17: Resurrection Agnosticism

17

Resurrection Agnosticism

A noteworthy trend has appeared to become a more prominent option in recent years, though it has been evaluated and addressed very rarely. In this chapter we will be concentrating on agnostic positions in current scholarship, building a series of a half dozen steps that will, in subsequent chapters, lead to questions of what, if anything, may have occurred to Jesus in his death and afterward. Is it possible to keep moving to a final view on these matters, or are scholars justified in more or less stopping along the route at a particular critical position that declares that no further moves can (or will) be made? At first glance, this latter position might appear to be an eminently defensible position without very many pitfalls. But appearances are not always what they seem to be!

Agnostic Default Positions

As we have discussed, the vast majority of recent critical scholars at least allow for and usually even accept what some might consider a surprisingly strong amount of known historical data surrounding the end of Jesus’s life and the very earliest preaching of the gospel message. For example, virtually all scholars, whatever their personal beliefs, espouse or at least concede that Jesus died by Roman crucifixion, which was followed by his disciples experiencing grief and disillusionment at his death. Although the scholarly acceptance rates drop somewhat on the next two here, it is still accepted by a majority of commentators that Jesus was buried in a tomb and that it was later found empty.

Then, essentially all scholars think that the disciples experienced what they believed to be appearances of the risen Jesus. As a result, these believers were transformed, even being willing to die for their faith. Very soon afterward, they began to proclaim the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the church was founded on this gospel message. Even a few former skeptics, such as James the brother of Jesus and then Paul, became believers after they believed that they had seen the risen Jesus.

In earlier chapters we divided these historical data into two slightly differentiated lists. A few of these particulars were singled out and termed the minimal facts due to the presence of two factors: each one was determined as being heavily evidenced, and each was also recognized as historical by virtually all critical scholars who work in the relevant fields. These particular minimal facts will be employed later to argue for the historicity of Jesus’s post-crucifixion appearances. The remainder of the facts referenced above are part of our slightly longer list made up of events that are almost always recognized by scholars due to their historical support, though not always with the same degree of recognition.

These agreements among recent critical commentators are intriguing. On the surface, these parameters appear to support, at least in outline, the New Testament teaching that Jesus appeared again after he was raised from the dead. At a minimum, they point to exceptionally important occurrences that can be neither dismissed nor ignored easily. One such indication of this tendency is that only a minority of scholars actually hold that naturalistic hypotheses can account comfortably for the data.

So, to repeat, it is virtually unanimous that critical scholars hold that Jesus’s disciples thought they had witnessed appearances of the risen Jesus. But how many think that the disciples really saw Jesus in at least some form? From my recent and ongoing survey of the majority of critical scholars in relevant fields who have addressed these questions, a strong number do accept that Jesus’s disciples actually saw him in some sense after his death by crucifixion, but this will be addressed in detail in a later chapter. But further, the majority scholarly view is that Jesus probably appeared in a bodily manner! While it is absolutely true that surveys do not indicate that any particular position is correct, an accurate assessment regarding the contemporary theological outlook may well provide at least some clues as to where recent scholars think the data point.

During the past 200 or more years of critical theological trends, this is perhaps the closest that the predominant view has come to embracing at least the general New Testament teaching on the nature of Jesus’s resurrection body. One obvious question is why more scholars do not willingly and openly acknowledge their recognition or belief that Jesus was raised from the dead and actually was seen afterward. Why are so many caveats sometimes added to the discussion that one wonders if the scholar meant what they seemed to say in their works? Moreover, when pressed, why do some scholars at least appear to take steps backward, ending their comments by asserting something like, “Well, when all is said and done, we cannot really be sure what happened. Sure, the disciples had real experiences of some sort, but we should perhaps just leave the issue there and not attempt to say what actually occurred.”

My suggestion brings us to the heart of this chapter. This latter move sometimes appears to be made for a variety of reasons, many of which seem to be closely related. Some scholars simply do not want to be “pinned down” to a particular view. Others perhaps do not want to sound overly conservative, especially when they are in the presence of their colleagues. On the other hand, maybe still others do not wish to be known as “liberals” either! Peer pressure of various kinds is always a strong motivator. Still other scholars do not want faith or theology to be linked too closely to historical findings, even if they actually believe in Jesus’s resurrection. And perhaps some simply think that the evidence cannot be pressed beyond the initial recognition that the disciples’ had real experiences.

One last puzzle piece needs to be added. Rather intriguingly, in spite of these caveats that are often heard in public dialogue or in private conversation, comparatively few scholars appear to publish their position if it is agnostic, or at least overtly so. On the other hand, other scholars who may even be positive toward either the resurrection appearances or their bodily form sometimes seem to lack enthusiasm in airing that view, even if their research provides support for these views.

Here is a potential suggestion worth considering. It is certainly arguable that although agnosticism may not be the first option for a scholar to set forth, it still may serve well as a “fallback” statement for those who perhaps feel that they have gone as far as they can in the direction of historicity, for reasons such as those just given. In other words, when scholars are pushed for specific details that indicate where they stand, some more clearly defend the historicity of the resurrection appearances, while others migrate to a different response. For the latter, then, the agnostic position often functions as a sort of default setting. In this chapter we will present an overview of the agnostic position, followed by a general critique.

The Agnostic Position on Jesus’s Resurrection

In keeping with these comments, it may not be surprising that there are relatively few developed agnostic positions on the resurrection appearances that have appeared during the past few decades. More frequently, we find a brief comment here or there that may indicate more questions.

Willi Marxsen

One exception is Willi Marxsen’s nuanced resurrection research, including his mostly slight changes of emphasis over the years. In older treatments that manifested Rudolf Bultmann’s strong and ongoing influence, Marxsen favored the importance of faith and interpretation while downplaying history as a means to faith. In the process, Marxsen favored a natural understanding of Jesus’s resurrection, such that the actual occurrence was not at all necessary for faith. If it were, he stated, then all Christians would have to see Jesus even today in order to make faith possible!

Still, there was much room for an agnostic stance here. For example, we can only get back to Peter’s faith, not somehow “behind it” to the nature of any actual events themselves. Regarding those events, we can never really know what occurred—that information is “impossible” to obtain. In a much later volume on the same subject, perhaps reflecting the changed scholarly climate more in favor of the resurrection, Marxsen rather strikingly concluded that he did not know whether Jesus appeared in a subjective or an objective manner.

Peter Carnley

Peter Carnley’s version of agnosticism is of a different sort. Like virtually all contemporary scholars, including Marxsen, he is sure that the disciples at least thought that they had seen the risen Jesus, who was alive after his death: “It seems clear enough that, on the basis of these alleged experiences, the disciples were convinced that they had seen the raised Christ.” Later he reaffirms this: “Meanwhile, there is no doubt that the first disciples interpreted the Easter visions or appearances as signs of the heavenly presence of Christ.”

However, while historical investigation does have some value, it is ultimately inconclusive regarding the resurrection. The major theme of the volume, emphasized throughout his text, is Carnley’s thesis that Christians have internal confirmation of the resurrected Jesus. Such assurance is due not to the rigors of historical research but to the witness of the Holy Spirit. So Carnley’s agnosticism is with regard to the unsure results of historical investigation rather than the truth of the resurrection itself.

A. J. M. Wedderburn

While Marxsen and Carnley are examples of scholars who hardly employ historical investigation at all, the most developed historical treatments of resurrection agnosticism are the theses of A. J. M. Wedderburn and Bart Ehrman. With a more clearly stated, robust appreciation of historical matters than most of the others in this cate­gory, Wedderburn begins his treatment of the question by clearly stating that many of the key resurrection questions are historical in nature. Examples of such historical questions include what happened to Jesus’s body, whether or not various naturalistic theories apply to the empty tomb or appearance accounts, and whether particular events are necessary to explain what happened.

After all, we need to do something with the claims “that human eyes have seen something and human ears have heard something.” Accordingly, Wedderburn at least lists, and sometimes affirms, data similar to that which we mentioned at the outset of this chapter, beginning with the central dictum of most scholars, whatever their ultimate views on the historical nature of the resurrection: “It is an indubitable historical datum that sometime, somehow the disciples came to believe that they had seen the risen Jesus.”

However, after looking at a host of subjects, Wedderburn concludes his study by supporting the verdict of a “reverent agnosticism.” While there are good data that favor the resurrection appearances, and the naturalistic alternatives are problematic (perhaps even clearly so), a supernatural event like a resurrection or the resulting afterlife are difficult barriers to overcome. The result is that skeptics will probably not be convinced by historical arguments. So the verdict is “Not proven.”

In a touching discussion of emotional matters following this verdict, Wedderburn admits that this leaves some very difficult pastoral problems with those who need assistance in areas of guilt, suffering, bereavement, and fear of the unknown, given a faith that is agnostic and “vulnerable at all points.” One might be tempted to tell such hurting persons that they will be reunited with their loved ones after death, which would presumably be very comforting and otherwise helpful, but can this be affirmed in good conscience?

Bart Ehrman

Bart Ehrman has described himself along the atheistic-agnostic continuum. On the central datum of contemporary critical scholars, for example, “we can say with complete certainty that some of his disciples at some later time insisted that . . . he soon appeared to them, convincing them that he had been raised from the dead.” Explaining further, “Historians, of course, have no difficulty whatsoever speaking about the belief in Jesus’s resurrection, since this is a matter of public record. For it is a historical fact that some of Jesus’s followers came to believe that he had been raised from the dead soon after his execution.”

Still, Ehrman thinks that as we work beyond these crucial questions, we also get into areas that we cannot know about the resurrection appearances. For instance, “we cannot be completely certain, historically, that Jesus’s tomb was actually empty.” Further, as historians, “we cannot say that Jesus was actually raised from the dead.” Yet, each of these beliefs can be “affirmed” by faith.

So here we find ourselves in a bit of a quandary between what we can know and what we cannot know. In fact, in one of his later books, Ehrman uses these subtitles for two chapters that deal with the resurrection. For examples, on the “cannot know” side, Ehrman has serious doubts regarding the historicity of Jesus’s burial in Joseph of Arimathea’s private tomb, and he also notes that he has changed his mind regarding the empty tomb. As expected, however, we obviously cannot know historically that Jesus was actually raised from the dead.

But quite surprisingly, Ehrman does not claim to be saying “that historians can use the historical disciplines in order to demonstrate that Jesus was not raised from the dead.” Stated simply, historians just cannot demonstrate the case “one way or the other.” As a result, and even more incredibly, Ehrman no longer subscribes to “any” particular naturalistic theory of the resurrection appearances, especially since all of these alternative theories are more likely than a miracle. Yet, believers can always believe in the resurrection and appearances by faith.

However, having said this about not choosing a particular naturalistic theory, the next chapter in Ehrman’s book How Jesus Became God, entitled “What We Can Know,” exhibits an extraordinary amount of interest in various visionary ­hypotheses. This is strange for a couple of reasons. Initially, if any natural theory will do the job over against resurrection claims, as we just saw, then why spend half a chapter on a single thesis from several different angles? Further, why does Ehrman raise questions throughout this entire chapter rather than follow his own title as well as the previous chapter on what we cannot know and tell us what he thinks we can know about the resurrection? Hence, why is there comparatively little on what we can know, and why the preoccupation with visions here? This latter question in particular is a discussion to finish up what has been dealt with in the specific chapters on hallucinations and other notions of visions.

The agnostic positions mentioned here share several features. Historical study is deemed to be at least partially applicable and may even be able to establish a number of relevant data. For example, for each researcher it is clearly the case that the data indicate that Jesus’s disciples were totally convinced that they had seen the risen Jesus after his death. Yet for at least Marxsen and Carnley, ultimately history is judged to be deficient as a basis for exercising faith as applicable to life and ministry, or perhaps even as grounds for supporting the facticity of the resurrection. One common element here, at least for Marxsen, Wedderburn, and especially for Ehrman, seems to be that Jesus’s resurrection appears to require an acknowledgment of supernatural activity in the world, and this remains problematic, especially in that it involves the intrusion of an “alien” realm that we can know almost nothing about. Nonetheless, the resurrection can still be believed, though only as a tenet of faith.

Problems with the Agnostic Position on the Resurrection

However, the agnostic position on the resurrection of Jesus is problematic on multi­ple grounds. Here we will discuss a series of six problems with this approach, working from general to specific and progressing to the most crucial issues.

Overstated Positions

First, as often happens with responses to rival positions in presumably every sort of situation, occasionally the case against one’s opponent is slanted unfairly. Expressed popularly, the cards are frequently stacked in such a manner that the task of establishing the contrary position from the outset is more difficult than it need be. This is a less serious offense and can certainly be corrected.

Wedderburn provides a couple of examples in his treatment. He states that the historical defense of the resurrection would not convince a skeptic. Furthermore, the verdict against the supernatural positions of either Jesus’s resurrection or life after death is “Not proven.” But since when is convincing a person of the opposite persuasion a prerequisite for arguing that anyone’s view is fairly indicated by the data? So should it be concluded that the data are faulty when a person of another faith (or none at all) fails to “convert” after hearing the argument? Is it not the case that the opposite could also be said with assurance? How likely is it that the argument constructed by a skeptic or agnostic would convince a believer against his or her Christian theistic position? Doubtless, neither side wants this to be a prerequisite for their rationality or the truth of their own beliefs! After all, so many other things contribute to one’s faith than arguments alone, such as family backgrounds, emotions, pain and suffering, and so on, that even a suggestion of this nature should rightly be considered naive.

Still, conversions do indeed move in every direction. Former evangelicals have become atheists, agnostics, or skeptics of one sort or another. But without any question it can be attested from both public publications as well as private testimonies, many (probably thousands) of persons have converted in recent decades on evidential grounds of some sort and become Christians.

Moreover, regarding the second comment above, virtually no scholar on any portion of the theoretical spectrum requires that one’s position be “proven.” Stated succinctly, “proof” is simply not the measure in any inductive discipline, including history or even the experimental sciences. For an entire host of reasons, such as those discussed in our methodology chapters in volume 1, probability is the guide for research. Thus, to label the position taken by an opponent as “not proven” is, similarly, to assume or imply a standard that no historian can live by and is rather vacuous in nature. Nor can the atheist or agnostic positions be “proven,” so this ought not be required by conservatives either. Speaking evidentially, then, we need to be satisfied with a probable argument. That is all that is required, though some are of far better quality, and hence much stronger arguments, than others. In our case, we therefore want to know if the resurrection is the most likely event given the data that we possess.

As already mentioned, this is not necessarily an egregious error; it is committed regularly and can be corrected, so we can move forward. However, it is a decent place to begin. The chief point here is that in evidential discussions of this nature, falsely inflating even the inferred levels of evidence that seemingly must be reached by either side to be “successful” runs the risk of providing unfair emotional standards that may tend to stick especially in the minds of those who are unfamiliar with the canons of good research, leading to misconstrued evaluations of the data.

It must also be remembered that converting others to one’s own opinion is not the gold standard of an effective argument. After all, people convert for all sorts of very poor reasons as well. Further, reaching “proof” in inductive arguments is not even strictly possible. So, bandying the word about is bad practice—that is no one’s goal in this species of research.

The Burden of Proof

A second issue is that the agnostic position usually entails its own burden of proof. If a scholar is satisfied to assert what may be called the “weaker” or even the “private” agnostic stance and just respond that something is simply her private view without any encumbrance on any other position, then that may well be, of course, her opinion alone. But a “stronger” agnostic position may also be chosen, one that maintains that neither we nor others are able to ascertain the truth of particular religious positions.

In our case, however, if the harder, more assertive line is taken that no one is justified in believing religious views, that position, in effect, crosses the line into another individual’s “space.” As such, this sort of assertion then assumes its own burden of proof, for it seeks to make decisions on behalf of another, thereby settling the issues for them. That would clearly seem to raise the relevant question as to why no one else is justified in moving further in belief on a particular subject—such as the origin of the disciples’ faith regarding their thinking that they saw the risen Jesus. A critic can say that this and nothing further occurred, but now an assertion is being made. When challenged in these situations, certainly stronger reasons are needed in order to solve the issue at hand.

Now, is the Christian also justified in asking for the grounds on which this stronger agnostic position should be held? In this case, both the more forceful agnostic position as well as the more assertive theistic assertions about the disciples’ resurrection beliefs should be prepared to evidence their positions. The agnostic position is not established simply by the claim that we can go no further. Nor is the believer’s view now set in cement because it has been stated. How or why should the conclusion to the discussion remain at precisely this point, and on someone’s say-so alone? Why is it the case that we cannot get behind the data and know what happened to the disciples?

But now, agnostic scholars may have reached a dilemma—perhaps one that they were unaware was their responsibility. They presumably may be satisfied with the very personal, more passive stance above and the resulting private view that it involves, devoid of any evidential force. In this sense, the weaker (nonargumentative) agnostic position might be comparable to those who hold to the weaker (nonevidential) Christian position that it is enough to believe firmly in the bodily resurrection of Jesus, but without any evidence or other data being produced in its favor. It is enough that Christianity is true “in our hearts.” Christians often make such assertions. Both are personal positions without evidential confirmation.

On the other hand, both agnostics and Christians ought to accept their own burdens of proof, providing reasons for their beliefs. But too often in dialogues of this nature, it is thought to be evidentially insufficient for Christians to “simply believe,” while agnostics have the evidential right to “simply assert” their view. The reasoning is sometimes repeated even more frequently by atheists than by agnostics, but it is often said that the prefix “a” before either “theist” or “gnostic” only means that they do not subscribe to whatever word comes next, and hence they have absolutely nothing to prove—strictly speaking, they do not even hold a position on the matter!

Not being so careful philosophically, Sam Harris falls exactly into this trap, showing that he definitely does not understand the worldview implications of philosophical issues. He presents just such a straightforward comment featuring the mindset with which atheism is often plagued—that it is not a worldview or real position at all. Really? Harris asserts quite naively, “Atheism is not a philosophy; it is not even a view of the world; it is simply an admission of the obvious,” like saying that atheists are simply not-somethings. Atheists are just persons who tell religionists to produce evidence for their views!

It may be true that neither agnosticism nor atheism are, in and of themselves, full-blown worldviews. But two things are important and should be mentioned here. Initially, the essence of these two views holds much in common with the very heart of naturalism, as can be seen in this definition: “Naturalism—very roughly—may be defined as the philosophy that everything that exists is a part of nature and there is no reality beyond or outside of nature . . . nature is all that exists and nature itself is whatever will be disclosed by the ideal natural sciences, especially physics.” So atheism, agnosticism, and naturalism appear to share quite closely the core beliefs regarding the nonexistence of the supernatural realm.

Further, Harris plainly does not stop with what we have identified as the weak or softer unbelieving position that may not need any defense—that of being satisfied to simply affirm one’s own personal, private “faith.” Rather, he goes on the offensive on many occasions, especially for such a short book. Harris piles up what he considers to be one critique of Christianity after another, charging Christians numerous times with having insufficient evidence, as well as offering what he considers to be positive arguments that favor his naturalism. So this is plainly over the line that he set for himself and his colleagues. Harris goes far beyond his own limit of simply registering that he is not religious!

So, Harris thinks that atheism is neither a philosophy nor even a view of the world? Here’s the atheist angle: there is no God, and the universe exists by accident, perhaps eternally, perhaps emerging out of nothing. Is this “not a philosophy . . . not a view of the world”? Does this sound like a simple belief that needs no backup?

So as we just stated, it may be the case that neither agnosticism nor atheism is, in and of itself, a full-orbed worldview. We are certainly not saying that they are identical ideas. Nonetheless, the naturalistic worldview involves as a major tenet the belief that God does not exist (or perhaps that God may never be known to exist). With naturalism serving as one of the philosophical parents here, atheism and agnosticism certainly play large roles in the natural scenery that there is at least no traditional God. Many would identify naturalism as the dominant worldview in the Western world. Further, a dominant message here is that religious believers of all sorts are quite gullible and guilty of employing faith without good reasons. However, if these theists and agnostics would have looked more closely, they might have found a plethora of recent Christian scholars who even agree with them that “faith only” positions (including secular ones!) are insufficient.

Thus, some forms of agnosticism are plainly one-sided, quaint positions that stack up all the cards in their own corner, all in the absence of any real evidential data on their own behalf. It is a mere assertion—and an incorrect one at that. But it is incredibly convenient to tell someone else that they bear the entire burden of proof, while all “your side” has to do is to say, “No, not this,” or “No, we’re not that,” without any further responsibility. This frequent disparity in roles and perceptions of occupied positions must change.

So, in the name of getting his foot in the front door, Harris then declares outright war! Since he freely both initiates and engages in the debate, it then becomes “put up or shut up time” for him rather than resting on his earlier “innocent routine”! He has made the charges against others as well as offered defenses of his own system (hence, offering a worldview!). So we are back to the original point: the duel has been offered and now it has been taken.

Harris and other atheists or agnostics who wish to argue against other phi­losophies or to suggest evidence in favor of their own views have every bit as much of a burden of proof as anyone else, for they have decided not to remain with a stated, undefended “faith” system. They may choose to run into a corner and hope to be overlooked, but when a position is argued in favor of or against others, a system is being favored. It should not even be pretended that such a critic can shoot darts left, right, and all around but never have any burden to indicate that the critic’s under­lying system is true!

This ploy may have been very useful while the ruse lasted, or whenever it goes unopposed. Perhaps a mere sneer and guffaw are enough to keep religious believers at bay. But as we will see next, perhaps naturalism and related views that reject the supernatural simply cannot be shown to be true! If so, perhaps agnostics and atheists are better off using ploys in order to distance themselves from producing evidence. Otherwise, it may be more widely known that the emperor is not wearing any clothes!

Naturalism and Related Views as Truth?

Third, before going further, an issue that ranks as crucially as any other in this discussion must be solved. What actual arguments determine that naturalism or materialism in general, along with atheism, agnosticism, or similar views in particular, are even true in the first place? It is easy to pretend to sit on a lofty height and throw stones down at someone else, all the while proclaiming loudly to be immune from having to establish one’s own case, as in the second point just mentioned. But until a sufficient number of positive evidences and other good arguments arise that are capable of indicating the actual truth of the philosophical position from which the criticism is coming, the agnostic begs the question by assuming the truth of that position.

Thus, what are the grounds for denying the supernatural realm? How would these grounds be established in the first place? True, the existence of the supernatural is probably denigrated as much as any idea in these discussions, but is there more to these naturalistic attacks here than mere verbiage and bombast?

Sometimes the suggestion is made that the one-two punches of these philosophi­cal positions are the problem of pain and evil along with the process of evolution. While these two areas can indeed be pithy issues that raise good questions, neither one disproves either the existence of God or the existence of a supernatural realm. Though nothing on these fronts can be solved here, a few brief observations that indicate this conclusion may be helpful.

Regarding the classic problem of evil, the best-known statements of the problem are the logical and the evidential versions. In perhaps the best-known example of the potentially stronger, logical version, J. L. Mackie states, “There seems to be some contradiction” between the theist’s propositions. “However, the contradiction does not arise immediately . . . we need some additional premises.”

Years later, Alvin Plantinga challenged Mackie to produce the actual contradiction by indicating which additional premises would complete his argument and prove that theism was false. The result, as Plantinga notes, is that “no atheologian has produced even a plausible candidate for this role, and it certainly is not easy to see what such a proposition might be.”

In a surrejoinder by Mackie after he and Plantinga had “slugged it out,” Mackie concluded the matter by conceding in the final two paragraphs of his treatment: “We cannot, indeed, take the problem of evil as a conclusive disproof of traditional theism, because, as we have seen, there is some flexibility in its doctrines, and in particular in the additional premises needed to make the problem explicit.” The matter “leaves open several possibilities for revised religious views.”

So, while Mackie no doubt wanted to retain in some form his original thesis of a few decades before, he had to admit that it did not work. In short, theists simply have too many theological options to avoid getting pinned down on the logical problem of evil. As Mackie concludes the matter, theism has enough “flexibility in its doctrines” leading to “several possibilities” of avoiding any serious issues.

In fact, prominent atheist philosopher and specialist on the problem of evil, William Rowe, dismissed the discussion rather unceremoniously, concluding regarding the logically inconsistent form of the problem (like Mackie’s) that “no one, I think, has succeeded in establishing such an extravagant claim . . . there is a fairly compelling argument for the view that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God.”

Thus, the stronger, contradictory form of the argument from evil suffered an inglorious death. However, Rowe is best known for developing the evidential problem of evil. Could there actually exist such intense examples of human or animal suffering where God could have done something about it without losing either a greater good or by permitting an equal or worse evil in the process?

But after pursuing this option for years, Rowe also had to concede that this chief question could not be demonstrated so as to discount God’s existence: “The truth is that we are not in a position to prove” that evil refutes God’s existence. But Rowe does think that there are still some rational grounds for supporting atheism here, presumably in that there is just too much evil in the world. Even so, rather incredibly, Rowe also suggests that there are ways that theism can counteract these moves by atheists. Theists could defend one or more of the traditional arguments for God’s existence, appeal to aspects of religious experience, or provide an “account for a variety of phenomena” in the world. Rowe thinks that an atheist like himself can even concede that the theist can be justified in believing in God on grounds like these!

So, neither the harder-line argument from logical contradictions in the theistic response to evil in the world nor the more popular evidential argument from even heinous cases of human and animal suffering have disproven theism, even as conceded by the strongest atheist defenders. As Mackie states, the theist just has too many options that do not allow the atheist to close all the doors.

What about evolution? Critics should acknowledge that this subject has nothing like the force of the argument from evil. A huge indication of this is simply straightforward: many Christian scholars actually affirm some notion of evolution while also confessing their orthodox views of many of the central tenets of Christianity, including the inspiration of Scripture, the nature of sin, the atoning work of Christ via his crucifixion, and so forth, whereas evolution is seen as a peripheral issue involving the question of method.

Of course, this is a hotly disputed issue and there is certainly enough disagreement to go around, with any number of items to debate. So the presence of this evolutionary perspective hardly indicates that everyone is pleased with this or that reasoning. But this is not the matter we are discussing here. The point is that if even theologically sophisticated conservatives like J. I. Packer and many others can be open to the subject, then it is hardly an issue that contradicts central Christian theology or requires that this theology be jettisoned.

An additional issue beyond whether evolution is compatible with Christian doctrine is the cosmological angle. Apparently following the lead of the well-known twentieth-century philosopher Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Warren C. Young stated that Darwin’s thesis indicates “the survival of the fittest without explaining the arrival of the fittest.” The idea here is that evolution describes the process of how already existing, living organisms flourish, but not how they came about in the first place. Since this is the case, some think that God’s existence is even required before Darwin’s descriptions of life in order to create the entire living system in the first place.

The upshot here is that without being grounded or otherwise known to be true, naturalism and similar positions cannot act as if they are able to judge other systems for lacking sufficient evidence. Yet, these philosophical positions seem not to hesitate to do just this. For example, it is often argued that we are justified in doubting or denying the existence of supernatural events, perhaps even on a priori grounds. Many have commented that the occurrence of a miracle is highly unlikely, if not impossible, since it involves a supernatural occurrence.

But philosopher Stephen Parrish makes the point in forceful terms: “Why are miracles widely accepted as extremely improbable?” If one knew that a particular philosophical position that basically disallowed miracles was true, “then one would be completely justified in assigning miracles a very low order of antecedent probability.” But this is the very position that must be demonstrated, not assumed. Apart from such a heavily evidenced positive case, the question has been begged against the possibility of miracles. Thus, no matter how strongly such an agnostic or atheistic stance is asserted, it still fails, having committed an informal logical fallacy.

Miracle Claims and History

Fourth, the agnostic scholars above argue or imply that a major problem with affirming that God raised Jesus is that such an event involves supernatural activity. But many researchers, including even some of those who affirm the resurrection, note that it is problematic to argue historically that a particular event was a miracle. On this latter view, it is at least arguable that history as a discipline is unable to show that God is the one who acted in a particular event. History may only be able to decide on the status of the event itself, since, as historians, we may only be able to judge the evidence for what happens in the space-time world and decide on that, but there are no photographs or footprints when God works a miracle.

On such a distinction, then, we may study the historical ramifications of “normal” events, such as whether Jesus really died. All of the agnostic scholars surveyed above judge that this event occurred in space-time history. Did Jesus’s followers see him after that point, without inquiring about any supernatural implications? A real death for a historical figure and seeing a person walk around and talk in space and time are both matters that historical and other inductive research techniques (such as documents, interviews, medical data, photographs, and so on) can determine.

In other words, it would hardly be disputed that historical methodology can study the side of the issue that occurred within its own domain. But whether this event was a miracle or whether God raised Jesus from the dead—these are distinct philosophical questions, and some would say that they must be treated differently. Or at least, different or additional “tools” or methods for getting at these issues need to be employed.

On this specific point, though it is possible that we can be too strict at times, my tendency is actually to agree with the agnostic scholars! We can view the historical portion of the miracle claim, as Wedderburn states, by examining its this-worldly components. Therefore, in this chapter, we should concentrate on these same two questions: According to the canons of historical probability, can it be determined whether Jesus died? Then, can it be determined that human witnesses saw him afterward? We can agree not to cloud the issue with other questions. So, for now, we will therefore suspend judgment on any potential supernatural portion of the issue with regard to the possible cause of Jesus walking around after his death.

Wedderburn correctly recognizes this crucial distinction between historical investigation and one’s philosophical and theological positions, conclusions, and arguments. Moreover, he also makes the same distinction between the historical portion of a claim and the philosophical portion. Answering those who argue that history and revelation are sometimes so intertwined that we cannot investigate the claims at all, Wedderburn states that even such events “have a side, a dimension, which is open to history and the historian . . . the fact that it is supposed to be a reve­lation in history means that human eyes have seen something and human ears have heard something. . . . This side of the revelatory act that is open to history . . . must be scrutinized to ascertain its trustworthiness and credibility.”

Ehrman is helpful here too, making some of the same sorts of distinctions as Wedderburn between initial historical observations and their meanings, interpretations, and so on. Similarly helpful is the dual discussion of the crucifixion and Paul’s first visit to Jerusalem to see Peter and James. Other discussions are full of nuance as well as key distinctions throughout, whether or not one agrees with Ehrman. Given his background views, the data that Ehrman allows, in particular, and his rationale for allowing each piece of evidence are the most instructive items.

How would this translate to a study of the resurrection? Here Wedderburn applies well his previous point: “The resurrection-event itself may be beyond the reach of historians, but they can still pass judgment on whether that event is needed at all to explain what is within their reach, namely the early Christians’ claim that Jesus had been raised.” So Wedderburn thinks that history cannot tell whether God was actually involved in the resurrection event, but it is still necessary to determine whether “some such event occurred and impinged upon and occasioned the more obviously human events of which we do know? This is a historical question to which the historian can attempt to give some sort of answer.”

However, distressingly, Wedderburn seems to forget his own distinction later when he decides in favor of agnosticism. When discussing naturalistic alternatives to the resurrection, he judges that, “however unconvincing they may seem,” these options have an advantage over supernatural origins for this event. So even though natural hypotheses do not seem to explain the data that we have, they may be better than looking to God for an explanation. But we have agreed that the discipline of history cannot answer the supernatural portion of the question! So why bring it up again and prejudice the decision?

Thus, rather than keeping the clear distinction that he called for earlier between human observations in space and time and any possible supernatural cause of this event, Wedderburn leaves the realm of historical investigation. He even decides rather “unconvincing” natural options are probably better than supernatural explanations. So, he crosses his own line of historical research and then opts for what he takes to be a less likely cause. But we should note that he does this because the miraculous possibility does not fit well with his own preconceptions—exactly what we have been discussing in this fourth point!

After many strong comments on the historicity of these events, Ehrman agrees with Wedderburn and makes very similar moves. In fact, even experienced readers may not be able to distinguish from one another the comments made by these two scholars. Once again, any thesis at all, no matter how improbable, is more likely than a resurrection. This conclusion, it must be remembered, comes from a scholar who has stated that history can neither prove nor disprove the resurrection. But as we have seen here, something always gets in the way when it comes to the final verdict!

We close this fourth critique by asking how, specifically, can agnostic forms of naturalism be shown to be true as the chief backdrop for this position? If evidencing this view strongly is not strictly an option in any rigorous way, then upon what foundation can this widespread and, in some places, fairly unanimous agreement against the supernatural realm and those sorts of events be grounded? Why should this skeptical view simply be assumed?

Incidentally, it will simply not do to respond that we just do not actually witness these supernatural events today, because dozens, if not hundreds, of these occurrences of various species have been documented carefully in medical and other researched literature—so many so that shrugging shoulders just does not work anymore. If the naturalistic emperor is not wearing any clothes, as it appears that he is not, how can the absence of a grounding position eliminate potentially evidenced positions, especially with a guffaw and quick wave of the hand?

Thus, Wedderburn, Ehrman, and other scholars first need to evidence strongly their agnosticism, followed by reaffirming their own methodologies. Even if it is decided that we cannot determine with historical tools whether God by his power raised Jesus from the dead, our attention here in the remainder of this chapter is still on a smaller, more focused goal: Did Jesus die? Then, was Jesus seen later at least one time, no matter what the cause?

The Role of the Minimally Known Facts

So far in this chapter, after surveying representative agnostic scholars, we have outlined four consecutive steps that build on one another. We began with a minor admonition not to use language in ways that build expectations to levels that will always be unachievable from any perspective, even according to the actual standards being employed. This led to discussing the burden of proof that all sides, agnostics included, must bear when discussing the relative strengths of their own positions.

Next, how do we know that naturalism in general, including agnostic, atheistic, and other similar components, are themselves true? If they are going to serve as the backdrop for truth, including whisking away other positions with which they disagree, then they must also pass muster. Finally, the question of actual interventions by God is addressed in volume 4 of this study.

Our fifth move, in working toward the case for Jesus’s resurrection that we have forecast in this overall study, is our contention that by using only the recognized historical data that are conceded by virtually all critical scholars, including agnostics, we have the advantage of a powerful factual cartel from which we might draw for our discussion. The nature of agnostic questioning sometimes makes it appear that a particular scholar does not want to follow the evidence to its conclusion, thereby functioning as a way to stop the proceedings before they ever begin pointing in the direction of the resurrection.

However, it is certainly possible that these shared data could be just what is needed to remove the agnostic question mark. Especially if naturalistic theories have failed to explain Jesus’s resurrection appearances, or are even less likely options, then perhaps we have plenty of evidence already to decide the case. The crucial point, then, is that critical scholars ought not reject or arbitrarily pull up short of the results that proceed from their own research. That is, unless such is precisely their goal. It is of course possible that agnostics and others want to stop there in order not to arrive at a conclusion that they may not appreciate!

Instead of looking at less likely data, as scholars often do, such as concentrating on textual conflicts that cannot even hinder let alone halt these recognized historical findings, perhaps it can be determined that more than an undefined “something” occurred to Jesus’s disciples. The key here is to highlight not what we think we cannot know, but what our own methodology indicates that we can know. Do we already have an adequate foundation from which we might answer our most vital questions? Scholars need to viably address the results of their own research. Of course, they can deny the conclusion of the resurrection, but this is different from providing an adequate explanation.

So, we may already possess precisely what we need—plenty of data to know what occurred. Since scholars readily concede that Jesus’s disciples had experiences that they thought were appearances of Jesus after his death, these need to be explained. If naturalistic hypotheses do not do so viably, then we must look elsewhere for what convinced them of this.

In other words, did the disciples really see Jesus after his death, no matter the cause, or not? Anything less is an inadequate response. By using only those data to which virtually all scholars agree, we may already have adequate grounds to argue that Jesus’s followers actually saw him alive after his death. So, we need to stay focused precisely on this particular issue. If the resurrection appearances follow, then we have successfully made a historical case for them. We must account for our commonly held data.

By pulling up short with an agnostic response of “I do not know; let’s stop right here” sort of reply, we may actually be curtailing the historiographical process, bypassing the very information that might be enough to establish Jesus’s appearances as the most likely explanation of the sightings. Reginald Fuller is correct in asserting that the factual situation “therefore requires that the historian postulate some other event” as an adequate reason for the disciples’ conviction. We must have a real “cause of the Easter faith . . . outside of their belief.”

Near-Death Experiences and Supernatural Reality

Our sixth move takes aim at the frequent objection that any conclusions, like the one to which we have been pointing, would still involve a supernatural realm, hence invoking its automatic dismissal or, at the very least, a concession that it is just barely possible, since we know of no such realm. This response seems about as common as a jerk of the knee when stimulated with a little medical hammer! When faced with the possibility of a supernatural event, the automatic retort is quite often that we must draw back to the agnostic stance, strictly to avoid the miraculous claim.

What makes this reaction so incredible is that its utter confidence follows from its position that frequently denies its own burden of proof while demanding of others that such a burden is theirs alone. This is sometimes followed up by begging the question by seldom, if ever, attempting to indicate the truth of its own worldview (without which they have no right to hold prisoner any supernatural views) as well as failing to distinguish what can be known on the historical (nonmiraculous) side, even when they already acknowledge the historicity of these data.

Although these last two steps of our half dozen definitely cannot be argued in this chapter, perhaps the central claim of this entire study is that the minimal facts argument is strong enough to indicate the historicity of Jesus’s resurrection. Further, it has already been argued at length elsewhere that an exceptionally strong evidential case can be made for at least an initial afterlife based on individual, highly evidenced near-death experiences (NDEs). The latter could potentially supply an empirical case for a nonmiraculous but still supernatural reality, in the same realm (the afterlife) as the resurrection.

Cases cited elsewhere include many highly evidential reports where the individual is later able to recount minute details from their surroundings as well as other events while in a near-death state. For example, in dozens of documented cases of NDEs where the individual was without brain or heart activity of any measurable sort, these individuals reported accounts that were later corroborated. Sometimes the subsequently confirmed events occurred miles away from their locations, while others provided evidence from minute descriptions in their immediate environment, such as an operating room.

In a few other reported cases, healthy persons have reported witnessing the NDEs of others! In another few accounts, the NDE patients had been blind all of their lives except during the experience. Once in a while, those experiencing an NDE seemingly brought back testimonies from deceased individuals whom they reported seeing again. These individuals, who had died years before, imparted information that apparently was unknown to anyone alive but was confirmed later, sometimes quite dramatically.

The most likely conclusion to be drawn from this plethora of more than 300 interdisciplinary, exceptionally well-evidenced NDE cases is that at least the best of these strongly evidence what we have termed “minimalistic life after death,” in that they indicate consciousness beyond the initial stages of death. Though NDEs are not miraculous events requiring God’s intervention, they would evidence a supernatural realm, which is also anathema to naturalism and its relatives.

The relevance of NDEs for the resurrection is twofold, as these truths would be interconnected. Not only would a supernatural realm exist, but this confirmation concerns the specific area of life after death. The claim of agnostic doubt is that we cannot decide on either such events or such a realm. But if an afterlife is a reality, the popular naturalistic objection against the resurrection that supernatural events are practically impossible loses a great deal of its force. Further, the resurrection could be investigated strictly on its own grounds in order to ascertain if it is a unique instance of this reality, since the path has already been opened. The evidence for the disciples seeing an appearance of Jesus after his death is strong, and this would be a final blow to the agnostic option. Hence, afterlife and resurrection play off one another.

Would Jesus’s resurrection appearances still be unique events? Even the straightforward historical events would indicate that this is the case. According to the fourth critique of agnosticism above, we are pursuing here this-worldly, historical aspects of this event. Did Jesus die? Was he seen afterward? The way is now totally clear to answer these two questions.

Is there is a path by which we may move from the most secure historical facts to the historical appearances of Jesus? That Jesus died and that afterward his early followers thought they saw him again are both held by virtually all critical scholars today, including the agnostics whose views we studied above. Most critical scholars also concede that natural alternative hypotheses are unable to explain these data. This scenario in tandem indicates that, at least for those who reject the alternative hypotheses, the best explanation for what occurred is that Jesus was indeed seen by his disciples after his death.

To repeat, then, that the early disciples really thought that they had seen Jesus after death, coupled with failing to disprove this naturally, indicates that they did see Jesus again. The more thoroughly these natural options are disproven, the more probably Jesus’s appearances are indicated. This is the inference to the best historical explanation. No wonder the distinguished, self-described liberal scholar E. P. Sanders thought that Jesus’s postmortem appearances were “secure facts” that we could know about Jesus.

Conclusion: To Pull Back or Move Ahead?

So where does this discussion leave us? We began this essay with a brief list of facts that is accepted as historical by the vast majority of scholars who comment on the issues, regardless of their personal beliefs or theological outlook. Other pertinent data could be added to the list too. The relevant question for us here, then, is whether we ought to pull back and conclude that, in spite of all these data, almost anything is preferable to Jesus’s appearances after death, as Wedderburn and Ehrman do? Or ought we to move ahead and affirm that an examination of the historical portion of Jesus’s postmortem appearance claim pushes us to the conclusion that it is indeed the best explanation of our data?

Some scholars think that agnosticism has the advantage of always taking the natural path, hence its question marks have to do with the supernatural. But I have argued that the agnostic alternative is seriously troubled by an ascending series of six problems, many of which are quite troublesome. Besides some overstatements that need some adjusting, taking the agnostic stance on the resurrection may be simply a private notion, devoid of providing its own reasons. But if the agnostic position is asserted or thought to be held for good reasons, then the mere claim is insufficient; a burden of proof follows. Why, precisely, can we not get behind the data and know what happened to Jesus’s disciples? Why are the data insufficient? Why should we stop exactly here?

Additionally, unless a deeper philosophical position that questions the supernatural realm is itself established, the agnostic begs the question against that conclusion. On what grounds are we justified in doubting the occurrence of the supernatural realm or of miracles? What determines that this agnostic outlook on the world is correct? After all, if it is to rule out all of nonnatural existence, we need some grounds for this move.

Moreover, it seems that the agnostic contention that historians are only able to investigate the historical side of a miracle claim makes a good deal of sense, though we must be careful not to overemphasize specializations. Yet, historical research still indicates both that Jesus died and that he was seen afterward by his followers. We tabled for now the supernatural portion of the question regarding the cause of the resurrection when speaking specifically of the historians’ craft. But now the balance would be shifting well away from agnosticism anyway, because its skepticism of the supernatural would be a moot point at this juncture.

Further, if the historical facts on which virtually all critical scholars agree strongly favor the resurrection appearances, then the central claim that Jesus was seen after his death would still obtain. For those agnostics who agree, they would be moving toward taking this stronger position!

Finally, if the many well-evidenced NDEs establish at least a minimal afterlife, it would appear that the nature of this reality drives a final nail in the agnostic position. For if life after death actually exists, we now know about the reality of a central, relevant tenet that agnostics have long questioned. So, even if we are pursuing only the historical side of the issue for now, Jesus could have lived after his death.

As just summarized above, the fact that the early disciples really thought that they had seen Jesus after his death, when juxtaposed with the failure of natural alternative hypotheses, indicates the strong likelihood that the early disciples did see Jesus again. The more these natural alternative options fail, the more Jesus’s appearances emerge as the probable inference to the best historical explanation.

Therefore, the view that Jesus was indeed raised from the dead makes the best sense of the historical and other data. For those who already think that God exists or that there are other reasons to hold to a supernatural realm (see some examples in the other chapters in this volume), these would provide still additional “clinchers” to the argument here.

The agnostic position on the resurrection exhibits the modern charm engendered by a scholarly shoulder shrug and accompanied by a verdict of “We cannot always be sure.” But it opts for the question mark without realizing that this maneuver exposes a position devoid of solid reasons that would establish its position. Exactly why can’t we know the nature of the disciples’ experiences? Further, how is the agnostic position itself established? And since we are only investigating the historical side of these claims for now, what about the strong evidence that Jesus was seen after his death, especially when NDEs indicate independently that agnostics are already mistaken regarding the cognate realm of an afterlife?

By championing the question mark, agnosticism works itself too quickly into a corner, opening itself up to the precise contrary data that can disprove it. Here it comes up very short on a number of crucial questions in areas where we already have plenty of data to draw positive conclusions.

Notes

In several places along the way, it will be very helpful to mention or note atheistic notions, for various reasons, but these will be kept to a minimum. This inclusion will hopefully also augment some particular points being made here.

There are a considerable number and variety of recent critical scholars who provide their own lists of historical facts that parallel (often quite closely) this list, with some frequently exceeding the number of events on our list. Some examples include Jesus Seminar founder Robert W. Funk, Honest to Jesus (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), 32–34, 40, 237, 239; highly skeptical scholar James D. Tabor, The Jesus Dynasty: The Hidden History of Jesus, His Royal Family, and the Birth of Christianity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 228, 310–11; self-styled liberal E. P. Sanders, The Historical Figure of Jesus (London: Penguin, 1993), 10–14, 278–80; and New Testament scholar Luke Timothy Johnson, The Real Jesus: The Misguided Quest for the Historical Jesus and the Truth of the Traditional Gospels (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), 119–36.

Of course, this also requires that these critical researchers provide clear indications that they hold these positions! A couple of decades ago, there was a bit of an upturn of interest in these alternative theses; see Gary R. Habermas, “The Late Twentieth-Century Resurgence of Naturalistic Responses to Jesus’ Resurrection,” Trinity Journal 22 (2001): esp. 179–96. However, the outlook and interest at present seem to have noticeably slowed.

Gary R. Habermas, “Mapping the Recent Trend toward the Bodily Resurrection Appearances of Jesus in Light of Other Prominent Critical Positions,” in The Resurrection of Jesus: John Dominic Crossan and N. T. Wright in Dialogue, ed. Robert B. Stewart (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), esp. 78–92.

One may, of course, disagree with my survey of recent scholars or otherwise dispute these trends. But if my count is anywhere close to being accurate, the percentages are high enough that they would have to be mistaken by quite a large margin for these general observations to be overturned.

Habermas, “Mapping the Recent Trend,” 81–82, 91.

This was also my conclusion in “Mapping the Recent Trend,” 204n60. As a rather incredible and insightful aside, it is always amazing when this sort of specific clarification is requested, such that those who move to the conservative side, or who opt to present arguments for their position, are often termed “apologists” or perhaps even viewed as nonscholars, while those who take the agnostic stance are thought of as being “careful” or “scholarly” thinkers!

For instance, G. T. Eddy pleads, “Let us allow more room . . . for a reverent agnosticism about bodies and tombs.” See Eddy, “The Resurrection of Jesus Christ: A Consideration of Professor Cranfield’s Argument,” Expository Times 101 (1990): 329. Sometimes it is even difficult to know if agnosticism is what the scholar(s) is implying. One example of this possibility is the comment by Richard A. Burridge and Graham Gould that they are not sure of the sense in which Jesus was raised; see their volume, Jesus Then and Now (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 208. But they may simply be saying that Jesus was raised in some sense, but that they are not prepared to give specific empirical details. However, Dale Allison spends more creative time than most in musing on the sense in which it might be said that Jesus rose from the dead. See Dale C. Allison Jr., Resurrecting Jesus: The Earliest Christian Tradition and Its Interpreters (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 364–75.

Willi Marxsen, The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, trans. Margaret Kohl (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970), esp. 88–97. An earlier essay by Marxsen was a forerunner while featuring its own phase of development: “The Resurrection of Jesus as a Historical and Theological Problem,” in The Significance of the Message of the Resurrection for Faith in Jesus Christ, ed. C. F. D. Moule (Naperville, IL: Allenson, 1968), 15–50. There were a few themes in this earlier essay that were emphasized less frequently in later works by Marxsen, such as intriguing references to the empty tomb as history but without thereby getting from it to the resurrection (24–25), or to the early “pre-Pauline” creedal material regarding the resurrection witness, as found in specific New Testament texts such as 1 Cor 15:3–8; Luke 24:34; and even the Acts passages in 9:17 and 13:31 (26). Further, Marxsen emphasizes the sense in which history establishes the truth of Jesus’s disciples believing that they saw the risen Jesus (17, 21–22, 36, and esp. 31), along with Paul’s faith being based on him seeing the risen Jesus (22–23, 27, cf. 33). Marxsen’s last emphasis on the importance of sight almost seems to suggest as if it were different for Paul and the disciples (in Lessing’s terms) because they were contemporary with the occurrences themselves! But more fideistic themes that reverberate throughout his later thoughts on the resurrection can also be found here, like history being unable to establish either the resurrection or Jesus’s appearances (18–19, 21, 25, 28, 31, 38, 48, cf. 36). Last, while subjective visions “cannot be excluded,” we must not get back into the type of thinking that involves studying history to validate faith (28). Hans Grass’s view of objective visions must also be rejected, again because it mixes history and “faith alone prevails” (29). Incidentally but not surprisingly, Marxsen’s comment about subjective visions being possible rather parallels Rudolf Bultmann’s similar thoughts in “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch, trans. Reginald H. Fuller (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 42.

Marxsen, Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, 96–97, 119, 126, 152.

Willi Marxsen, Jesus and Easter: Did God Raise the Historical Jesus from the Dead?, trans. Victor Paul Furnish (Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 70–74.

Peter Carnley, The Structure of Resurrection Belief (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 64.

Carnley, 246.

Carnley, 72, 95, 225–26, 264.

Carnley, 248–65, esp. 248–49, 256, 259–65.

A. J. M. Wedderburn, Beyond Resurrection (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1999), 12–19, 21–22, 38.

Wedderburn, 15.

Wedderburn, 13.

Wedderburn, esp. 95–98, but also 134, 153, 218–19, 221, 225.

Wedderburn, esp. 221–26.

Bart D. Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist? The Historical Argument for Jesus of Nazareth (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), particularly 98–132, 140–41, and chap. 5.

Bart D. Ehrman, Jesus: Apocalyptic Prophet of the New Millennium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 230–31.

Ehrman, 229. The sources below contain other references here.

Bart D. Ehrman, How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee (New York: HarperCollins, 2014), examples on 7, 141–43, 151–69, 173–74, 184–86. Ehrman used to accept the empty tomb but now does not. The change of mind on this issue is noted on 164. For a number of relevant, detailed responses to Ehrman in a book released simultaneously by Zondervan (a sister publishing company to HarperCollins), written by a number of highly trained New Testament scholars (with additional endorsements by Richard Bauckham and Larry Hurtado), see Michael F. Bird, ed., How Jesus Became God: The Real Origins of Belief in Jesus’ Divine Nature. A Response to Bart Ehrman (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014). For a response specifically to the issue mentioned here of Ehrman’s change on Joseph’s burial tomb by a specialist in this area, that also includes a brief treatment of the empty tomb, see the chapter by Craig A. Evans, “Getting the Burial Traditions and Evidences Right,” 71–93.

Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 132, 143–44, 148–49.

Ehrman, 132.

Ehrman, 146–48

Ehrman, 164–65, 173, 186; also, Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist?, 315–16.

Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 132, 143, 150. However, just as Ehrman points out from time to time that too many people pontificate on subjects in which they are not trained (e.g., Did Jesus Exist?, 2–3, 14–30, 167, 194–96, 268), he should never have offered the comment that “religious faith and historical knowledge are two different ways of ‘knowing’” (How Jesus Became God, 132). Taken at face value, this is nothing short of shocking! But if he meant this seriously, as any sort of epistemic comparison of these two avenues as differentiated ways of knowing something to be true, as we sometimes might hear chiefly in some preaching services (almost always seeming to invoke “amens”), then Ehrman is simply mistaken. This is a matter primarily for philosophers, not New Testament scholars!

Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 183–204, or exactly half of the entire chapter!

Wedderburn, Beyond Resurrection, 95.

Wedderburn, 225.

Examples include perhaps the best-known former evangelical-turned-atheist, Robert M. Price, whose background figures heavily in works like Inerrant the Wind: The Evangelical Crisis of Biblical Authority (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2009) and Beyond Born Again: Toward Evangelical Maturity (Eugene, OR: Apocryphal Books, 1993). Already discussed is former evangelical-turned-agnostic Bart D. Ehrman, as in Did Jesus Exist?, with autobiographical reflections on 5, 35–37, 70–71, 94–95. Also in this category is John W. Loftus, Why I Became an Atheist: A Former Preacher Rejects Christianity (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2008). Geza Vermes, born into a Jewish-Hungarian family, later became a Roman Catholic priest and then later returned to Judaism. He is known as one of the early pioneers in the Third Quest for the historical Jesus; see Vermes, Jesus the Jew: A Historian’s Reading of the Gospels (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1981); Vermes, Jesus in His Jewish Context (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), with autobiographical reflections in the preface and chap. 12. Vermes was also a professor of Jewish studies at Oxford University.

The best-known example in the twentieth century is no doubt C. S. Lewis, Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955). Others include Sheldon Vanauken, A Severe Mercy (New York: Bantam, 1977); Josh McDowell with Christóbal Krusen, Undaunted: One Man’s Real-Life Journey from Unspeakable Memories to Unbelievable Grace (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House, 2012), chaps. 7–10, on the resurrection of Jesus, see 78–81; Viggo Olsen, The Agnostic Who Dared to Search (Chicago: Moody, 1974). Olsen was a medical doctor before his conversion to Christianity (see chap. 1). Also Alister McGrath, Why God Won’t Go Away: Is the New Atheism Running on Empty? (Nashville: Nelson, 2010); James S. Spiegel, The Making of an Atheist (Chicago: Moody, 2010), complete with surveys, reports, and other important information in chaps. 3–5 in particular; Dinesh D’Souza, What’s So Great about Christianity (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2007); Nabeel Qureshi, Seeking Allah, Finding Jesus: A Devout Muslim Encounters Christianity (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016). Qureshi is an adult convert from Islam and also a medical doctor, see esp. chap. 47 plus chaps. 48–53, including Qureshi’s visions that paved the final steps for him to the gospel of Jesus Christ. For a treatment in the same book of the reported 100,000 or even far more visions of Jesus that have led to so many contemporary Muslims coming to Jesus, see appendix E: “Dreams and Visions” by Josh McDowell, including some statistics along with many testimonies (331–35). Abdu H. Murray, Apocalypse Later: Why the Gospel of Peace Must Trump the Politics of Prophecy in the Middle East (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2009), esp. chaps. 6–7; note that Murray is also an adult convert from Islam and a practicing trial lawyer.

A simple distinction between these two, using the terms “modest” and “aggressive” agnosticism, is given by C. Stephen Evans: “It is helpful to distinguish the ‘modest agnostic,’ who merely claims to be unable to decide the question of God’s reality, from the ‘aggressive agnostic,’ who claims that no one can decide the question and that suspension of judgment is the only reasonable stance.” See Evans, Pocket Dictionary of Apologetics and Philosophy of Religion (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2002), 8–9.

Or either could, of course, try to dispute who has the burden of proof.

The more philosophical discussion here is represented by Antony Flew as he applies these terms to the term “atheism” in The Presumption of Atheism and Other (Philosophical) Essays on God, Freedom, and Immortality (London: Pemberton, 1976). Flew’s earlier essay by the same title was published in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1972): 29–46. Here, Flew makes the distinction between the “positive” use of the term “atheism,” where God’s nonexistence is being asserted, and the “negative” use of the term, where the individual simply means “someone who is simply not a theist.” But note also that Flew is not so interested in applying this reasoning to agnosticism (30). Cf. the rejoinder by R. Douglas Geivett, “A Pascalian Rejoinder to the Presumption of Atheism,” and Antony Flew’s response: “Response to R. Douglas Geivett’s ‘A Pascalian Rejoinder to the Presumption of Atheism,’” with both of these latter essays appearing in Raymond Martin and Christopher Bernard, eds., God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Pearson, 2003), chaps. 21 and 22.

Sam Harris, Letter to a Christian Nation (New York: Random House, 2006), 51–52.

Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 6–7, cf. 14.

Harris, Letter to a Christian Nation, 23–32, 47, 50–61, 64–67.

Harris, 6, 25, 33, 43, 49, 51–52, 64–65, 67, 87–91.

Harris, x, 46, 68–87.

Harris, 51.

Many instances of these combinational comments can be located in the recent unbelieving literature. For example, Richard Dawkins blames Christians with throwing faith into discussions thinking that any reasons they have given (if any) have now been given a boost! See Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 134. Christopher Hitchens as well as others have railed regularly on the absence of reason or evidence in religious arguments. See Hitchens, God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (New York: Hachette, 2007), 150, 202, 204. Sam Harris has complained, “In fact, every religion preaches the truth of propositions for which no evidence is even conceivable. This put the ‘leap’ in Kierkegaard’s leap of faith.” See Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Religion (New York: Norton, 2004), 23, cf. 40. Broadly, there is insufficient evidence for religion, as noted above.

Besides the dozens upon dozens of Christian scholars who hold this and similar positions, here are still more volumes that defend reason and science, directing the comments to the unbelievers such as those in the previous footnote: John C. Lennox, God’s Undertaker: Has Science Buried God? (Oxford: Lion Hudson, 2007), esp. chaps. 1–3; David Marshall, The Truth Behind the New Atheism: Responding to the Emerging Challenge to God and Christianity (Eugene, OR: Harvest House, 2007), chaps. 1–2 in particular; Paul Chamberlain, Why People Don’t Believe: Confronting Seven Challenges to Christian Faith (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2011), chaps. 4–5; Peter S. Williams, A Sceptic’s Guide to Atheism (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009), chaps. 3, 5–7; Spiegel, Making of an Atheist, chaps. 2–4, plus page 123 on the helpfulness of doubt; D’Souza, What’s So Great about Christianity, chaps. 8–10; McGrath, Why God Won’t Go Away, chaps. 4–5, 7; Alister McGrath and Joanna Collicutt McGrath, The Dawkins Delusion: Atheist Fundamentalism and the Denial of the Divine (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2007), chap. 2, where the absolutely stunning endorsement on the front of this book by well-known atheistic philosopher of science Michael Ruse reads, “The God Delusion makes me embarrassed to be an atheist, and the McGraths show why.” Two other major research volumes by a major scholar are among the many that argue two of the themes that are among those that these atheists absolutely detest: namely, how Christianity led to both modern science as well as the voice of reason in the Western world; see Rodney Stark, For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to Reformations, Science, Witch-Hunts, and the End of Slavery (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), esp. chap. 2; Stark, The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success (New York: Random House, 2005), chap. 1.

J. L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind 64 (1955): 200–212; reprinted in Louis P. Pojman, ed., Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994), 185–92, quotation on 185 of the Pojman edition.

Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 24.

J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), 176.

William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 335–41, reprinted in William L. Rowe and William J. Wainwright, eds., Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, 3rd ed. (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace, 1998), 242–51. The quotation is from 243n1.

Other examples of this wide recognition are common. Another similar evaluation by Rowe is his Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1978), 94; cf. also Ronald H. Nash, Faith and Reason: Searching for a Rational Faith (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1988), 212–15; C. Stephen Evans, Philosophy of Religion: Thinking about Faith (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1982), 137.

This question is paraphrased from Rowe, “Problem of Evil,” 243 in the Rowe and Wainwright edition.

Rowe, 245.

These last few comments are drawn from Rowe, 245, 250–51.

Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 176.

For example, Denis R. Alexander, Creation or Evolution: Do We Have to Choose? (Oxford: Lion Hudson, 2014), 11–12.

Such as the response volume edited by prominent British geneticist Norman C. Nevin, Should Christians Embrace Evolution? Biblical and Scientific Responses (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2009). Another example of the debate is Kenneth Keathley, J. B. Stump, and Joe Aguirre, Discussing Origins with Reasons to Believe and Biologos: Old-Earth or Evolutionary Creation? (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2017).

Among other endorsers, Packer, as perhaps the “dean” of evangelical theologians, states on the cover of Alexander’s book that it is “surely the best informed, clearest and most judicious treatment of the question in its title that you can find anywhere today.” That’s hardly the move of someone who fears that this method will potentially replace treasured theological beliefs.

Warren C. Young, A Christian Approach to Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1954), 91. The statement by Brightman is found in his text Philosophy of Religion (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940), 317.

Ehrman asserts that miracles “by definition, are infinitesimally remote.” See Jesus, 196, cf. 228. He makes similar comments in Did Jesus Exist?, 315–17; How Jesus Became God, 132–33, 143–51, 165, 172–73. Here he confuses the unlikelihood that a miracle will happen at any given moment with the overall near impossibility of miracles anytime and anywhere. But to hold that the latter is true by definition, as Ehrman clearly states, is more than a confusion. It also provides a good example of the error mentioned above, for he must assume a particular philosophical stance in order to “know” this about miracles, for he has certainly not proven that miracles virtually never occur. And by assuming such a perspective, he ignores and begs the very question that he is trying to address.

Stephen E. Parrish, God and Necessity: A Defense of Classical Theism (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997), 156–57, cf. 172. Similarly on the importance of taking a strong stand when naturalistic and other similar options had failed in the previous century, former prominent Oxford University philosophical theologian Basil Mitchell read an essay at the C. S. Lewis Memorial Lecture in Belfast, Ireland, in 1986, which was published as “Contemporary Challenges to Christian Apologetics,” Journal of the Irish Christian Study Center 4 (1989): 1–18. This essay was later included in Mitchell’s volume, How to Play Theological Ping-Pong and Other Essays on Faith and Reason, ed. William J. Abraham and Robert W. Prevost (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 25–41. Mitchell argued that several philosophical movements had come and gone in recent years. These included positivism and Marxism as well as scientific versions of naturalism, humanism, and materialism. Each had fallen to a host of refutations, such as positivism’s failure both to “give a convincing account of science” as well as also having failed to justify its rejection of metaphysics (27–33). Though these secular movements, including forms of naturalism, failed, Mitchell encouraged Christians to step into the gap and reassert their leadership in the philosophical, theological, and ethical spheres without keeping to themselves and settling for private goals. Mitchell encouraged conservatives to take the lead among current options just as C. S. Lewis had done in his day, to join the debate, and to hold up the gospel message as the truth rather than adding to the contemporary malady by treating the gospel as just one option among others (36, 40–41).

Psalm 77 includes an intriguing metaphorical description of God taking the children of Israel through the Red Sea while escaping the Egyptians, and at the end we are told that though God’s paths were through the sea, he left no footprints (v. 19)!

Granted, sometimes we may rely too strictly (or even too artificially) on graduate school or other research specializations in the sense of whether or not scholars had specialized training in particular study areas. For example, what if a person is not formally trained in philosophy but has a theological or historical background and happens to think very well in the philosophical mode? Sometimes decent treatises are written by scholars who are removed from the field in question. To Ehrman’s credit, he makes some complimentary remarks regarding mythicists who either have no specialized training at all, or for those whose field is in other areas of study (such as Did Jesus Exist?, 17–21, 347n1, 348n11, 349n20). We will discuss the philosophical side of this question in later chapters as to whether God raised Jesus and how specifically and definitely these issues can be answered. For many details here, see Gary R. Habermas, The Risen Jesus and Future Hope (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), esp. chaps. 2–3.

For discussions of this distinction between the historical and philosophical sides of an issue, see Habermas, Risen Jesus, esp. 4–5; Habermas, The Historical Jesus: Ancient Evidence for the Life of Christ (Joplin, MO: College Press, 1996), 60–61.

Wedderburn, Beyond Resurrection, 97, cf. 12–19, 21–22, 38.

Wedderburn, 15.

Examples of these discussions are found, consecutively, in Ehrman, Jesus, 229–31; Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist?, 145–74; Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 143–51.

Wedderburn, Beyond Resurrection, 14–15.

Wedderburn, 96–97.

Ehrman, Jesus, 196, 227–28; Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist?, 315–16; Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 165, 173.

Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 132, cf. 204.

While we have definitely not yet surveyed this evidence, or decided that the resurrection probably occurred, or that it is more likely than not, we leave it here for now as only a potential option. The point we are making is that there seems to be very little if any evidence on the other, natural side of the ledger.

This is the portion of the argument that has been the central focus of the minimal facts argument over the years, and precisely where the case is at its very strongest.

Reginald H. Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 169, 181.

As is the chief response in Larry Shapiro, The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 29, 55–58.

For many accounts of well-evidenced cases, relevant sources, data drawn from medical journals, plus detailed arguments for an afterlife, see Gary R. Habermas and J. P. Moreland, Beyond Death: Exploring the Evidence for Immortality (Wheaton: Crossway, 1998), chaps. 7–9; cf. also Habermas, Risen Jesus, 60–62; Habermas, “Near-Death Experiences and the Evidence—A Review Essay,” Christian Scholar’s Review 26 (1996): 78–85; Habermas, “Paradigm Shift: A Challenge to Naturalism,” Bibliotheca Sacra 146 (1984): 437–50, esp. 444–49. For the work of others, see esp. J. Steve Miller, Near-Death Experiences as Evidence for the Existence of God and Heaven: A Brief Introduction in Plain Language (Acworth, GA: Wisdom Creek, 2012); Michael Sabom, Light and Death: One Doctor’s Fascinating Account of Near-Death Experiences (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998); Mario Beauregard and Denyse O’Leary, The Spiritual Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the Soul (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), esp. chap. 6.

It may be remembered that Wedderburn also links together these two topics (Beyond Resurrection, 129–34), citing John Hick in the process. An afterlife could help with Wedderburn’s “most problematic” pastoral issues too (221–26), although we are bereft of a strictly Christian response if we leave out Jesus Christ’s resurrection role in all of this discussion. Hick, on the other hand, did bring Jesus’s resurrection into the discussion, including much more detail than Wedderburn. For our purposes here, an important example is Hick’s argument that Jesus’s resurrection provided additional support and confirmation for the disciples’ belief in life after death, though they already believed in an afterlife both “before and independently of his resurrection.” But now the ideas could work together. See John Hick, Death and Eternal Life (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1976), particularly chap. 9 and page 179. Incidentally, in April 1987 I, John Hick, and a few others participated in a dialogue on the afterlife at Louisiana State University. On the second day of the dialogue, Hick opened his remarks by arguing that Jesus’s resurrection experiences and NDEs were two of the very best indicators we have of the truth of the afterlife.

After all, the resurrection appearances were not NDEs for several key reasons. The relevant texts indicate that Jesus (1) was really dead, (2) was raised in his own (although now-changed) body, and (3) would never die again. The apostle Paul taught that Jesus was the very first to be raised in this manner (1 Cor 15:20). Moreover, (4) what are we to make of the Acts descriptions (9:1–9; 22:6–11; 26:12–18) of brilliant light associated with Jesus’s appearance to Paul, unlike NDEs? (5) If Jesus predicted his resurrection ahead of time, which we will also argue later on critical grounds, this indicates his not only being aware of the event beforehand, but his having had an actual part in worldview planning terms, surely unlike anything in NDEs. (6) The empty tomb by itself would be a simply huge point of differentiation from NDEs, where the body remains behind in some shape. (7) The amazing array of resurrection appearance details, including the reported number of appearances, to both groups and individuals, indoors and outdoors, and so on, are unique as well. For a dialogue that highlights a number of these points, see Gary R. Habermas, “Resurrection Appearances of Jesus as After-Death Communication: Response to Ken Vincent,” Journal of Near-Death Studies 30 (2012): 149–58.

E. P. Sanders, The Historical Figure of Jesus (London: Penguin, 1993), 11, 13, 278–80.

As William Lane Craig noted many years ago, if Jesus indeed rose from the dead, then “only a sterile, academic skepticism resists this inevitable inference,” namely, that God was the one who had raised him. See Craig, The Son Rises: The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus (Chicago: Moody, 1981), 137.

An earlier, much briefer essay on this topic appeared as Gary R. Habermas, “The Resurrection of Jesus and Recent Agnosticism,” in Reasons for Faith, Making a Case for the Christian Faith: Essays in Honor of Bob Passantino and Gretchen Passantino Coburn, ed. Norman L. Geisler and Chad V. Meister (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2007), 281–94.

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