though he drew them not, if he gave that gift to all men. And Augustine, when he interprets this place, saith;
Whie he draweth this man, and draweth not that other man, do not thou judge, if thou wilt not err. In which words he declares that all
men are not drawn of God. And in the self-same chapter it is written; All that my Father giveth me shall come unto me. Wherefore, if all men were drawn, they should all come unto Christ. And in the same place it is written; Everyone which hath heard of my Father, and hath learned, cometh unto me. Seeing then many come not unto
Christ, thereby is declared that many neither have heard nor learned.
And in the 10th chapter, when Christ had said, that He is the shepherd, and hath his sheep: amongst other things he saith; These whom my Father gave me, no man can take out of my hands. But we see that many fall from salvation, and therefore we ought to think that those are not given of the Father unto Christ.
39. But here also the adversaries cavil, that Although no man can take them away, yet nevertheless men of their own accord may go away. As if a man had servants, being himself a lord of great might, he might doubtless say; No man can take away these servants from me, and yet they of their own accord may go from him. But how vain this their cavillation is, the words which follow declare. For Christ adds; The Father which gave them unto me, is greater than all: by which words he declares that therefore those, whom he had received of the Father, could not be taken away from him; for that he is most mighty. Wherefore if they cannot by them be taken away which are in Christ; neither also are they able to withdraw themselves: not that they are compelled by force, but by the way of persuasion it is of necessity that they abide. The very which thing the Lord also spoke, touching the temptation of the latter times; namely, that If it were possible the elect should be deceived. In the self-same 6th chapter of John, Christ said; that No man cometh unto him, but he unto whom it is given of the Father: which place has one and the self-same sense with that other sentence, wherein he said; No man cometh unto me, unless my Father draw him. And John Baptist, as it is written in the 3rd chapter of John, when he heard of his disciples, that Christ
baptized many, answered; that No man can receive anything, unless it be given him from heaven. And in the self-same chapter; The spirit breatheth where it will. Which although it be spoken of the wind, yet notwithstanding it is applied unto the Holy Ghost, which regenerates: for to declare the force of the Holy Ghost, the similitude is taken from the nature of the wind.
But this is more manifestly set forth in Matthew, when it is said; No man knoweth the Father, but the Son, and he to whom the Son will reveal him. Wherein we are taught, that the revealing of Christ is not given unto all men. Which thing Christ in the same Evangelist declared, when turning him unto the Father, he said; I give thee thanks, O King of heaven and of earth, for that thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent men, and hast revealed them unto babes. There also is declared, that the revealing of true doctrine is not common unto all men. But if thou wilt say, that therefore it is not revealed unto the wise men, for that they will not receive it: the words following do not render this cause; but rather declare, that the will of God hath so decreed: for it follows; For so it hath pleased thee.
And again, when the Apostles inquired why he spoke in parables to the people, he answered; Unto you it is given to know mysteries, but unto them it is not given. And he said, that he so spoke unto them, that they seeing should not see, and hearing should not understand.
And he cited a prophecy out of the 6th of Isaiah, wherein was commanded, that the people should be made blind, and that their heart should be made gross; least peradventure they should be converted, and God should heal them. Moreover, the apostle cites out of the book of Exodus, God thus speaking; I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and will show compassion on whom I will show compassion. Also that which is written of Pharaoh; To this end have I raised thee up, that I might show my power in thee. And he says also, that Some vessels are made to honour, and some to
dishonour. Which words most evidently declare, that grace is not set forth common unto all men.
Peter also in the Acts of the Apostles, said unto Simon Magus; Repent, if peradventure God forgive unto thee this thought. But they say that in this place Peter doubted not, but that grace is common unto all men: but he was uncertain whether Simon would receive it, and earnestly repent. But this subtle shift nothing helpeth them; for, as the apostle teaches us unto Timothy, Even repentance also is the gift of God. For he admonishes a bishop, to hold fast sound doctrine, and to reprove them that resist, if peradventure God give unto them to repent. Whereby is concluded, that it lies not in the hands of all men to return into the way, unless it be given them of God.
Moreover, some sin against the Holy Ghost; Who are not pardoned, neither in this world, nor in the world to come. So as it is manifest, that unto these men, grace is no more offered nor common. And in the Acts of the Apostles, God is said to have opened the heart of the woman that sold silks, to give heed unto those things which Paul spake: which is spoken, as a certain thing peculiarly given to that woman. And this place makes that plain, which is written in the Apocalypse; Behold, I stand at the door and knock, if any man open unto me, etc. For we are said to open, inasmuch as God works that in us; for he makes us to open, and it is he which gives unto us to work our salvation, as it is said unto the Philippians. And in the Gospel it is many times written, that Many are called, but few are chosen. Paul also declares the liberty of the spirit in distributing his gifts, when he says unto the Corinthians; that One and the self-same spirit distributes unto all men as pleases him. Which sentence, although it be meant of graces and free gifts, as they term them; yet may it no less be transferred unto the grace, whereby we are renewed unto salvation, seeing God is alike free in the one and the other.
40. Lastly, whilst these men thus make grace common unto all men, they convert it into nature: which in no wise agrees with the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures. And how much they are deceived hereby, it may easily be proved; for that they seek of these things to infer, that it lies in every man's power to receive grace when it is offered unto them. Which in no case agrees with the Holy Scriptures; for Paul says, that We are not able to think anything of ourselves, and that all our sufficiency is of God. And unto the Philippians he writes, that God works in us, both to will and to perform, according to his good will. And unto the Corinthians, when he had said that he had laboured much, he added; Not I, but the grace of God which is in me.
To the Romans he writes; It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that has mercy. Which could not be true, if it lies in our will to receive grace when it is offered. Touching which place,
Augustine to Simplicianus, in his first book and second question says, that The meaning of those words is not, as though it were sufficient for us to will, unless God aids us with his grace: for by that means he might contrariwise have said, It is not of God that has mercy, but of man that wills. But the sense is, as it is written unto the Philippians; that It is God which works in us to will and to perform; and it is true, that we in vain, will, unless God have mercy, and help.
But who will say, that God in vain has mercy, if we will not? In Ezekiel the prophet, it is said; that God himself would change our hearts, and instead of stony hearts, give us fleshy hearts. And David in the psalm sings; Incline my heart, O God unto thy testimonies; to declare, that it pertains unto God to bow our wills. Which he in another place meant, when he said; A clean heart create in me, O
God. And in the book of Wisdom it is written, that No man can have a chaste heart, but he unto whom God shall give it. And Christ most manifestly taught, that An evil tree cannot bring forth good fruits.
Wherefore, so long as men are not regenerate, they cannot bring forth so good fruit, that they should assent unto grace when it
knocks. So that first it is necessary, that they be changed from the same, and that of evil plants they be made good. As in the generation of the flesh, no man which is procreated, helps anything thereto: even so is it in regeneration, for that there also we are born again through Christ and in Christ.
Moreover, if we should give place unto the opinion of these men, all boasting should not be excluded; for every man might boast of that his own act, whereby he received grace when it was offered.
Furthermore, seeing that this apprehension, according to our mind is done by faith, but (as they think) by charity, what will they do? Will they deny that faith and charity are the gifts of God? Augustine also reasons, that As in Christ the divine nature took human nature freely, not waiting for the consent thereof; so they, which are justified, are not justified by their own will or assent. The same father also notes, that Eternal life is in the Scriptures sometimes called by the name of a reward; for that good works go before it. But grace (says he) and righteousness, are never in the Holy Scriptures called by the name of a reward; for that before it, goes no good work acceptable unto God. And unto the Romans Paul writes; I know that in me, that is in my flesh dwells no good: where, by flesh, he understands whatsoever is in a man not yet regenerate. And dare they notwithstanding attribute unto man, being yet in the flesh, that is, not yet regenerate, so much good, that he is able to apply salvation unto himself?
And unto the Corinthians; What hast thou (says he) which thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why boastest thou, as though thou hadst not received? Neither will we suffer these men to run unto creation; for here we speak not of the soul, or of the powers thereof, that is of will or understanding, which we had of God by creation: but of that action or work, which these men seek to pick out of free will,
to the receiving of grace. And forsomuch as they say, that they have this of themselves; they manifestly speak against the apostle. For the Corinthians might have answered; Thou demandest of us, what hath separated us, what we have that we have not received? Behold, we now show unto thee, that act and assent, whereby we freely, and by our own power receive the grace, which thou preachest unto us; this doth separate us from others: and so Paul had in vain in such sort reproved them. Moreover, if grace were set forth as common to all men, as these men teach, what should we pray unto God for the conversion of infidels? Doubtless we so do, for that we believe it lies in the hand of God to open their hearts, if he will.
41. Neither must we think, as these men feign, that God gives to every man so much grace as is sufficient to move them: for if that did suffice, they should doubtless be moved. For if there were set before a man, a thing of huge weight; and he being willing to move it, had in himself so much strength as were sufficient, that is, as might overcome the weight, which is to be moved; then without doubt there would follow motion. So if God (as they say) would in very deed move the hearts of the wicked, and would give so much strength, that is, so much grace, as should suffice; yea rather so much as should exceed the hardness of the wicked heart, nothing could let, but that it should be bowed, not indeed by compulsion, but by most effectual persuasion. Augustine unto Simplicianus, in his first book and second question says, that There are two sorts of calling, one common, whereby men are called, but not by one and the self-same manner, whereby they are apt to be moved and converted: others be so called, as they are apt to be moved. Neither must we think (says he) that God could not so have called Esau, as he might be moved, and as he might be made apt: for all men are not after one and the self-same manner allured and moved unto God. Verily forsomuch as he is omnipotent, he might by his impulsion take away that natural
hardness. But say they, if he would, he might: and yet will not God always do that he can do. Let it be so; we say even the self-same, that God oversteps some, and will not have mercy on them, and therefore gives not unto all men, so much as might be sufficient unto their salvation. And against those whom he oversteps, he attains the end that he wills; as it is written of Pharaoh; To this purpose have I raised thee up, to declare in thee my power, and that my name might be spread abroad throughout the whole earth.
Christ knew very well (as he himself testified) that Tyre, Sidon, and Sodom would have been moved to repentance, if he had applied to them the miracles and doctrine which he granted to the Jews.
Wherefore, forsomuch as he gave not those things unto them, they wanted that which sufficed unto salvation. The Lord also said unto the Apostles; I have chosen you, but ye have not chosen me. But by the opinion of the adversaries, that universal grace being granted, no man should be chosen of God, forsomuch as he should be after one and the self-same sort unto all men; yea rather, we should choose
God, in receiving his grace when it is offered: and we should be formers of the election of God, and should not be formed of him. I have planted (saith Paul) Apollo hath watered, but God hath given the increase, that is, life and spirit. But if those things should be granted to be common unto all men, he should rather have said; Ye have taken unto yourselves, the spirit, life, and grace. The self-same apostle said, that God had begun in the Philippians a good work, and also would perform the same against the day of the Lord. Which words plainly declare, that all whole is to be ascribed unto God; namely, to begin and to perform. And unto the Ephesians; He worketh all things, according to the counsel of his will, not (saith he) according to the counsel of another man's will: which doubtless he should have said, if every man had in his power to take salvation, or not to take it. Again, unto the Galatians; When it seemed good unto
him, which separated me from my mother's womb. If it were (as these men affirm) Paul should have said; When it seemed good unto me. For, as touching God, they affirm that grace is always ready, and offered unto all men. Wherefore by their judgment, conversion should then come, when it should please us.
42. These arguments I think to be sufficient at this time, though many more might be brought. Only now resteth to overthrow those reasons, which seem to make against us. But before we enter into that matter, this we say, that we in no wise deny, but that God by outward calling; namely, by his prophets, apostles, preachers, and scriptures, calleth all men. For this man is no more excluded from the promises or threatenings than that man; but these things are alike set forth unto all men, although all men are not predestinated to attain unto the fruit of them. This is diligently to be noted, if we will readily answer to those things which are objected. And when they lay against us (which thing they very often do) that the promises are common and universally proposed; it is needful to be restrained unto these or those men, and that God dallies not in them, but deals in good earnest. First, as touching universality, I will bring other propositions no less general. All flesh shall see the salvation of God;
All shall be taught of God; All shall know me, from the least to the greatest; I will pour of my spirit upon all flesh. Shall we say, that these things are true as touching all men? No doubtless, unless
Origen's fable should be renewed, that all men shall at the last be saved.
They will answer, that these propositions ought to be restrained unto the believers, unto them that are willing, and unto them that respect the grace of God. And we also say, that they are to be restrained: but we fetch our restraint further off, and ascend unto the election of God, and unto reprobation. And whether resolution (I beseech you)
is the perfecter; and whether restraint is of more equity? And yet do we not say, that God dallies in these universal promises; because forsomuch as the predestinate and the reprobate lead their life together, and are not known who they be, it is meet, that there should be preaching unto all men, least that for the reprobate, the elect should be defrauded, which by the preaching of God's word shall take profit. And by this universal preaching, God brings that end to effect, which he himself wills. For the godly, when they see that the reprobate are left in their own sense, and believe not, do understand, that it is grace, and not nature; and in them perceive what should also have happened unto themselves, without the mercy of God, of whose gift conversion is, and not of the power of man. And the ungodly are made inexcusable, when as they have not performed so much as those outward works, which they might have done; as it is declared to the Romans in the first and second chapters.
43. First, the adversaries imagine, that they are setters forth of the mercy of God, for that they grant it common unto all men. But if we consider the matter more inwardly, we attribute much more unto mercy than they do: for we affirm, that all whole dependeth of it; which is of them denied, whilst they will have it to lie in our power to receive the grace of God. And if we say, that mercy is not distributed alike unto all men, we cannot therefore be reproved; forsomuch as the scriptures manifestly testify the same. But these men, when they say, that it lies in our will to receive grace, though they extenuate the same, yet is it in very deed proved to be a great matter: for what should it profit, to have grace universally set forth unto all men, unless a man would by his own proper will apply it to himself? Let them cease then to adorn this their opinion, with the title of the mercy of God. They bring also another argument; that Forsomuch as God provideth for all men things competent unto bodily life, it is not very likely that he will fail them, as touching the preparation of
eternal salvation; which should not be, unless unto every man were set forth, so much of the grace of God, as is sufficient.
But for this cause, these men are reproved by a similitude. For even as God giveth unto every mortal man corporal life, without any their assent; even so must they needs conclude of spiritual life, which by all means they refuse to grant. We confess in deed, that God, through his mercy, causeth the sun to arise upon the good and upon the evil; and we also confess, that both the predestinate and the reprobate are partakers of some of the benefits of God. And even as in this life, the commodities of the body and of life, are not alike given unto all men: so also predestination unto eternal felicity is not common unto all men. Some are borne leprous, blind, deaf, foolish, most poor, and utterly unapt unto all manner of natural felicity; neither attain they unto it at any time: so as the comparison which they bring makes very much against themselves. But (say they) God hath created all men to his own image, and therefore hath appointed all men unto blessedness: wherefor we ought not to say, that some are predestinate, and some are reprobate. That men are made to the image of God, and capable of blessedness, that we grant: but after the fall, nature was corrupted, and the image of God much blemished: so as men cannot of themselves attain unto felicity, but have need to be delivered from misery. But that God hath now decreed to deliver all men from misery, and through Christ to have them blessed, the scriptures teach not: wherefore we do not without just cause say, that he hath decreed to deliver some, and to leave other some, and that justly: the causes of which justice, yet are not to be sought by our own works, seeing they are known to God only through his hidden and unspeakable wisdom.
44. They object this out of John; He gave unto them power to be made the sons of God. As though they could thereof infer, that every
man may be made the son of God, if he will. But they give no heed unto those things which follow: for it is added; Unto those which have believed in him, which are borne, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. These things, if they be rightly peised, declare that this dignity and privilege is given unto the believers, and unto the regenerate: for, to have power given to be the sons of God, signifieth nothing else. Wherefore, this dignity is put as an effect of regeneration, and of faith, and not as the beginning thereof, as these men dream. They grant also, that Christ died for us all; and thereof they infer, that his benefit is common unto all men.
Which we also will easily grant, if only the worthiness of the death of Christ be considered: for as touching it, it might be sufficient for all the sinners of the world. But although in itself it be sufficient; yet it neither had, nor hath, nor shall have effect in all men. Which the School-men also confess, when they affirm, that Christ hath redeemed all men sufficiently, but not effectually: for thereunto it is necessary, that the death of Christ be healthful unto us, that we take hold of it; which cannot otherwise be done, but by faith: which faith we have before abundantly declared to be the gift of God, and not to be given unto all men.
This also is objected unto us, that the Apostle compared Adam with Christ, and said unto the Romans; that Even as in Adam we all die, so in Christ we are all quickened. Wherefore by this means, they say, that the grace of Christ ought universally to be open unto all men.
But if they will so take this comparison, they shall be compelled to grant, that all by Christ shall be brought unto felicity, as by Adam all are thrown headlong into sin and into death. But seeing the thing it self declareth the contrary, they may easily perceive, that this similitude is not to be taken as touching all the parts thereof; especially seeing none fall of their own consent into original sin. And these men will, that grace be not admitted, but through a man's own
consent. Then if they admit this difference, how dare they affirm, that the matter is on each side alike? The scope of the Apostle in this comparison, is to be considered; and besides the scope, nothing is to be inferred. And in that comparison, Paul meant nothing else, but that Christ is to those which are regenerated, the beginning of life and of blessedness: as Adam is unto them, that are derived of him, the cause of death and of sin. Now, whatsoever is afterward beside this scope gathered touching the equality of multitude, or of the manner, the same is Per accidens, that is, By chance, and pertaineth not unto the scope and substance of the similitude.
45. They object also the sentence unto Timothy; God will have all men to be saved. For this sentence Pighius continually repeateth, as though it were invincible: when yet Augustine oftentimes hath taught, that it may in such sort be expounded, that it bringeth no weight at all to prove those men's fond invention. First we take it to be spoken of all estates and kinds of men; namely, that God will have some of all kinds of men to be saved: which interpretation agreeth excellently well with the purpose of the Apostle. He had commanded that prayers and supplications should be made for all men, and especially for kings, and those which have public authority, that under them we may live a quiet life, in all godliness and chastity. And therefore to declare that no estate or kind of men is excluded, he added; God will have all men saved. As if he should have said, No man is letted by that vocation and degree, wherein he is placed, so that it be not repugnant unto the word of God, but that he may come unto salvation: and therefore we ought to pray for all kind of men.
But hereof we cannot infer, that God endueth every man particularly with grace, or predestinateth every man to salvation. Even in like manner as in the time of the flood, all living creatures are said to have been saved in the ark, with Noah; whereas there were but only some of every kind gathered together in it: or we may understand it
thus; that God will have all men to be saved; for that as many as are saved, are saved by his will. As if a man should say of one that teacheth Rhetoric in a city, that he teacheth all men: by which kind of speech is not signified, that all the citizens are hearers of Rhetoric; but that as many as learn, are taught of him. And this also is like, if a man pointing to the gate of a house, should say, that All men enter in this way; we must not thereby understand, that all men enter into that house, but that as many as do enter, do enter in by that gate only.
Further, there are some who interpret these words of the apostle, of the will of the sign, or of the antecedent; that all men are invited, for that preaching is indifferently set forth to all men. Neither is there any, in a manner, who inwardly feels not some prick whereby he is oftentimes stirred up to live well. So that if we respect this will of God, we easily grant that he will have all men to be saved. But they will not have it to be understood of the hidden and effectual will, which they call consequent: and after this manner may those kinds of speech be understood; God enlightens every man who comes into this world; Come unto me all ye who labor, and are laden. For all men are provoked by the oracles of God, and all men are inwardly moved by some provoking. All these interpretations are doubtless very likely, and also apt: and yet there is another besides these, ready and plain. The holy scriptures set forth two societies of men: the one of the godly, and the other of the ungodly, and of both societies have patched together universal propositions, which ought of the wary reader to be drawn to their kind. The prophets say, and Christ cites the same; All men shall be taught of God. And; All men shall know me, from the least to the greatest. Again; When I shall be lifted up from the earth, I will draw all things unto myself. These universal propositions, unless they be understood of the godly, who are elected, are not true: as are these also; I will pour of my spirit upon
all flesh. And; All flesh shall come in my sight, and shall worship in Jerusalem. Again; All flesh shall see the salvation of God. Again also;
God lifts up all them that fall. Now, who sees not, that these things are to be understood only of the saints? Contrariwise, to the fellowship of the ungodly pertain these sentences; No man receives his testimony, and yet many believed; Ye shall be hated of all men.
Again; All men seek the things that are their own. And again; All men have declined, and are altogether made unprofitable, there is none that does good, no not one. When yet holy men, and those who are now regenerate, are acceptable unto God, and do endeavour themselves to exhibit unto him some obedience of the law. But these universal sayings ought not to be extended beyond their own society.
This distinction had Augustine a regard unto, in his book De ciuitate Dei, where he declares and proves, that there have ever been two cities; namely, one that city of God, and another the city of the devil.
Wherefore in these general propositions, we must always have a consideration unto what order or fellowship of men they pertain.
Which if we in this present place do, then shall we apply unto the saints, and unto the elect this sentence, which we have now in hand; namely, that God will have all men to be saved, and by that means all manner of doubt is taken away. Otherwise, that God effectually wills not the salvation of all men, very many infants declare, which perish without Christ; and many also who are born fools, and deaf, and had never in their lifetime the right and just use of reason. And it often happens, that some have lived a long time, honestly and faithfully enough, and yet suddenly at the last do fall, and being taken out of the world do perish eternally. And contrariwise, others, who have perpetually led their life in wickedness, being at the end of their life endued with sudden faith and repentance, are saved: when yet notwithstanding, those first might have been taken away, that maliciousness might not have changed their minds. Who will in these
examples say, that God alike effectually wills the salvation of all men?
46. They also object a sentence of Christ; "How often would I have gathered together thy children, as a hen gathers together her chickens, and thou wouldst not?" But here also is meant of the antecedent will of the sign, whereby God by his prophets, preachers, apostles, and scriptures, many times invited the Jews to fly unto him by repentance: which yet they refused to do. But yet God, by his effectual will, which they call consequent, perpetually drew to him those that were his: neither was there ever any age, wherein he gathered not together as many of the Hebrews as he had predestinated. Therefore, Augustine said; "Those which I would, I have gathered together, although thou wouldst not." They think also, that this makes on their side, which is written in the beginning of the epistle to the Romans, concerning the Gentiles; namely, that they were inexcusable: which they say could not have been said, unless unto every man were given so much grace and help, as might suffice unto salvation. But this is to be known, that the apostle in that place intreteth only of knowledge; namely that the Gentiles could not excuse their sins, for that they had not a law given unto them of God, as had the Jews: neither for that God had not in such sort opened himself unto them, as he manifested himself unto the people of the Jews; "Ye know God" (saith he) "by his creatures, and by the light of nature; ye wanted not the knowledge of right and of wrong; therefore, ye are inexcusable." Wherefore we must not think, that this sentence extendeth further, than for the which Paul spake it.
And if also thou weigh the matter better, thou shalt see, that the Ethnics and ungodly men, against whom the apostle writeth, thought not that they wanted strength to perform those things which they knew to be upright: forsomuch as they ascribed all things unto free will. So as the apostle very well concludeth against them, as if he
should have said; "Do ye think that ye have strength enough, so that ye judge that ye have no need of Christ? But forsomuch as I have proved, that ye wanted not knowledge, and have notwithstanding lived wickedly, I do therefore infer, that ye are inexcusable."
Furthermore, infirmity and want of ability excuse not; seeing that we have it not in ourselves by creation, and by our first institution; but by the fall and sin, which was brought into our whole kind, by the first man.
The Ethnics also were inexcusable, for that they performed not that in civil justice, which lay in them to do. Wherefore nothing can be inferred of this place, which can prove the sentence of the adversaries. They think that this also makes with them, which is spoken in the self-same epistle to the Romans; "Is God the God of Jews only, and not of the Gentiles also? Yes, of the Gentiles also."
They labor of this place to infer, that God giveth unto all men sufficient aid, for that he is the God of all men. But they should consider, that Paul there reproves the Jews, for that they thought that the benevolence and grace of God was so bound unto them, that the Gentiles were utterly excluded: so then he declared, that God hath not only elected some of the Jews, but also hath his elect amongst the Gentiles. Neither follows it therefore of necessity, that unto all the Gentiles should be given grace, which might suffice unto salvation; seeing that neither all the Jews were partakers of such grace. And we speak this, not as though we deny God to be the God of all men; for we know that even the wicked also, will they or nill they, are subject unto him; neither can they avoid his providence; whom although he bring not to eternal salvation, yet at the least way, he punishes them for their evil deserts. But he is peculiarly said, to be the God of them, unto whom he hath given to acknowledge him for their God; and having acknowledged him, to worship him.
47. But that place seemeth to be of more difficulty, which is written unto Timothy, where God is called the savior of all men, and especially of the faithful. In which words, this word "Saviour", is to be taken, not as though God giveth unto all men eternal salvation, but as it signifies, that he preserveth and defendeth all men from many evils, which otherwise the devil practises against them. For so great is his rage against mankind, that if he were not restrained by God, he would destroy all things: he would suffer no commonwealth nor church, but would bring to naught, both goods, and all things whatsoever pertain to man's life. So therefore God is the saviour of all men, in that he driveth away so great evils from men. But as touching eternal salvation, that is to be understood of the elect only: and therefore it is added; "And especially of the faithful." For seeing they are predestinated, they, above all others, attain unto this benefit. They wrest that also out of the prophet Isaiah, which also
Paul hath a little after, in the same Epistle; "All day long have I stretched out my hands unto a people that believeth not, but speaketh against me." Out of which place they can gather nothing else, but that which hath oftentimes been said; namely, that all men universally are invited of God; that the prophets were sent indifferently unto all men; that the scriptures are set forth to all men.
But this makes nothing to the grace of efficacy, whereof we speak; we grant also that he standeth at the door and knocketh, and will enter in, if any man will let him in. But this they should add, that there is no man, who can of himself open; but it is necessary that it be first given unto him of the mere goodness of him that knocketh. And to commend also the mercy of God, they bring a sentence of Isaiah;
"Though a mother can forget her children, yet will not I forget thee."
Which sentence doubtless, very little or nothing at all pertaineth to this matter, whereof is now treated. Who ever denied, but that God is constant of faith, and standeth to his promises and covenants? This doth God in that place promises of himself; namely, that he will not
forget his promise. And we also everywhere hitherto have taught, that the predestination of God is most certain: wherefore, whether this place of Isaiah be understood of predestination, or of the covenants and promises; yet doth it not thereof follow, that it is to be understood of all men. Pighius also cannot abide that, which both
Augustine and we say; namely, that the reprobate do serve the purpose of God, to advance and set forth the power of God's severity; and saith further, that God hath no need of this cruel dealing, to make his name famous. Which thing he laboreth to prove by a certain sentence taken out of the book of Ecclesiasticus. But that is thus to be interpreted; that none of us ought to think, that God hath need of the works of men: for his felicity is perfect and absolute, without the aid and help of any creature. But that the justice of God is made manifest by the unfaithfulness, and wicked acts of men, while that God taketh vengeance on them: who dare deny, when as Paul teacheth that most evidently and plainly? He citeth also out of the self-same book of Ecclesiasticus; "God hath mercy on all men, because of repentance." But the solution of this objection evidently appeareth, by that which hath been spoken; namely, that these words are to be understood of the universality of the elect. For by the winking at sins, it is so far off that the wicked do aspire unto repentance, that they rather wax every day worse and worse; they fall headlong into more grievous sins. But it pertaineth to the predestinate only, to return again into the right way, after that God hath borne some while with them.
48.
And touching answering to objections, here will I finish, and consequently end the third article. Howbeit, this we will in the meantime put you in mind of; that the reprobate may sometimes in some degree do good works: and that the predestinate on the other side, may fall into sins most grievous. Of the first part, Saul may be
unto us an example and firm testimony; for he was at the beginning moderate, having a modest opinion of himself, as the scripture saith.
Solomon also at the later end of his age fell grievously; yea, he fell away from God, when yet at the beginning he was most holy; and had in his prayers, when he was consecrated, required those things, which highly pleased God: wherefore he was also heard. Likewise
Ahab repented, which repentance God talking with Helias, commended. And also Joash the king, as long as Joiada the priest lived, behaved himself well. Ezekiel also teacheth the self-same thing, when he writeth; If a righteous man depart from his righteousness and live wickedly, I will forget all his righteousness. Yea, and experience itself testifieth, that there are many which have lived indifferent honestly; and yet do at the length, in the last time of their life, perish. Wherefore it is manifest, that in the reprobate, good works sometimes have place, which yet come not from a sincere and a perfect faith, but from a faith, that endureth but for a time; and therefore they cannot simply be said to be good, neither do they in very deed please God, but only have a show of goodness, and may as touching outward discipline be praised.
And that the predestinate do sometimes most grievously sin, David is a witness, who committed adultery and manslaughter. Peter also is a witness, who abjured his saviour. Likewise Moses and Aaron are witnesses, who as the Scripture testifieth, committed no light sin. We daily also see, that they, which are peradventure in the number of the predestinated, do fall into horrible crimes: and therefore we may affirm, that good works do sometimes serve unto predestination, and sometimes also to reprobation. Predestination by them bringeth the elect to eternal life; and as touching reprobation, they are sometimes reasons, why the fall is made the grievouser. For they which fall away from God, forsomuch as they were by him adorned with good works; as their sin is more grievous, so also is their punishment more sharp.
Sins in like manner serve both to reprobation and to predestination; for they that are reprobate, are by them brought to eternal destruction; they which are predestinate, do by them the more set forth the glory of God, when they are delivered from them. And thereby also is ministered unto them occasion more and more to know themselves, and to acknowledge the benefits that are given unto them of God; and so do give thanks for them, and do call upon him for help. And yet are not these things so to be taken, that because God, by his most singular wisdom, useth these things most rightly to our salvation, we should therefore sin: we must follow the holy scripture, which commandeth, that evil things are not to be done, that good may come thereof.
49. Now let us at the length come to the fourth article, in which we purpose to entreat of three things in especial; First, whether by the predestination or reprobation of God, any necessity be laid upon us;
Secondly, if there be any necessity, whether the same do hinder free will; Lastly, whether by the foreknowledge or predestination of God be taken away his justice, whereby he is said in the Scriptures to render to every man according to his work. These things being thoroughly declared, I trust the article proposed shall be fully satisfied. Touching the first part, this we said first, that necessity is defined to be that which cannot be otherwise. But the principles or grounds of necessity, are sometimes inward, and sometimes outward. Things which of their own nature are of necessity, and of an inward principle; either they are absolutely necessary, as God: and whatsoever things, if they be changed, include contradiction (as they speak;) As, that four is not an even number, or that four and three are not seven, and this is called a Geometrical necessity; for that it suffereth no variety. Other things indeed are of necessity of an inward ground, but yet not absolutely and simply, unless they follow the accustomed course of nature. Fire is said of necessity to burn that
which is apt to be burnt, and the sun also of necessity perpetually moveth; but these are not simply necessary: for God is able to let them, and to cause these physical and natural things sometimes to cease from their proper operation. As it is manifest of the three children put into the oven of fire, which were not burnt, although the flame were most great. The sun also stayed from his course, whilst
Joshua pursued after his enemies. And in the time of Elias, it is most likely, that there were vapours drawn out of the earth, and out of the sea; and yet for all that, for the space of three years, came not down out of the clouds, dew, nor rain. This also is manifest of Hezekiah, that his disease was by nature to the death. And these things shall suffice touching inward necessity.
That necessity also, which cometh outwardly, is of two sorts: the one violent, when things are compelled to abide or to work contrary to their nature; the other is by supposition: by occasion whereof the School-men have said, that there is a necessity of the consequence and another of the consequent. By which distinction, they meant nothing else, but that the connection is sometimes necessary, although that which is inferred, be not of itself necessary. The Logicians also have thus distinguished them; that they call the one a compounded sense, and the other a divided sense: as if thou wilt say, that it is not possible that white should be black; that will be granted, if these two things be taken conjunctively and together; namely, that one and the self-same thing, should be both white and black, which is by no means possible: but if they be taken apart, then it may be said not to be impossible; for that which is now white may be changed and made black. Wherefore the School-men think, that the whole difficulty of this controversy consisteth in the necessity of the consequence, and of the consequent in the compounded sense. But we, for the more perspicuity, will add another distinction; that there is one necessity of certainty or infallibility, and another of coaction.
50. Now let us more narrowly search out how those distinctions of necessity may be applied unto this present purpose. First, I say that our actions have not necessity by an inward principle; for that is will, which of her own nature, that is, (as God hath made it) is mutable and flexible unto either part: however, they have necessity by supposition. For that as soon as thou respectest the foreknowledge and predestination of God, it followeth of necessity that it shall so come to pass, as it is of God foreknown and predestinated. Our will indeed hath an aptness, that it may be bowed to either part alike; but the action thereof, namely the conversion, it shall not have, but to that part which God hath foreknown: wherefore the necessity falleth upon the connection and conjunction of the predestination of God with our works. Which they meant by the compounded sense, and by the necessity of the consequence. For our works, if they be considered apart, and that we only have a respect unto their nighest original, that is, unto the will, are of necessity. Here also is confessed necessity of certainty, or of infallibleness: for that God can neither be changed nor deceived.
Neither do we plainly grant that predestination bringeth necessity of coaction: for coaction and violence is against the nature of will. For if it should unwillingly do anything, it should not then be called will, but rather a nill (if a man may so term it) which were to overthrow it. I know that the Schoolmen strive among themselves whether God foreknoweth those things, which he foreknoweth, necessarily, or contingently. But in this contention, I will not intermeddle myself, for that there is not such matter set forth in the scriptures; it is sufficient unto me to prove that God is clear from all manner of change and alteration. For the contingence and newness is in the things; but God always and perpetually abideth one and the self-same.
But that there is such a necessity, namely of the consequence, or of the compounded sense, or of infallibleness found in the holy
scriptures, we will allege certain places, which evidently prove the same. Lest any should think it but a feigned invention, Christ said; It must needs be, that he should be delivered unto the Jews, to be mocked. This necessity can be of no other thing inferred but of the definite counsel of God: which Peter teacheth in his sermon in the Acts of the Apostles. Christ also said; that It must needs be that the scriptures should be fulfilled. In John it is written; The scripture cannot be broken, that is, it is not possible, but that it must needs be fulfilled. Unto the Hebrews; It is impossible that they which once being illuminated, etc. In which place is entreated of sin against the Holy Ghost, that it is impossible that they which are guilty of it should escape; for that God hath altogether decreed forever to forsake those which have so sinned. Christ also said of the temptations of the latter times; that The elect also, if it were possible, should be deceived. Again; Heaven and earth shall pass, but my words shall not pass away. In which words is signified that all those things which God hath spoken either in the scriptures, or in his eternal determination, cannot by any means be made frustrate. He answereth also unto his parents; Did ye not know that it behooves me to work those things which pertain to my father? Unto Timothy
Paul writeth; The foundation standeth firm, God knoweth who are his. And in John; Whom the father hath given unto me, no man can take out of my hand. Lastly; All things whatsoever he would he hath done both in heaven and in earth. Wherefore of all these things is gathered how evidently this necessity of certainty and infallibleness is set forth in the holy scriptures; neither is it (as some think) a device of man.
51. And these things which we have spoken of foreknowledge pertain also to providence: for although in this universality of things, many things are said to be done by chance; yet notwithstanding, because that there is nothing, be it never so small, but it is subject unto the
providence of God, therefore also hath it necessity, which we call necessity of certainty; and others, of consequence. But if, forsooth as things may be called partly necessary, and partly also contingent, or free, as we have declared, thou wilt ask whether condition is most agreeable unto them? I answer, that that is most agreeable, which is natural and inward. Forsooth therefore as the necessity, whereof we now entreat, cometh outwardly, and is only by supposition; therefore things ought in no wise to be esteemed according to it, but according to those principles, or grounds, which are understood of us: & so our works, which proceed from will, shall be said to be free; & those things, which are so produced in nature (that also their contrary may come to pass) are counted contingent. However, that necessity of certainty, or of consequence, which we affirm, is never to be denied; neither must we pluck away our works, either from nature, or from foreknowledge, or from the providence of God. And as touching the will of GOD, we must think, that in very deed it governeth and moderateth all things, which thing is of all men commonly granted.
For although men perceive and feel, that they by will do decree and choose those things which they are minded to do: yet if they be godly men, they will always say; This or that will I do, if God permit. But if they be yet without the religion of Christ (as were the Ethnics) yet notwithstanding, they always make mention of fate or destiny, of the three sisters called Parcae, or of chance, which is oftentimes read in the poets. Who (as we have said before) if by the word [Fate] or such like, they understood the connection of causes, over which God himself is the ruler, and moderateth & governeth it, then is there no hurt in that opinion; although, by reason of the abuse of the word, it is better utterly to abstain from it. There are some also, which dream of a certain fatal, mighty, and strong necessity, affixed unto the stars, and unto natural causes, which God himself cannot change: which is erroneous, wicked, and far from the wise men of old time; who expressly declare, that by Fate they understood the will and
government of God. The verses of Cleanthes the Stoike, which he wrote touching this matter, Seneca in his 18th book of epistles hath turned into Latin, whose meaning in English is thus;
Lead me, ô sovereign sier, and Lord of lofty sky Where pleaseth thee: for I obey to follow speedily. Lo, pressed I am without delay, though loath thou makest me, Yet groaning forward shall
I go, and evil while I be. What, being good, I might have done, to do I shall be fain: The willing persons fates do lead, unwilling they constrain.
Although in these verses be avouched fate or destiny, yet is the government thereof put in the hands of God: for he calleth upon the most high father, and desireth to be led of him; whose will notwithstanding, he affirmeth to be both certain and infallible. The self-same thing seemeth Homer in his Odyssey to have meant in these verses, which are thus in English;
Such is the mind in earthly men, and so themselves they bend, As moves the sier of men, and gods: that daily do ascend.
And when we speak of foreknowledge, we exclude not will: for, as we at the beginning admonished, God cannot foreknow that anything shall come to pass, unless he willeth that it shall come to pass. For there can nothing be, but that which God willeth to be; and that which God willeth, he also bringeth to pass for us: for as Paul saith;
He worketh in us both to will and to perform.
52. But this will joined to foreknowledge, neither inverts nor destroys natures; but so works in them, as is agreeing with them: and therefore, for so much as the nature and propriety of the will of man is to work freely and by election, the foreknowledge and will of God takes not away this faculty or power from it; although his
predestination be the cause of all good actions, which are done of the elect, and in the elect. Which thing is not only proved by testimonies of the scriptures, but also the consent of the church in their prayers affirms the same. For thus it prays, O God from whom all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works do proceed, &c. And sins, although after a sort they are subject unto the will of God yet are they not in such sort produced of it, as are good actions: however, this ought to be for certain, that they also are not done utterly without any will of God. For permission, which some do acknowledge, differs not from will: for God permits that which he will not let. Neither ought it to be said, that he does unwillingly permit, but willingly; as Augustine says. Wherefore in either kind of works, the will and foreknowledge of God, in such sort uses itself, that it overthrows not the faculty or power of man's will. In the predestinate it provides, that nothing be of them committed, which may overthrow their everlasting salvation. And from the reprobate it takes away no natural power, which pertains to their substance or nature; neither compels it them against their will to attempt anything: but it bestows not upon them so much mercy, nor so much grace, as it does upon the elect, and as should be needful to save them. But a great many hearts stumble, for that they think with themselves; If God have foreknown, that we shall meet together tomorrow, then must it needs be that our will was utterly determined to this part: otherwise that could not be foreknown.
But we answer, as we have already signified, that that determination is in such sort with God, as is agreeing with the propriety or nature of the will. But unto it is proper so to will one part, that of his nature, it can also will the other part. Wherefore we confess, that if we have a respect unto God, it is appointed and decreed what we shall do; for his knowledge is not in vain called foreknowledge: for he has not an opinion of things, so that his knowledge can be changed, but has a
certain and sure knowledge. And there can be no knowledge, unless (as we have said) it be certain and firm. But this definition and certainty of his, we both have said, and do say, inverts not the nature of things, neither takes away liberty from our nature. Which is proved by this reason; God did foreknow that many things are possible, which in very deed shall never be: and although they shall never be, yet the foreknowledge of God takes not away from them, but that they are possible. Which we will declare by an example of the scripture; Christ, when he was taken, said; I could have asked of my father, & he would have given me eleven legions of angels, which should defend me from these soldiers. Wherefore Christ affirms, that it was possible for him to ask, and that unto him might be granted so many legions of angels: which yet was neither done, nor was by any means to be done. And yet notwithstanding, God foreknew that it might have been done: and although it should never come to pass, yet was it not hindered by foreknowledge, but that it was possible.
Wherefore, as the foreknowledge of God lets not possibility; so likewise it takes not away contingency and liberty.
53. This necessity of infallibility is not only declared and proved by the holy scriptures, and by reasons (as we have now shown) but also is acknowledged of the fathers. Origen against Celsus, in his second book against the argument of Celsus, which he objected against the Christians, saying; Your Christ at his last supper foretold (as ye say) that he should be betrayed of one of his disciples: if he were God, as ye counted he was, could not he let the doing thereof? Origen here wonders, & answers, that this objection is very ridiculous: for, for so much as he foretold that that should come to pass, if he had letted it, then had he not spoken the truth: and therefore he added, that it was of necessity; neither could it otherwise be, but that the same should come to pass which was foretold. However, because that this foretelling changed not the will of Judas, therefore he is worthily
accused, neither ought the blame to be laid upon Christ which foretold it. Origen in that place acknowledges the one and the other; namely the necessity of certainty, and the nature of will not letted.
Ambrose also interpreting these words of Paul; Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated, refers the sentence of the apostle to works foreseen, and yet adds, that it could not otherwise have come to pass, but as God foresaw that it should come to pass. Chrysostom also expounding that which is written unto the Corinthians; It behooveth that heresies should be, confesses, that this necessity is a necessity of foretelling, which is nothing prejudicial unto the power of our will & choice. Neither is this necessity taken away, by certain places in the scriptures, which otherwise at the first sight seem to affirm a change to be in the mind of God; as is that of Isaiah, when he threatened to Hezekiah the king, present death: which prophesy nevertheless God seemed to change, when he prolonged his life fifteen years. And to the city of Nineveh it was foretold, that it should be destroyed within forty days; which nevertheless came not to pass.
Those things in very deed make nothing against the truth before taught; for God foretold unto Hezekiah his death, which was even at hand, according to the causes of the disease whereof he was then sick, and therein was made no lie. But as touching foreknowledge, as GOD foreknew, that the king should be in danger of that most deadly disease; even so foreknew he that his life should be prolonged fifteen years. And as he foreknew, that the sins of the Ninevites deserved present destruction; even so likewise foreknew he, that of his mercy he would give unto them to repent, and to be saved. By the very which rule is to be expounded that place of Jeremiah, in the 18. chapter, wherein God saith, that He also would change his mind, or repent him of the plague, which he had threatened unto any city, nation or kingdom, if they would repent. But what shall we say of Paul, who writes to the Corinthians, that He chastised his body, and
brought it into bondage, that he might not be a reprobate? What meant he to change that firm purpose of God? Verily Paul meant not, that he was able to invert the order of the predestination or reprobation of God; and therefore he said not, Lest I become a reprobate; but, Lest I be reproved: for he minded by all industry and carefulness to be obedient to the predestination of God. For they which are predestinated unto eternal life, study to mortify the flesh.
And he said that he would not become reproved, that is, he would not be found and accused, to lead his life otherwise than he preached: which kind of vice all men disallow, detest, and condemn. Wherefore in that place, was not entreated of the reprobation of God; but of that kind of crime, which they are guilty of, whosoever give good monitions, and in the mean time, they themselves lead their life most wickedly. Although if a man will needs refer these things to the judgment of God, he might well grant the same as touching present justice or injustice; but not according to firm purpose, whereof we at this present entreat.
54. Cicero, a man otherwise full of wit, and of good literature very well deserving, was exceedingly deceived in this question; as it is evident by his second book De divinatione. Which thing Augustine declared in his fifth book De civitate Dei, the ninth and tenth chapters. For he thought it impossible, that the foreknowledge of things to come should not overthrow the faculty or power of man's will: therefore he took away all manner of predestination or foretelling. Which opinion, how much repugnant it is to our religion, all men understand; seeing it is staid upon the oracles of the prophets, as upon sure foundations. And it is written, that God did never anything, which was of any weight, but he first revealed it unto the prophets. He showed unto Noah the destruction that should come by the flood, long time before it came to pass. Unto Abraham he foreshowed the burning of Sodom; and unto him he signified the
oppression and deliverance of his posterity in Egypt. And in a manner unto the self-same prophets he gave charge to foretell the captivity of Babylon, and the return from there. He also commanded all the prophets to prophesy, that Christ should come. And therefore unto us so constant is the authority of prophecies, that to deny it, is utterly to overthrow all religion. Wherefore Augustine not without just cause said; that Those men, which were called Genethliaci, which avouched the fatal necessities of the stars, were more tolerable than Cicero; for they gave some place unto God. But if he be denied to foreknow things to come; thereby also is he denied to be God.
David saith; The foolish man said in his heart, There is no God.
Which saying he showeth to be the opinion of the wicked; for that they, when they commit wicked facts, think that GOD seeth them not, & that he will never punish them. And Cicero hath given us occasion to suspect, that he was after a sort infected with this impiety; for that in his book De natura deorum, he brings in Cotta, and the high priest thus reasoning together; that Cotta desired much, that he might have undoubtedly proved unto him, that there are gods. However, because he saw that it was a thing odious, hateful, and in a manner infamous, to deny that there is a God; therefore towards the end of the book, he gave sentence on Balbus's side, who defended that there are gods: but yet he so gave sentence, that he said unto Velleius, that the opinion of Cotta seemed unto him more probable. Verily a godly man, and one confirmed in religion, would never say that that sentence is likely to be true, wherein the divinity is called into doubt. But these are the disputations of over reason, whereof Paul abundantly wrote in the first chapter of the epistle to the Romans.
But afterward Cicero himself in his book De divinatione, under his own person, denies God to have the foreknowledge of things to come; and makes answer to his brother Quintus, who in the whole
course of the first book, had confirmed prophecies and oracles. But why denies he foreknowledge? He was therefore driven unto it; for that he saw that he must needs grant an order of causes, and of effects, which is immovable and constant: for otherwise, things to come could not be foretold. Now, if such an order be granted, he supposes that nothing remaineth in our hands & power. But as in God, we must affirm to be a most singular will, joined with a most singular power; even so unto him must be attributed the knowledge of all things: yet let us not therefore be afraid, but that we may do the things which we do, by our own will and choice. The Stoics, which did appoint fate or destiny, seem also to have been somewhat moved with Cicero's reason: for they did place the motions of the will of man, not to be under fate or the connection of causes. Not that they utterly made free the will of man, but only they affirmed, that in it lay, at the choice thereof, to meddle or not to meddle with some things: which if it meddle with, straightway it should be wrapped in the necessity of fate. By an example the thing may be made manifest;
They say that it lay in Oedipus to company with a woman, or to abstain: but if he once company, he could not choose but commit incest; of which incest children should be begotten, which should pollute themselves with murdering of their brother, and should overthrow their fathers kingdom. The ancient philosophers, as Democritus & Empedocles, affirm, that The will also is subject to fate or to the connection of causes. But Chrysippus the Stoic inclined rather to exempt man's will, as Oenomaris the Cynic by report of Eusebius Caesariensis De praeparatione evangelica says, that Democritus made men bond-men, and Chrysippus half bond-men.
55. But leaving these, let us return to Cicero, who said, "If there be foreknowledge, then things should in such sort come to pass, as they were foreknown; neither can the event foreseen be avoided: so that the liberty of man is utterly lost. Laws, admonitions, rewards,
punishments, and such like things, are in vain." Therefore, he proposed a choice, that a man should choose whether he would rather admit foreknowledge or liberty of the will; for that they could not coexist, as far as he judged. And because he was a man involved in civil matters, and dealt in laws & judgments, he rather rejected the foreknowledge of God than lose the liberty of the will of man. And for this cause, Augustine saith of him; "Those who will be free, he makes sacrilegious, so that for defence of their liberty, they spoil God of his foreknowledge." Cicero's reasoning was; "If the will be free, there can be no sure connection of causes. For if it were sure, it might not be broken by our will: and if there be no sure connection, then foreknowledge cannot stand; and therefore he affirms that God also foreknows not what things shall come to pass. For if he should foreknow them, then should there be a sure and firm order of causes; which being granted, there should nothing remain in the power of our will." But we ought to hold both these, because we have experience of the one by sense. For every man may perceive in himself, how he works by counsels & deliberation, and chooses that which pleases him. But the other, that is, the foreknowledge of God, we hold by faith; which knowledge is of no less force than the apprehension both of sense and reason. And so we deny unto Cicero that consequence. There is a certain and constant order of causes, which God foreknew; therefore there is nothing in our will. And for this, the argument is denied because our wills also are to be placed amongst the causes of things, yea & have not amongst them the unworthiest place. Wherefore, even as God can foreknow what shall come to pass of other causes: in like sort is he able plainly to see what our wills will choose. And as in foreseeing other causes, and their effects, he in no wise destroys nor changes the nature of them: so likewise he has left the wills of men untouched.
This also moved Cicero, that then nothing should happen by chance: but forsomuch as very many things happen by chance & fortune, it is manifest, that there can be no sure order & foreknowledge of causes.
In this sort reasoned he. But we answer, that "Those things, which are said to come by chance, are so called things coming by chance, as they are referred to our understanding, which being but weak by reason of his dullness, it sees not the course or connection of causes: but if they be referred unto the mind of God, from which nothing is hidden, they cannot be said to come by chance or rashly." The infirmity of the mind of man hath made place for fortune or chance, which we will declare by an example; If a master should send his servant to the market, and command him to be there by six of the clock, and should also command his bailiff apart, to do the self-same thing, doubtless both the bailiff and the servant shall meet together; which to either of them shall happen by chance, for that they knew not of their master's commandment; but the master himself, who knows the matter, will not judge this to come by chance. Which thing also by this may appear; Suppose that I knew that there were treasure hidden in a place, and I should command one to dig in that place, when he should find the treasure, he would cry, "Good fortune"; but I which knew the matter, would attribute nothing unto fortune. Even so God, forsomuch as he knows the course and connection of all causes, never finds any. Therefore let us submit all things unto the providence of God; and amongst all other things, our wills, which we must affirm to have that power, which God would
(who tempers the power and nature of all things.) There is a certain cause, (as saith Augustine) which so works that it is by no means wrought; and such a cause is God. And there is another cause, which so works that it also is wrought of another; of which kind is our will, which so wills and works, as it is wrought of God.
Wherefore we ought neither to assent unto Cicero, nor to the Stoics;
for as we ought to withdraw nothing from the foreknowledge of God, so least of all are our wills to be exempted from it, for they pertain to the better part of the world. For what should he have a care of? Or what should he foreknow, if he should not have a care of men? Our wills (as saith Augustine) are able to do so much as God would and foreknew they should be able to do: and therefore, whatever they are able to do, they most certainly are able to do; & whatever they shall do, they shall without all doubt do it: for that he, whose foreknowledge cannot be deceived, foreknew that they should be both able and also do it. And in the tenth chapter of the fifth book before cited, he distinguished, as we did, the two sorts of necessity; one, whereby we are compelled to suffer those things which we would not, as is the necessity of death, whereunto, will we or nill we, we must give place; the other necessity he saith, is that, according to which anything is said to be necessary, that is to say, that which shall undoubtedly come to pass. And as touching this, there is no need that we should be afraid concerning our will; for by it the will is not diminished. The former indeed is repugnant unto it; for it is not possible that it should will anything unwillingly: but this latter is nothing at all against the nature of the will. The life and foreknowledge of God, although they are necessarily attributed unto him, yet they nothing hurt his nature nor will: he neither can be deceived nor die; and yet suffereth he not anything which he wills not. So also we say, that when we will anything, by will, we necessarily will it: and yet do we not think, that hereby our choice is violated.
56. And how the foreknowledge of God does not harm our will, Augustine in his third book De libero arbitrio, in the second and third chapters, very well explains. Firstly, he says that this question engages many wicked men, who either desire that if the will were free, God should have no providence or care of mortal things, so that
they might indulge in their lusts with more freedom by denying both God's and man's judgments and by avoiding them as much as possible. Or, if it must be admitted that God foresees and understands the things we do, they would at least want God's providence to compel the wills of men so that they may be excused from blame for their wicked deeds. Augustine easily refutes these men's ideas by explaining how the knowledge of God can coexist with will, and that too, a free will. He asks the person he's reasoning with whether he knew if he would have a righteous or corrupt will tomorrow. The person admits he couldn't tell. "Do you think," says
Augustine, "that God knows this?" The other confesses that he thinks God knows. Therefore, Augustine concludes that since God foreknows this, He also foreknows what He will do with him, whether He will glorify him at the end of his life: which if He foreknows and cannot be deceived, then He will glorify him necessarily. But tell me, will you be glorified against your will, or with your will? "Certainly not against my will," he says, "for I most earnestly desire the same." Thus, it's concluded that what God will necessarily do in us does not hinder the will. He also shows that this will be clearer if we consider foreknowledge as if it were our own.
Suppose I foresee that a certain man will come to me tomorrow, will my foreknowledge take his will from him so that if he comes, he comes of his own choice? Undoubtedly, that cannot be said: for he willingly comes, and my foreknowledge does not diminish anything of his choice.
And just as our memory does not force past events to remain in the past, so foreknowledge does not compel future events to occur. This can also be explained another way; if a man sees Plato arguing with Socrates, or the sun or the moon eclipsed, the sight of the seer does not cause Plato and Socrates to dispute necessarily or unwillingly; nor does it cause the sun or moon to eclipse by chance, as these
eclipses of the heavenly bodies have their necessary causes.
Therefore, the seer does not, by reason of his sight, make what is contingent necessary, nor does he make what is necessary contingent. We should not think that God's foreknowledge obtains its certainty from the necessity of things; for the clarity of the mind of God is so great that it can certainly understand contingent things as well. This reason is not hindered by what we have often admonished before; namely, that God's foreknowledge always has will joined with it, since nothing can be foreknown by God to be, which He himself does not will to be. But this will, by which God works all in all, applies itself to the natures of things; for in food it nourishes, in the sun it gives light, in the vine it produces wine, and in the will of man it causes them to will freely those things which they will. Paul, as we read in the Acts, cited that saying of Aratus; "In him we live, we move, and have our being": from which it follows that the will of man has its motions from God. But if someone says that it receives from God such motions as it itself previously wills, then he will speak absurdly: for then our will would measure and govern the influences of God, which is far from the truth. Rather, let us say that it receives from God such impulses and motions as He will give; and let us meanwhile note that God works in our will in such a way that it gladly, willingly, and of its own accord receives the motions that God puts into us.
57. But how it comes to pass that God most certainly foresees things to come, when yet the wills of men, and many natural causes are doubtful, and work contingently; it may thus be explained. It is true indeed that those who consider things only in their causes are often deceived. For all causes do not necessarily bring forth their effects; sometimes they are hindered, and otherwise inclined than they were supposed. Therefore, people are not deceived when they judge of effects lying hidden in their causes. But the foreknowledge of God
not only knows what things shall come to pass in their causes, but also thoroughly sees them, as if they were already brought forth and made perfect by their causes. Hence, we may infer necessity of certainty and infallibility from the foreknowledge of God, which we cannot do from the nearest causes. For when we say that God foreknew that this or that should be tomorrow, we rightly add that therefore it shall of necessity be. Necessity is not applied to a thing known, but as it is foreknown by God as present and already brought forth, which not only leads to perspicuity but also to necessity: for everything, whilst it is, is of necessity. We must not afterward grant that the thing is of necessity because it is not taken in such a way as it was foreknown by God.
Hitherto, we have defended the power of man's will, which yet we would not have taken generally but only concerning foreknowledge and predestination. For although thereby (as it is proved) free will is not hindered, yet it does not lack impediments or hindrances. We are born in sin, and whether we will it or not, we are wrapped in original sin; neither can we by any means extricate ourselves from sin. And before regeneration, whatever power we attribute to the will of man in indifferent and civil matters, we must first think that, whichever way it turns, it inevitably sins; nor can it do anything that is truly acceptable to God; nor can it give civil works the success it intends.
Therefore, Augustine rightly wrote in his Enchiridion that the first man, by sinning, lost the liberty of free will. Furthermore, it is to be considered that the wills and motions of the mind, and actions, even of men not yet regenerated, are directed by God; and so directed, that by His providence, they are brought to the end predetermined by Him. Also, when we are regenerated, although we obtain liberty through Christ to some extent, it is not full, but only begun. For the first motions that lead to sin creep upon us against our will, which motions we have shown to be sins.
And Ambrose plainly confesses that our hearts are not in our own power, and there is none of the believers who often does not fall, even though he would prefer to stand. Therefore, we should all pray,
"Forgive us our trespasses." And to the Galatians, Paul said, "The spirit fights against the flesh, and the flesh against the spirit, so that you do not do the things which you would." And in his epistle to the Romans, it is written, "The evil which I hate, that I do." Again, "I feel a law in my members striving against the law of my mind, and leading me away captive into the law of sin," which words can only be understood of a regenerated man. For he had said, "In my mind, I serve the law of God, but in the flesh, the law of sin," which cannot be referred to a man not yet justified. We indeed grant that God could, if He would, give unto men so much aid that they should not sin at all, but He has not done so yet, nor has He ever undertaken to do it.
Therefore, our will is still subject to some servitude, which, as we desire to remain certain and undoubted, we affirm is not hindered by the foreknowledge and predestination of God.
58. Hitherto in this article, it is seen what necessity comes from the foreknowledge and predestination of God; namely, such a necessity as is not absolute, but by supposition, which we call necessity of consequence, of infallibility, and of certainty; but not of coercion.
And seeing it is so, it is now evident that no injustice is committed by God when he condemns sinners and glorifies the righteous. For to every man is rendered according to his works, so that no man can say that his sins are not his own works, seeing he is not compelled to commit them, but exceedingly allows and wills them. Neither are laws, admonitions, promises, and punishments in vain, as it was objected; for they are of so much force as God has decreed they shall be, as Augustine writes in his fifth book De Civitate Dei, in the chapter before cited. For God's will is to use them for the salvation of many, and although they do not benefit some, yet they do not miss
their end; for they help forward to the condemnation of the wicked.
Prayers also are not made unprofitable; for by them, we obtain those things which God has decreed to give us through them. Therefore, this is an excellent saying of Gregory in his Dialogues: "By prayers, only those things can be obtained which God has predestinated to give." And how by predestination, foreknowledge, or prophecies, sins are not excused, we are taught by many testimonies of the holy scriptures. Christ foretold that Judas would betray him; truly, that foretelling neither took away Judas's wickedness nor poured it into him. He followed the enticements of covetousness; he betrayed the Lord not to obey his prophecy. Christ also was by the will of God slain, for he said in the garden, "Let this cup pass away from me if it be possible, but not my will be done, but thine." And of himself, he said beforehand, "I will give my life for my sheep."
Yes, Herod and Pilate are said in the Acts of the Apostles to have agreed together to do those things which the counsel of God had decreed. Are either the Jews or those princes, by reason of this, to be acquitted from sin when they condemned and slew an innocent man?
Who will say so? Shall any man also acquit of villainy the brethren of Joseph when they sold their brother, although God willed by that means that Joseph should come into Egypt? Neither shall the cruelty of the king of Babylon be excused, although the justice of God decreed to have the Jews in such a manner punished. He who is killed is said to be delivered by God into the hands of his enemy. And God is also said to deliver a city when it is won by assault. And Job said that those things which were taken away from him by violence and robbery by the Chaldeans and Sabeans were taken away by God;
"The Lord," says he, "gave, and the Lord hath taken away."
Therefore, from that counsel of God, whereby he uses sins to their appointed ends, no just excuses of sins can be inferred; for wicked works are judged and condemned by reason of the lewd and corrupt
heart from which they are derived. Therefore, let no man be offended with the doctrine of predestination, seeing rather by it we are led to acknowledge the benefits of God and to give thanks unto him only.
And let us also learn not to attribute more to our strength than we ought; let us also have an assured persuasion of the good will of God towards us, whereby he would elect his before the foundations of the world were laid. Let us moreover be confirmed in adversities, knowing assuredly that whatever calamity happens, it is done by the counsel and will of God, and that finally, by the moderation of predestination, it shall turn to good and to eternal salvation.
Whether God would kill or destroy any man.
59. But there arises a doubt, whether God would kill or destroy any man: for it is written that The sons of Eli heeded not their father's words, because the Lord would slay them. In the 18th and 33rd chapters (for both the chapters are of one argument, although
Jerome showed some difference between them, yet so small, as it makes in a manner no matter), Ezekiel, under the person of God, says; As truly as I live, I will not the death of a sinner, but that he convert and live. And in Isaiah 28th chapter, it is read; I, saith the Lord, will do a strange work; namely, to punish you: whereupon it is gathered, that it is far from the nature of God to lay punishments upon us for sins. Wherefore it is everywhere pronounced of the church, that the property of God is to forgive, and to be merciful. And in the first chapter of Wisdom (if yet we shall allow of that book), it is written; God made not death, nor delighteth in the destruction of the living. Furthermore, the name of the very same GOD is called in the holy scriptures Jehovah; which soundeth nothing else, than Being, or, To be. Wherefore Augustine in his book De vera religione, the twelfth chapter saith; that The nature of God is To be; forasmuch as all things have from thence even that being that they have. But death
brings to pass that things cease to be; so that it seemeth not to proceed from God. And in Genesis, it is written, that God made man a living soul. whereupon it follows, that he did not so make him, that he would destroy him; but rather that he should live. And in the 29th chapter of Jeremiah, it is said; My thoughts are the thoughts of peace, and not of affliction, saith the Lord. Nevertheless, we understand here, that he would destroy the sons of Eli. And Jeremiah in the Lamentations saith, that God minded to overthrow the wall of Zion. And in Zechariah, it is said; Even as God thought to punish you, what time as your fathers provoked him to wrath: so now have I determined to do well unto you. And there is a place extant in the 14th chapter of Isaiah, wherein by manifest words it is declared, that God consulted and decreed with himself utterly to destroy the Babylonians and Assyrians. And very many testimonies, for the confirmation of this matter, might be gathered out of the holy scriptures: but because we meet with them everywhere, I will pass them over.
60. As touching the discourse which we have in hand; first, we must determine of some certain thing; secondly, we must encounter the testimonies and reasons which may seem to be against the definition set down. First of all, the nature of death is to be distinguished: because there is one of the soul, and another of the body. As touching that of the body, it would be superfluous to say anything; seeing by the sense, we perceive the same to be nothing else but a departure of the soul from the flesh. Wherefore, on the other side, we affirm that the death of the soul doth then happen, when we, for sin's sake, are separated from God. Unto these things, this also is to be added, that the death of the body doth depend on the death of the soul; for unless that had gone before, this should not follow: whereupon Paul most truly wrote; that By sin came death into the world. Only Christ is here to be excepted, who only died without sin: albeit that neither
he, in very deed, died altogether without sin, seeing that he bore our sins on his body upon the cross. But the procurer of death (as Augustine saith in his fourth book De Civitate Dei, the 12th chapter) was the devil: for he was therefore of John called A murderer even from the beginning because he persuaded the first men unto sin.
Even as Christ therefore is the mediator of life, so is the devil, of death. And it is written, that Sin entered into the world by one man, because that same one, that is, the first man, was corrupted by the devil. Therefore, saith Augustine; God made not death absolutely and by itself, but for a just recompense imposed the same upon sinners. For indeed it is one thing to produce a thing absolutely, and by itself; and another thing justly to lay it upon us; for all things that are done of God by themselves are indeed good: for God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good.
Those things also which are laid upon us for a reward of sins, although in their own nature they be evil, that is to say, against our nature; yet so far forth as they have the nature of justice, they ought to be counted as good things. For the plain declaration whereof,
Augustine useth a very apt similitude; When a judge condemneth a man to execution, he is not properly said to have done the execution, seeing the guilty man procured the same to himself. Wherefore there is a certain will of God absolute, and another (as Augustine calleth it) recompensing, To whether of those belongeth the present place, wherein it is said, that God would destroy the sons of Eli? Whether shall we understand it of the absolute will, or of the recompensing will? Doubtless of the recompensing; because of the absolute will it must not be understood. Therefore (saith Augustine) it is most just, that when our soul shall of his own will depart from God, it should be separated from his body, whether it will or no. In like manner, there would be a difference put between the conditions of sinners; for there be some of them which sorrow that they have sinned, and
whom it repenteth of their sins committed: these men, as they belong to the election, even so do they exercise the faith wherewith they are adorned.
61. Of this kind of sinners, speaketh God when he saith in Ezekiel; I will not the death of a sinner. And this will of God is so firm and steadfast, as he confirmeth the same with an oath; As truly as I live
(saith he) I will not the death of a sinner. But others do so stick in their wickedness, as they are never led with any repentance; for so much as they belong to the number of the reprobates: these men assuredly God would have to die. And for a truth, after that they have fulfilled the measure of their grievous sins, it is requisite that they should die; that one day at length they may make an end of their sinning. Therefore, whereas the prophet saith under the person of God, that He will not the death of a sinner, it must not be understood universally, as touching all; but of some certain. We might also add with many divines that there is a certain will of God, which they call effectual; and also another of the sign: for there are given to all men one with another certain signs of salvation; such as are outward vocation, which chiefly consists of the word of God, of preaching, and of the administration of the sacraments. Another will there is of God secret, which is called effectual; and belongeth not unto all men together: for if it comprehended all men, no doubt but all men should be saved. For such is the strength and power of God, as of him the scriptures pronounce; He hath done all things whatsoever he would. So that the prophet Ezekiel meant, that our punishments must not be ascribed to God; but rather to the sins of our own selves.
And when he addeth, that God would, that men should convert and live; that must not so be understood, as though we may obtain eternal life by the merit of repentance; seeing we obtain that by faith, which only procureth to us the mercy of God, through Christ. And no
less is repentance than our faith to be reckoned among the gifts of God. And undoubtedly, as touching repentance, Paul speaketh unto
Timothy; If peradventure God shall give them repentance: but of faith it is written to the Philippians; God hath not only given it unto you, that you should believe, but also to suffer for his sake. And unto the Ephesians; By faith ye are saved, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God. Verily we have these things by the liberality of God, not of our own strength; because we are not sufficient of ourselves, as of ourselves, to further anything unto our salvation; For it is God that worketh in us both to will and to perform: wherefore not some part of our salvation, but the whole dependeth of God. But and if thou shalt demand, why God bestoweth these his gifts rather on this man than on that? It is a thing unsearchable. This ought to satisfy us, to confess, that whatsoever he doth, he doth it rightly and surely.
62. But whereas Isaiah saith; that God doth a strange work when he bringeth just punishments upon the wicked; it is no hard matter to make it agree with the sentence that we have set down, seeing that God, of his own accord, and without just cause inferreth no evil: for he is provoked by our sins, and he recompenseth our wickedness with a just damnation. Nevertheless, in that place, a strange work seems unto me to signify a work unaccustomed, not seen, nor heard of before: as if God should say; I will bring upon you, not an ordinary and daily punishment, but a notable and wonderful punishment. He that shall after this manner understand the words of the prophet, in my judgment he shall vary from the natural sense thereof. And whereas it is written in the first chapter of the book of Wisdom, that God made not death, nor delighteth in the destruction of the living, it is (as I think) plainly enough to be understood by those things which are already spoken. For we may understand, that God made not death, because we by our sins have drawn it unto us: but yet we must not therefore affirm, that the same is no manner of way derived from
God. Neither must Made or Ordained be urged vehemently in that place, otherwise it might be again objected against them out of the 11th chapter of Ecclesiasticus, that Death and life, good and evil, poverty and riches are of God. And whereas it is added, that God rejoiceth not at the destruction of the living; that is true as touching the predestinate, seeing of them he suffereth none to perish: when otherwise of the reprobate it is said in the first chapter of the Proverbs; I also will rejoice in your destruction: for God is not led unwillingly or violently, but willingly and gladly to destroy the ungodly. Moreover, truth it is, that man at the beginning was created a living soul: and God for that cause may seem not to be the author of death, because he created man, that he might live; who afterward by his own fault, procured death unto himself.
But yet hereunto I add, that man could not have life, without the special benefit of God; for he giveth it at his will and pleasure to whom he thinketh good. And undoubtedly that is true, which he himself speaketh in Jeremiah; that His thoughts are the thoughts of peace, and not of affliction. First, because that death, and her retainers are (as it hath been said) drawn to us by our own selves.
Further, it must not be lightly weighed, which is afterward written in the prophet unto the house of Israel, that is, unto the elect, and them that are predestinate to salvation: for unto them GOD intendeth nothing but for their salvation. As touching the name of Jehovah, by which God is specially named; because all things have of him even the very being which they have; and that therefore death, seeing it bringeth a man to nothing, cannot seem to have his cause of God, it is to be understood, that death is ordained for men as a punishment of sin, and is laid upon them that deserve it. Neither do we deny, but that God of himself is life; seeing the essence of all things dependeth of him, as of the fountain. Which nevertheless is not so, but that he can withdraw the same, so often as he thinks good; for whatsoever he
doth, he doth it voluntarily, and of his own accord: not as doth the sun, the stars, the moon, the fire, and other natural things, which work naturally, and of a certain necessity. Therefore David wisely said; When thou openest thy hand, all things shall be filled with goodness, which if thou pluck back again, and once doest close, all things shall straightway be destroyed. Howbeit, he closeth not his hand, except he be provoked by our ill deserts.