Pighius Argues that Justification Cannot be Separated from Charity or Good Works
shall suffice. In addition to those testimonies which Paul cited from the fifteenth chapter of Genesis: "Abraham believed God, and it was accounted to him for righteousness;" from Habakkuk: "The just shall live by his faith;" from David: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven;" from Isaiah: "Everyone that believes in him shall not be confounded;" and a few other similar passages. Besides these testimonies, I will cite the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, where Christ is most explicitly portrayed. For there He is described as having taken upon himself our sorrows and borne our infirmities, given his soul as a sacrifice for sins, and many such other things: which are so clear that they can be applied to none other but Christ Jesus our
Saviour. It is also said: "And by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many, and he shall bear their iniquities." These words teach that Christ justifies many, namely the elect, by the knowledge and perfect understanding of him: which knowledge is undoubtedly nothing else but true faith; and that he justifies them in such a way that he takes upon himself and bears their iniquities. Jeremiah in the fifth chapter writes: "O God, do not your eyes regard faith?" As if to say: Although you see all things, and nothing concerning man is hidden from you, yet you primarily regard faith as the root and foundation of all good deeds. As for the oracles of scripture, this shall suffice.
Pighius Argues that Justification Cannot be Separated from Charity or Good Works 55. Now I will answer such objections that are commonly brought against this second proposition. We will begin first with Pighius, because our adversaries count him as their Achilles, or chief champion; and think that he alone, by his subtle and sharp wit, has
pierced even into the deepest mysteries of the truth. Pighius uses this sophism: You are not justified by that which can be separated from justification; for it is not possible that causes should be separated from their effects. But faith is separated from justification; for many who believe still live most shamefully; so far from it, that they seem to be justified. However, since he thinks this can be denied, he brings a reason to prove that it is not against the nature and definition of faith for justification to be separated from it. He makes an objection, from the thirteenth chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians: "If I have all faith, so that I can remove mountains, but do not have charity, I am nothing." By these words he concludes that faith can be separated from charity; and therefore, from all good works. He also cites this from Matthew: "Many will come on that day and say, 'Lord, in your name we have prophesied, cast out devils, and performed signs.' But the reply will be: 'I do not know you.'" These signs,
Pighius says, cannot be done without faith. Therefore, seeing that they are excluded from the kingdom of heaven, yet do these things; it is clear that they were not justified: therefore, in them, faith was separated from righteousness.
But he thinks this is even more clearly confirmed by John: for he says that many rulers of the priests believed in Christ, yet dared not openly profess him. But those who shun the confession of the name of Christ are far from salvation: for Christ himself says, "He who is ashamed of me before men, of him will I be ashamed before my
Father." These arguments, although at first sight, they may seem to have some merit; yet if one examines them more closely, he will see that they agree with what Epictetus pronounces of his books: "These are but sights, or ghosts of the dreams of hell." Therefore, we must carefully ponder these reasons and not judge them by first appearances. And just as in coins, we pay less attention to the inscriptions or images, and more to the quality and weight of the
metal; so also in arguments, we should weigh and regard not so much the appearance and color of them, but the thing itself and the strength of them. We first deny that faith can be separated from justification. And whereas Pighius says that it is not repugnant to the nature and definition of faith; we absolutely do not accept it: for against that opinion are all the Holy Scriptures, and the true sense of the definition of faith, and also the Fathers.
Concerning the scriptures, John says, "He who believes that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, is born of God: and he who is born of God does not sin." For as long as faith holds sway in our hearts, we do not commit those sins that destroy the conscience and alienate us from God. How then does Pighius say that it is not against the nature of faith to be separated from justification, and from good works; especially seeing John says, "He who sins does not know God"? The Fathers also saw this: for Cyprian, in 'De Simplicitate Praeparatorum' (where he complains of the ingratitude of his time, for charity, fear, good works, and such like had become very cold) writes, "No one thinks upon the fear of things to come, no one considers the day of the Lord, and the wrath of God, and that punishments will come upon the unbelievers, and that everlasting torments are appointed for the unfaithful: of which things our conscience would be afraid if it believed; but because it does not believe, therefore it is utterly without fear; and if it believed, then it would also be cautious; and if it were cautious, then it would also escape." These words declare that with true faith is joined the fear of God, and the avoiding of eternal punishments, and the avoidance of sins. Let Pighius now go and say that true faith can be separated from the holy motions of the mind, and from good works. Jerome, along with Cyprian, affirms against the Luciferians: "And if I truly believed, I would cleanse that heart, with which God is seen; I would with my hands beat my breast, I would with tears water my cheeks, I
would have in my body a horror, I would be pale in the mouth, I would lie at the feet of my Lord, and wash them with weeping, and wipe them with my hair: I would undoubtedly cling fast to the wood of the cross; nor would I let go my hold thereof, before I had obtained mercy." Hereby also it is manifest that with true faith are joined good works and repentance.
Regarding the definition and nature of faith, it can easily be proven that it cannot be separated from justification and good works; that is, from its effects. Faith is not a common, but a firm and vehement assent, and that proceeding from the Holy Ghost. If a poor wretch condemned to die should receive a promise from a man that he would be delivered, and should believe those words, straight away his mood would wholly change to joy, and he would begin inwardly to love the man who promised him such things, and would try to please him in whatever way he could. How much more should be attributed to true faith, which is given to the word of God, and is inspired by the Spirit of God? Therefore, if that human faith brings with it wonderful emotions of the mind, how can we say that true and Christian faith exists without good works, and is destitute and alone? Thus, we now plainly see, both by the Holy Scriptures, by the Fathers, and by the definition and nature of faith, that it cannot be separated from righteousness and godly works.
Now let us consider Paul: he says, "If I have all faith, etc." But how does Pighius know that Paul there speaks of that general faith, which clings to the promise of God and justifies, and not rather of a particular faith, whereby miracles are performed, which is a free or gracious gift of the Holy Ghost? This faith is not applied to all things found in the Holy Scriptures; it is instead a certain vehement confidence, by which we certainly believe that God will perform this or that miracle. Chrysostom interprets Paul in this context.
To distinguish these types of faith, one is called 'The faith of doctrine'; the other, 'The faith of signs and miracles'. To this latter faith, Chrysostom applies these words: "If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed, you will say to this mountain, 'Move from here to there,' and it will move; and nothing will be impossible for you." It cannot be denied that there is such a kind of faith: for Paul, in the twelfth chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians, when he lists the free gifts which the Holy Ghost distributes to every man as He pleases, writes: "To one is given through the Spirit a message of wisdom, to another a message of knowledge by the same Spirit, to another faith by the same Spirit, to another gifts of healing by that one Spirit." Here we see that among the free gifts of the Holy Ghost is reckoned faith, which Paul would not have spoken of the general faith, whereby we are justified.
If we carefully weigh these things, we will see that Paul maintains the same order in the thirteenth chapter of the first to the Corinthians.
For just as here he places the word of wisdom first, so there he places prophecy; and as here he places knowledge second, so there he does the same; and as here, so there he places faith third; and as here the gifts of healing and miracles follow faith, so does it there with moving mountains. Therefore, those things which Paul has spoken of a particular faith should not be twisted to apply to the universal and justifying faith; for that is to make a false argument, which they call
'from the specific to the general'. As if a man should say, "This faith may be separated from justification, which is called faith in some respect; therefore, the true faith, and the justifying faith, which is called faith absolutely, may be separated from justification." If a man should so compare two different kinds, ascribing one and the same property to both of them, he will soon be deceived.
57. But Pighius saw that by this easy and plain exposition, all his reasoning might be overthrown; therefore, he attempted to wrest it out of our hands, forgetting in the meantime that the author and patron thereof is Chrysostom. To challenge it, he uses this argument:
Paul clearly says, "All faith"; therefore, we may not understand it of any specific faith. For the Apostle makes a universal proposition. But this man ought to know that universal propositions are to be narrowed and confined to the matter of which the words are meant and spoken. Although this might be demonstrated by many examples, at this present only one shall suffice. Paul in that same epistle to the Corinthians, the first chapter, says that he gives thanks to God for them, that they were enriched in all kinds of speech and in all knowledge. It is not very likely that they were endowed by the Spirit of Christ with natural philosophy, metaphysical and mathematical knowledge, knowledge of the law, and other liberal sciences, but only with all knowledge which should pertain to piety and to the gospel. Neither is it likely that they were adorned by the power of the Holy Ghost with all kinds of rhetorical, logical, poetical, and historical speeches, but only with those which should pertain to the edification of the church, with sound doctrine and godly admonitions. Therefore, propositions, although they are universal, are not always to be understood simply but ought sometimes to be narrowed to the matter which is being discussed at that time.
Likewise, what Paul says, "If I have all faith," we understand of all that faith which serves the working of miracles. And that this must necessarily be the interpretation, the words following declare: for Paul immediately adds, "so that I can remove mountains."
Chrysostom also says that he, in that universality, saw that this particular sentence is necessarily to be understood: for he questions how Christ says that to remove mountains, a little faith is sufficient, which is in the smallness of quantity resembled to a grain of mustard
seed, whereas Paul says, "If I have all faith, so that I can remove mountains," as though to bring that to pass a wonderful great faith is required. He explains the question and says that Christ spoke of the truth and nature of the thing: for the gift of faith, although it be never so small, suffices to work miracles, be they never so great. But Paul had regard to the common opinion and judgment of men: for they, when they look upon the greatness and hugeness of a mountain, think that it cannot be removed without a certain incredible efficacy and greatness of faith.
Neither does it help Pighius's cause that Erasmus, in making an answer to the Sorbonne doctors, rejects this our interpretation. For first, his reason is very weak, and secondly false: for he says that the purpose of the apostle was to praise charity by comparison. But what praise should that be, he asks, if it should be compared with faith, which is one of the free gifts of the Holy Ghost and may light as well upon the wicked as upon the godly? For he would but coldly praise a man, which would say that he is better than a dog or a bear. First, this is false, that Paul compares not charity with free gifts of God: for he mentions prophesying, knowledge, and the gift of tongues, and prefers charity before them. Secondly, it is weak that he says, if our interpretations are accepted, the apostle would compare charity only with free gifts: for we confess that toward the end, he compares it with true faith. For Paul says, "There are three things; faith, hope, and charity: but the greatest is charity." And he brings a reason why: for it abides, and the others shall cease. Further, it is a full comparison, if (as we have said) we begin at the free gifts, and so afterward come in order to the theological virtues; yea rather, by that, that Paul, toward the end of the chapter, compares charity with true faith, it is most likely that he did not so before.
But if we should fully grant this to Pighius, that the faith of which Paul speaks is the general faith whereby men are justified; yet neither so undoubtedly should he obtain his purpose. For the apostle, attempting by all means to extol charity, thought to amplify that by a fiction or feigning; which is a figure of rhetoric, known even to children. And yet does not Paul therefore bring a false proposition: for he uses a conditional proposition, which may not resolve into a categorical proposition; and yet, in the meantime, the truth is kept.
As if I should say to any man, "If you had the life or use of the reasonable soul without the life or use of the sensible soul, you would not be troubled with perturbations of the mind." No man could reprove this kind of speech as false; and yet it is not possible that in a man the life and use of the reasonable soul should be severed from the sensible. Such kinds of speeches are also found in the Holy
Scriptures: for example, "If I ascend into heaven, you are there; if I make my bed in hell, behold, you are there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there your hand shall lead me, and your right hand shall hold me." These sentences are true; and yet it is not possible for a man to take unto him the wings of the morning. In the same manner, we say, "If a man should separate faith from charity, he should make it unprofitable," though in very deed it cannot be separated from charity.
And that Paul in that place used such an excess of speech or fiction, that is evidently declared by what he spoke a little before, "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal." But we know that angels have neither bodies nor tongues; and yet notwithstanding
Paul speaks truth, that "If they had tongues, and I should speak with them, yet that would profit me nothing without charity." And this exposition Basil confirms in an epistle to the Neocaesarians: for he says that the apostle intended in this place to commend charity; and
he says that he uses those reasons not that all those things which he here makes mention of can be separated from charity. Wherefore, of the former interpretation, we have Chrysostom for an author: and the latter interpretation Basil confirms. Let Pighius go now, and from this saying of the apostle conclude, if he can, that which he contends so much about.
58. Regarding those words of Matthew, "Lord, have we not in your name prophesied, and in your name cast out devils, etc.," which Pighius denies can be done without faith, yet those who have performed these acts are not justified, as they are excluded from the kingdom of heaven. We may answer with the same solution that we have already provided; namely, that those whom Matthew mentions had the faith of signs, or a dead faith, but not a true and justifying faith. Moreover, I see no truth in the claim that miracles cannot be done without faith: for God sometimes works miracles not for the faith of those by whom they are performed, but either to advance His glory or to testify to true doctrine. Undoubtedly, Moses and Aaron, when they drew water from the rock of strife, wavered in faith; yet God, to uphold His promise, performed a great miracle by providing water to the people and reproved Moses and Aaron for their lack of faith. And Naaman the Syrian doubted he would recover his health in the waters of Jordan; indeed, he would have departed, complaining that the rivers of his own country were much better than Jordan: yet, notwithstanding, God did not leave His miracle undone. When a dead body was cast into the tomb of Elisha, by a great miracle it came to pass that upon touching the bones of the prophet, life was restored to it. But there was no faith there, neither in the dead body nor in the bones of the prophet, nor in those who brought the dead man there.
Yet, it is not always granted to those who desire to perform miracles to do so when faith is absent: for in the Acts, we read that when the exorcists, who were the sons of Sceva the high priest, attempted to cast out devils in the name of Christ, whom Paul preached, the demon answered, "Jesus I know, and Paul I know, but who are you?"
And immediately it attacked them. Here we see that God would not grant a miracle when it was requested, as it is most likely, by wicked and unbelieving men. However, conversely in Mark 9, a certain man did cast out devils in the name of Christ, who yet did not follow
Christ; and when John would have reproved him, Christ did not allow John to do so. By this, Pighius might have seen that the performance of miracles does not always require faith. And yet, if I were to grant him that faith is necessarily required, it would suffice to have either the faith of signs or a dead faith. Therefore, Pighius, in his second confirmation, proves nothing; for it contains nothing that is substantiated.
59. Now let us examine his third proof. John says; Many of the rulers believed in him, but they did not confess him, for fear they would be cast out of the synagogue: and therefore, they were not justified by faith. This argument is but a weak one, and not as strong as he thinks it to be: for we deny that they truly believed. Their assent was nothing but a human assent: for when they saw that wonderful works were performed by Christ, and that his doctrine was confirmed by most evident signs, they began to give credit to him through a certain human persuasion. The devil also, because he certainly knows many things done by God, assents to the truth and believes it: yet it is not to be thought that he is induced to believe by a true faith. And that these rulers did not have true and lively faith is evident from Christ's words to them: "How can you believe, when you seek glory from one another?" From these words, we understand that those who value human glory more than godliness cannot truly believe in God. And
these rulers were to be counted among them: for they so valued their reputations and the judgments of men that rather than being cast out of the synagogue or being noted for any infamy among the people, they would forsake the confession of the name of Christ. Therefore, when the Lord says, "Such cannot believe," and John asserts, "They did believe," it is evident that they spoke of a different and varied faith; unless we are to say that two contradictories can both be true at the same time. Therefore, John spoke of a human faith, but Christ of the sincere and true faith: which true faith ought to be joined with confession, as Paul declares, saying, "With the heart one believes unto righteousness, and with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation." Anyone who sees the connection between righteousness and salvation must also see the link that ought to exist between faith and profession. Therefore, we say that their faith was a dead faith; but a dead faith is not a faith, no more than a dead man is a man.
60. Although Smith, in a small book on justification he wrote against me, contends that a dead faith is still a faith, he primarily supports this argument by comparing it to the body of a dead man, which, although dead, is still a body. This wise man takes great delight in this analogy, which reveals a sophistical argument, typical of his study and skill. Let us examine this analogy more closely. I would have him answer whether a corpse is the body of a dead man, or simply the body of a man? I think he would not answer that it is the body of a man, for the body of a man and a dead corpse differ significantly; indeed, more than two particular kinds which belong to the same general category, as they are contained under diverse general kinds from which they directly and linearly descend. I grant that the carcass of a dead man is a body in the general nature of substance, as are stones and logs, but I utterly deny that it is in very deed the body of a man. Death removes from the body of a man the
proper form and nature which it had before, but it leaves only the general nature, so that it may be called a body.
Similarly, true and justifying faith, when it is lost or ceases to be true and proper, may indeed, as touching the general term which denotes all kinds and natures of faith, be called a certain cold assent, born of human persuasion, and not such as comes from the Holy Ghost, with the same strength and efficacy it had before. Therefore, if the same proportion of the analogy is maintained on either side, this clever sophism makes no argument against us: for as we confess that a dead body is a body, so we grant that a dead faith is a faith, as long as by 'faith' we understand the general kind, which encompasses all sorts of faith, and not the lively and true faith by which we are justified.
This reasoning is, as they call it, a paralogism of equivocation, that is, a false argument stemming from a word with diverse significations.
He also adds that faith cannot justify because by its own nature it is a dead thing and receives life from another source, namely, charity and good works. These objections are vain and trivial: for no one in their right mind will assert that true faith is a dead thing, for "The just man lives by his faith." And if we draw life from faith, how can it then seem dead to anyone? But that it takes life from another source, we do not deny: for it receives it partly from the things it believes, namely, from Christ and the promises of God, and partly from the Holy Ghost, by whose inspiration it is enlivened. In this way, we will agree that it derives life from another thing, but not in the way this man suggests, namely, that it receives it from charity or good works.
For what sane person would ever say that either the trunk of a tree, or the branches, or the fruits, or the flowers give life to the roots?
And faith exists before either hope or charity; therefore, it does not receive life from them, for indeed, faith cannot be the substance of these virtues. Just as the faculty or power of the soul by which we live
and are animated, which they call vegetative, gives life to the body and does not receive life from the sensitive faculty by which we feel, or the rational faculty by which we understand, which follow it, so faith gives life to the soul but does not take that life from charity or good works. However, I concede that the life of faith is made much greater and more ample as it produces more and better works and more fervent charity emanating from it, not because it is enhanced by performing many actions, as they say of virtues which they call moral, but because God, by His grace and mercy, multiplies the talent since it was not idle, and because God by His power ensures that faith, when it works through love, is stronger than itself when it does not.
61. But setting aside these considerations, let us return to Pighius.
He strives mightily to prove that a man cannot be justified by faith in Christ and in the remission of sins: for, he asserts, the faith by which Abraham was justified did not concern these matters. For God promised Abraham only numerous descendants and possession of a land: and it is immediately added that Abraham believed God, and it was credited to him as righteousness. In this argument, Pighius scorns and triumphs in words against the truth, and utterly ridicules our opinion and judgment: but this is essentially to ridicule Paul himself. For Paul explicitly affirms that we are justified by faith in Christ and by the remission of sins. There is nothing in Pighius but sheer folly and a wicked desire to contend. But let Paul come forward and answer for himself what he thought was meant by the seed promised to Abraham. Undoubtedly, in his epistle to the Galatians, the third chapter, he identifies that seed as Christ; "To Abraham," he says, "were the promises made, and to his seed." He does not say,
'and to seeds,' as referring to many, but as if of one, 'and to your seed,' which is Christ. And this covenant, I assert, was confirmed by God in Christ. Let Pighius now yet believe Paul, that in that seed
which was promised to Abraham, Christ was included and meant; nor let him henceforth with such impertinence and desire for victory, claim that the faith by which Abraham was justified was not faith in Christ.
As for the remission of sins, since the blessing is promised to us, we ought to remember that the chief and principal aspect of it consists in this: that we should be received into God's favor, and that our sins should be forgiven us. But Pighius openly opposes the apostle's teaching on the justification of Abraham: for he argues that before Abraham was circumcised and had the testimony of scripture that his faith was credited to him as righteousness, he believed God, as is evident in the 12th chapter of Genesis: wherefore, according to your opinion, he was then justified, and his righteousness was not deferred until the account written in the 15th chapter. It is astonishing how much he attributes to these arguments; as though by them all possibility of response were taken from us.
What, I ask you, prevented Abraham from being justified the first time God spoke to him, telling him to leave his country and his kindred? For even at the very beginning of the 12th chapter, we read the same promises that are in the 15th chapter. For thus God promised him: "I will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you, and make your name great, and you shall be a blessing. I will bless those who bless you, and curse him who curses you; and in you all the families of the earth shall be blessed." Undoubtedly, these words contain the promise of Christ and the remission of sins. Therefore, there is no absurdity in saying that Abraham, by believing these words, was also justified. But because the scripture in that chapter does not plainly set this out, Paul, with great wisdom, cited the words spoken in the 15th chapter, where it is expressly written that faith was credited to him for righteousness: which statement was most
necessary to confirm the apostle's doctrine, that a man is justified by faith. But why God would renew the same promises, it is not hard to see; so weak is our mind that unless God's words are repeated and driven into us again and again, it easily strays from faith. Nor, indeed, is justification only seized upon once, but is grasped as often as we truly and powerfully assent to the promises of God; for seeing we continually slip and fall into sin, we ever need our justification to be renewed.
62. Afterward, Pighius quibbles that in the Epistle to the Hebrews, many wonderful acts obtained by faith are discussed, but not a single word suggests that justification is to be ascribed to faith. However, this man weighs the words of the Holy Scripture with an unjust balance and does not fully consider what those words mean; "The just have by faith conquered kingdoms, worked righteousness, obtained the promises." These should be understood such that from the last effect, we must return to the first. The last is to conquer kingdoms; next is to work righteousness; the first is to obtain the promises, among which are counted blessing, life, remission of sins, and similar benefits, which serve justification. Therefore, what is first mentioned, faith apprehends, and by it we are justified; good works follow, hence it is said, "They worked righteousness;" lastly, by the same faith, we obtain temporal benefits, and for that reason, it is stated, "They have overcome kingdoms." Thus, Pighius falsely asserts that in the Epistle to the Hebrews, among the effects of faith, there is no mention of justification; for, although that word is not explicitly read there, it is necessarily and clearly derived from what is written.
We are certainly not Arians, as some maliciously believe us, that we would accept only what is plainly and expressly stated in the Holy
Scriptures; we also accept those things that are clearly and logically inferred from them.
But Pighius then questions why we deny the power of works to justify. To this, we could simply reply that we do so because the Holy
Ghost in the scriptures teaches us that men are justified by faith without works.
However, to address this more thoroughly, he has laid a trap: he responds to himself that the reason is that our works are imperfect; they do not satisfy God's law, nor can they withstand the judgment seat of God. By this logic, he argues, justification is not by faith either: for faith, too, is imperfect; no one believes as much as they should. To this, we repeatedly respond that faith, as a work, does not justify; it has that effect and bears fruit not by any power of its own, but by its object, that is, by what it regards and lays hold upon: for righteousness is derived to us from the death of Christ and the promises of God. A beggar receives alms with a leprous, weak, and sore hand; yet not because his hand is in such a condition. But one might ask, why do not other good works also by their object (namely,
God, for whose sake they are done) apprehend righteousness as well as faith? I answer that faith was designated for this purpose by God: for just as in the body of a man, though it has many and varied members, only the hand grasps and receives. And thus, the common, misguided, and false reasoning is easily resolved: "We are justified by faith; Faith is a work; Ergo, we are justified for works' sake." Here, the conclusion incorrectly introduces the word "for," which was not present in the initial propositions, hence the argument is flawed.
Further, the form of the argument is, as they say, from accident, thus it is faulty: for it is accidental, or happens to faith, to be a work, in that it justifies us. Therefore, it is a fallacy of the accident, as logicians term it.
Additionally, Pighius objects that charity justifies rather than faith, for it is a nobler and more excellent virtue. But we have already
refuted this ridiculous reasoning: "Charity is nobler than faith, therefore it justifies rather than faith." Nobility or dignity contributes nothing to justification. It's as if one argued, "The eyes are more excellent than the mouth and hands; therefore, food should be taken in through the eyes, not the mouth or hands." This is also seen in natural phenomena, where more perfected forms follow earlier ones, though they do not confer life. In a conceived child, nature progresses gradually from the capability to quicken to the capabilities to feel and to reason; yet, it does not follow that because the powers of reason and sensation are nobler than the power to quicken, they therefore give life to the child. That justification pertains more to faith than to charity (besides what the Holy
Scriptures teach) can also be demonstrated by sound reasoning: for the power of knowledge, which pertains to understanding, lies in perception. Therefore, those who are taught something and come to understand it customarily say, "I get it," or "I grasp it"; indeed, by knowledge, a thing is in a way received into the mind. Therefore, it should not seem strange that by faith we are said to grasp the promises of God and the merits of Christ. But charity involves pouring out, bestowing, and communicating our goods to others; this should follow justification and not precede it: for before we are regenerated, we are inherently flawed; we cannot properly or in a manner acceptable to God, share any good with others.
63. Hereunto Pighius adds that if faith, which justifies, does not allow heinous sins that may spoil the conscience and alienate a man from God, it must follow that if a man who believes falls into any grievous and wicked crime, he is immediately devoid of faith and ceases to believe that there is a God; yet we see that wicked men not only believe that there is a God but also confess all the articles of the faith. This argument at first seems formidable; however, gentle reader, do not be deceived by its superficial appearance. Examine it
thoroughly and test it diligently, and you will find it to be a weak and ridiculous argument. We acknowledge that a person alienated from God by sins and wicked deeds may assent to the articles of the faith and believe that there is a God. But this man should have explained further that this is done by the motion and impulsion of true faith.
Indeed, a wicked man may retain a certain human persuasion, either through upbringing or opinion, because he thinks it most likely.
But lest anyone should think that what I say is of my own invention— that a man who grievously sins is devoid of true and justifying faith— let us consider what Paul says. To Timothy, he states, "If anyone does not provide for his relatives, and especially for members of his household, he has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever."
Clearly, he who denies the faith does not have faith. And to Titus, he says, "They profess to know God, but they deny him by their actions."
To confess and to deny are contradictory; therefore, as both are spoken of the same men, they must be understood in different senses. Thus, they may have a form of faith—a certain human opinion, as it is—but not that firm and forceful assent, inspired by the Holy Ghost, about which we now speak.
John states in his first epistle, second chapter, "Whoever says, 'I know him' but does not keep his commandments is a liar, and the truth is not in him." So then, the true faith by which we genuinely believe in God is not without good works. It should not seem absurd to anyone that one and the same thing can be known in different ways; for the devil also, as well as we, knows and confesses many things about Christ, whom yet Pighius (as I suppose) would not concede to be endowed with the true faith by which we are persuaded to believe those things we confess about Christ.
It is also possible that someone skilled in mathematics may assent to a conclusion confirmed and proved by demonstration, which if he later forgets due to age or illness, he will still affirm the proposition he once knew, but he will do so based on opinion or some probable argument, not by the demonstration as before. Hence, the knowledge of one and the same thing does not necessarily imply the same basis and principle of knowledge.
Let us suppose, as though conceding the opinion that after committing any great, heinous, and wicked act, true faith is lost, which in the elect is later recovered by God's grace; otherwise, it can be said that in those justified and destined for salvation by God, faith cannot be utterly extinguished by any heinous crime but is rather cast into a slumber, lying dormant and not manifesting its vitality through good actions unless it is again stirred by the Holy Ghost. For in such fallen individuals, the seed of God remains, although it may temporarily fail to bear fruit.
But Pighius continues, asserting, "Faith is the foundation; therefore, it is far from the perfection of the building; so then it does not justify, for many other preparations are required for justification." If by this perfection of the building he means the blessed resurrection and ultimate felicity where we shall see God face to face, we agree that faith is far from it; for we must reach the kingdom of heaven through many tribulations, adversities, and arduous labors. Similarly, we can say that justification is merely the foundation of eternal salvation and is far from the blessedness we anticipate. For the first step towards salvation is to be received into God's favor and be regenerated through Christ, followed by other stages leading to that ultimate and supreme bliss we await.
Where this man finds that faith is only the foundation, he cannot demonstrate from the Holy Scriptures, unless perhaps he refers to the Epistle to the Hebrews: "Faith is the substance of things hoped for." But those words mean only that what we hope for is upheld and confirmed in our minds by faith, which would otherwise waver and not stand firm. This does not support his argument. And if he should cite, "Whoever would draw near to God must believe," we have previously answered this and may discuss it further in its proper place.
64. Well, now that Pighius has attempted by many means to overthrow our doctrine, let us hear at length what he himself asserts and to what things he attributes the power of justifying. He states that many preparations and dispositions are required in us to be justified. First, he says, we believe the words of God; afterward, we fear His wrath; then we hope for mercy; and finally, we detest sins.
To be brief, he enumerates all those things which we previously described under the name of the Council of Trent. But lastly, he claims that there succeeds a sincere and pure love of God, which dominates our hearts, and to this, he says, justification is ascribed. I cannot marvel enough at this man's notion: for he asserts that a man is nearly perfect before he can be justified, for one who believes, fears, hopes, repents, and sincerely loves God—what lacks he in perfection? But this man asserts that a man, being without Christ, a stranger from God, and not yet justified, is capable of accomplishing these things, which undoubtedly does not align with the Holy
Scriptures. The Scriptures teach that before a man is justified, he is engaged in evil works and wanders in hatred of God, as is evident in the Epistle to the Colossians, the first chapter, and to the Ephesians, the second chapter. But how can those who perform such excellent works, as this man mentions, be children of wrath? How can they be
sinners? How can they, as written to the Romans, be enemies of God?
But setting aside these concerns, let's examine the foundations of this opinion. First, he cites from John: "Whoever does not love remains in death," and thereby he concludes that from love comes justification and life. This is as if someone said, "He who cannot laugh is not a man; therefore, by the power of laughing, a man attains to be a man." But how absurd this is, every man can perceive: for we are men by virtue of a soul endowed with reason, to which the capacity to laugh is necessarily joined, thus the proposition "He who cannot laugh is not a man" is always true. Similarly, what John says is most certain: "He who does not love remains in death," although he does not have life from love, but from faith, with which love is necessarily joined. He also cites Christ's words: "If you had God as your father, you would surely love me." Therefore, he says, from love we receive adoption, whereby we are made children of God. But here too he uses the same form of reasoning: for those who do not love
Christ are not children of God, yet we are not God's children by virtue of that love, but by faith, from which love springs. In the same way, one might say, "If you were generous, you would also be prudent," and this is indeed a true proposition, yet it does not follow that a man is made prudent by generosity; rather, generosity springs from prudence. Briefly, these arguments and similar others conclude nothing else than that justification cannot exist without love and other Christian virtues, yet it cannot rightly be inferred that a man is justified on account of these virtues.
Pighius also adds this statement of Christ: "If anyone loves me, he will keep my commandments, and my Father and I will come to him and make our abode with him." By these words, he asserts, it appears that justification follows from love and the observance of God's
commandments, for Christ promises that upon their observance, He will come with His Father and abide with us. He means that to receive and retain Christ is nothing else but to be justified. And we agree that when Christians, already regenerate and justified, live uprightly and show their faith through good works, God comes to them and abundantly pours greater gifts and more ample grace. For God, though He is everywhere, is expressly said to come to those in whom He begins to work anew. And since He daily enhances and adorns those who conduct themselves uprightly and godly and faithfully exercise the talents entrusted to them, it is very well said that He daily comes to them by reason of new gifts. This is the kind of visitation about which Christ speaks in the Gospel of John. But if we seek to understand the initial approach of God and the coming of Christ into our hearts to dwell in them, Paul instructs us in his letter to the Ephesians: "That Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith." Therefore, this statement of Christ does not teach that justification comes from love, for justification precedes it, although not in time, yet in order.
65. Pighius goes on and makes such a distinction of testaments; he says some are absolute and free, whereby the heir may immediately enter upon the inheritance, while others are conditional, which do not make an heir except under certain conditions. To this latter category, he assigns the testament of God. Therefore, he emphatically asserts that unless these conditions are fulfilled, no one can be justified. Here we refute what he claims; namely, that the testament concerning the remission of sins in Christ includes any conditions. This is affirmed by Paul in his letter to the Galatians, third chapter, where he writes: "Brothers, I speak in terms of human relations: even though it is only a man's covenant, yet when it has been ratified, no one sets it aside or adds conditions to it. The promises were spoken to Abraham and to his seed. Scripture does
not say 'and to seeds,' meaning many, but 'and to your seed,' meaning one, who is Christ. What I mean is this: the law, introduced
430 years later, does not set aside the covenant previously established by God and thus do away with the promise." These words clearly indicate that the testament God made with Abraham was pure, absolute, and devoid of any conditions imposed by the law.
Furthermore, the very words of Genesis declare: God once promised Abraham the blessing. Later, the law was given, which might seem to add conditions of precepts; suggesting that if individuals wished to be justified and obtain these promises, they needed to perform and fulfill all of God's commandments. Yet, this latter method of justification, though it cannot be fully achieved, does not nullify the original promise. This first way was nothing other than the Gospel through Christ; and to encourage people toward it, the path of justification through works was also presented, so that upon realizing their inability to fulfill these works, they might turn to Christ. From Christ, upon being justified and striving to live uprightly, they might freely receive the promises outlined in the law.
Now let us consider the conditions this man adds to the testament of God. In Psalm 103 it is written: "The mercy of the Lord is from generation to generation on those who fear him, and his righteousness to children's children, to those who keep his covenant and remember to do his commandments." From these words,
Pighius concludes that the fear of God, the remembrance of God's covenant, and the endeavor to perform his commandments are the conditions for God's promises. Yet I am surprised that Pighius would claim justification is by love, while he admits that the scriptures attribute it to fear. However, we will not let Pighius contradict himself. Yet if we listen to the scriptures in Psalm 32, mercy is promised to those who hope: as it states, "Love surrounds those who