CHAPTER III
CHAPTER III
THE "LUMEN INTERIUS" — PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE
Philosophy, properly so-called, is the knowledge of all things that man can acquire by means of reason alone. St. Bonaventure defines it as a science which guides man in the investigation of intelligible truth1. Its distinctive character is certitude based on investigation2. This knowledge by the natural light of reason extends to everything3 — knowledge itself and its methods, being and non-being, good and evil, the world, beings animate and inanimate, motion, man, and God.
This illumination of philosophical knowledge St. Bonaventure calls "inner" because it inquires into principles of knowledge and natural truth inherent in man4. The truth of our knowledge, says
St. Augustine, rests upon God, the Light in Whom we see the unchangeable truth of things5. There is a ratio in the Divine Mind corresponding to everything which God knows or does. These prototypal forms, fixed and unchangeable principles existing in the mind of God from all eternity, we call "ideas"6. They are perceived by man alone in virtue of his intellect, that inner eye which God deems worthy of the things it strives to see. Considered as the principle of creation, the idea is called a prototype or 1 "Tertium lumen, quod illuminat ad veritates intelligibiles perscrutandas." De Reduc. art. ad Theol., n. 4, t. V, p. 320. Cf. supra p. 24.
2 "Scientia philosophica nihil aliud est quam veritatis ut scrutabilis notitia certa." De Donis S. S., IV, 6, t. V, p. 474.
3 Hugh of St. Victor, Eruditio Didascalica I, 5, Migne, P. L., t. 176, col. 744.
4 "Quod ideo interius dicitur, quia interiores causas et latentes inquirit, et hoc per principia disciplinarum et veritatis naturalis, quae homini naturaliter sunt inserta." De Reduc. art. ad Theol., n. 4. t. V, p. 320. Cf. supra p. 24. "Lumen innatum est lumen naturalis iudicatorii sive rationis . . . Quantum ad primum dicit: Deus, qui dixit lucem splendescere, id est lumen naturalis iudicatorii impressit creaturae rationali, id est non solum intellectum possibilem, sed etiam intellectum agentem." De Donis S. S., IV, 2, t. V, p. 474.
5 "Deus intelligibilis lux, in quo et per quern intelligibiliter lucent quae intelligibiliter lucent omnia." Sol. I, 1. 3, Migne, P. L., t. 32, col.807.
6 "Primo auctoritate Augustini libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum:
'Ideae sunt formae aetemae et incommutabiles, quae in divina intelligentia continentur.' Ex his tribus conditionibus concluditur quod idea sit in Deo." I Sent., 35, 1, 1, t. I, p. 600.
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exemplar in which signification it pertains to practical knowledge.
But the idea in the mind of God is more than the ultimate principle of being; it is the source of the intelligibility and truth of things and of the certitude of our knowledge7. As the principle of knowl edge, it is properly called ratio. This truth is the light of the mind, its ratio discernendi which shines in the judgment of the intellect.
In the works of St. Bonaventure, no thought recurs with greater frequency than that which states that all knowledge is brought about ratione lucis increatae or rationibus aeternis; that God is light; that He is present by His truth to every intelligence8.
It is the Saint's doctrine of divine illumination and it admits of as many interpretations as does that of St. Augustine himself.
However, if we keep in mind the favor with which both Saints regarded the theory of light, we can better understand how human knowledge is related to divine knowledge of which it is a faint reflection. For St. Bonaventure, as for William of Auvergne and Alexander of Hales, light and being have a definite relationship; being is light in the measure in which it exists. St. Bonaventure applies the theory of light to the beings which creation has called into existence: they are participated or derived lights which must be carefully distinguished from the Uncreated Light. The light in which all beings share is that which is most noble in their reality, hence their greater or less participation in the light determines their rank among created beings9. If we carry over into the in tellectual order these terms, "being", "truth", and "light", we shall arrive at an important conclusion, namely, that the intel lectual light shared by the creature has no existence of its own; that the truth which it gives is insufficient; that just as the truth of being is dependent upon the creating Truth, so is the truth of the mind a ray of the illuminating Truth.
7 "Item, quia res a Deo producuntur, ideo sunt in Deo tamquam in efficiente, et Deus verissime est efficiens; similiter, quia ab ipso finiuntur, ideo verissime finis: ergo pari ratione, quia ab ipso cognoscuntur et exprimuntur, per se ipsum Deus verissime est exemplar.
Sed exemplar non est, nisi in quo sunt rerum exemplatarum ideae."
I Sent., 35, r, 4. t, I, p. 600. St. Bonaventure's doctrine of illumination as set forth in this chapter has been taken from Gilson u. Bohner,
Die Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie, Paderbom, 2nd ed. 1954, p. 499 ff.
8 "Deus sic est causa essendi, quod nihil potest ab aliqua causa effici, quin ipse se ipso et sua aetema virtute moveat operantem: ergo nihil potest intelligi, quin ipse sua aetema veritate immediate illustret intelligentem." De Scientia Christi q. 4, n. 24, t. V, p. 19 b.
9 "Secundum cuius (lucis) maiorem et minorem participationem corpora habent verius et dignius esse in genere entium." II Sent., 13,
2, 2, t. II, 320 b.
THE "LUMEN INTERIUS" — PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE 79
The truth of an act of knowing is always based on the truth of a being. A being is what it is, through its essence. This essence, taken absolutely, must be established by an act of thought, and the essence conceived, in the full sense of the word, by this thought, is truth.
Truth, then, can be determined only by reference to Being, which is God10.
Just as all truth will be defined by means of two terms, one of being and one of knowledge, so also the knowledge which we have of truth. Our act of thought must conform to being. We may, then, arrive at the following definition of truth: Adaequatio intellectus et rei* 11. Hence, truth diminishes in proportion as it lacks either being on which it is based or a concept by which it is expressed.
But since God is the ultimate cause of all being, He is likewise the cause of our knowledge12. Without God, then, there can be no knowledge of truth. By the first condition of knowledge of the truth, there is required an unchanging object. But this object is not to be found in things, since they are changeable, nor in our thought which likewise is subject to change. Consequently, there remains only being in the thought of God. If, then, we would attain some final immutable truth, we must come into contact with this original principle of all truth13.
Were this contact only external, taking place merely through the divine universal concurrence, it would be a mere influence on the part of God, which would not raise our thought out of its contingency. If we attain to the certain, we attain to the unchange able, the necessary, the eternal; our thought is contingent; there is, therefore, in our thought something transcendent to our thought; but there is nothing above our thought save God and 10 "Omnia enim vera sunt et nata sunt se exprimere per expressionem illius summi luminis; quod si cessaret influere, cetera desinerent esse vera." I Sent., 8, i, i, i, ad 4 and 7 and ad 4, t. I, p. 151 ff. Cf.
Gilson-Bohner, Die Geschichte dev christlichen Philosophie, Paderborn, 2nd ed. 1954, p. 600. "Tunc enim res sunt verae, quando sunt in re vel in universo, sicut sunt in arte aetema, vel sicut ibi exprimuntur.
Res autem vera est, secundum quod adaequatur intellectui causanti.
Quia vero perfecte non adaequatur rationi, quae exprimit earn vel repraesentat; ideo omnis creatura mendacium est, secundum Augustinum. Res autem adaequata non est sua adaequatio: ergo necessario est, ut Verbum vel similitudo vel ratio sit veritas; et ibi est veritas creaturae."
In Hexaem., III. 8, t. V, p. 344 b.
11 Brevil. VI, c. 8, t. V, p. 273.
12 "Nam idem est principium essendi et cognoscendi." In Hexaem., Coll. I. 13, t. V, p. 331 b.
13 "Si ergo ad plenam cognitionem fit recursus ad veritatem omnino immutabilem et stabilem et ad lucem omnino infallibilem, necesse est, quod in huiusmodi cognitione recurratur ad artem supernam ut ad lucem et veritatem: lucem, inquam, dantem infallibilitatem scienti, et veritatem dantem immutabilitatem scibili." De scientia
Christi IV, t. V, p. 23 b. Cf. Gilson-Bohner, op. cit., p. 500.
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His truth. We judge things with the aid of laws which we do not invent, but to which, rather, we are subject and which judge us.
So we cannot explore the content of our thought without dis covering in it a gift which comes from above, because we do not contain in our essence the sufficient reason of the characteristics which make of our judgment a necessary, absolutely certain truth14.
We may say, then, that St. Bonaventure explains all our knowledge of the intelligible by the action and the presence within us of a ray of Divine light, faint though it be, for the Seraphic
Doctor always declares that we do not arrive at the eternal prin ciples or ideas as they exist in God, but that we see only what a creature can see cum propria ratione creata, their faint reflection.
The Divine Ideas, however, are the source of our knowledge and it is only in and through them that we behold the truth15. Though the direct action of the rationes aeternae on our thought does not permit our perceiving them, still they concur with our act of knowledge. Their action is, first of all, regulative. Their function is to make our knowledge of truth possible by submitting the restless uncertainty of our truth to an inevitable law. It is, therefore, the immediate influence of God, the necessary, eternal, and absolute truth, that gives our knowledge the transcendent character of necessity which we have attributed to it. Human thought is fixed by the necessity of the eternal act in which God cogitates
Himself and knows His image and all His possible participations.
The eternal principles move and direct our thought ut regulans et motiva16. The rationes aeternae in God are not a substitute for the abstractive activity of the mind; their function, rather, is to gather up and organize the multiplicity of our sensible experi ences, directing them towards fixed centers, the first principles
14 "Haec autem (scil. certitudo cognitionis) non potest esse ex ea parte, quae potest falli, vel ex ea luce, quae potest obscurari."
Sermo IV, n. 9, t. V, p. 569 b.
15 "Sed cum ipsa mens nostra sit commutabilis, illam (scil. veritatem incommutabilem) sic incommutabiliter relucentem non potest videre nisi per aliquam lucem omnino incommutabiliter radiantem, quam impossibile est esse creaturam mutabilem." Itiner. Ill, 3, t. V,
304. "Omne quod cognoscitur certitudinaliter, cognoscitur in luce aeternarum rationum." De Scientia Christi, q. 4, concl., t. V, p. 22 b.
"Ex quo manifeste apparet, quod coniunctus sit intellectus noster ipsi aeternae veritati, dum non nisi per illam docentem nihil verum potest certitudinaliter capere." Itiner. III. 3, t. Y, p. 304 b.
16 ". . . ut regulans et ratio motiva, non quidem ut sola et in sua omnimodo claritate, sed cum ratione creata." De Scientia Christi, q. 4, t. V, p. 23 b. "In his autem, quae sunt ipsius, in quantum est imago, sicut sunt actiones intellectuales, quibus anima percipit ipsam veritatem immutabilem, cooperatur Deus sicut obiectum et ratio motiva." Sermo Christus unus omnium magister, n. 17, t. V, p. 571 b.
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of knowledge and morality17. The eternal principles, or the eternal light, act only through their presence, not as immediately known objects. They are for human thought only a "source-object", the presence of which is required, though not directly perceived; they are known rather by a contuitus18. Though the divine light acts in us immediately, it is not seen immediately. The light is always present to us in this life, and in the mystical vision which takes place through love, but it is inaccessible19.
If we start from a judgment which shows the character of necessity and immutability and if our reflection upon the judg ment is perfect, we thereby establish that here we must always contact the source of truth in God. This reflection St. Bonaventure calls a resolutio plena. To reduce or resolve the truth of a judgment is to follow the series of its conditions down to the eternal prin ciples on which they are based20. Whenever the reduction is concluded, it leads the intellect to state that its necessity requires the immediate collaboration of God21. Thus St. Bonaventure teaches that the Divine Presence is implied in every one of our certitudes; that God alone is the immutable light of the judgments of our changing minds22.
17 "Haec igitur apparet immutabilis in regulis divinarum legum, quae nos ligant. Regulae istae mentibus rationalibus insplendentes sunt omnes illi modi, per quos mens cognoscit et iudicat id quod aliter esse non potest, utpote quod summum principium summe venerandum ; quod summo vero summe credendum et assentiendum; quod summum bonum summe desiderandum et diligendum. Et haec sunt in prima tabula; et in his apparet sapientia, quod ita certa sunt, quod aliter esse non possunt." In Hexaem., Coll. II. 9, t. V, p. 338.
18 Contuition differs from intuition in that the presence of an unseen cause is known immediately in its operation. Cf. Gilson-Bohner, op. cit., p. 501.
19 "Haec lux est inaccessibilis, et tamen proxima animae etiam plus quam ipsa sibi. Est etiam inalligabilis et tamen summe intima."
In Hexaem., XII. 11, t. V, p. 386.
20 "Hae regulae sunt infallibiles, indubitabiles, iniudicabiles, quia per illas est iudicium et non est de illis . . . Sunt etiam incommutabiles, incoarctabiles, interminabiles; et ideo nunquam marcescit. Sic enim certae sunt, ut nullo modo sit eis contradicere "nisi ad exterius-rationem", secundum Philosophum in libro primo Posteriorum. Hae enim radicantur in luce aeterna et ducunt in earn, sed non propter hoc ipsa videtur . . . Haec enim sapientia radiat super animam, quia assistit prae foribus, ut se, inquit, prior illis ostendat." In Hexaem. II. 10, t. V, p. 338.
21 "In iudicando deliberativa nostra pertingit ad divinas leges, si plena resolutione dissolvat." Itiner., III. 4, t. V, p. 305. Cf. GilsonBohner, op. cit., p. 502.
22 "Ostenditur triplici via. Prima est ista: omne verum omnibus mentibus impressum est verum indubitabile. Secunda est ista: omne verum, quod omnis creatura proclamat, est verum indubitabile. Tertia
6 St. Bonaventure, De Reductione
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All science as well as all practical and social life is based on the trustworthiness of the memory, the storehouse of thought23.
Discussing its powers, St. Bonaventure says that the memory retains the past by recollection, the present by the reception of impressions, and the future by anticipation24; that it retains simple ideas as units of contiguous or divisible quantities as the dot, the present moment, and unity without which it is impossible to recall or think of things derived from them; that it retains the principles of knowledge as eternal truths because nunquam potest sic oblivisci eorum, dum ratione utatur, quin ea audita approbet et eis assentiat, non tamquam de novo percipiat, sed tamquam sibi innata et familiaria recognoscat; sicut patet, si proponatur alicui . ..
'omne totum est maius sua parte'25. In its actual retention of all temporalities, things past, present, and future, the memory bears a likeness to eternity, the indivisible present of which extends to all time. In its retention of simple ideas or essences, it is evident that these ideas are formed not from the representation of external objects in the imagination but from the recognition of simple essences from above — essences which cannot enter through the door of the senses or of the imagination26. In the retention of principles of knowledge and values, it possesses an unchangeable light by which it recalls to mind unchangeable truths. The memory, sometimes called the apex mentis, is the deepest part of the soul, its self-consciousness, as it were, which as part of the image of God corresponds to God the Father27. And so from the operations of memory, it is clear that the mind itself is an image of God Who is immediately present to the soul and to every intellect through est ista: omne verum in se ipso certissimum et evidentissimum est verum indubitabile." De myst. Trinitatis, t. V, p. 45.
23 Cf. I Sent., 17, 1, 1, q. 4 fund. 2, t. I, p. 301 a; In Hexaem., XI.
24, t. V, p. 348 a; St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV, 11, 14, Migne, P. L., t. 42, col. 1047-1048; ibid., 6, 8, t. 42, col. 1041-1042. ". . . me moriae tribuens omne quod scimus, etiamsi non inde cogitemus . . . intelligentiae vero proprio modo quodam cogitationis informationem."
St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, 21, 40, P.L. t. 42, col. 1088.
24 "Retinet namque memoria praeterita per recordationem . . .
Retinet praesentia per susceptionem. Retinet. . . futura per praevisionem." Itiner., Ill, 3, t. V, 303.
25 Ibid.
26 "Ex secunda apparet, quod ipsa non solum habet ab exteriori formari per phantasmata, verum etiam a superiori suscipiendo simplices formas, quae non possunt introire per portas sensum et sensibilium phantasias." Ibid.
27 "Memoria accipitur tripliciter: uno modo prout est receptiva et retentiva sensibilium et praeteritorum; alio modo prout retentiva praeteritorum, sive sensibilium sive intelligibilium; et tertio modo prout est retentiva specierum, abstrahendo ab omni differentia temporis, utpote specierum innatarum. Et hoc tertio modo est pars imaginis;
. . . et respondet Patri." I Sent., 3, 2, 1, 1, concl., n. 3, t. I, p. 81 b.
THE "LUMEN INTERIUS" — PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE 83
truth28. How, then, can it deny Him in Whose light it knows all things? How can it affirm in the name of that light that the light does not exist ? Thus we see that the core of St. Bonaventure's philosophy is Truth.
In order to add to the fund of innate and certain knowledge that it possesses of principles for the knowledge of things exterior to it, the human reason must proceed in the ordinary way: sense first, then memory, and finally experience which reduces to one common expression the images left in us by the object. And this is the purpose of philosophy — to connect and systematize all knowledge, whether innate or acquired, by this purely natural method. But St. Bonaventure did not confuse the two methods of reason and faith. With St. Augustine he believed quod credimus debemus auctoritati, quod intelligimus rationiM.
Though distinct from the special sciences, philosophy is not unrelated to or separated from them. One who has a knowledge of a whole must have some knowledge of each and all of its parts, and there can be no sane and comprehensive philosophy without a thorough understanding of the particular sciences which interpret the phenomena of the world in which we live. Philosophy is the scientia rectrix; by constantly throwing its light' on the discoveries and the development of the sciences, it interprets and renders fruitful their data. The other human sciences are subject to philosophy in the sense that it judges and governs them. Philo sophy, on the other hand, is free in relation to the sciences which it uses only as instruments. It is the highest of the human sciences, that is, of the sciences which know things by the natural light of reason.
Philosophically speaking, St. Bonaventure distinguishes three kinds of truth30, each of which implies the relation of something outside the mind to something within it. The first truth, often called the "truth of thought'' or logical truth, consists in a judg ment or mental act in which something is asserted or denied.
The second kind of truth is the "truth of things" or ontological truth which signifies things in relation to their existence in the archetypal mind of God, the causa exemplaris of all things. The third kind of truth, moral truth, or "truth of expression", consists
28 "Lux animae veritas est; haec lux nescit occasum. Ita enim fortiter irradiat super animam, ut etiam non possit cogitari non esse, nec exprimi, quin homo sibi contradicat." InHexaem., IV. 1, t. V, p. 349.
29 De utilitate credendi, XI, 25, Migne, P. L., t. 42, col. 83.
30 "Ipse describit earn tripliciter, scilicet in quantum est veritas rerum, veritas sermonum et veritas morum." De Donis S. S., IV, 7, t. V, p. 474. "Emittit autem haec lux (sc. veritas increata) tres radios primos. . . . Est enim veritas rerum, veritas signorum seu vocum et veritas morum." In Hexaem., IV, 2, t. V, p. 349 a.
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in perfect conformity of thought, word, and action with the knowledge man possesses; in other words, it is knowledge per fected by outward expression31. In the existence of this threefold truth is found justification for the division of philosophy into three main branches: rational, natural, and moral.
Or again: since God is the "Cause of being, the Principle of knowing, and the Order of living32," so philosophy must deal with a science which investigates the cause of being, as does physics; the principles of reasoning, as does logic; and the right order of life as does moral or practical philosophy.
Or considering it in another way: the knowledge of philosophy may enlighten the intellect by controlling the motive as moralis, the intellect itself as naturalis and the interpretative power as sermocinalis. Thus man is enlightened unto the truth of life, the truth of knowledge, and the truth of doctrine33. Philosophy, then, is a threefold science and St. Bonaventure attributes the classification to God Himself34. In the three branches, natural, rational, and moral, he sees a representation of the Holy Trinity35.
The first is concerned with the cause of being and, therefore, leads to the power of God the Father; the second, with the reasons for the intelligibility of the universe and it bespeaks the wisdom of God the Son; the third, dealing with the Christian mode of life, points to the goodness of the Holy Ghost36.
31 "Veritas morum est rectitudo, secundum quam homo bene vivit intus et extra secundum dictamen iuris, quia ius est regula rectitudinis; veritas sermonum est adaequatio vocis et intellectus; veritas rerum est
"adaequatio intellectus et rei." De Donis S. S., IV, 7, t. V, p. 475.
32 "Sicut Deus est causa essendi, ita est ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi." De Scientia Christi, q. 4, t. V, p. 19. Cf. supra p. 24.
33 ". . . ut sic illuminetur homo ad veritatem vitae, ad veritatem scientiae et ad veritatem doctrinae." De Reduc. Art. ad Theol., n. 4, t. V, p. 321. Cf. supra p. 24. "Ex his propter obtinendam beatam vitam tripartita, ut dixi, a philosophis inventa est disciplina: naturalis propter naturam, rationalis propter doctrinam, moralis propter usum." St. Au gustine, VIII De Civitate Dei, Migne, P. L., t. 41, col. 339.
34 "Dico, quod potest esse Verbum Dei. Ipse enim describit scientiam philosophicam tripliciter, id est secundum triplicem rationem describit earn, ut naturalem, ut rationalem et ut moralem, scilicet in quantum est "causa essendi, ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi". In quantum est causa essendi, designat scientiam naturalem; in quantum est ratio intelligendi, significat scientiam rationalem; in quantum est ordo vivendi describit scientiam moralem." De Donis S. S., IV. 6, t. V, p. 474.
35 "Ad hanc speculationem, quam habet anima de suo principio trino et uno per trinitatem suarum potentiarum, per quas est imago
Dei, iuvatur per lumina scientiarum, quae ipsam perficiunt et informant et Trinitatem beatissimam tripliciter repraesentat." Itiner., 3. 6, t. V,
P30536 "Nam omnis philosophia aut est naturalis, aut rationalis, aut
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Not only in the three main branches of philosophy but in the subdivisions of each branch does St. Bonaventure see the reflection of the Blessed Trinity, as he points out in his Itinerarium. Natural philosophy is subdivided into metaphysics, mathematics, and physics. Metaphysics deals with the essence of things; mathe matics, with numbers and figures; physics, with the nature, quali ties, and movements of things. In the first, the mind is led to the ultimate Principle of things, the Father; in the second, to His image, the Son; in the third, to the gift of the Holy Ghost37.
Rational philosophy is subdivided into grammar, which imparts the power of expression; logic, which aids the clearness of the mind in dispute; and rhetoric, which imparts skill in persuading and moving. These branches, too, reflect the mystery of the same
Blessed Trinity38. Moral philosophy, likewise, with its subdivi sions of individual ethics, economics, and political theory recalls the mind to the Blessed Trinity, the first suggesting the unbegotten character of the First Principle; the second, the intimacy of the Son; the third, the liberality of the Holy Ghost39. "All these sciences", continues the Seraphic Doctor, "are governed by fixed and infallible principles which are like so many rays of light coming to our minds from the eternal law. So filled are we with the brightness of this light that unless we are totally blind, we shall be led from the contemplation of our souls and their natural powers to the contemplation of God's eternal light"40.
1. RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY
Let us first consider rational philosophy which is subdivided into grammar, logic, and rhetoric — three sciences which have to do with language. Language, we read in the De Reductione, is the medium by which man may express a thought, teach, or persuade moralis. Prima agit de causa essendi, et ideo ducit in potentiam Patris; secunda de ratione intelligendi, et ideo ducit in sapientiam Verbi; tertia de ordine vivendi, et ideo ducit in bonitatem Spiritus sancti." Ibid.
37 "Rursus, prima dividitur in metaphysicam, mathematicam et physicam. Et prima est de rerum essentiis, secunda de numeris et figuris, tertia de naturis, virtutibus et operationibus diffusivis. Et ideo prima in primum principium, Patrem, secunda in eius imaginem, Filium, tertia ducit in Spiritus sancti donum." Ibid.
38 "Secunda dividitur in grammaticam, quae facit potentes ad exprimendum; in logicam, quae facit perspicaces ad arguendum; in rhetoricam, quae facit habiles ad persuadendum sive movendum. Et hoc similiter insinuat mysterium ipsius beatissimae Trinitatis." Ibid.
39 "Tertia dividitur in monasticam, oeconomicam, et politicam.
Et ideo prima insinuat primi principii innascibilitatem, secunda Filii familiaritatem, tertia Spiritus sancti liberalitatem." Ibid.
40 Ibid.
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— three processes which imply simple apprehension, judgment, and motivation and require correct, true, and embellished speech41.
In the same strain, we read in the De Donis that wisdom can become learning (doctrina) only through the medium of meaningful speech; that man can speak intelligently or in a meaningful way only if his speech be accurate (discussivus), direct or well-defined
(inquisitivus), and forceful (persuasivus); that he should have a good command of words, use terms that are clearly intelligible, or those which can sway the emotions. Grammar equips him for correct expression; logic, for rational inquiry; rhetoric, for power ful persuasion42.
Grammar denotes the mode in which words are connected in order to express a complete thought, or, as it is termed in logic, a proposition. The object of language is to convey a thought and so long as this object is attained, the machinery for attaining it is of comparatively slight importance. The way in which we combine our words and sentences matters little, provided that our meaning is clear to others. Hence it is evident that grammatical correct ness or incorrectness of an expression depends upon its intel ligibility43.
Logic, in the most general acceptation of the term, may be regarded as the systematic study of the laws of thought in relation to the acquisition of knowledge. It sets up a scheme of all that we know of the method of constructing the sciences; and there is nothing that the human mind cannot know in some imperfect way.
Logic must be the widest of all arts and sciences because thinking, which is its object — matter, belongs to them all; it is ars artium, the art which comprehends them all, because its rules apply to every subject on which the human mind can be engaged. The concept represents things to us under abstract and general aspects, some proper to a single species of things, others common to several species of a common genus. Judgment, or enunciation, is the union of two concepts of which one, the predicate, is affirmed or denied of the other, the subject. Reasoning or ratiocination, of which the syllogism is the expression, is the act by which the mind compares with a third idea (called the middle term) two notions (the ex41 De Reduc. art. ad Theol., n. 4, t. V, p. 321. Cf. supra pp. 24-26.
42 "Congrue autem exprimit quod dicit per grammaticam, rationabiliter investigat per scientiam logicam et efficaciter persuadet per rhetoricam. Ista igitur est pars philosophiae, scilicet scientia sermocinalis, quae triplex est. . ." De Donis S. S., IV, 8, t. V, p. 475.
43 "Secundum grammaticam omnis pars orationis significat mentis conceptum. ... Unde grammatica a rebus naturam trahit, nec potest esse bonus grammaticus, nisi sciat res." In Hexaem., IV, 19, t. V, p. 352.
Aristotle defines the articulate sounds of the human voice as signs manifesting the ideas of the mind. Cf. I Periherm. c. x.
THE "LUMEN INTERIUS" — PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE 87
tremes) between which it does not immediately perceive the agreement or disagreement, identity or non-identity44.
Rhetoric may be considered a popular branch of logic. It is an art by which the speaker aims to persuade the reason or move the feelings45. It is the art of argumentative composition which, in almost all essentials, must be regarded as the creation of Aris totle.
2. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY
The second division of philosophy is the truth of things which truth Solomon said he possessed: "For he hath given me the true knowledge of the things that are: to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the elements46''. Since the intellect must be guided in its judgment by fixed principles, we must consider the causes which have a direct influence upon the existence and properties of a being: namely, the formal causes in matter, the intellectual causes in the mind, and the ideal causes in Divine
Wisdom47. Natural philosophy, therefore, is subdivided into physics proper, into mathematics, and metaphysics. This division of Aristotle48 St. Bonaventure also mentions in the De Donis where he says that the knowledge of the truth of things is threefold since it deals with concrete forms, abstract forms, and separate forms. The physicist considers concrete forms; the metaphysician, abstract forms; and the mathematician, separate forms49.
Physics has to do with generation and corruption which take place through the forces of nature and seminal principles. It is
44 "Alia directio est, quae illustrat ad argumentationes inducentes mentis assensum, quod fit per solidam argumentationem, ut 'quaecumque uni ei eidem sunt eadem, necessario inter se sunt eadem'. Haec argumentatio habet formam generalem et specialem in materia necessaria, solida; et ideo est prima analysis et secunda analysis de syllogismo simpliciter." In Hexaem., IV. 20, t. V, p. 352.
45 "Tertia irradiatio est, qua mens illustratur ad persuadendum vel inclinandum animum; hoc fit per rhetoricam." Ibid., n. 21, t. V,
353.
46 Cf. De Donis S. S., IV, 9, t. V, p. 475.
47 De Reduc. art. ad Theol., n. 4, t. V, p. 321. Cf. supra p. 26.
48 Evidently, then, there are three kinds of theoretical sciences— physics, mathematics, and theology. The last class of theoretical science is the best, for it deals with the highest of existing things, and every science is called more or less excellent in virtue of its proper object."
Aristotle, VI Metaphysics, c. 6 (X. c. 7) Cf. W. D. Ross, op.cit., Vol. VIII, 1064 a.
49 "Formas concretas considerat physicus, formas abstractas metaphysicus, et formas separatas mathematicus." De Donis S. S., IV, 9, t. V, p. 475; cf. Aristotle VI Metaphysics, c. 2 (V. v. 1) Cf. W. D. Ross, op. cit., Vol. VIII, 1025 b.
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the study of the material world in so far as it is subject to change or movement50. To study change, then, in its inmost nature, whether it be change in the inorganic, the vegetable, or the animal kingdom, change in the smallest particle of matter or in the course of the stars, is the task of natural philosophy.
But through all their changes, there is one fundamental, common attribute which every body retains — its quantity51.
To study quantity as intelligible, that is, quantity itself apart from the body which it quantifies, is the work of mathematics.
Knowledge of the abstract is more certain that knowledge of the concrete thing, because it is knowledge of what is prior. The certitude of mathematical science is far superior to the insignif icant certainty derived from mutable, natural things.
Metaphysics deals with what is beyond motion and quantity —the very being of things52. Even though the metaphysician deals with sensible, material things, he studies them apart from their materiality, so that the science of metaphysics may be called the science of the immaterial. The metaphysician reduces all things to their first principle, whence they proceeded according to rationes ideates, that is to God, in so far as He is the "Beginning, the Exemplar, and the End"53.
This is the threefold knowledge of natural philosophy to which Solomon referred when he said: Mihi dedit Deus scientiam eorum quae sunt, id est entium principaliter, quae vere entia, quantum ad scientiam metaphysicam; ut sciam dispositionem orbis terrarum, quantum ad mathematicam; et virtutes elementorum, quantum ad naturalem philosophiamhi.
3. MORAL PHILOSOPHY
Again following Aristotle, St. Bonaventure divides moral philosophy into ethics, the science of man's actions as an individual; economics, the science of his actions as a member of the domestic society; and politics, the science of his actions as a member of 50 In Hexaem., IV. 6, t. V, p. 350.
51 "Secunda irradiatio intelligentiae per naturam inditae est ad considerandas quantitatum proportiones manifestas." In Hexaem., IV.
14, t. V, p. 351.
52 "Philosophus enim considerat omnia per motum; considerat enim de motu, de principiis motus et causis, ut locus et tempus; con siderat autem naturas corporum caelestium, sive corpora aetheralia, meteoricalia; elementaria., vegetabilia, sensibilia, rationabilia." In Hexaem., IV. 17, t. V, p. 352.
53 "Quia Deus est omnis creaturae origo, exemplar et finis."
Itin., 2. 12, t. V, p. 302.
54 De Donis S. S., Col. IV. 9, t. V, p. 475.
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the city or of civil society55. This, likewise, is the classification adopted by Hugh of St. Victor56.
In his De Donis Spiritus Sanctfi1, St. Bonaventure remarks that great prudence is required for the government of one's self, still greater prudence for the government of a family and the greatest possible prudence is needed for the government of a state; that he who does not exercise self-control cannot expect to govern a family or state. Our chief concern, then, will be the duties of the individual.
The perfection of the rational creature requires something more than mere knowledge. However learned a man may be, without virtue he is as one without life58, and he will never attain wisdom which is perfect knowledge59. There remains for us, then, to con sider God as the ordo vivendi and to study His influence upon the will, the third faculty of the rational soul which bears His image no less than do the faculties of memory and understanding.
In so doing, we shall discover the third kind of truth, moral truth, or the "truth of expression".
God wills to bind His creatures to certain lines of action, not arbitrarily, of course, but according to the specific nature of each creature's being. The laws of physical nature and the action of physical causes no less than the moral law and the acts of human beings come under this decree. It is the one primeval law of the universe, co-etemal with God; it is the eternal law.
This eternal law which governs the world has existed from all eternity in the mind of God. How it is received by the creature and made the inward determinant of his actions is a question to be
55 Cf. Nic. Eth., vi, 8, 1141 b; Eud. Eth., 1, 8, 1218 b and the first two chapters of the Politics. For further details on this subject, cf.
Nolkensmeier, Christ., O. F. M., "Ethische Grundfragen bei Bonaventura", Forschungen zur Geschichte der Philosophic and dev Pddagogik,
Band V. Heft 2. Leipzig, 1932.
56 Practical philosophy is subdivided into the following classes: individual or monastic philosophy which aims to exalt the individual, to adorn him with virtues so that he may admit nothing in his life which would cause him regret or sorrow; private or economic philosophy which is concerned with the proper regulation of the household; civil or political philosophy which is concerned with the welfare of the city or state as a whole. Cf. Eruditio Didascalica, 20, Migne, P.L., 1.176, col. 759.
57 "Impossibile est, quod sol illuminet remota corpora a se et non illuminet propinqua sibi. Non potest aliquis habere ordinatam familiam, nisi ipse sit ordinatus. Si velit aliquis habere servientes castos; et ipse non erit castus, hoc non potest esse. Similiter nisi homo regat familiam suam, non poterit bene regere civitatem, quia 'qualis princeps civitatis, tales et habitantes in ea'." De Donis S. S., IV. 10. t. V, p. 475.
58 " Quantumcumque homo habeat alias scientias, nisi habeat virtutes, non habet vitam." In Hexaem., VI, 19, t. V, p. 363.
59 ". . . quod tarn alte non posset perveniri nisi per virtutes." In Hexaem., V. 33, t. V, p. 359 b.
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considered. The agent is free; the law, therefore, must oblige and bind but not constrain the rational creature; it must operate rather as a motive to the will. God rules the rational creature as He rules the universe. Within man's mind there is a law by which he shall measure and regulate his behaviour60. Each indi vidual applies this law, as he understands it, to his own particular acts and judges their morality accordingly. This eternal law made known to the rational creature is the natural law of conscience61.
Conscience is not a faculty; it is a habit of the practical intellect which in the order of action corresponds exactly to science in the order of knowledge62; it is something which every rational creature must possess in order to arrive at perfection. It is from God, then, that man through an interior illumination receives rules of conduct and if he wishes by means of this illumination to possess moral goodness as he possesses intellectual certitude, he must follow the light which is good as he follows the light which is true63.
Like every being, man acts in view of an end and since he is endowed with reason and free will, he can control the end which he pursues. The great master-trait of every man's nature is his inborn desire for happiness — his longing for something which will per fectly satisfy the human heart. This desire so firmly implanted in man's nature has its root in the intellect but it springs directly from the will. What the intellect apprehends as true, the wall embraces as good and it is in this readiness of the will to follow the higher good that man's moral goodness consists. The will is good by reason of its object which is good, and Aristotle defines
"good" as that towards which all things tend64. Now the , will of man may tend toward an object which is a requisite for him, or useful to him; such an object constitutes a relative good, bonum conferens, a useful good. An absolute good is the objective towards which the will tends; a relative good is a means to the end65. By virtue of a psychological law, the attainment of the good
60 "Item, habet normas directissimas; unde Apostolus et Jeremias dicunt: 'Dabo leges meas in visceribus eorum, et in corde superscribam eas.' Superscribit enim primo in natura; secundo, in industria seu in progressu; tertio in gratia; quarto in gloria. In quolibet statu dat normas suas; ergo necesse est, ut in se habeat eas." In Hexaem., XII, 7, t. V, p. 385.
61 "Si liber conscientiae concordat cum libro vitae, approbatur . . .
In hoc libro scribuntur omnes leges aeternae.'' Ibid., XII.8, t.V, p. 385.
62 E. Gilson, La Philosophie de S. Bonaventure, p. 401.
63 "In quantum est (Deus) ordo vivendi, est lux bona." In Hexaem., V. 1, t. V, p. 354 a. "Ipse est lux infallibilis, lux aeterna, quam sequi debemus." Sermo 1 de s. Angelis, t. IX, 618 b.
64 I Ethica Nicomachea, 1. Cf. W.D. Ross, op. cit., Vol.IX, 1094 a.
65 "Omne bonum aut est finis, aut ad finem; sed solo bono, quod est ad finem est utendum; quia ratio utilis est ducere in finem." I Sent.,
1, 1, 3, t. V, p. 34.
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is a source of pleasure to the conscious subject. Hence in striving after a good, the will may seek the pleasure it will experience in its attainment. The pleasure which this objective good brings to the subject is bonum delectabile, the agreeable good. Finally, the will under the guidance of right reason may seek a good object for its own sake and this immaterial and intelligible object is called bonum honestum66. The delight which the will experiences in the possession of good varies with the character of the good67.
Now God by His very nature is the Supreme Good for the pos session and enjoyment of Whom man was made. It is upon his human nature, and ultimately upon God's command, rather than upon the warnings of the inner voice of conscience that the ob ligatory force of the moral law rests.
We are inclined to the knowledge of the ways leading to our end by an innate, infallible, and indestructible gift which the scholastics called "synderesis". Residing in the highest part of the superior region of the soul, according to St. Bonaventure, this primary impulse toward good directs and guides the faculties of desire and action. St. Bonaventure locates synderesis in the will, thus distinguishing it from the conscience in the practical intellect which he calls habitum innatum6B. St. Thomas places synderesis not in the will, but in the intellect69. This preference for the predominance of the intellect is characteristic of the Thomistic School. St. Bonaventure, in true Franciscan spirit, maintained the primacy of willing over knowing; that is to say,
66 "Honestum dicitur quod propter se ipsum expetendum est, utile autem quod ad aliud aliquid referendum est." St. Augustine,
83 Qq., Quaest. 30.
67 "Item, ostenditur ratione, quia fruitione delectamur, secundum quod delectabile est differentia boni, cum sit bonum honestum, conferens et delectabile." I Sent., 1, 2, 1, t. I, p. 36.
68 "Habitum etiam innatum dicit (scil. conscientia) respectu luminis directivi, habitum nihilominus acquisitum respectu speciei ipsius cognoscibilis." II Sent., 39, 1, 2, Concl., t. II. p. 903. "Sicut intellectus indiget lumine ad iudicandum, ita affectus indiget calore quodam et pondere spirituali ad recte amandum: ergo sicut in parte animae cognitivae est quoddam naturale iudicatorium, quod quidem est conscientia, ita in parte animae affectiva erit pondus ad bonum dirigens et inclinans; hoc autem non est nisi synderesis." II Sent.,
39, 2, 1, t. II, 908 b. "Alio modo lex naturalis vocatur collectio praeceptorum iuris naturalis, et sic nominat obiectum synderesis et conscientiae, unius sicut dictantis, et alterius sicut inclinantis. Nam con scientia dictat et synderesis appetit vel refugit. Et utroque istorum modorum invenitur lex naturalis in diversis locis; hoc tamen ultimo modo accipitur magis proprie. Et sic, ut proprie loquamur, synderesis dicit potentiam affectivam in quantum naturaliter habilis est ad bonum et ad bonum tendit; conscientia vero dicit habitum intellectus practici; lex vero naturalis dicit obiectum utriusque." Ibid., p. 911.
69 Summa Theologica, Pt. II, QQ. LXXI-LXXVII.
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he held fast to the pre-eminence of the good over the true; it is through goodness of will and through love that man takes posses sion of God. Under the influence of the lumen innatum, the in tellect formulates the general principles which are the standards of moral life. Moral conscience is but the application of these universal principles to a particular case.
Man's will may be reached by two channels, the reason and the imagination or the senses, and in many cases the latter affords the better passage. Hence, it happens that, according to the inward man, we are delighted with the law of God, but, according to the flesh, we obey the law of sin. There is a law in our members fighting against the law of our mind, and making us captives in the law of sin, which is in our members. The good which we will, we do not; but the evil which we will not, that we do70. Thus does
St. Paul describe our inborn propensity to evil. It is the effect of original sin, a part of the common heritage left us by our first parents.
When Adam ate the forbidden fruit, in spite of the divine will clearly manifested to him, he destroyed the established order of things, spoiled the plan of his Creator, and introduced disorder and confusion in the work of God — disorder and confusion in his will and lower nature, followed by a host of evils which invaded the whole world. By means of constant self-discipline, man must restore and embellish the divine image and likeness, defaced and defiled by sin, so that he may at length attain that higher state to which Our Lord invites him when He says: "Be ye perfect, as also your Heavenly Father is perfect"71. This state can be reached only by the practice of virtue.
Aristotle defines virtue as the medium duarum extremitatum, secundum quod sapiens determinabit™; St. Augustine says, virtus non aliud est quam modus73. All virtue is a habit — a habit of doing that which is the proper act of the power wherein the virtue resides. The virtues which perfect human nature in a purely natural way are called the natural virtues. They do nothing more than adjust man's powers so that it may be easy for him to act in conformity with the laws of morality.
The moral virtues are very numerous but all can be reduced to four — prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, cardinal virtues, as they are called, because they are the pivots or hinges upon which an upright life turns. They meet all the needs of the 70 Cf. Rom. 7:15.
71 Matth. 5: 48.
72 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea Book II. Cf. W. D. Ross, op. cit., 6, t. IX, 1107 a.
73 Cf. St. Bonaventure, In Hexaem., VI. 12, t. V, p. 362.
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soul and extend their influence to the whole man74: prudence governs the intellect; temperance, the concupiscible appetite; fortitude, the irascible appetite; and justice, the will.
Prudence may be defined as that virtue which inclines the intellect of man to choose what is most suitable for the attainment of his last end75. It is concerned with all the details of life, reg ulating his thoughts, motives, affections, and sentiments.
Fortitude is the virtue which strengthens the soul in the pursuit of good. The secret of its strength is distrust of self and confidence in God. Closely allied to this virtue are magnanimity and munificence, which aid man in the accomplishment of arduous tasks, and patience and constancy, which support him in suffering76.
The virtue of temperance regulates the pleasures of sense, especially those of the palate and flesh. It includes sobriety, chastity, and modesty which theologians call "discipline"77.
Justice, a virtue which regulates man's relations with God and his fellow man, often stands for the sum-total of all Christian virtues. St. Augustine, comparing the cardinal virtues to the four rivers of Paradise mentioned in the Book of Genesis, says of it:
"As for the fourth river, it is not stated where it flows or what land it compasses, for justice belongs to all parts of the soul and where prudence, fortitude, and temperance are in harmonious combination with it, there do order and peace of soul abound78."
In the strict sense of the term, however, it applies to that moral virtue which inclines the will to render unto others what is strictly their due79.
Though Aristotle like St. Bonaventure recognized four car dinal or moral virtues, he could not, like the Seraphic Doctor, find
74 "Cardinales dicuntur tripliciter: vel quia per ipsas est ingressus ad acquirendum omnes virtutes; vel quia sunt principales, in quibus integratur omnis virtus; vel quia omnis ratio vitae humanae dirigi et regulari per eas." In Hexaem., VI, 11, t. V, p. 362 ab.
75 "Prudentia est bonorum et malorum scientia et utrorumque discretio, cuius partes sunt memoria, intelligentia, providentia." In Hexaem., VI. 16, t. V, p. 363.
76 "Fortitudo est aggressio periculorum vel susceptio et eorundem constans et laboriosa perpessio. Cuius partes sunt fiducia, patientia, perseverantia: fiducia in aggrediendo, patientia in sustinendo, perseverantia in perseverando." Ibid., n. 17, p. 363.
77 "Temperantia est rationis in libidinem aliosque animi motus non rectos firma et moderata dominatio. Partes eius sunt sobrietas in gustu, castitas in tactu, modestia in ceteris sensibus; quam modestiam vocant theologi disciplinam." Ibid., n. 15, p. 363.
78 II de Genesi contra Manichaeos, Migne P. L., t. 34, col. 204.
79 "Iustitia est habitus, communi utilitate servata, suam unicuique tribuens dignitatem." In Hexaem., VI. 18, t. V, p. 363.
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their archetypes in the Divine Wisdom80. As in the order of knowledge, so, too, in the order of action do the divine exemplars work upon the soul81. The purity of the Divine Being communi cates to our cognitive, affective, and operative faculties the purity of temperance; the beauty of the Divine Being, the tranquillity of prudence; the eternity of the Divine Being, the constancy of fortitude; the supreme rectitude of its act of self-communication communicates to them the evenness of justice82.
St. Bonaventure sees in temperance the light that purifies; in prudence, the light that illumines; in justice, the light that perfects; in fortitude, the light that invigorates83. The dry earth adorned with flowers reminds him of temperance; water, so clear that it seems one with light, is analogous to prudence; the pure fragrant air, to justice; fire with its wondrous vigor, to fortitude84.
St. Bonaventure likewise sees an analogy between the virtues and the different kinds of causes. If the causes are to attain per fection, the efficient cause has need of fortitude; the formal cause, of prudence; the final cause, of justice; and the material cause, of temperance85.
Here we find a typical example of the Saint's symbolism by which he connects man's body and his environment with the soul and links the life of this world with the life to come. This cor respondence between the visible world and the invisible world not only illustrates his doctrine of exemplarism but it also shows that both the material world and the moral world are modeled on the archetypal world from which they derive their origin and meaning86.
It may be well here to review St. Bonaventure's theory of knowledge and to consider it under its double aspect. Like the Victorines, St. Bonaventure diversifies our mode of knowing according to the nature of the objects to be known. For our knowledge of the corporeal world we depend upon the use of our senses without which the material universe would remain unknown
80 "Hae sunt quatuor virtutes exemplares, de quibus tota sacra Scriptura agit; et Aristoteles nihil de his sensit, sed antiqui et nobiles philosophi." Ibid. VI. io, t. V, p. 362.
81 "Haec imprimuntur in anima per illam lucem exemplarem et descendunt in cognitivam, in affectivam, in operativam." Ibid.
82 Cf. In Hexaem., VI. 7, t. V, p. 361.
83 In Hexaem.., VI. 20, t. V, p. 363.
84 Ibid., n. 21.
85 Ibid., n. 22.
86 "Ilia lux aeterna est exemplar omnium, et . . . mens elevata, ut mens aliorum nobilium philosophorum antiquorum, ad hoc pervenit.
In ilia ergo primo occurrunt animae exemplaria virtutum. Absurdum enim est, ut dicit Plotinus, quod exemplaria aliarum rerum sint in Deo, et non exemplaria virtutum." In Hexaem., VI. 6, t. V, p. 361 b.
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to us. Through the medium of his senses, man comes in contact with the outside world and his mind is peopled with facts. Here
St. Bonaventure is following Aristotle who maintained that cognition originates in us by the way of the senses, of memory, and of experience, out of which the universal, which is the beginning of art and knowledge, is deduced. It is altogether otherwise when the mind turns back upon itself or turns towards God87. The moment we go beyond sensible objects to ascend to intelligible truth, we have recourse to an inner light contained in the principles of knowledge and natural truth with which man is endowed. The mind itself, the principles of philosophy which it contains, and the divine light which makes them intelligible to us reveal a higher kind of knowledge in which sense perception plays no part, and this is the teaching of Plato. Thus we see that St. Bonaventure has revived the tradition of a synthesis, that of Aristotle and Plato, which the great St. Augustine had already realized. Aristotle was a scholar; Plato, a wise man; in St. Augustine were combined the qualities of both. St. Bonaventure makes mention of this fact when he says that Plato made sure the path of wisdom which proceeds according to the eternal rationes, but destroys the path of knowledge, which proceeds according to the rationes of created things; that among philosophers, the word of wisdom was given to Plato and the word of knowledge to Aristotle, for the one looked to things above, the other to things below88; that both the word of wisdom and of knowledge, through the Holy Ghost, was given to Augustine89.
Why this double aspect of knowledge ? The nature of man places him between God and material objects but he is infinitely nearer to things than he is to God. We have already considered truth as it exists in God and in matter and if we consider it as it exists in the mind, we shall see that it bears a resemblance to the truth in God and the truth in matter. The soul, placed between the two extremes, turns by virtue of its higher powers towards
God90; by virtue of its lower ones, towards material objects91.
87 Cf. footnote 39, supra p. 73.
88 Thus does Raphael represent the two philosophers in his "School of Athens". Cf. Dr. Ludwig Pastor, The History of the Popes, translation from the German edited by Frederick Ignatius Antrobus, London, 1923, vol. VI, p. 551.
89 Cf. St. Bonaventure, Sermo IV, t. V, p. 572.
90 "Superior (sc. portio rationis) secundum quern ordinamur ad Deum"; II Sent., 24, 2, 2, 2, opp. 4, t. II, 580 a; cf. ibid., opp. 3; also
II Sent., 39, 2, 1, concl., t. II, 909 b.
91 "Dicendum quod divisio rationis in superiorem portionem et inferiorem non est adeo per diversa membra, ut haec et ilia potentia alia et alia . . .; nec est per membra ita convenientia ut non sit in eis differentia nisi solum secundum aspectus. Est enim differentia in eis
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Of what is below, it receives a relative certitude; of what is above, an absolute certitude92. In the one case, it is the ratio inferior, the direct knowledge of things by the intellect; in the other, the ratio superior, the knowledge of all beings in conformity with their Uncreated Exemplar, the basis of all truth93.
St. Bonaventure likes to think of the soul as a mirror and the faculty of knowing as the light which is reflected in it. Every intellectual being can reflect upon itself; it can comprehend, know, and love itself, and form a judgment94. In other words, it is as a mirror which reflects the image placed before it. St. Anselm gives expression to this same idea when he says: Nulla ratione negari potest, cum mens rationalis se ipsam cogitando intelligit, imaginem ipsius nasci in sua cognitione; imo ipsam cognitionem sui esse suam imaginem ad sui similitudinem, tamquam ex eius impressione formatam95. Just as the eye of the body per ceives material objects by means of corporeal light, so does the eye of the mind behold intelligible things by means of a light which is, like itself, incorporeal96. The light is spiritual, as is the mind itself, says St. Augustine97. The Seraphic Doctor interprets this passage in a broad sense and to him the expression lux sui generis signifies all incorporeal light, created or uncreated98.
Again and again in St. Bonaventure's works we read that all the light of the mind comes from God; that, without Christ, the secundum dispositiones et secundum officia." II Sent., 24, 1, 2, 2, concl., t. II, p. 564. "Potentia cognitiva . . . dividitur ita quod, . . . ratio in superiorem portionem et inferiorem; quae potius nominant diversa officia quam diversas potentias." Brevil., II, 9, t. V, p. 227 b.
92 "Cum enim spiritus rationalis habeat superiorem portionem rationis et inferiorem; sicut ad plenum iudicium rationis deliberativum in agendis non sufficit portio inferior sine superiori, sic et ad plenum rationis iudicium in speculandis. Haec autem portio superior est ilia, in qua est imago Dei, quae et aeternis regulis inhaerescit et per eas quidquid definit certitudinaliter iudicat et definit: hoc competit ei, in quantum est imago Dei... in opere vero, quod est a creatura per modum imaginis, cooperatur Deus per modum rationis moventis; et tale est opus certitudinalis cognitionis, quod quidem non est a ratione inferiori sine superiori." De Scientia Christi q. 4, concl., t. V, p. 24.
93 In Hexaem., I, 13, t. V, p. 331.
94 "Omnis substantia intellectualis est sciens et rediens supra se reditione completa. Unde omnis substantia intellectualis intelligit se et diligit et iudicat. Unde habet rationem speculi et lucem super illud radiantem." De Donis S. S., 8, 20, t. V, p. 498.
95 Monol., c. 33, Migne, P.L., t. 158, col. 187-188.
96 Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. XII, c. 15, n. 24. Migne, P. L., t. 42, col. ion.
97 ". . . et vocat (Augustinus) illam lucem increatam, quam dicit esse sui generis propter hoc quod est spiritualis sicut anima." II Sent.,
17, 1, 1, ad 3. t. II, p. 412 b.
98 "Large dicitur lux sui generis omnis lux incorporea, sive creata sive increata." De Scientia Christi, q. 4 ad 4. t. V, p. 24 b.
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medium par excellence, there can be no knowledge and perfect certitude". The demonstration of this truth was the object of his conferences entitled In Hexaemeron. To the development of the same thought St. Bonaventure devotes the entire Fourth Quaestio of his De Scientia Christi, a thought which impregnates every chapter of his Itinerarium mentis in Deum, a work the praise of which, according to the great Chancellor Gerson, no mortal tongue can fitly utter. St. Bonaventure's thought on this subject never wavered; once he had adopted the formula of St. Augustine he preserved it inviolably. His synthetic mind seemed to delight in centering all knowledge in Christ; his pious soul, to rejoice in establishing God the only source of truth.
The mystic treatises of St. Bonaventure, especially those expounding his theory of illumination, present many difficulties to our feeble minds, and we must admit that in many passages we are at a loss to know whether the Saint is referring to the natural light of the understanding or to the supernatural light which illumines beyond reason. The following quotation seems admirably to summarize the whole question and should help us to grasp the Saint's conception of his theory: Quia ipse (deus) doctor est, docet infallibiliter et certificat sic, quod impossibile est aliter se habere. Secundum sententiam omnium doctorum Christus est doctor interim, nec scitur aliqua veritas nisi per eum, non loquendo, sicut nos, sed interim illustrando; et ideo necesse est, ut habeat clarissimas species apud se, neque tamen ab alio acceperit. Ipse enim intimus est omni animae et suis speciebus clarissimis refulget super species intellectus nostri tenebrosas; et sic illustrantur species illae obtenebratae, admixtae obscuritati phantasmatum, ut intellectus intelligat. Si enim scire est cognoscere, rem aliter impossibile se habere; necessarium est, ut ille solus scire faciat, qui veritatem novit et habet in se veritatem100.
From this passage, we readily see that there are two elements to be considered in the theory of illumination —- God, the Sun of the intelligence on high; the mind, below, receiving TIis light and seeing in it the whole truth. Here St. Bonaventure refers to the intermittent action of God which comes into play only when the soul performs an act of higher knowledge. This illumination presupposes two other lights, the natural faculty of the under standing which the Saint terms naturale iudicatorium and the light which comes from the senses through natural forms and 99 "Unde illud medium veritas est; et constat secundum Augustinum et alios Sanctos, quod 'Christus habens cathedram in caelo docet interius'; nec aliquo modo aliqua veritas sciri potest nisi per illam veritatem." In Hexaem., I, 13, t. V, p. 331.
100 In Hexaem., XII, 5, t. V, p. 385 ab.
7 St. Bonaventure, De Reductione
g8 DE REDUCTIONS ARTIUM AD THEOLOGIAM
images of exterior things101. This light, in its true name, is truth; it knows no eclipse and shines upon the soul with such brilliance that its presence cannot be denied102.
Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine (Ps 4:7), ''The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us". This text proves the existence in us of an intellectual light. For the Saint, the light signed upon us ordinarily signifies the power which we have termed the naturale iudicatorium, the understanding, a natural faculty of the soul and its necessary complement in asmuch as it is an intellectual substance and the image of God103.
However, the truth of the human mind is not the whole truth; the human mind cannot arrive at the perfect knowledge of any truth without the aid of the light of the Eternal Truth. Thus, this light shed upon our minds signifies not only its natural light, the power of knowing and judging, but also the Uncreated Light, the Eternal Truth which perfects the natural light. After one has acquired by experience the content of abstract notions, he must relate these to the ratio regulans et motiva which is God.
In conclusion, let us state that St. Bonaventure places no bounds to the influence of the light coming down from above.
It extends to natural knowledge acquired by the powers of the mind and to supernatural knowledge which requires a revelation from above104. As the sun is the center of the solar system, the source of light and heat for the natural world, even so is Christ the light of the soul, its very sun105. ''He is the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world106." Lie is the Truth present xoi. "Omnes enim in hoc concordant, quod potentiae cognitivae sit lumen inditum, quod vocatur naturale iudicatorium; species autem et similitudines rerum acquiruntur in nobis mediante sensu, sicut expresse dicit Philosophus inmultis locis; ethocetiamexperientiadocet."
II Sent., II, p. 903. Here St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure are in accord with Aristotle who also maintains that the principles are innate, in this sense, that we possess from birth the light which makes it pos sible for us to acquire them.
102 "Lux animae veritas est; haec lux nescit occasum. Ita enim fortiter irradiat super animam, ut etiam non possit cogitari non esse nec exprimi, quin homo sibi contradicat." In Hexaem. IV, 1, t. V, 349.
103 "Perfectio et complementum substantiae intellectualis lux est spiritualis." II Sent., 24, 1, 2, 4, concl., t. II, p. 569 b.
104 "Hie notandum est, quod est claritas scientiae philosophicae, scientiae theologicae, scientiae gratuitae, et claritas scientiae gloriosae."
De Donis S. S., IV. 3, t. V, p. 474.
105 "Secundum quod est ratio intelligendi, intrat in animam ut sol intelligentiae. Iste est sol, qui omnes illuminat; a quo aliqui aberrant, secundum quod dicunt impii in libro Sapientiae: 'Ergo erravimus a via veritatis et iustitiae; lumen non luxit nobis, et sol intelligentiae non est ortus nobis'.'' De Donis S. S., VIII. 15, t. V, p. 497 a.
106 Jn. 1 :g.
THE "LUMEN INTERIUS" — PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE 99
to the mind107, and in this truth the angels, prophets, and philo sophers possess whatever truth they own, for He alone, the Uncreated Word, is the source of all illumination108. As He is the medium of being, so is He the medium of knowing; He is the supersubstantial light, the pure emanation of the glory of the all-powerful God. He is the Sun of countless rays from Whom proceed the treasures of wisdom and knowledge109.
107 "Cognitio huius veri innata est menti rationali, in quantum tenet rationem imaginis." De myst. Trin. q. 1, a. 1, concl., t. V, p. 49 a.
"Prima visio animae est intelligentiae per naturam inditae. Unde dicit Psalmus: signatum super nos est lumen vultus tui, Domine." In Hexaem.
IV. 1, t. V, p. 349 a.
108 "Psalmus David dicit, quod magnus doctor scientiarum Deus est. Scitis, si aliquis habet haurire aquam, libentius haurit earn ab originali suo principio quam a rivulo. Ideo, si Dominus est doctor magnus et donator doni, de quo intendimus loqui; oportet quod recurramus ad fontem ilium ad illuminationem consequandam." De Donis
S. S., IV, t. V, p. 473.
109 "Propositum igitur nostrum est ostendere, quod in Christo 'sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae Dei absconditi', et ipse est medium omnium scientiarum." In Hexaem., I, 11, t. V, 331.