VI. Alternative Theories

VI. Alternative Theories

1. GENERAL COMMENTS

A. Early Versions of Naturalistic Theories

1. Brown: Brown surveys numerous naturalistic theories from the second century on, including gnostic views like those of Basilides (“Jesus did not suffer” and Simon of Cyrene was crucified in Jesus’s place), “look-alike views” like Cerinthus’s and similar views in the Second Treatise of the Great Seth (51.20–52.3) and the Qur’an, as well as the swoon theories of ‘Abd al-Jabbar (ca. AD 1000), Thiering, and Schonfield.

2. Hauck: Hauck finds that Celsus is a forerunner of several naturalistic theories as well as joining other second-century sources in questioning the epistemic value of empirical evidence.

3. Kasper: Kasper lists a number of naturalistic theories and then says, “The only hypotheses to retain any importance today are the evolution [legend] and vision hypotheses.” Vision theories remain the “most widespread and still influential.”

4. O’Collins and Kendall: O’Collins and Kendall mention several second- and third-century theories, chiefly gnostic theses along with the Qur’an.

5. Stanton: Graham Stanton surveys second-century objections to the resurrection from Celsus, Trypho, and a few other responses (in Barton and Stanton, chap. 8). He contends that almost all of the objections “raised since the Enlightenment were anticipated by the pagan Celsus, or by the Jew whom he [Justin Martyr] quotes.” The importance of these early objections to the resurrection “cannot be overestimated.”

B. Any Theory More Probable than the Resurrection

1. Carrier: Carrier provides three naturalistic arguments he thinks are more probable than Jesus’s resurrection. His preferred option is “outright legend,” but he also considers the stolen body and moved body theories as more likely.

2. Parsons: Parsons thinks that “it will be more reasonable for an atheist to believe just about any alternative scenario, no matter how improbable.”

C. Historical Epistemology as Objection to Resurrection

1. History Is Uncertain, Probable, and Provisional

A) Allison: Allison stresses that it is always possible to conceive of various ways to explain Jesus’s resurrection. He uses a speculative hypothesis about aliens to show how one could always conceive of various ways to explain Jesus’s resurrection. Allison also suggests that decisions about Jesus’s resurrection must do more than look at mere historical data points. Allison appears to place an odd emphasis on the fact that multiple possibilities exist. Given his other comments regarding how worldviews affect historical conclusions, it seems he may be concerned with a “future phantom.” Indeed, he writes that there is no evidence for the hypothetical possibilities he presents. Nevertheless, Allison finds this to be decisive in showing that the Christian message cannot be proved (Cartesian certainty?).

2. Worldviews Justify Historical Descriptions; Historical Descriptions Do Not Justify Worldviews

A) Allison: Allison states that we must defer to theologians and philosophers when it comes to worldview issues. He also argues that those who are naturalists will easily reject all miracles. Allison does not understand why a miracle would challenge such a naturalist worldview because naturalist worldviews make rejections of the miraculous reasonable. Indeed, this would not only make “speculative” theories reasonable but also “inevitable.” Allison appears to give the same weight to speculative theories as he does to better evidenced ones and, thus, believes that even speculative theories are ultimately not “un-reasonable.” He notes that we “inevitably” assess the data by our worldview and that what is considered probable is determined by the individual. Allison gives the impression that one is determined by their worldviews here too. He notes two extreme positions: wholesale skepticism and wholesale belief. One must do more than pure history to show that Jesus rose from the dead, which is a conclusion from Christian thought. Jesus’s resurrection cannot establish one’s worldview; it cannot be one’s “epistemological foundation.” The resurrection interpreted within the Christian worldview makes sense, while those with other worldviews will reject or reinterpret it. The resurrection cannot be understood apart from our worldview. Allison notes that Wright disagrees here and makes some brief comments. For example, even if one was convinced that Jesus rose from the dead, it would not mean that God did it. Modern analogies are court cases, where there can be different ways of accounting for the evidence. It seems Allison has ignored the human element in history and that people can use history for their own purposes. Disagreements do not always mean that we cannot arrive at a true conclusion (otherwise our courts would never decide on cases!). It appears that Allison gives no room for a historian to address worldviews apart from saying that we all have them. It is quite possible for historians to also explain their worldviews. Some worldviews are better than others, and many are in-compatible with one another (cf. Wright’s arguments below).

B) Carrier: He seems to want to say that we should be open methodologically. He does not know what kind of evidence could support methodological supernaturalism and, thus, he seems to indicate that methodological naturalism is the only option.

C) Davis: Davis believes that the resurrection is among a number of rational views one can hold regarding this event. Although he believes in the resurrection, he notes that unbelief in the resurrection is also a rational view (within a naturalistic worldview). Davis contends that we only give up our worldviews in the face of multitudes of disconfirmations. For example, a naturalist will only give up his or her worldview once multiple angles of argumentation have challenged it. Thus, where one is in one’s life will determine whether one is more or less open to changing or converting from one’s current worldview to another worldview. However, we are left wondering what, if anything, makes one more open to worldview change (especially in light of cognitive dissonance, etc.). Nevertheless, Davis finds the value of his argument is that believers are rational for believing the resurrection, and unbelievers could be rational for their disbelief. If both theism and naturalism are rational positions, as well as belief and disbelief in the resurrection, how is one to pick between two rational positions? This question seems to arise regarding Davis’s solution. Davis also notes what appear to be fideistic comments when he says that only those with faith can reach correct conclusions.

D) Meier: States that decisions about miracles must go beyond pure history.

3. Jesus’s Resurrection Is Not an Event Open to Historical Inquiry (History Cannot Do Theology)

A) General Comments

(1) Various Scholars: Various scholars think there is no proof for the resurrection. Or, like Goergen, they hold that the resurrection is “a meta-historiographical historical event.”

(2) Carnley: Carnley doesn’t think we can answer the question of the resurrection because there is not enough evidence.

(3) Crossley: Crossley notes that the resurrection “cannot be proved” and, perhaps paradoxically, it ought to be “dismissed as a historical event.”

(4) Cupitt: Cupitt asks how could one ever posit a “transcendent cause” for a historical event? The most one could say is the event occurred, without discussing its cause. One must, accordingly, keep historical affirmations separate from theological ones like Jesus’s exaltation to God’s right hand. The historian, like the scientist, must only use natural explanations.

(5) Ehrman: Ehrman doesn’t think history can show that Jesus did or didn’t rise from the dead. Nevertheless, when it comes to miracles, history cannot assist in demonstrating what occurred (see below). However, as noted elsewhere, Ehrman indicates that one can say that the event happened without commenting on its cause (e.g., miraculous).

(6) Jesus Seminar: “By definition [not clear to which definition they are referring], words ascribed to Jesus after his death are not subject to historical verification. . . . Such claims are beyond the limits of historical assessment.”

(7) Meier: Meier emphasizes throughout A Marginal Jew that historians are not allowed to appeal to theological explanations because they are beyond the empirical conversation.

(8) Neill and Wright: Neill and Wright appear to suggest that there is at least an element of truth to the idea that the resurrection does not belong to history but to the realm of faith. However, the reason they seem to say this is to later show that mere intellectual assent to historical truths is not enough in itself for faith.

B) Rejection by Definition

(1) Ehrman: Ehrman appears to define miracles in a way that a priori rejects them historically. “Since historians can only establish what probably happened in the past, and the chances of a miracle happening, by definition, are infinitesimally remote, they can never demonstrate that a miracle probably happened.” Yet Ehrman argues elsewhere that the problem is not probability, but rather that the historian does not have the tools to do theology. Additionally, following his logic on probability, events that are low in antecedent probability can be made high in probability depending upon the evidence (e.g., getting a royal flush). Curiously, Ehrman uses the example of how we could identify a miracle by referring to a preacher and a floating iron bar.

C) Rejection Due to Lack of Epistemological or Methodological Tools to Identify Supernatural Causation

(1) Allison: As noted above, Allison thinks the historian cannot comment here. This is not because theologians and philosophers can discern miracles, but because they are better equipped than historians to address worldview issues. One must do more than pure history to show that Jesus rose from the dead, which is a conclusion from Christian thought.

(2) Ehrman: Ehrman notes he can grant that miracles are possible, but there remains an “insurmountable” problem, which is that historians still cannot demonstrate them. The reason for this problem, it appears, is Ehrman’s understanding of a miracle, which means the historian only has access to public events and not supernatural forces. What epistemological tool is the historian lacking (skeptics might suggest naivete, wishful thinking, blind faith, etc.)? Ehrman contends that miracles are ultimately an issue of “faith” and not “objective” knowledge. Is he suggesting that faith is a type of epistemology?

D) Belief in Supernatural Events

(1) Ehrman: When historians say a miracle occurred, according to Ehrman, they are doing so as a believer and not as a historian. One cannot help but wonder what tool does the believer have to believe that a miracle has occurred in the past that the historian does not have? Ehrman seems to suggest that context is a relevant factor in his example of a pastor praying over an iron bar that then floats as being a miracle.

E) Minimalist Approaches Reject Theology

(1) Meier: Meier uses an approach that appears to seek minimalist conclusions (perhaps to an overly limited extent). He does not allow theological considerations and appeals to conclusions that would be accepted by “every fair-minded” person. He does observe, however, when it comes to Christian origins, that “faith claims” come alongside empirical claims. An example he uses is Jesus’s death, which is widely accepted, and the claim that Jesus’s death was for the sins of the world, which is a theological claim that is not widely accepted and cannot be proven. (How did the belief come about in the first place, and would Jesus’s resurrection be relevant to answer this question?)

F) Must Presuppose the Worldviews That Were Generally Held by Historians

(1) Ehrman: Ehrman makes the comment that historians should only use popular or widely held worldviews or perspectives because to do otherwise would be inappropriate.

4. Refusal to Accept Miraculous Claims from Other Religions

A) See Also: “Miracles in Other Religons” (section 6) in this chapter.

B) Ehrman: Ehrman states that apologists virtually always ignore evidence for the miracles in other religions. He then, surprisingly, seems to compare the miracles associated with Romulus as being evidentially on par with Jesus. He also references appearances of the Virgin Mary.

2. ACCEPTANCE OF VARIATIONS OF HUME’S WORK, INCLUDING ANTECEDENT PROBABILITY

A. General Comments

1. Blackburn: On the nature miracles, Blackburn notes a “major factor” in their treatment is that “miraculous events are simply impossible” or are “so wildly improbable that human testimony would never be strong enough to render them otherwise.”

2. Cranfield: Cranfield thinks that the “most important objection” is “simply the apparent sheer, stark, utter impossibility of the thing.”

3. Cupitt: Cupitt thinks that even if naturalistic responses don’t work, it doesn’t help us today. When such explanations fail, we still must not employ supernatural explanations.

4. Davis: Davis thinks the best option for nonbelievers is something like the antecedent improbability of the resurrection. Although they might be able to agree concerning the positive evidence toward the surrounding facts and regarding the fact that alternative theories fall short, they still would say God did not raise Jesus bodily from the dead. The reason for this is that dead people have historically stayed dead.

5. Ehrman: Ehrman sounds very similar to Hume in an example he gives of three people who witness a pastor walk on water. He believes it is more likely that they were mistaken or lied rather than the pastor walked across the water. (Yet what if there was more evidence; e.g., the pastor carried something from one side to the other?)

6. Fiorenza: Fiorenza seems to accept antecedent problems for those “with different background assumptions.”

7. Hartshorne: Hartshorne agrees with Hume that we must balance testimony for and versus miracles. But he says that he doesn’t agree completely with Hume. He ends his essay: “My metaphysical bias is against resurrections.”

8. Keller: Keller thinks that in our search for evidence of miracles, “we could seek such events in the Bible or in contemporary life.”

9. Lüdemann: Lüdemann finds a “consensus” among the other debaters and points out their agreement that natural explanations should be sought first.

10. Martin: Martin argues that the resurrection has very low initial probability “even if” God exists.

11. Nielsen: Nielsen thinks that even if there was good evidence for the resurrection, it would just be seen as an anomaly of nature.

12. Tipler: Due to billions of cases where the dead stay dead, Tipler says this “must outweigh” evidence for the resurrection.

B. More Evidence Needed for Miracles

1. Davis: Although Davis argues for the resurrection, he thinks we “ought to have a powerful bias against the miraculous” and even assume methodological naturalism.

2. Goulder: Goulder agrees that there are differences of opinion concerning what “plausible” might look like.

3. Henaut: Mentions (and obviously agrees with) Van Harvey’s (The Historian and the Believer, 1966) contention that “shifts the burden of evidence to the one who alleges the miracle to be true” to “produce a far stronger rebuttal” for miracles. Defenders frequently “failed to meet the initial burden of proof.”

4. Keller: Keller says what we need is “good reason to believe that events have occurred for which a naturalistic explanation is very unlikely.”

5. Konyndyk: Although Konyndyk thinks that, overall, Flew has a very weak case against the resurrection, he still says, “I agree with Flew that . . . an extraordinary claim will typically require considerably more evidence.”

6. Owen: Owen agrees Hume is right that “the credibility of testimony in favor of miracles would never be high enough to command our assent, even if the reliability of the witnesses was high.” Owen thinks that, although few recognize it, Hume recognizes it is possible for eyewitness testimony to be more reliable than the evidence of a law of nature. However, even with this being the case, it does not follow that such an event could be the basis for a religious system because it couldn’t be shown that God did it. It seems that the outworkings of this means that if one already believed in Christianity, one could rationally accept the event, but it is not enough to change an unbeliever’s mind.

7. Parsons: Parsons writes that evidence and initial probability are important considerations and that something being impossible simply means the lowest possible probability that an event could happen. But Parsons also states, “If Moreland is only maintaining the weakest of these claims, that it is rational for Christians to believe in the resurrection, I see no reason to belabor the point.”

8. Puleo: Puleo’s position is that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof. This should be our attitude toward Jesus’ alleged resurrection.”

9. Staudinger: Staudinger argues along the lines of the Sagan standard, which asserts that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.

10. Viney: Viney seems to agree that more evidence is needed in a Humean vein.

3. AGNOSTICISM

A. Cavin: In an article aimed at Habermas, Craig, Harris, Ladd, and Pannenberg, Cavin writes that “the New Testament Easter traditions, do not provide sufficient information to enable us to establish the historicity of the resurrection—even on the assumption of their complete historical reliability.” Cavin concludes that we don’t have enough data to establish “the resurrection hypothesis.” Cavin prefers the hypothesis that Jesus had a twin.

B. Davis: Repeatedly says that he thinks it is “rational” for someone to say that although they do not know what happened, it was not a resurrection. Recall also that Davis encourages methodological naturalism.

C. Eddy: Advocates for a limited agnosticism, writing, “Let us allow more room . . . for a reverent agnosticism about bodies and tombs.” Eddy may be suggesting that we should be a little more cautious about things than is often considered.

D. Flew: Repeats there is not enough evidence (often in debate with Habermas). However, in the Dialogue manuscript, Flew acknowledges that there are some decent things to be said as far as evidence for the resurrection, especially for those coming to the issues who hold a Judeo-Christian worldview. In the Moreland-Nielsen debate, Flew asserts that the evidence for the resurrection is not immediate enough, as in parapsychological studies, and apparently thinks that the evidence for the latter is stronger.

E. Tipler: Tipler does not believe in Jesus’s resurrection. He agrees with Flew (below) that 2,000 years is too long ago to determine what happened.

F. Viney: Viney says that just because naturalistic theories might fail, “it does not follow that we have good reason to believe in the resurrection.” Rather, the question is “whether we have better reason to remain agnostic than to believe in the resurrection theory.” Viney charges that more evidence is needed for supernatural events.

G. Wedderburn: Wedderburn agrees with Flew. He says that there is an insufficient amount of eyewitness testimony to tell if a naturalistic theory could be true. It is similar to the resurrection case as a whole, so if naturalistic theories are even possible, they cannot be discounted.

4. ACCEPTED ALTERNATIVE THEORIES

A. Swoon Theory

1. Various Scholars: Various scholars have considered the swoon theory or some similar variation.

2. Derrett: Derrett’s thesis makes much use of Mark. Derrett claims Jesus was stabbed with a spear, which was normal Roman practice, but it was more likely a prick to see if he would flinch. Perhaps Jesus entered a trance on the cross and didn’t die. His clinical death was reversed and Jesus was revived in the tomb. Jesus was then found by a young man outside, who was assigned to watch the tomb. Jesus then had very brief conversations with the women and disciples, commissioning them. Jesus was convinced all of this was God’s vindication and fulfilled Scripture. Then Jesus died of gangrene and was ultimately cremated by the disciples. The disciples knew that he didn’t die on the cross but died later. But all of this was “not a hoax.” “The greatest obstacle” to Derrett’s theory is Paul’s conversion/appearance, but for Derrett, Paul had a vision. According to Derrett, the term anastasis (which he translates as “revival”) in the New Testament doesn’t mean Jesus actually rose from the dead, but that he revived after his crucifixion. Derrett notes that two proofs for the resurrection are said to be the empty tomb and appearances. This later turned into proclamations of his resurrection appearances. The appearances were “ecstatic visions.” The empty tomb was the earliest message that Christians centered on. This is no problem for Christian theology because “the ‘mode’ of the Resurrection of Jesus has never been an article of faith.” Derrett notes that crucifixion victims could possibly have been taken down alive. He cites Herodotus 7.194; Josephus, Life 420–421, m. Yevamot 16:3; t. Yevamot 14:4c; 16:3; y. Yevamot 5; Iamblichus, Bab. 2 and 21.

3. Hartshorne: Hartshorne says he neither accepts nor rejects the swoon theory.

4. Davies and Davies: They claim the side wound to Jesus was no more than a “pricking.” They note an article from the Journal of the American Medical Association on Jesus’s crucifixion and shock as well as people thinking Jesus was dead. “As Jesus showed signs of life he was not placed in a tomb . . . but taken away and tended.” They add that from “early removal from the Cross, and to resuscitation,” the appearances were apparently hallucinations “under intense psychological pressure.”

5. Oberdorfer: Notes that since Schleiermacher “tended to interpret Christ’s death as only an apparent death, it is quite likely that he understood ‘resurrection’ as a kind of reanimation.”

6. O’Collins: Following Venturini in the nineteenth century, O’Collins surveys ten swoon theories from the twentieth century, both fiction and nonfiction, including some devastating reviews of these volumes. O’Collins notes some trends: (1) several of these theories employ connections from Qumran; (2) most have Jesus living for years afterward; and (3) some have Jesus traveling to other countries. In conclusion: “Schweitzer was right. Every year or so Venturini will continue to be plagiarized.”

7. Price: Says that in ancient novels, heroes often escaped death. He notes we see hints that Jesus never died on the cross. Price states Jesus’s brother James may have pointed to him as still living, and Jesus may have been hiding so as to come out later to fight the Romans. Price sees hints of swoon in Mark 14:35–36 (Gethsemane, let this cup pass); Mark 15:34 (quoting Psalm 22); Mark 15:44 (Pilate marvels at Jesus); and Heb 5:7 (God heard Jesus’s cries to escape death). Price holds that John’s crucifixion nails and spear wound were added later. Price also considers the possibility of the swoon perspective following the Muslim view.

8. Wolfe: Wolfe’s anachronistic volume is way off the beaten critical track. He proposes that Jesus was not nailed to the cross and had no spear wound. He provides many modern but anecdotal instances of premature burial. Then he says, “The view that Jesus was only in a state of coma when placed in the sepulcher, and that he later revived, probably will increasingly commend itself to scientifically minded modern people with advanced medical knowledge and awareness.”

B. Fraud Type 1: Disciples Stole the Body

1. Carrier: Carrier dedicates a chapter to argue for the theft theory. He thinks that theft is a plausible theory since there are reasons for taking it seriously. Carrier essentially believes that the arguments against theft fail, the appearances are hallucinations or visions, and the empty tomb is a legend, as is the guard in Matthew. The reports of theft indicate that one could believe in a resurrection because of an empty tomb. “And that may well be what happened.”

2. Derrett: Derrett says that Jesus didn’t die on the cross (see also above). The disciples later cremated his dead body, but they apparently did it secretly and never preached that they had thus disposed of it. Note Derrett’s view above that he does not think this was a “hoax.”

3. Henaut: Simply mentions in passing the stolen body thesis.

4. Houlden: Houlden believed that the stolen body theory “must have dominated the scene” in Matthew’s area for him to spend so much time refuting it.

5. Kent: “Maybe Jesus’ friends or enemies came and removed the body.” But Kent holds it is more likely that Jesus’s body was just thrown into an unknown grave.

6. Martin: Says while “not deliberately perpetrating a fraud,” there are still many other forms of “self-delusion and wishful thinking” that could explain the disciples’ experiences as indicated by Zevi and his followers.

7. Smith: Morton Smith admits that the Jews claimed that the disciples stole the body of Jesus.

8. Tabor: Tabor suggests that although one is left to guess, “the most likely possibility would be his mother, Mary, and his sister Salome, likely assisted by some of the other women who had come with them from Galilee.” One wonders why Mary forgot to tell the disciples.

C. Fraud Type 2: Someone Other Than the Disciples Took the Body, or Wrong Tomb

1. Crossan: Crossan says Jesus was buried in a shallow grave and eaten by dogs.

2. Funk: Funk says concerning the Jesus Seminar, “About three-fourths of the Fellows believe that Jesus’ followers did not know what happened to his body.”

3. Goulder: Goulder considers the possibility of Jesus being buried in a common grave.

4. Henaut: Henaut (a skeptic) simply mentions the “wrong tomb” thesis in passing and later says about Jesus’s burial that there are “two logical possibilities competing against each other for assent: a common grave versus the Joseph tradition.”

5. Kent: Kent considers the possibility of an unknown grave.

6. Robinson: Speaking of the empty tomb, about the only hypothesis that John A. T. Robinson thinks “cannot be so easily dismissed” is that of “foul play” where some “extremist fanatics” moved or took the body.

7. Sheehan: Sheehan also notes the possibility that Jesus may have been buried in a common grave.

8. Thrall: Thrall says that while it is “very unlikely,” the “most plausible” natural thesis regarding the empty tomb is Kirsopp Lake’s wrong tomb theory. Later she asks why the Jews couldn’t have moved the body to “some common grave.”

9. Wedderburn: After mentioning Jesus being “dumped in a common grave,” Wedderburn says, “no one saw what happened to the body,” raising questions about Jesus’s burial.

D. Legendary and Divine Man Parallels

1. General Comments

A) Alsup: Although disagreeing that they can explain the resurrection appearances, Alsup provides a lengthy overview of both “divine men” texts and Jewish parallels. Regarding Apollonius of Tyana, Alsup notes that Philostratus is using traditions that are from the same time as the “NT beginnings.” Although there are some similarities to Jesus’s ascension or Paul’s experience, Philostratus’s accounts “have no likeness whatsoever to the appearance stories of the gospel tradition.” Also, the literary form of his account is entirely different. Alsup also provides overviews of Romulus’s apotheosis and appearance; Aristeas of Proconnesus’s apotheosis and appearances; Cleomedes of Astypaleia’s disappearance; Alcmene’s disappearance; Peregrinus Proteus’s death, ascension, and appearance; Demainte’s appearance after her cremation; and some fragments of other cases. The “divine men” don’t die, according to Alsup, but they disappear to a higher plane, living there.

B) Bolt: Although Bolt is opposed to these ideas, he says that ancient magicians claimed the ability to raise the dead. Pliny mentions persons who returned after burial, although Pliny apparently thought they were not really dead. “Mythology provided several examples of resuscitations . . . followed by eventual death.” Apotheosis and divination in the Roman world could involve both disappearing and being translated—like Romulus, Julius, and Augustus Caesar.

C) Carrier: Carrier notes that while there are undoubtedly differences, a number of similarities exist between Christianity and Rome’s founding ceremony.

D) Elliott: Elliott says that the resurrection “cannot be described as an historic event. The Easter story is a faith-legend.”

E) Fiorenza: Notes that there are some “striking” examples of Hellenistic “divine man” parallels to the New Testament appearance narratives, especially the road to Emmaus episode, which makes the case difficult. Regarding differences with these paralells, Fiorenza notes, “They are less accounts of resurrection from the dead than accounts of the appearance of an absent person who has been exalted.”

F) Fuller: Although he rejects legends as explaining the appearances, Fuller says that in Gospel accounts of the road to Emmaus, Jesus eating fish, and doubting Thomas, Luke is using stories that were well known to the common world, and using them for his own ends.

G) Funk: Says Paul “identified Jesus as a savior figure of the hellensitic type, a dying/rising god, such as Osiris in the Isis cult.” He claims the proclamation in 1 Cor 15:3–5 may have been “suggested” by Old Testament texts and by dying and rising mystery cults.

H) Gethin: Gethin says that Buddhists would make sense of Jesus by thinking of him as “an accomplished yogin.”

I) Graham: Graham says (apparently giving his own view or at least one he agrees with): “Sixteen times this Savior myth has risen thus to deceive the race; let us now, henceforth and forever, recognize it for what it is, a myth and nothing more.”

J) Helms: Helms compares Jesus to Hellenistic “divine men.”

K) Jesus Seminar: The Jesus Seminar pronounces that Jesus was seen by his followers as “analogous to others in the hellenistic mystery religions.” Paul thought of Jesus “as a dying/rising lord . . . of the type he knew from the hellenistic mystery religions.”

L) Kaufman: Kaufman says that Jesus and his followers be-lieved history was soon coming to an end. When it didn’t happen, “Christians came to think of Jesus as God’s unique son, enthroned at the right hand of God the father, ruling the world from on high.”

M) Knight: Utilizes mystery religion stories to argue a Jungian archetype visionary theory of Jesus.

N) Mack: Mack says that all of the ways early Christians spoke of the resurrection “have parallels in other Hellenistic literatures and religions.” These parallels are particularly seen in the “myths of dying and rising gods.” Mack further notes that visions were experienced by many people.

O) Mackey: Perhaps a limited use of legend as it relates to citing the Old Testament, Mackey states, “The early resurrection preaching is to a great extent woven from Old Testament texts.” He provides a long list of potential examples. The result is that the “earliest resurrection preaching is not language suggested by a new event, but rather language borrowed.”

P) Martin: Martin argues that “resurrection stories were common in Jesus’ era and before.” He cites Price for including Apollonius of Tyana here. Martin cites all kinds of gods and goddesses, including Inanna, Isis, and Osiris, saying, “I owe these references to Richard Carrier, personal correspondence.”

Q) McKenzie: He thinks the “Resurrection Archetype” comes from several avenues of human experience: (1) vegetation cycles; (2) climatic or solar cycles; (3) daily cycles, like the path of the sun; (4) stellar cycles; (5) sleep and waking cycles; (6) tribal changes of good and bad fortune; and (7) human mood cycles. McKenzie postulates “four elements that came together in the creative process” of forming “pagan resurrection myths”: (1) “an intuitive understanding of the resurrectional structure of the created world,” which is “the very foundation” of the “resurrection myths”; (2) the local hero and his exploits; (3) “development of the great monomyth” of the triumphant hero story; and (4) “the redaction of multiple local sagas into regional or territorial resurrection myths.”

R) Osborne: Osborne lists Strauss, Bousset, Bultmann, and Tillich as proponents of the theory that early Christianity borrowed from other religions in some sense.

S) Price: Notes numerous fictional parallels to Jesus’s death such as Chariton’s Chaeras and Callirhoe, as well as some parallels to the empty tomb. He then explains how he thinks the resurrection accounts arose. Price thinks that the resurrection teaching came rather late, but when Christians heard it, they vigorously embraced it. So it might have been the consequence of a slow evaluation by a small number of believers within the group.

T) Puleo: “There are over twenty such claimed revivals from the dead. Some of them precede the Christian era; others presumably occurred after the beginning of Christianity. . . . Most, if not all, of the characters involved are mythological.” Puleo provides the following examples: (1) “The earliest claim of resurrection comes from . . . ancient Sumer . . . about 3500–2000 B.C.” and Inanna and Dumuzi. (2) Egyptian Teta, who entertained Pharoah “by reattaching the decapitated heads of animals to their bodies and making them live again” and who claimed he could do it to humans too. (3) Two Egyptian brothers, Anpu and Bata, one of whom “dies and then returns to life.” Bata’s “soul leaves his body and conceals itself in one of the blossems [sic] of the plant” is an account found in Papyrus D’Orbiney dating “from about 1225 B.C.” (4) The Old Testament case of Elijah. (5) Ezekiel 37. (6) Greek “divine men” in Euripides’s (c. 485–406 BC) play Alcestis. Queen Alcestis is dying. Hercules wrestles “with Death and forcing him to return” her. But the “main theme of the drama has to do with [King] Admetus’ character, not with a miraculous revival from the dead.” (7) Hercules is killed by the giant Typhon “and is brought back to life by his nephew, Iolaus.” (8) Asclepius, whose “ability to bring back the dead is well attested to by several authors in antiquity,” like the poet Pindar (518–438 BC), Euripides (above), Vergil (70–19 BC), and Pausanias (second century AD). (9) Plato’s myth of Er. (10) Augustine lists five resurrections from the dead connected with saints. Since the chief rejoinder from Christians is that those cases are mythological: Caesar Augustus and Alexander the Great were both said to have been virgin born, and Julius Caesar had “remarkable events before and after death”

U) Sheehan: Sheehan employs various parallels from mystery religions and syncretism to the Christian belief in Jesus’s divinity.

V) Smith: Morton Smith seems to hint in the direction of Christianity as a mystery cult.

W) Thrall: Similar to Knight, Thrall utilizes these archetypes and subjective visionary theories.

X) Wilson: A. N. Wilson postulates that Paul invented Christianity in terms taken from beliefs like those of the Mithraic cult.

2. Evolved over Time

A) Crossley: Crossley alludes to this possibility based off of the predictions of Jesus’s death. The disciples would have had to account for Jesus’s predictions in some way. He also believes that Wright “underestimated creative storytelling” during this period. People could use historical figures in created stories. He refers to examples from Jubilees, the Genesis Apocryphon from Qumran, Joseph and Aseneth, and midrashic and haggadic literature, among other sources. These are examples of approaches that were justified because of an immediate need, according to Crossley, and it seems quite possible the Gospel writers did this as well. He acknowledges that “much of the rewriting of history concerns distant figures,” but that alone is insufficient to show that it could not be done in the present. Crossley goes on to provide some examples of cases from the more recent past (including rabbis, Alexander the Great, and Augustus). Crossley concludes that such suspicions are “never applied” to the resurrection accounts. He then says one would expect the Christian traditions to function similar to its Jewish and gentile counterparts.

B) Price: Price believes Mack helpfully identifies different factions caring more about the resurrection than others. This leads Price to argue that the resurrection “was the product of one faction of early Christianity, not the foundation of any sort of Christianity at all.” It then grew and developed over time.

3. Divine Man Comparisons

A) Ehrman: Ehrman gives his list of similarities between Apollonius and Jesus.

B) Jesus Seminar: The Jesus Seminar makes various comments regarding their analysis of Apollonius of Tyana.

C) Price: Aretalogy, according to Price, was used in the ancient world as a “wonder-laden religious hero biography or saint’s life.” Price suggests that the accounts of Jesus are part of this “fictional genre.” Price considers the possibility of aretalogy being relevant for understanding Jesus in ways similar to that of Moses, Alexander the Great, and others. Price notes a parallel between Philostratus, Life of Apollonius 4.45 and Luke 9:11–17 (raising of the widow’s son in Nain) and that one is tempted to see borrowing. (But note Murray Harris’s essay in Gospel Perspectives). Later, Price also makes it sound as though Philostratus copied from Luke. Philostratus’s Life of Apollonius is like an ancient novel. Price also makes a few comments regarding Livy’s account of Romulus’s ascension, which he believes to be somewhat similar to Jesus’s ascension account.

4. Mystery Religions

A) Allison: Allison summarizes the view of others who track dying and rising prophets that could explain Mark 6, which show that the pre-Easter disciples would naturally assume God’s vindication of Jesus upon his death. These scholars, according to Allison, say that the accounts in the Gospels are legendary or expressions of this vindication, and 1 Corinthians 15 is part of a formula of legitimation.

B) Assmann: “Still through his death and resurrection, Christ has paved the way to paradise or Elysium in a way not altogether dissimilar to that of Osiris . . . it seems that Egypt is the likely original source of these ideas.” Assmann also argues in his chapter that “the death and resurrection of Christ happened once and for all; it belongs to history and not of nature, to linear not cyclical time.”

C) Callahan: “Yet it is my belief . . . that the myth of the risen Christ represents a syncretism of the messiah figure with the dying and rising gods so popular among so many peoples of the Roman empire. Even the cross has pagan associations since it is found as a solar symbol in many ancient cultures, and solar deities are often gods who die and are reborn on the winter solstice.” It would be interesting to see how the uniqueness of the cross is highlighted by Barnett, Hengel, and others. But Callahan here apparently sees multiple similarities. Is Callahan being anachronistic with symbols that we call a cross today that would not have been a cross then? Nevertheless, the potential influences on Jewish thought could have been any among the “myriad fertility cults among all of the peoples of the ancient world.” These fertility cults all “have the motif of a god who represents either the sun or grain who is violently destroyed by an enemy representing death, winter or the dry season.”

D) Ehrman: Ehrman says that Heracles’s trip to Hades to bring Alcestis back, as described in Euripides, “is thus about a person who voluntarily dies in someone else’s stead and is then honored by a god who conquers death by raising the victim back to life. Sound familiar?” Nonetheless, Ehrman does not think that these stories became the basis for Christian claims.

E) Price: Price thinks that the Jesus described in the New Testament Letters reflects “strong parallels” to seasonal and vegetation gods who were known to die and rise. He notes that pagan cases before Christianity should be evidence, since early church fathers argued concerning them predating Christianity. He does not think the New Testament Epistles show a historical Jesus. Price notes that a repeated question from mythicists is why there are no references to Jesus in secular sources. Price then lists the twenty-two aspects of the mythic hero archetype (using italics to identify what is relevant to Jesus according to Price). “Strong” archaeological evidence indicates that Baal and Osiris belong to the category of dying and rising gods that existed before Christianity. Price adds that other pre-Christian evidence includes the resurrection of “Attis, Adonis and Dumuzi/Tammuz.”

E. Hallucinations or Visions

1. General Comments

A) Allison: Allison briefly summarizes the position that genuine visions are real visions combined with a legendary account of the empty tomb.

B) Carnley: Says subjective visions are a real challenge. We just don’t have enough evidence to know if the original experiences “were objective disclosures” or were “more akin to ‘subjective visions’ having a psychological cause.” We need criteria to distinguish subjective from objective visions. He notes that Pannenberg fails to disprove subjective visions. He also notes that the New Testament writers are not always clear about what they saw.

C) Carrier: Carrier contends that one of the better natural explanations is that the first believers hallucinated. This, in short, applies to mass appearances as well, since everyone claimed that they were seeing the same thing even though they would have had different hallucinations. Carrier is cautious concerning the case of Paul since he does not think Paul provides very much evidence. However, he theorizes that (1) Paul had some guilt; (2) Paul started to become persuaded by the Christian message; and (3) the physical circumstances involved on his trip to Damascus played a role. Carrier thinks this could have led Paul’s mind to see something that he was ultimately desiring to see and thus convert to Christianity.

D) Casey: Casey believes that the experiences of Jesus can “reasonably” be called both appearances and visions. However, one “should not” refer to them as hallucinations (it is seemingly anachronistic) or as apparitions. Casey concludes that bereavement experiences are the most reasonable explanation. He acknowledges the simplicity of the appearance experiences and that they did not occur while anyone was seemingly in a trance or ascending to heaven. Accordingly, this better connects them with bereavement visions. In other words, Casey is distinguishing between bereavement visions and apocalyptic visions. Bereavement visions are a simpler explanation.

E) Crossley: Crossley notes that one’s culture guides the content of an apparent vision, and the same is true in the case of Christians in a Jewish culture. Crossley contends, “These very specific cultural assumptions could easily account for the earliest Christians believing Jesus was bodily raised and left an empty tomb.” Crossley later adds that Luke 24:41–43, John 21:1–14, and Acts 10:41 were “not” inspired by hostility to “Docetic” motivation. Yet why would these authors have such a concern for a bodily interpretation in the first place? Crossley seems to think that a bodily resurrection would have vindicated Jesus’s message.

F) Cupitt: Cupitt argues that “religious experiences can be shared” and that there “are plenty of collective hallucinations. Repeated collective visions of Mary . . . at Cairo . . . at Fatima and so on.” Thus, the collectivity does not mean that they actually occurred.

G) Ehrman: He says he is not taking a stand on whether the appearances were veridical or not. He tentatively suggests that Peter, Paul, Mary, James, and possibly others had visions. He also discusses that those who have had subjective visions truly believe them, including hallucinations, bereavement visions, visions of religious figures like Mary, and group appearances.

H) Flew: Suggests hallucinations were experienced in the case of Paul as well as the rest of the apostles. He also includes references to Marian apparitions.

I) Goulder: He speaks of “conversion visions” for individuals like Peter and Paul (including reports of light). These appearances are also related to cognitive dissonance, grief visions, biblical cases, and hypnosis. By Goulder’s definition, these causes were “arising without external physical causes.” This first category is conversion disorder, of which only Peter and Paul would be most susceptible and which is “relatively rare.” Goulder’s primary secondary distinction concerning the other disciples: after one person had a vision, “it is very common for many other people to have the same.” Collective delusions, like Bigfoot, UFOs, and moving statues of Mary, are cited in the category above. These collective experiences are like those of the other disciples. They “will come to expect to see Jesus, and they will see him” (like the “expectation” and “emotional excitement” that are “prerequisite” of Zusne and Jones). Elsewhere, Goulder offers a much a briefer version of his essays.

J) Kent: Using contemporary grief studies, he suggests psychological causes such as “grief related hallucinations or illusions.” Behind the resurrection appearances, the disciples had normal grief-related hallucinations. Kent also says Paul had “conversion disorder.” Kent dates Paul’s experience either AD 38–41 or 36–41. Kent mentions five kinds of hallucinations. The disciples and Mary Magdalene probably had all five types. Kent realizes that hallucinations have been rejected by most scholars. He doubts the accounts of group appearances. Kent holds that groups can collectively experience illusions, albeit each being different. He claims James had an hallucination too.

K) Knight: Argues that the resurrection appearances can best be understood if psychological and anthropological studies are brought to bear on the topic. He holds that the experiences of Jesus had a “dreamlike character” to them and that the “sudden appearance and disappearance and delayed recognition” point to “dream imagery,” which “may allow us to begin to understand the nature of the visionary experiences (if such it was).” Knight also refers to the “visionary nature of the Pauline experiences.” Using Carl Jung’s collective unconsciousness and archetypes to explain the appearances, Knight notes, “The archetypal character of the experiences involved is unquestionable.” Utilizing Frazer’s Golden Bough and accounts like the death and resurrection of Attis, he attempts to show that “in certain unusual mental states, especially at times of great emotional stress or need, there occur visions of a dreamlike character, containing imagery which reflects ancient and primitive mythology, and which may be a vehicle for an experience of the numinous.” The resurrection appearances reflect just such a psychic formation process. Group experiences can even be explained this way. Although “much rarer,” they are exemplified by Marian apparitions and UFOs. Since death and resurrection are thus “a universal archetypal theme,” the application of them to the experiences of the risen Jesus would seem to make for a “tentative hypothesis.” The ascension is also “certainly archetypal.” Knight goes on to offer more comments on Jung’s theorizing. Knight also discusses how contemporary science, such as the observer-observed distinction in physics, shows how we might explain telekinesis and healing. Knight then gives a very tentative conclusion. He notes this thesis can also be applied to other religious traditions as a model for understanding “revelatory experiences.”

L) Küng: Küng mentions the “‘appearances’ or ‘revelations’” and adds that they are “probably objective or subjective visions or hearings.”

M) Martin: Argues that “collective hallucinations are well-known phenomena” and that “one hallucination can trigger others.” Martin cites Price citing the Zevi tradition. He also mentions Marian sightings. Martin prefers a combination of hallucinations and legend.

N) Parsons: Parsons provides various reactions to Kreeft and Tacelli’s response to the hallucination theory. For Parsons, their response is not persuasive and too easily dismissive without its own substantive argumentation.

O) Thrall: Notes three elements of a “psychological argument”: (1) Jesus prepared his disciples by his predictions of his resurrection (which created expectation). (2) The disciples recovered quickly from the effects of his death. (3) A natural explanation for the empty tomb. Like Knight above, Thrall thinks that the most “coherent psychological explanation” for the species of subjective hypothesis is taken from Jungian psychology. Accordingly, “the unconscious mind . . . may sometimes produce visions.” This can help in “the case of ‘the very people who are least prepared for such phenomena and least inclined to believe in them.’ ” Note that Thrall attempts to cover the bases here, almost as if she is saying that, in the “likely” cases, hallucinations work, whereas in the “unlikely” cases, Jung works! Thrall’s three steps to a “tentative explanation” via Jung are (1) arguing that the visions of Jesus were “due to the activation of the archetypes of the collective unconscious,” (2) correlating the archetypes with “the historical fate of Jesus,” and (3) asking how Jesus’s death “activated the archetypes” in “the original disciples” and in Paul. She argues that the first is basic to humanity. The second “is by no means difficult” and can be connected through “the archetypal motif of rebirth, immortality, or resurrection” like ancient mystery religions. The third fits the visionary experiences to the disciples, Paul, and James. To get the disciples, Paul, and James involved, Thrall gets especially creative. The disciples are tougher to explain than Paul and James because they didn’t have the inner conflict, but their despair after Jesus’s death could cause an “introversion,” which they took to be a revelation “projected in the form of an external vision.” “The obvious link” for Paul was that “in his pre-conversion state he must consciously have seen the crucified Jesus as subject to the divine curse.” Then “a conflict situation would arise . . . archetype . . . his vision of the risen Christ.” For James, she postulates “a similar conflict” to Paul’s, “resulting in . . . an unconscious acceptance of Jesus’s messiahship.” His attitude toward Jesus “unconsciously began to change.” As a “new orientation emerged to his consciousness,” James understood Jesus as the Messiah. It is, for Paul and James, “highly likely that there was precisely the conflict between conscious and unconscious attitudes which Jung described,” and if this was the case, then the result could have been a vision of Jesus. Ultimately those involved possessed “the unconscious mind to create and project the resurrection visions.” But she says we might then have two options: subjective visions in Jungian, archetypal terms or objective visions caused by God (an option explained in “Objective Vision Theory” in section 4.I below). Note that throughout Thrall’s treatment, she makes at least a dozen references to words such as “could,” “may,” “sometimes,” “suppose,” or “tentative,” only to conclude in several ways that she has “disproved” the apologist’s argument or “established” her thesis, based merely on happenstance, totally apart from any historical data.

P) Ware: Like Knight and Thrall, Robert Ware also makes extensive use of Jung and others, but it is very difficult to determine where he is going on the historicity of the resurrection. Ware says that the “emerging” aspect in resurrection studies is “the ‘psychological’ approach to resurrection.” He mentions Jung’s work later. In the second part of his article, he says “no one has yet pursued this symbolic dimension” of the resurrection in a systematic manner. In the postscript to his second article, he pursues the approach in more detail, speaking about “the ‘objective psyche,’” which is “collective” and “inter-psychic” in nature. Archetypes and “psychic ‘projection’” are “projected outwards.” This “by no means implies that nothing happened to Jesus.” He concludes that the “Jungian conception—‘archetypes’” are “of immense far-reaching consequence.”

Q) Wedderburn: He cites Vollenweider that group visions in the history of religions are rare. Wedderburn then counters with the briefest of suggestions that Broer has produced a record of one such case.

2. Mass Visions

A) Allison: Allison, seemingly noting a possibility, considers that reports of visions “can be mass produced,” and we can imagine that those who reported seeing Jesus might have “coped with their disillusionment and stress, gained attention, and enhanced their status.” He also notes that hypnotists persuade people, including groups, so that “they all see the same phantasmal object, and religious enthusiasm can work the same trick.”

B) Barclay: Barclay says, “There almost certainly have been historical examples of mass hallucination,” and the disciples’ transformations “could” have included “spurious visions.”

C) Carrier: Says the group appearances could have been “revelatory epiphanies.” In such a scenario, mass visions would be such that each person would see Jesus in their own way and understanding, but would think they are seeing the same thing.

D) Casey: Concerning the appearance to the 500 at once, Casey appeals to appearances of Mary to thousands of Christians and Muslims alike in Zeitoun, Egypt.

E) Cohn-Sherbok: Cohn-Sherbok considers subjective visions as a likely explanation for the experiences.

F) Cupitt: Cupitt says, “It’s no accident that Catholics have visions of Mary, and Buddhists have visions of the Buddha.” He then refers to “Bernadette’s vision . . . at Lourdes” and to multiple “collective visions of Mary . . . at Cairo . . . at Fatima and so on.”

G) Davies and Davies: They seem to refer to at least the possibility of hallucinations, although they are unclear.

H) Derrett: Even though Derrett employs the swoon theory and a limited form of fraud type 1 (see both above), he also says that Jesus appeared later to the disciples in the form of “ecstatic visions.”

I) Gundry: Gundry refers to Lüdemann’s use of the Marian visions.

J) Knight: Knight discusses Jung’s use of vision to explain group religious phenomena of a subjective nature.

K) Lorenzen: Although he decisively rejects hallucination theories, he says they should not be dismissed too quickly and that there are some considerations in support of them. Then he lists “visions of Christ, or Mary, or the Buddha” as examples. (Besides other problems, Lorenzen makes a category error here, mixing objective and subjective visions.)

L) Lüdemann: In his debate with Craig, Lüdemann suggests we have a comparable phenomenon between those who see Mary today and those who saw Jesus.

M) Martin: Contends that there are “several well-documented cases” of mass hallucinations. He also mentions Marian apparitions.

N) Muddiman: Among the recent views on the appearances listed by Muddiman are “veridical hallucination,” citing Cupitt and making clear that this category is “subjective.”

O) Osborne: Osborne lists Strauss, Renan, Marxsen, and Fuller as proponents. He also has a brief section on objective visions.

P) Parsons: Parsons argues that there are writers who refer to mass hallucinations. Parsons only cites one person, Rawcliff, for this statement. He also uses examples of the Virgin Mary, Fatima, and Elvis but provides no references. He appears to confuse delusions and illusions with hallucinations.

Q) Zusne and Jones: These two offer various comments on mass appearances.

3. Right Frame of Mind and Expectation

A) Carrier: Carrier contends that the disciples were desperately seeking the Scriptures for a way to explain Jesus’s recent death. These texts could have provided the inspiration and expectation for various visions.

4. “Real” Visions Not Visible to Others

A) Borg and Crossan: Although Paul thought that Jesus’s resurrection was real and was something that could be known, Borg and Crossan add the nuance that “real need not mean a transformed corpse whom others would have seen had they been there.”

5. Peter

A) Allison: Allison makes some general comments about Peter having a vision. (He appears to have some confusion about illusion and hallucination).

6. Paul

A) Akenson: Akenson argues in what appears to be three parts for a spiritual resurrection. (1) Paul does not say Jesus was resurrected bodily. (2) Acts 9 and 1 Corinthians 15 provide evidence for a spiritual resurrection. (3) Paul argues for a spiritual resurrection, as is consistent with Hebrew texts. Nevertheless, it was a “real event” for Paul.

7. Women

A) Carrier: Regarding Matthew’s account of the women grabbing Jesus’s feet, Carrier notes in passing the possibility that the women could have been grabbing nearby stones and thought they were Jesus’s feet due to a hallucination.

F. Other Subjective Theses

1. Allison: Allison explains how the cognitive dissonance approach could work, based on the “pre-Easter hopes” of the disciples. He curiously thinks it is “one of the most plausible” scenarios on naturalistic grounds, though it lacks empirical data, which prevents it from being accepted.

2. Boring: Boring is reminiscent of Bultmann and says that he somewhat agrees with Bultmann. Boring argues that since Jesus is living, “the words of the Spirit are as certainly the words of Christ as are the words of Jesus.” Therefore, present preaching is still Christ speaking to the church, so Christ may speak through “any country priest.”

3. Collins: Provides lengthy lists of ancient reports of apotheosis. She speaks positively of the “socio-psychological theory of cognitive dissonance” and cites Jackson, even though she doesn’t personally embrace this.

4. Crossan: Speaking about 1 Corinthians 15, Crossan stresses Paul’s uses of “metaphor.” Crossan says his view on the Gospels is that some stories that might be understood as literal “were intended to be and should be taken symbolically instead.” His examples of such “sacred fictions” are the triumphal entry, Joseph’s burial of Jesus, and the empty tomb. He also notes that they can be understood as metaphors. Luke’s example of the recognition and disappearance of Jesus at the meal is, for Crossan, “a perfect metaphorical summary of the first years of the church.” Today, a better way for Christians to use resurrection language is as a metaphor for experiencing “the continuing salvific, powerful presence of Christ in their lives.”

5. Cupitt: “Now the birth of the Easter faith was . . . a religious experience,” which means for Cupitt that “the Easter belief is prior to the Easter experiences, which express it.” He says he shares the same type of experience as the earliest disciples. The interpretation “precedes the vision” and so is before Easter. “I don’t deny [the appearances] happened: I don’t know.” But they can’t serve apologetically to justify Easter. The question is whether the interpretation or the visions came first. Cupitt says he agrees “that the apostles had veridical religious experiences of the risen Lord Jesus.” Cupitt thinks Moule’s argument for the objectivity of the appearances is circular: (1) the disciples’ purely historical experiences, (2) to God causing them, (3) to God’s confirmation of the original experiences. Question: Does (or at least must) Moule make move 3? (It seems that 3 is more proper from 1 to other doctrines or truths [although it is far from clear that this is what Cupitt means; it seems, rather, that Cupitt missed the step]. But if so, we have the step 1 or 2 issue here.)

6. Elliott: Reminiscent of Bultmann, Elliott writes, “Jesus was ‘risen’ because his message, personality, power and influence continued after his death. Jesus’ guidance and inspiration outlived him, and for the believer he was still living.”

7. Fiorenza: Fiorenza discusses the Pesch-Schillebeeckx-Verweyen connection and gives some critique.

8. Goulder: Goulder has a section titled “Collective Delusions” and perceives analogies of the origin of Christianity with UFOs, Bigfoot, and moving statues of Mary.

9. Hodgson: Somewhat like Bultmann, Hodgson proposes a “functionalist” interpretation of Jesus’s resurrection. He states that a “good case can be made” that this is the view of the New Testament Epistles, once we get past the initial appearance and empty tomb data. The essence of the functionalist view is that the emphasis is not on the miracle that happened in past history, but “on the saving, life-giving, redemptively transformative work of the risen Christ.” Jesus is no longer physically present but comes in the sacraments and sharing.

10. Hopkins: Applies psychoanalytic techniques to explain “the resurrection myth.” For him, the historical facts aren’t important; what matters is what the resurrection symbolized for those who believed it. The account of Jesus’s resurrection “provides a clear analogue to . . . the destruction/survival paradigm . . . Jesus’ murder embodies, on some level, the infant’s fantasized destruction of the mother.” Jesus’s resurrection is a myth that “allows those who participate in it to re-enact basic developmental processes, beginning with the infant’s relation to its mother,” and “for the believer, Jesus represents the object of destructive attacks who has, somehow, miraculously survived those attacks.”

11. Jackson: Jackson’s theory suggests the possibility of Jesus’s resurrection originating from failed prophecy. He places special emphasis on dissonance theory to explain how, “when there is a clear failure of prophecy,” committed believers “experience a high degree of dissonance . . . [which] will have the paradoxical effect of producing an increase in proselytizing.” The disciples’ “belief is explicable in terms of dissonance theory . . . they were therefore led to modify the cognition regarding his death, and the belief in the resurrection was the result.” Jesus taught that the kingdom was imminent, but the disciples were unprepared for the crucifixion. Still, they were “not shattered by the crucifixion.” In fact, “under pressure of the crucifixion” the disciples came to believe that “the end time had been moved forward” and that Jesus was alive and “would usher in the kingdom of God.” Jackson writes, “My conclusion, therefore, is that perhaps the origins of the resurrection belief are to be found in a failure of prophecy.” Michael Martin argues a bit similarly concerning religious movements where “negative evidence had no effect on the zeal of the followers.”

12. Kerr: Following Michaelis on the use of ōphthē in the Septuagint, Kerr says it “very seldom refers to perception with the eye in any ordinary sense.” The most common reference is to appearances of the angel of the Lord. “It is difficult not to regard these expressions as the model for the language of the credal [sic] fragment which Paul cites in 1 Cor 15.” “Ophthe with the dative” seems to mean that “the risen Christ presented himself to [the apostles] alive (Acts 1:3) . . . the passive mood of the verb is often used in the Bible to indicate an action by God.” But the emphasis seems to be on the giving of revelation, not ordinary sight, though still more than Paul’s own imagination.

13. Machovec: As cited in O’Collins, Machovec is seemingly like Cupitt and Sheehan. Peter “was the first to assimilate the tragedy and absurdity of a Calvary without a parousia . . . and to realise that Jesus’ crucifixion was his victory.” Peter led the other disciples to see Jesus in a new light and “to regard Calvary not as the end but as the transition to victory and exaltation.” O’Collins lists other proponents of what he calls “the continuity hypothesis,” as found in the chapters by I. Broer, P. Fiedler, and H. Verweyen.

14. Martin: Martin lists “many collective delusions” like cattle mutilation, UFOs, and witchcraft cases in colonial New England.

15. Marxsen: Although in the 1970s Marxsen thought Peter’s experience convinced him that Jesus was somehow raised, Marxsen seems to have changed a bit in the ’90s where he thinks the resurrection is not an event of the past. He mentions the confusion and despair of the disciples. The priority of Peter’s vision and its role as the cause of Peter’s faith are also discussed. Marxsen says we can’t tell its exact nature. He also states we can’t tell exactly what happened with Paul’s vision. Early followers were content to say that “God raised Jesus.” For Marxsen, faith is all that is indispensable, not history.

16. Miller: Taking Matt 27:51–53 as his prime example, Miller states Matthew was not trying to write a literal account but rather “assumed his audience would take it symbolically.” He calls Matthew’s treatment “imagery” and “symbol.” Miller emphasizes that there are “strong clues” that Matthew was not trying to be understood literally. Miller asks whether Matthew created a “historical fiction” here and whether he does so elsewhere. Immediately after, he talks about the “dozens and dozens of places where Matthew alters Mark” and mentions the empty tomb as an example. Matthew makes the changes not because Mark is wrong, but because the facts could be changed as the messaged required. On the resurrection, then, we do not know if Matthew thought his account was literally true. This is even more problematic given that it was written late and, for Miller, Matthew apparently felt comfortable making up facts.

17. Muddiman: In discussing recent views on the resurrection appearances, Muddiman lists the thesis that “the resurrection appearances are expressions of prior theological beliefs.”

18. Pesch (via Galvin): Galvin say Pesch argued that the pre-Easter claims and teachings of Jesus set the stage for the disciples’ faith.

19. Schillebeeckx: Apparently like Marxsen, Cupitt, Sheehan, and Spong, he holds that Peter was converted and then Peter inaugurated conversions in the other disciples. These experiences were not visual appearances and were not those reported by Paul and the Gospels. Additionally, religious parallel legends account for the appearance and empty tomb reports.

20. Scuka: Reminiscent of Bultmann (and citing him), Scuka agrees with James Mackey “that the primary meaning and referent of the New Testament’s proclamation concerning the resurrection of Jesus has to do not with a presumed event in Jesus’ personal destiny but rather with . . . new life in the Spirit and liberation from bondage . . . a way of acknowledging the participant’s own experience of the life-giving power of the Spirit.” Scuka says that if salvation is based on grace, then it is not based on any historical act and so the resurrection “cannot be what guarantees the very possibility of human salvation.” Following Mackey, it would be “better to interpret the Christian affirmation concerning Jesus’ resurrection as a symbolic affirmation” of liberation and new life. And like Marxsen, Scuka even concludes that this is the meaning given in the New Testament for Paul. For Paul, the resurrection is not an event in Jesus’s life but is symbolic of what happens to us. This is “indirectly supported by the implicit content of Jesus’ own preaching.” Finally, it is probably better if, like the ancient Jews, we serve God without recourse to eternal life, since when the New Testament says we have eternal life, it really means we would “experience the new life in the Spirit and liberation from bondage.” Scuka cites Bultmann here and says that, for John, eternal life is a “symbol for the Christian experience of new life in the Spirit right here and now (cf. John 5:24–25).” Paul and Jesus “implicitly recognized” this too. So “Christianity, properly understood, is not about what happens to us after we die,” but is about living “authentic lives before God” now.

21. Sheehan: Sheehan holds that Peter (Simon) was in despair and “‘saw’ . . . in an ecstatic vision” that God had vindicated Jesus and took him to glory, making him the Son of Man. Other disciples were also convinced by Peter’s testimony, and they too “‘saw’ God’s revelation and had the Easter experience.” “We cannot know with certainty the psychological genesis of that experience, but we do know its result.” All we have is Simon’s claim to have had a revelation and the disciples’ claims to have had a similar experience. What happened “could have been as dramatic as an ecstatic vision, or as ordinary as reflecting on the meaning of Jesus.”

22. Tipler: Tipler says that “mass delusions” are likely and can spread, mentioning UFOs at length.

23. Wedderburn: Wedderburn makes the slightest suggestion by saying that if the resurrection visions were “in some way the culmination or product of a process of reflection,” then we need to check out this possibility.

24. Williams: Williams’s view is like Bultmann’s view: Jesus is “risen into the preaching of the church.”

G. Appearances Used to Create Power or Prestigious Position

1. Various Scholars: Various scholars have noted that the appearances reflect the legitimation of authority for the apostles.

2. Conzelmann: Conzelmann simply notes that 1 Cor 15:4 and Luke 24:34 are “the reason for the status of Peter” in the early church. James’s status in the church “was also grounded” in his appearance.

3. Funk: Says the appearances have “to do primarily with apostolic right and succession . . . with . . . politics.” The recipients of the appearances were “undoubtedly to be understood as preeminent among the leaders of the new movement,” and the chief honor went to Peter and James.

4. Mack: Says Paul’s purpose in 1 Corinthians 15 was a power move regarding (1) his own authority and (2) his gospel proclamation. So, his purpose was not to evidence the resurrection but “the legitimacy of Paul’s claim to be a preacher of the gospel!”

5. Pesch (via Galvin and Plevnik): According to his earlier position, Pesch rejected postresurrection appearances because the appearance to Peter listed in pre-Pauline creed is, in literary form, a legitimation formula drawn from the LXX and doesn’t provide historical parameters. Plevnik says Pesch thinks the appearances function “to legitimate the proclaimers.”

H. Twin Brother Theory

1. Cavin: The “most probable explanation” for the appearances, according to Cavin, is the existence of “an unknown identical twin” of Jesus. While noting disagreements, Cavin suggests that a “mistaken identity” could come from several causes connected to Cavin’s thesis: “drastic physical or psychological changes, or has a genetically identical sibling, or is deliberately attempting to deceive . . . or is not especially well-known to the person . . . or simply resembles someone else to an amazing and highly unlikely degree.”

I. Objective Vision Theory

1. General Comments

A) Badham: Badham calls a view like objective vision the “most popular modification” to the orthodox or traditional understanding of the resurrection.

B) Craig: Craig contends that both subjective and objective visions occur “wholly in the mind,” but the resurrection was something that happened in the “external world.”

C) Fuller: Says the Acts accounts—which Fuller seems to trust because they have only “minor variations”—have details describing light and a voice, and that these “common elements are pre-Lukan, not redactional.” Fuller wants to “suggest, very tentatively,” that the nature of these revelations involved light and “involved a communication of meaning.” Fuller summarizes, “Their outward, historically definable form is a vision (perhaps a vision of ‘light’), accompanied by an audition (i.e., a communication of meaning).” Elsewhere, Fuller also refers to the visual and auditory “self-manifestation” of the raised Jesus. He also argues that, historically, one must recognize that there was more than just a visual element since there was also communication. But still, Fuller notes, the concept of objective visions “is not really satisfactory.”

D) Grayston: Grayston says Jesus appeared to Paul from heaven, Paul thought all the other appearances were the same as his, and an “appropriate form for a heavenly appearance is light.”

E) Kerr: Kerr does not think there is good reason to think Paul’s experience of the risen Jesus “took place entirely in his head.” While Jesus wasn’t seen in the ordinary sense, Paul’s experience “was certainly something more than simply the product of his own imagination.”

F) Küng: Küng mentions appearances (revelations) and adds “probably objective or subjective visions or hearings.”

G) Moltmann: Moltmann refers to the resurrection appearances: “They had visions of a supernatural light.”

H) Muddiman: In describing this view, Muddiman calls it “objective vision” and says it is objective because of aspects such as (1) group appearances, and (2) it must have been strong enough to reverse earlier despair.

I) Osborne: Osborne lists Lampe, Davies, Schweizer, Bornkamm, Grass, Wilckens, and Moule as proponents of this view.

J) Pannenberg: Wolfhart Pannenberg concludes that the appearances have a strong historical foundation. He defines their content as a spiritual body (“not . . . an earthly body”), appearing from heaven, probably “as light phenomenon, and “certainly connected” with auditory components. All except for the light can be “presupposed for the other appearances.”

K) Segal: Though it is difficult to identify exactly Segal’s view, he notes that Paul had a “vision,” though it was not a hallucination. Rather, Segal contends that, for Paul, “these were visions undertaken through the Spirit and were therefore spiritual depictions of what is soon to become actual.”

L) Stuhlmacher: Stuhlmacher thinks that the New Testament texts indicate that Jesus appeared “from heaven.” Christians need to stop referring to these appearances as “objective” and talking about photos of Jesus. Such is an “audacious false interpretation.”

M) Thrall: After a lengthy thesis arguing for subjective visions patterned on Jungian archetypes (see above), Thrall asks if there is any reason to think that “a divine, transcendent reality” could be the source of the disciples’ visions. She says it is “logically possible to maintain that . . . the risen Christ . . . may be required as a means of explanation.” There is some reason to “cast some doubt” on whether Jungian explanations are capable of explaining “biblical theism.” Her closing sentence reads, “The possibility remains open, therefore, that the theistic faith of the biblical writers does relate to some strictly transcendent reality, and that it is in terms of this ultimate reality that the resurrection appearances are to be understood.”

2. Parapsychological or Psychic Objective Phenomena

A) Allison: Allison notes, “Perhaps most parapsychologists who accept some apparitions as veridical regard them not as objective but as projections of the percipient.” The large amount of research on apparitions provides the “most profitable parallels” to the resurrection appearances (citing here works by Myers et al. in 1886 and Tyrrell in 1963), especially concerning “the recently deceased.” “Even collective perceptions of the departed are well-attested” and, accordingly, resurrection explanations should be sure to take these events into account. Yet this doesn’t mean that Jesus’s appearances automatically fit into that category, but “before one explains away the visions of the disciples of Jesus, one must explain away the similar visions others have had—a task which, it seems, has yet to be convincingly accomplished.”

B) Flew: Flew asserts that the evidence for the resurrection is not immediate enough, as in parapsychological studies, and apparently the evidence for the latter is better.

C) Pannenberg: Pannenberg cites recent parapsychological studies to show the possibility of confirmation of “extrasubjective reality.”

D) Robinson: John A. T. Robinson seems to think there is some possibility regarding parapsychological phenomenon.

3. Apparitions from the Dead

A) Allison: Allison argues that if one were to approach the research on apparitions, then one would find “numerous well-attested reports” (see below) and that we cannot simply dismiss all of these reports as subjective projections. Although he avoids apparitions as an explanation for the appearances of Jesus because of our limited knowledge about them, they nevertheless “might” be able to bring clarity to some of the traditions of the risen Jesus. Accordingly, for Allison these show that “it is simply not true that the events in the Gospels are ‘utterly without analogy.’” He also provides three accounts in which he personally claims to have experienced visitations from the dead in varying forms. As noted above, Allison finds these analogies limited. Regarding the research on apparitions, he provides the following examples that he contends might be relevant to understanding the traditions surrounding Jesus’s resurrection:

(1) Experiences may have both visual and auditory components to them.

(2) Experiences may be seen by two people, though at different times.

(3) Experiences may be seen by at least two people at the same time.

(4) Experiences may be seen by some, but not all, who are present.

(5) Experiences may be seen by those who were strangers in life.

(6) Some may doubt the experience.

(7) Some experiences are able to help bring comfort or relief.

(8) Some apparitions give advice or make demands.

(9) The apparition is considered very “real” and “seemingly solid.”

(10) Apparitions can have the ability to suddenly appear or disappear, possibly utilizing other dimensions.

(11) The experiences are not immediately considered to be apparitions.

(12) The person who has the experience can be dramatically changed as a result.

(13) The experiences become fewer as time goes by, and many of the apparitions occur within the first year of the death of the individual.

B) Casey: Casey argues that visions were normal in their culture, which could make the disciples more likely to experience bereavement visions. The brevity of the conversation provides one reason for Casey to suspect bereavement visions. He contrasts bereavement visions with apocalyptic visions, which were different.

C) Ehrman: Ehrman notes that the disciples were “bereaved” at the loss of Jesus in the context of visions. However, it is somewhat unclear as to what we should conclude from this.

J. Cybernetic Immortality

1. Herzfeld: “Cybernetic immortality is based on the assumption that thoughts, memories, feelings, and action define the human person.” This view gives one a way to “maintain belief in a reductionistic materialism without giving up the hope of immortality.”

5. USING MORE THAN ONE THEORY

A. Empty Tomb and Appearances

1. Casey: Casey argues that Jesus was not resurrected and that there was no empty tomb, but that the apostles had “visions” of Jesus and that Jesus’s resurrection predictions did not require an empty tomb or bodily transformation. Casey takes a bereavement visions view of the appearance. He considers that the empty tomb account is something that, in the face of opposition, “reassures believers” that Jesus was actually resurrected.

B. Relocation Hypothesis

1. Lowder: Lowder takes the relocation hypothesis, which argues that Jesus’s body was moved on Saturday. “The relocation hypothesis explains the empty tomb itself.” Lowder notes that this theory only addresses the empty tomb. He does not address whether this theory, along with others, would be able to account for all of the data.

C. Two-Body Theory

1. Carrier: Carrier suggests that early Christians believed that Jesus’s soul was given a new heavenly body while the old body remained in the tomb, and the traditions about the empty tomb are legends that grew over time. This new body was not fleshly but was a heavenly body. Jesus received this new glorious body in heaven, which means there is no physical evidence for the claim that Jesus was resurrected (because it occurred in heaven). This is why Paul doesn’t present any evidence either (though Carrier curiously does say that Paul would likely have checked the available evidence, otherwise he would not have continued as a Christian). Paul’s evidence is limited to Scripture references and appearances. Carrier does not think that Paul held to the bodily resurrection views held by rabbinic Pharisees. Since Paul converted and became a Christian, he abandoned those views. Regarding Phil 3:19–21, Carrier notes that it seems Paul has in mind an actual transformation of our old bodies into new ones. Yet he wants to push for an understanding that emphasizes an exchange rather than a transformation. Carrier argues that the “best explanation” is that the earliest Christians had “hallucinations.” He does note some agnosticism about Paul, since Paul does not tell us very much (Carrier postulates something of a feeling of guilt that might have led him to convert and “atone” for his wrongdoings). Regarding group appearances, Carrier thinks that the witnesses were claiming to see the same thing, even though they would have had different hallucinations. Elsewhere he notes that there was expectation among the group. Carrier then considers that the empty tomb was a legendary development comparable to those found in Herodotus (regarding Delphi). Some reasons it is comparable to claims in Herodotus is because it carries symbolism and was witnessed by multiple people who were still alive. (Yet if the resurrection meant two bodies, why would the disciples make this assumption?) Finally, Carrier notes that Rom 8:11 and 23 are problematic for him.

D. Prediction and Hallucination

1. Crossley: Crossley considers whether the cultural assumptions of the apostles “could easily account” for the believers thinking Jesus was resurrected. He adds that the death of Jesus “almost requires vindication” by the earliest believers, and this would have been all the more reasonable given Jesus’s predictions of his death.

6. MIRACLES IN OTHER RELIGIONS

A. Ehrman: Ehrman notes that if someone is open to the miracles of one person, he or she must be open to the possibility of other miracle claims in other religions. One wonders if his solution to this is his definition that seemingly rejects miracles a priori historically because historians can only affirm what is most probable, but miracles are events that are “infinitesimally remote.”

B. Gethin: Says a Buddhist would probably just think of Jesus as “an accomplished yogin.”

C. Hartshorne: “All the religions tell of miracles.” Speaking about Buddha and others, he adds, “I do not feel that I can choose between such accounts.”

D. Keener: Keener notes some of these claims, including a discussion on possible nonsupernatural healings.

E. Nielsen: Nielsen asks: Why choose Christianity over the “thousands of putative revelations in the world” (e.g., Islam, Hindu, Buddhist)? He also asks how anyone can choose between historical claims to “decide that a claimed revelation is a genuine revelation.”

7. THEOLOGIcaL OBJECTIONS

A. Carrier: Carrier thinks there could have been more effective ways to offer salvation to mankind than appearing to those reported in 1 Corinthians 15. For example, Jesus could have appeared to everyone.

B. Kirby: Kirby essentially contends that the evidence would not be so ambiguous for the empty tomb if God were really involved.

Notes

Raymond E. Brown, The Death of the Messiah, 2 vols., Anchor Bible Reference Library (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1994), 2:1092–96.

Robert J. Hauck, “‘They Saw What They Said They Saw’: Sense Knowledge in Early Christian Polemic,” Harvard Theological Review 81, no. 3 (1988): 240–41, 243, 246.

Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ, trans. V. Green (Mahweh, NJ: Paulist, 1976), 130.

Kasper, 131.

Gerald O’Collins and Daniel Kendall, “On Reissuing Venturini,” Gregorianum 75, no. 2 (1994): 241.

Graham Stanton, “Early Objections to the Resurrection of Jesus,” in Resurrection: Essays in Honour of Leslie Houlden, ed. Stephen Barton and Graham Stanton (London: SPCK, 1994), 83–84.

Stanton, 84.

Richard C. Carrier, “The Burial of Jesus in Light of Jewish Law,” in The Empty Tomb: Jesus beyond the Grave, ed. Robert M. Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005), 370.

Keith Parsons, “Is There a Case for Christian Theism?,” in J. P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen, Does God Exist? The Debate between Theists and Atheists (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2009), 192.

Dale C. Allison, Resurrecting Jesus: The Earliest Christian Tradition and Its Interpreters (New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 339.

Allison, 340.

Allison, 342.

Allison, 334.

Allison, 340.

Allison, 351.

Allison, 347. See also 342.

Allison, 340.

Allison, 350.

Allison, 198–99, 299.

Allison, 342.

Allison, 340–41.

Allison, 342.

Allison, 346.

Allison, 339.

Carrier, “Burial of Jesus,” 370.

Stephen T. Davis, Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 21.

Davis, 172–73.

Davis, 20.

Davis, 188.

Davis, 188–89.

John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, 5 vols., Anchor Bible Reference Library (New York: Doubleday, 1991–2016), 2:968.

Ulrich Wilckens, Resurrection: Biblical Testimony to the Resurrection: An Historical Examination and Explanation (Edinburgh: St. Andrew’s Press, 1977), 119; Donald Goergen, The Death and Resurrection of Jesus, vol. 2 of A Theology of Jesus (Wilmington, DE: Glazier, 1988), 157–59; Adrian Thatcher, “Resurrection and Rationality,” in The Resurrection of Jesus Christ, ed. Paul Avis (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1993), 185.

Goergen, Death and Resurrection of Jesus, 157–59.

Peter Carnley, “Response to Gerald O’Collins,” in The Resurrection: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Resurrection of Jesus, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 35.

Michael F. Bird and James G. Crossley, How Did Christianity Begin? A Believer and Non-Believer Examine the Evidence (London: SPCK, 2008), 51.

Don Cupitt, Explorations in Theology 6 (London: SCM, 1979), 35.

Cupitt, 36.

Cupitt, 40.

Bart D. Ehrman, How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee (New York: HarperOne, 2014), 132. See also 204.

Ehrman, 149. See also 147–48, 173.

Robert W. Funk, Roy W. Hoover, and the Jesus Seminar, The Five Gospels: What Did Jesus Really Say? The Search for the Authentic Words of Jesus (New York: Scribner, 1993), 398. Cf. 2, 5, 34.

Meier, Marginal Jew, 3:625.

Stephen Neill and N. T. Wright, The Interpretation of the New Testament, 1861–1986, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 307–12. See also 299–301. Cf. 287.

Bart D. Ehrman, The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 210–11, see also 240–241. See also Bart D. Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist? The Historical Argument for Jesus of Nazareth (New York: HarperOne, 2012), 315–16; Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 165, see also 173.

Ehrman, New Testament, 210.

Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 351.

Allison, 342.

Ehrman, New Testament, 208.

Ehrman, New Testament, 208, see also 209. See also Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 148–49.

Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 173. See also 132, 150.

Ehrman, New Testament, 212.

Ehrman, 210.

Meier, Marginal Jew, 3:9–10, 625, 641, 646.

Meier, 3:625.

Meier, 3:251–52.

Meier, 3:9–10. See also 3:625.

Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 146. See also 147–50. Even if Ehrman means all historians, how can he know what they all believe about God? Cf. 187 where Ehrman states that most New Testament scholars are Christians.

Ehrman, 143–44. See also 198–99 (Mary apparitions) and 200–201 (modern Jesus appearances).

Barry L. Blackburn, “The Miracles of Jesus,” in Studying the Historical Jesus: Evaluations of the State of Current Research, ed. Bruce D. Chilton and Craig A. Evans (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 370.

C. E. B. Cranfield, “The Resurrection of Jesus Christ,” Expository Times 101, no. 6 (1990): 169.

Cupitt, Explorations in Theology, 33.

Cupitt, 40.

Davis, Risen Indeed, 17.

Davis, 17. See also 16, 21n23, 168, 170–71.

Davis, 171.

Ehrman, New Testament, 211–12.

Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, “The Resurrection of Jesus and Roman Catholic Fundamental Theology,” in Davis, Kendall, and O’Collins, Resurrection, 247, 232.

Charles Hartshorne, “Response to the Debate,” in Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? The Resurrection Debate, ed. Terry L. Miethe (San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1987), 137.

Hartshorne, 142.

James Keller, “Response to Davis,” Faith and Philosophy 7, no. 1 (1990): 115.

Gerd Lüdemann, “Closing Responses,” in Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment? A Debate between William Lane Craig and Gerd Lüdemann, ed. Paul Copan and Ronald K. Tacelli (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2000), 150.

Michael Martin, “Why the Resurrection Is Initially Improbable,” Philo 1, no. 1 (1998): 63, 72; Martin, “Reply to Davis,” Philo 2, no. 1 (1999): 62.

J. P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen, “An Atheist’s Rebuttal,” in Does God Exist?, 64.

Frank J. Tipler, The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the Resurrection of the Dead (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 310, 312.

Stephen T. Davis, “The Question of Miracles, Ascension and Anti-Semitism,” in Copan and Tacelli, Jesus’ Resurrection, 74.

Michael Goulder, “The Explanatory Power of Conversion-Visions,” in Copan and Tacelli, Jesus’ Resurrection, 102.

Barry W. Henaut, “Empty Tomb or Empty Argument: A Failure of Nerve in Recent Studies of Mark 16?,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 15, no. 2 (June 1986): 179.

Henaut, 187.

Keller, “Response to Davis,” 115.

Kenneth Konyndyk, review of Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? The Resurrection Debate, by Gary R. Habermas and Antony Flew, The Reformed Journal 39 (1989): 31.

David Owen, “Hume versus Price on Miracles and Prior Probabilities,” in Miracles, ed. Richard Swinburne (New York: Macmillan, 1989), 129.

Owen, 131.

Owen, 132.

Parsons, “Is There a Case for Christian Theism?,” 191–92.

Parsons, 190.

Bruce Puleo, “Jesus Was in Good Company: Other Claimed Resurrections from the Dead,” The American Rationalist 30, no. 5 (1986): 82.

Hugo Staudinger, “The Resurrection of Jesus Christ as Saving Event and as ‘Object’ of Historical Research,” Scottish Journal of Theology 36, no. 3 (1983): 315.

Donald Wayne Viney, “Grave Doubts about the Resurrection,” Encounter 50, no. 2 (1989): 127.

Robert Cavin, “Is There Sufficient Historical Evidence to Establish the Resurrection of Jesus?,” Faith and Philosophy 12, no. 3 (1995): 361. See also 370.

Cavin, 374.

Davis, Risen Indeed, 171.

Davis, “Question of Miracles,” 74.

G. T. Eddy, “The Resurrection of Jesus Christ: A Consideration of Professor Cranfield’s Argument,” Expository Times 101, no. 11 (1990): 329.

Gary Habermas and Antony Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? The Resurrection Debate, ed. Terry L. Miethe (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1987), 33, 61, 70, 101.

Gary Habermas and Antony G. N. Flew, Resurrected: An Atheist and Theist Dialogue, ed. John F. Ankerberg (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 40–41, 68–69, 73.

J. P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen, “The Case for God Challenged,” in Does God Exist?, 164–65.

Tipler, Physics of Immortality, 308, 310, 320.

Tipler, 312–13.

Donald Wayne Viney, review of Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? The Resurrection Debate, by Gary R. Habermas and Antony Flew, Midwest Quarterly 30, no. 5 (1989): 394.

Viney, “Grave Doubts,” 127.

A. J. M. Wedderburn, Beyond Resurrection (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1999), 97.

Wedderburn, 13–14.

Wedderburn, 95–98. See also 76–77.

Rupert Gethin, “The Resurrection and Buddhism,” in Resurrection Reconsidered, ed. Gavin D’Costa (Oxford: Oneworld, 1996), 206; B. C. Johnson, The Atheist Debater’s Handbook (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1983), 121; Gaalyahu Cornfeld, ed., The Historical Jesus: A Scholarly View of the Man and His World (New York: Macmillan, 1982), 170–88.

J. Duncan M. Derrett, The Anastasis: The Resurrection of Jesus as an Historical Event (Shipston-on-Stour: Drinkwater, 1982), 50, esp. 67n16.

Derrett, 133.

Derrett, 98, 114.

Derrett, 60–65.

Derrett, 90–97, 114.

Derrett, 84.

Derrett, 81–86, 130.

Derrett, 127–28.

Derrett, 131. See also 122.

Derrett, 97, 99.

Derrett, 29–34, 130.

Derrett, 102.

Derrett, 108–9.

Derrett, 102.

Derrett, x.

J. Duncan M. Derrett, “Financial Aspects of the Resurrection,” in Price and Lowder, Empty Tomb, 394.

Derrett, 405n6.

Charles Hartshorne, “Response to the Debate,” in Miethe, Resurrection Debate, 141–42.

M. Lloyd Davies and T. T. Lloyd Davies, “Resurrection or Resuscitation?,” Journal of the Royal College of Physicians of London 25, no. 2 (1991): 167.

Davies and Davies, 168.

Bernd Oberdorfer, “Schleiermacher on Eschatology and Resurrection,” in Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments, ed. Ted Peters, Robert J. Russell, and Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 179.

O’Collins and Kendall, “On Reissuing Venturini,” 242–63.

O’Collins and Kendall, 265.

Robert M. Price, Deconstructing Jesus (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2000), 222.

Price, 56–57.

Price, 58–59.

Price, 224.

Price, 56–57, 222–24.

Rolland Wolfe, How the Easter Story Grew from Gospel to Gospel (Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 1989), 101.

Wolfe, 96–101.

Wolfe, 102–3.

Richard C. Carrier, “The Plausibility of Theft,” in Price and Lowder, Empty Tomb, 307–48.

Carrier, 364.

Carrier, “Burial of Jesus,” 387.

Derrett, Anastasis, 128.

Henaut, “Empty Tomb or Empty Argument,” 180.

Leslie Houlden, “The Resurrection and Christianity,” Theology 99 (1996): 203.

Jack A. Kent, The Psychological Origins of the Resurrection Myth (London: Open Gate, 1999), 88.

Martin, “Reply to Davis,” 68.

Morton Smith, Jesus the Magician (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 66. See also 54–55, 61.

Tabor, Jesus Dynasty, 235.

John Dominic Crossan, Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1994), 154, 158, 160; Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (New York: HarperOne, 1991), 392–94; Crossan, Who Killed Jesus? Exposing the Roots of Anti-Semitism in the Gospel Story of the Death of Jesus (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1995), 160–69, 187–88.

Robert W. Funk, Honest to Jesus: Jesus for a New Millennium (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996), 259. Cf. 220.

Goulder, “Explanatory Power of Conversion-Visions,” 99.

Henaut, “Empty Tomb or Empty Argument,” 184.

Kent, Psychological Origins, 88.

John A. T. Robinson, Can We Trust the New Testament? (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 123–24.

Thomas Sheehan, The First Coming: How the Kingdom of God Became Christianity (New York: Random House, 1986), 100, 102.

Margaret E. Thrall, “Resurrection Traditions and Christian Apologetic,” Thomist 43, no. 2 (1979): 199.

Thrall, 202.

Wedderburn, Beyond Resurrection, 12. See also 96.

John E. Alsup, The Post-Resurrection Appearance Stories of the Gospel Tradition: A History-of-Tradition Analysis with Text-Synopsis, Calwer Theologische Monographien 5 (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1975), 214–239, 239–65 (Jewish parallels).

Alsup, 222.

Alsup, 222.

Alsup, 224–30.

Alsup, 238.

Peter G. Bolt, “Life, Death, and the Afterlife in the Greco-Roman World,” in Life in the Face of Death: The Resurrection Message of the New Testament, ed. Richard N. Longenecker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 62.

Bolt, 73.

Bolt, 70–72.

Richard C. Carrier, “The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb,” in Price and Lowder, Empty Tomb, 181.

J. K. Elliott, “The First Easter,” History Today 29, no. 4 (1979): 220.

Fiorenza, “Resurrection of Jesus,” 229.

Reginald H. Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 173. See also 181.

Funk, Honest to Jesus, 35.

Funk, 39.

Gethin, “Resurrection and Buddhism,” 207.

Lloyd M. Graham, Deceptions and Myths of the Bible (New York: Bell, 1975), 362.

Randel Helms, Gospel Fictions (New York: Prometheus, 1997), 24–25.

Funk, Hoover, and the Jesus Seminar, Five Gospels, 4.

Funk, Hoover, and the Jesus Seminar, 7.

Kaufman, In the Face of Mystery, 380.

Christopher C. Knight, “Hysteria and Myth: The Psychology of the Resurrection Appearances,” Modern Churchman 31, no. 2 (1989): 39.

Burton L. Mack, review of Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? The Resurrection Debate, by Gary R. Habermas and Antony Flew, History and Theory 28, no. 2 (1989): 220.

Burton L. Mack, The Lost Gospel: The Book of Q and Christian Origins (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 22, 246.

Mack, review of Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? (by Habermas and Flew), 221.

James P. Mackey, “Christian Faith and Critical History: The Systematician and the Exegete,” in Critical History and Biblical Faith: New Testament Perspectives, ed. Thomas J. Ryan (Villanova, PA: Villanova University Press, 1979), 68.

Mackey, 69–70.

Mackey, 70.

Michael Martin, The Case Against Christianity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 69.

Martin, 75n18.

Leon McKenzie, Pagan Resurrection Myths and the Resurrection of Jesus: A Christian Perspective (Charlottesville, VA: Bookwrights, 1997), 61–67.

McKenzie, 139.

Grant R. Osborne, The Resurrection Narratives: A Redactional Study (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984), 276.

Price, Deconstructing Jesus, 213–17.

Price, 56.

Puleo, “Jesus Was in Good Company,” 80.

Puleo, 80–81.

Puleo, 81.

Puleo, 81–82.

Puleo, 82.

Puleo, 82.

Sheehan, First Coming, 206–10.

M. Smith, Jesus the Magician, 65.

Thrall, “Resurrection Traditions and Christian Apologetic,” 207.

A. N. Wilson, Jesus (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992), 19–21.

James G. Crossley, “Against the Historical Plausibility of the Empty Tomb Story and the Bodily Resurrection of Jesus: A Response to N. T. Wright,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 3, no. 2 (2005): 173.

Crossley, 178–80.

Crossley, 180–81.

Crossley, 181.

Price, Deconstructing Jesus, 56.

Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 11–18.

Funk, Hoover, and the Jesus Seminar, Five Gospels, 32, 437. Cf. 18.

Price, Deconstructing Jesus, 35.

Price, 38. See also 15.

Price, 35.

Price, 223.

Price, 42, 213, 221.

Price, 40.

Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 209–13. He mentions Klaus Berger, Rudolf Pesch, and Stephen Patterson.

Jan Assmann, “Resurrection in Ancient Egypt,” in Peters, Russell, and Welker, Resurrection, 135.

Assmann, 124, 135.

Callahan, Secret Origins of the Bible, 419.

Callahan, 332.

Ehrman, New Testament, 257. Cf. 31, which indicates a reluctance of scholarship to connect Christianity to mystery religions.

Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist?, 33, 153, 221, 223, 229.

Robert M. Price, “Jesus at the Vanishing Point,” in The Historical Jesus: Five Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul Rhodes Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 75. See also Robert M. Price’s response to James D. G. Dunn, 230–31.

Price, “Jesus at the Vanishing Point,” 75.

Price, 63. See also Price’s response to Dunn, 230.

Price, 62.

Price, 77–78.

Price, 75.

Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 208–9. He mentions C. J. Cadoux, Hans Grass, Theodore Keim, John Shelby Spong, and John Pilch.

Peter Carnley, The Structure of Resurrection Belief (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 64.

Carnley, 244–45.

Carnley, 69–72.

Carnley, 69–71, 244–45.

Carnley, 79, 82.

Carrier, “Spiritual Body,” 184.

Carrier, “Spiritual Body,” 194–95; Carrier, “Burial of Jesus,” 387.

Carrier, “Spiritual Body,” 187.

Maurice Casey, Jesus of Nazareth: An Independent Historian’s Account of His Life and Teaching (London: Continuum, 2010), 488. See also 493.

Casey, 490–97, 508.

Casey, 493. See also 490.

Crossley, “Historical Plausibility,” 174–75.

Crossley, 176n25.

Cupitt, Explorations in Theology, 40.

Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 183–210.

Habermas and Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?, 50–51 (Paul), 52–57, 84–87 (apostles), 59, 87 (references to Marian apparitions).

Michael Goulder, “The Baseless Fabric of a Vision,” in D’Costa, Resurrection Reconsidered, 49; Goulder, “Explanatory Power of Conversion-Visions,” 91.

Goulder, “Baseless Fabric of a Vision,” 48–52; Goulder, “Explanatory Power of Conversion-Visions,” 86–96.

Goulder, “Explanatory Power of Conversion-Visions,” 94.

Goulder, 96. Cf. Goulder, “Baseless Fabric of a Vision,” 54.

Goulder, “Explanatory Power of Conversion-Visions,” 96.

Goulder, “Baseless Fabric of a Vision,” 52–55; Goulder, “Explanatory Power of Conversion-Visions,” 96–98.

Goulder, “Explanatory Power of Conversion-Visions,” 97–98.

Michael Goulder, “Did Jesus of Nazareth Rise from the Dead?,” in Barton and Stanton, Resurrection, 58–68.

Kent, Psychological Origins, 21.

Kent, 47–61, 85–86, 89.

Kent, 56, 93. Cf. 49.

Kent, 28, 33.

Kent, 47.

Kent, 120n4.

Kent, 89–90.

Kent, 90, 120.

Kent, 89, 93.

Knight, “Hysteria and Myth,” 38.

Knight, 38.

Christopher C. Knight, “The Resurrection Appearances as Religious Experience,” Modern Believing 39, no. 2 (1998): 16.

Knight, “Hysteria and Myth,” 39.

Knight, 39–40.

Knight, 40, 42.

Knight, 41.

Knight, 41.

Knight, 41–42.

Knight, 42.

Knight, “Resurrection Appearances as Religious Experience,” 21–22.

Hans Küng, Eternal Life? Life after Death as a Medical, Philosophical and Theological Problem, trans. Edward Quinn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984), 104.

Martin, “Reply to Davis,” 70.

Martin, 76n22.

Martin, 70.

Martin, 70.

Keith Parsons, “Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli on the Hallucination Theory,” in Price and Lowder, Empty Tomb, 433–52.

Thrall, “Resurrection Traditions and Christian Apologetic,” 203.

Thrall, 198.

Thrall, 206.

Thrall, 204.

Thrall, 205.

Thrall, 206–7.

Thrall, 207.

Thrall, 208–11.

Thrall, 210–11.

Thrall, 209.

Thrall, 210.

Thrall, 211.

Thrall, 205.

Thrall, 213.

Thrall, 213.

Thrall, 203–13.

Robert C. Ware, “The Resurrection of Jesus, 1: Theological Orientations,” Heythrop Journal 16, no. 1 (1975): 24.

Ware, 28.

Robert C. Ware, “The Resurrection of Jesus, 2: Historical-Critical Studies,” Heythrop Journal 16, no. 2 (1975): 182.

Ware, 187.

Ware, 191n1.

Ware, 192.

Ware, 194.

Wedderburn, Beyond Resurrection, 276n275.

Wedderburn, 276n275. Cf. 96, 231.

Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 205.

Allison, 296–97.

John M. G. Barclay, “The Resurrection in Contemporary New Testament Scholarship,” in D’Costa, Resurrection Reconsidered, 26.

Carrier, “Spiritual Body,” 194–95; Carrier, “Burial of Jesus,” 387.

Casey, Jesus of Nazareth, 495.

Dan Cohn-Sherbok, “The Resurrection of Jesus: A Jewish View,” in D’Costa, Resurrection Reconsidered, 197.

Cupitt, Explorations in Theology, 29, 40.

Davies and Davies, “Resurrection or Resuscitation?,” 168.

Derrett, Anastasis, 109.

Robert H. Gundry, “Trimming the Debate,” in Copan and Tacelli, Jesus’ Resurrection, 108–9.

Knight, “Hysteria and Myth,” 39–40.

Thorwald Lorenzen, Resurrection and Discipleship: Interpretive Models, Biblical Reflections, Theological Consequences (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1995), 123.

Gerd Lüdemann, “Opening Statements,” in Copan and Tacelli, Jesus’ Resurrection, 45.

Michael Martin, “Swinburne on the Resurrection,” in Price and Lowder, Empty Tomb, 464.

Martin, “Reply to Davis,” 70.

John Muddiman, “I Believe in the Resurrection of the Body,” in Barton and Stanton, Resurrection, 133.

Osborne, Resurrection Narratives, 277.

Osborne, 278.

Parsons, “Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli,” 435.

Parsons, 436–37.

Leonard Zusne and Warren H. Jones, Anomalistic Psychology: A Study of Extraordinary Phenomena of Behavior and Experience (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1982), 134–36.

Carrier, “Burial of Jesus,” 388.

Marcus Borg and John Dominic Crossan, The First Paul: Reclaiming the Radical Visionary behind the Church’s Conservative Icon (New York: HarperOne, 2009), 150.

Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 204–7. See also 296–97.

Donald Harman Akenson, Saint Saul: A Skeleton Key to the Historical Jesus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 176–83.

Akenson, 176.

Carrier, “Spiritual Body,” 190.

Dale C. Allison, The End of the Ages Has Come: An Early Interpretation of the Passion and Resurrection of Jesus (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 163.

Allison, 164.

M. Eugene Boring, Sayings of the Risen Jesus: Christian Prophecy in the Synoptic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 236.

Boring, 236–37.

Adela Yarbro Collins, “The Empty Tomb in the Gospel According to Mark,” in Hermes and Athena: Biblical Exegesis and Philosophical Theology, ed. Eleonore Stump and Thomas P. Flint, University of Notre Dame Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 7 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 123–28; Adela Yarbro Collins, “The Empty Tomb and Resurrection According to Mark,” in The Beginning of the Gospel: Probings of Mark in Context (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 138–43.

Collins, “Empty Tomb,” 122.

See Crossan’s words in Copan, Real Jesus, 53.

John Dominic Crossan, “Reflections on a Debate,” in Copan, Real Jesus, 148–49.

See Crossan’s statements in Copan, Real Jesus, 54–55.

Crossan in Copan, 66.

Crossan in Copan, 46.

Cupitt, Explorations in Theology, 29–30.

Cupitt, 32.

Cupitt, 34.

Cupitt, 35.

Cupitt, 38.

Cupitt, 30.

Elliott, “First Easter,” 219.

Fiorenza, “Resurrection of Jesus,” 219–23, 243–44.

Goulder, “Baseless Fabric of a Vision,” 52–55.

Peter C. Hodgson, Winds of the Spirit: A Constructive Christian Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1994), 270.

Hodgson, 270.

Hodgson, 271–73.

Brooke Hopkins, “Jesus and Object-Use: A Winnicottian Account of the Resurrection Myth,” International Review of Psychoanalysis 16, no. 1 (1989): 93.

Hopkins, 96.

Hopkins, 97.

Hopkins, 99.

Hugh Jackson, “The Resurrection Belief of the Earliest Church: A Response to the Failure of Prophecy?,” Journal of Religion 55, no. 4 (1975): 415.

Jackson, 417.

Jackson, 420.

Jackson, 422.

Jackson, 423.

Jackson, 425.

Martin, “Reply to Davis,” 68.

Fergus Kerr, “Paul’s Experience: Sighting or Theophany?,” New Blackfriars 58 (1977): 309.

Kerr, 309–10.

Kerr, 310, 312.

Gerald O’Collins, “Peter as Easter Witness,” Heythrop Journal 22, no. 1 (1981): 5.

Gerald O’Collins, The Resurrection of Jesus Christ: Some Contemporary Issues (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1993), 15, 37n3. The essays of Broer, Fiedler, and Verweyen referenced here appear in Ingo Broer and Jürgen Werbick, eds., “Der Herr ist Wahrhaft Auferstanden” (Lk 24,34): Biblische und Systematische Beitrage zur Entstehung des Osterglaubens, Stuttgarter Bibelstudien 134 (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1988).

Martin, Case Against Christianity, 92–95.

Willi Marxsen, Jesus and Easter: Did God Raise the Historical Jesus from the Dead? (Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 42.

Marxsen, 66–67, 70–73, 90–91.

Robert J. Miller, “What Do Stories about Resurrection(s) Prove?,” in Copan, Real Jesus, 91.

Miller, 92.

Miller, 93.

Miller, 94.

Miller, 94–95.

Miller, 95.

Muddiman, “Resurrection of the Body,” 133.

Rudolf Pesch, “Materialien und Bemerkungen zur Entstehung und Sinn des Osterglaubens,” in Wie kam es zum Osterglauben?, ed. Anton Vögtle and Rudolf Pesch (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1975), 157–68. Cited in John P. Galvin, “Resurrection as Theologia Crucis Jesu: The Foundational Christology of Rudolf Pesch,” Theological Studies 38, no. 3 (1977): 516.

Edward Schillebeeckx, Jesus: An Experiment in Christology, trans. Hubert Hoskins (New York: Crossroad, 1987), 369, 395–90.

Schillebeeckx, 336, 441–515.

Robert F. Scuka, “Resurrection: Critical Reflections on a Doctrine in Search of a Meaning,” Modern Theology 6, no. 1 (1989): 79. See also 90.

Scuka, 81–85. See also 90.

Scuka, 85.

Scuka, 79.

Scuka, 80.

Scuka, 85.

Scuka, 88.

Scuka, 89.

Scuka, 91.

Sheehan, First Coming, 105. See also 107. Cf. 109.

Sheehan, 113–14.

Sheehan, 108.

Tipler, Physics of Immortality, 310–12.

Wedderburn, Beyond Resurrection, 124.

Rowan Williams, “Between the Cherubim: The Empty Tomb and the Empty Throne,” in D’Costa, Resurrection Reconsidered, 89, 93.

Wilckens, Resurrection, 16; Lorenzen, Resurrection and Discipleship, 136–37, 143–44; Gerald O’Collins, “Did Jesus Eat the Fish (Luke 24:42–43)?,” Gregorianum 69, no. 1 (1988): 73–74, 76.

Hans Conzelmann, First Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 256.

Conzelmann, 258.

Funk, Honest to Jesus, 272.

Funk, 267.

Mack, review of Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? (by Habermas and Flew), 222–23.

Rudolf Pesch, “Zur Entstehung des Glaubens an die Auferstehung Jesu: Ein Vorschlag zur Diskussion,” Theologische Quartalschrift 153, no. 3 (1973): 209–18; Pesch, “Materialien und Bemerkungen,” 136–56. Cited in Galvin, “Resurrection as Theologia Crucis Jesu,” 514–15. Cf. John P. Galvin, “The Origin of Faith in the Resurrection of Jesus: Two Recent Perspectives,” Theological Studies 49, no. 1 (1988): 525.

Joseph Plevnik, “The Origin of the Easter Faith According to Luke,” Biblica 61, no. 4 (1980): 495.

Robert Greg Cavin, “Miracles, Probability and the Resurrection of Jesus: A Philosophical, Mathematical, and Historical Study” (PhD diss., University of California, Irvine, 1993), abstract.

Cavin, 313.

Paul Badham, “The Meaning of the Resurrection of Jesus,” in Avis, Resurrection of Jesus Christ, 27.

William Lane Craig, “Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?,” in Wilkins and Moreland, Jesus Under Fire, 157.

Fuller, Formation of the Resurrection Narratives, 46.

Fuller, 46.

Fuller, 47.

Fuller, 49.

Fuller, 82.

Fuller, 172.

Fuller, 33.

Kenneth Grayston, “The Empty Tomb,” Expository Times 92, no. 9 (1981): 265.

Kerr, “Paul’s Experience,” 312.

Küng, Eternal Life?, 104.

Jürgen Moltmann, “The Resurrection of Christ: Hope for the World,” in D’Costa, Resurrection Reconsidered, 75.

Muddiman, “Resurrection of the Body,” 133.

Osborne, Resurrection Narratives, 278.

Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus: God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975), 91.

Pannenberg, 92–93.

Alan F. Segal, Life after Death: A History of the Afterlife in Western Religion (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 406. See also 448–49.

Peter Stuhlmacher, “The Resurrection of Jesus and the Resurrection of the Dead,” trans. Jonathan M. Whitlock, Ex Auditu 9 (1993): 48.

Stuhlmacher, 50.

Thrall, “Resurrection Traditions and Christian Apologetic,” 213.

Thrall, 214.

Thrall, 215.

Thrall, 216.

Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 295.

Allison, End of the Ages, 167–68.

See Moreland and Nielsen, “Case for God Challenged,” 164–65.

Pannenberg, Jesus, 95.

J. A. T. Robinson, Can We Trust the New Testament?, 125–27.

Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 294–95.

Allison, 285. See also 284, 293. Cf. 277.

Allison, 277–78.

Allison, 275–77.

Allison, 278–82, 294–95.

Casey, Jesus of Nazareth, 488–90.

Casey, 496.

Casey, 493. See also 490. Cf. Glenn B. Siniscalchi, “Maurice Casey on the Resurrection and Bereavement Experiences,” Irish Theological Quarterly 80, no. 1 (2015): 19–29.

Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 203–4.

Noreen Herzfeld, “Cybernetic Immortality versus Christian Resurrection,” in Peters, Russell, and Welker, Resurrection, 194.

Herzfeld, 197.

Casey, Jesus of Nazareth, 497.

Casey, 493. See also 490.

Casey, 476, 487, 498. See also 507–8 (discussion of accounts being rewritten to accommodate bodily resurrection).

Jeffery Jay Lowder, “Historical Evidence and the Empty Tomb Story: A Reply to William Lane Craig,” in Price and Lowder, Empty Tomb, 267. For full account see 266–70.

Lowder, 268.

Lowder, 295.

Carrier, “Spiritual Body,” 105.

Carrier, 106.

Carrier, 106. See also 147–48.

Carrier, 120. See also 151.

Carrier, 118.

Carrier, 116–17.

Carrier, 119.

Carrier, 184.

Carrier, 187.

Carrier, “Spiritual Body,” 194–95; Carrier, “Burial of Jesus,” 387.

Carrier, “Burial of Jesus,” 388.

Carrier, “Spiritual Body,” 173.

Carrier, 174.

Carrier, 149.

Crossley, “Historical Plausibility,” 174–75.

Crossley, 173.

Ehrman, New Testament, 210.

Ehrman, 210–11. See also 240–41.

Gethin, “Resurrection and Buddhism,” 207.

Hartshorne, “Response to the Debate,” 137.

Craig S. Keener, Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), 2:627–28, 638–41, 810–16.

Moreland and Nielsen, “Atheist’s Rebuttal,” 67.

J. P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen, “Closing Arguments for Atheism,” in Does God Exist?, 71–72.

Carrier, “Spiritual Body,” 195.

Peter Kirby, “The Case against the Empty Tomb,” in Price and Lowder, Empty Tomb, 256.

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