of some unformed matter, that matter was
St. Augustine lowest good. Every good thing is either God or derived from God.
Therefore even the lowest form is of God. And the same may be said of species. We rightly praise alike that which has form and that which has species.
That out of which God created all things had neither form nor species, and was simply nothing. That which by comparison with perfect things is said to be without form, but which has any form at all, however small or inchoate, is not nothing. It, too, in so far as it has any being at all, is of God.
36. Therefore, if the world was made out of some unformed matter, that matter was made out of absolutely nothing. If it was as yet unformed, still it was at least capable of receiving form. By God's goodness it is "formable." Even capacity for form is good. The author of all good things, who gives form, also gives the capacity for form. All that exists receives existence from God, and that which does not as yet exist but may do so, receives its potential existence from God. In other words, all that is formed receives its form from God, and from him all that is not yet formed receives power to be formed. Nothing has integrity of nature unless it be whole of its kind.
From God comes all wholeness as every good thing. comes from him. xix, 37He whose mental eyes are open and are not darkened or confused by zeal for vain verbal victory, understands easily that all things are good even though they become vitiated and die; whereas vice and death are evil. Vice and death do no damage to anything except by depriving it of soundness, and vice would not be vice if it did no damage. If vice is the opposite of wholeness no doubt wholeness is good. All things are good which have vice opposed to them, and vice vitiates them.
Things which are vitiated are therefore good, but are vitiated because they are not supremely good. Because they are good they are of God.
Because they are not supremely good they are not God. The good which cannot be vitiated is God. All other good things are of him. They can of themselves be vitiated because by themselves they are nothing. God keeps them from being wholly vitiated, or, if vitiated, makes them whole. xx,38. The primal vice of the rational soul is the will to do what the highest and inmost truth forbids. Thus was man driven from paradise into the present world, i.c., from eternal things to temporal, from abundance to poverty, from strength to weakness. Not, however, from substantial good to substantial evil, for there is no substanital evil; but from eternal good to temporal good, from spiritual to carnal good, from intelligible to sensible good, from the highest to the lowest good.
There is therefore a good which it is sin for the rational soul to love because it belongs to a lower order of being. The sin is evil, not the