Front matter
Of Free Will by Peter Martyr Vermigli
Table of Contents Free Will Certain clauses or sentences concerning Free will.
Of Free will.
This term Free will (as far as I recall) is not found in the holy scriptures. However, what it signifies must not be disregarded lightly. For it is widely debated, and remains a great controversy to this day, as it always has been among scholars and theologians. Even the Philosophers, when speaking of the soul, never made mention of it; instead, they used the term αὐτεξούσιος (autexousios). For in the mind, they only considered the understanding and the will; some added the memory. Cicero, an eminent author of the Latin language, never mentioned Liberum arbitrium; but in his work De fato, he once
or twice referred to Liberam voluntatem, which has the same meaning. The Greeks called it αὐτεξούσιον (autexousion), a word composed of αὐτός (autos) and ἐξουσία (exousia), signifying a person to be at their own liberty and under their own power, unable to be constrained.
In this manner, free will may be attributed to God, who cannot be compelled, as he has a will that cannot be turned. Likewise, the good angels cannot sin or be turned away from God, whom they constantly behold. They are said to possess free will in this sense, and so are the devils. The term αὐτεξούσιον (as far as I know) is not found in the holy scriptures. The Latin word Arbitrium consists of two words:
Arbitrium and Liberum. To arbitrate is to esteem, to perceive, to form an opinion, to judge; and Liberum, as we have already said, is for a person to be at their own liberty. Thus, free will seems to be when the appetite is carried of its own accord towards that which the understanding or power of knowledge reveals to it. It indeed resides in the will, but it originates in the understanding, for it is necessary that the thing be first judged and esteemed before either avoiding or pursuing it follows.
Augustine often said that it is a faculty of both reason and will.
Damascene also said that free will both judges and acts. Judgment belongs to the understanding, but desire belongs to the will. Reason or understanding takes the place of an advisor, while the will desires, undertakes, or refuses.
Therefore, we may thus define free will: It is a certain faculty of the will; which, while it follows the part of knowing, it of its own accord refuses or desires something. When I say faculty, I understand nothing else but power: lest anyone think that I mean here some quality; as though it were a habit added. Although Barnard said that
free will is a free habit of his own mind. Therefore, it is a power of the will, not as will absolutely, as we now discuss it (for we seek happiness, and we cannot do otherwise:) but it is said to be a power of the will, as choice proceeds from it. Those things that we choose, we choose for another thing: not by themselves, but by a certain counsel that went before. For we choose not, except those things that were considered: but it is necessary that this consideration be done by the understanding part. This is the definition of the cause, which, if it will not satisfy, we will bring another: which is from the Master of the Sentences, in the second book of Sentences, the 25th distinction. He says that free will is a power of reason and will, whereby good is chosen when God's grace assists, or evil when his grace ceases.
The Master thought it fitting to add grace, lest he should seem to agree with the Pelagians. But yet for all that, he names no justifying grace, but a preventing grace, which may knock at the mind, and may stir up both: then if we assent to the word of God, there follows regeneration. These things I think sufficient to know the nature of free will. But the objects into which this will is directed must be distinguished. These are of two kinds. Some are of a baser sort, which are subject to the senses and human reason, and they do not exceed our capacity, nor do they need a supernatural light: such as, whether I teach or not; whether I stay or not; whether war is undertaken or not. These things are subject to our senses, and by reason, we may discern them on either side. There are other things higher, of which we cannot even dream: such as, to believe in Jesus
Christ, to obey the commandments of God, to trust in him, to love him with all the heart, with all the soul, and with all the strength, to be obedient to the law through good impulses and guidance of the Spirit of God. These are very high things, as Paul said; The natural man does not perceive the things of the Spirit of God. Again, "The
things which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God has prepared for those who love him," God has revealed them to us by his Spirit, etc.
This distinction being made, another follows, which pertains to the state and condition of humans. Adam, before he sinned, had his state. Afterward came a miserable corruption, before people were regenerated, while they still lived in utter darkness. The third state is in regeneration itself. The fourth state is after regeneration, when people are born anew and upheld by grace. The fifth is that of the blessed, when they are in the kingdom of heaven. I have no need to dispute about all these states. Regarding the state of the first man, we have few references in the holy scriptures. We only know that God made man righteous and that he fell by his free will. It is unnecessary at this time to discuss the latter state, as it does not serve our purpose much. Therefore, three states remain to be considered: before man is regenerated, how it stands with him in regeneration, and when he is now regenerated. David, when he was given a choice by the prophet Gad, was in that third state: he was now regenerate and had returned into favor. But to clarify the matter further, we must speak of other things.
Now, I say that men not yet regenerated have partly free will concerning those good things subject to the senses, within the capacity of man. Experience teaches that I can stand or sit, go my ways hence or stay still; for this is naturally done in us, as sinews, muscles, and members are moved by thoughts. There are greater motions therein, but in the will or reason, there is a certain power of restraint.
Hypocrites often do this: they also have evil inclinations, but being led by the desire for glory, they suppress them through reason,
judging that they cannot attain the glory of God through common affections. However, this cannot always be done. Therefore, I said that they do not fully have it, because the vehemence of the motions and affections is such that reason cannot always constrain them. It should be noted that these initial thoughts or first assaults are not within our control when they arise and first burst forth; they are stirred up. Nor is reason itself always within our control to restrain.
Hence Ambrose (as Augustine often quotes) said, "Our heart is not in our own power." I understand this to mean "always," because sometimes it is in our power. There may be such a great perturbation of fear that those who had resolved to stand firm in battle may flee, as reason cannot suppress them. This happened to the Canaanites under Joshua: when they intended to destroy the Israelites, they could not stand before Joshua because God, according to his promises, struck fear into them. Thus, there is partly liberty in these matters, and partly not. Nor is it the same in every age; for children and fools are more moved like brute beasts than moved by reason.
If it is asked whether, by this partial freedom granted, people can do those things which may agree with the law of God, I say that we can, in a manner of speaking, use that word, but only if it is properly understood, as the scripture speaks. Paul, to the Romans, says, "The Gentiles do by nature those things which pertain to the law." For there is no nation so savage or barbarous that is not touched by some sense of right, justice, and honesty. However, if the law of God is properly and truly understood, in this liberty, people cannot do those things that are in line with the law. Because the law does not only require outward actions, but it chiefly demands good inward motivations, that we should love God with all our heart, soul, and strength. That commandment is the soul and spirit of other precepts.
Therefore, whoever obeys other precepts must do so with all their heart, soul, and strength, loving God, and with that mindset,
abstaining from robberies, fornications, and other such things for God's sake, whom they love with all their heart. We might say that, by this liberty, our actions may align with civil and economic laws, which consider outward deeds and are not greatly concerned with the will.
And when Paul says that the law is appointed for the wicked, the ungodly, and murderers, it should not be inferred that we can fulfill the law. For although one might say that the law is not appointed for just men (because they, being regenerate and free from the danger of damnation, have no law to accuse or condemn them, except that they are not yet perfectly regenerated), it cannot be concluded that people, by this liberty we speak of, can fulfill the law. For that law, being so appointed, may have many other purposes than fulfilling it; namely, that people may acknowledge their sins and the weakness of their own strength, see what they ought to have done, be stirred up to better things, and come to Christ. Augustine, in his book "De gratia & libero arbitrio," in the second chapter, seems to teach that our free will consequently follows the very precepts; otherwise, the precepts would be unprofitable. To this, I say that the law, being presented in this way, implies a free will concerning man made in his first state of perfect nature, and likewise concerning regenerate men, that they may obey with an imperfect obedience but not with a perfect one.
But what can be concluded from the commandments concerning men not yet born anew? Mans strength and power cannot thereby be proved, but that they have a will may be proved; which, being moved by grace, they shall have some power to obey or perform their duty, since it is not contrary to them to be renewed, being of such a nature that they may be regenerated by God, and at least obey him with an imperfect obedience.
Furthermore, if outward things are considered, there is some liberty, but this is not fulfilling the law, which especially requires the inward motivations that proceed from faith and inspiration of the Spirit of God. Therefore, I grant some kind of liberty in this regard, because experience teaches that it exists; not because I am compelled by that argument to admit that if the law cannot be kept by a free will, magistrates shall punish offenders in vain, and the laws were given in vain. For if this argument were valid, it would conclude that we, while not yet regenerated, also have free will towards supernatural things, since even to those who are not regenerated, God has given laws regarding these things and punishes them if they transgress. I therefore grant that concerning outward things, we partly have this liberty, but I could not be persuaded by these arguments alone unless there were other factors at play. For the magistrate himself, if presented with an open robber or thief who knowingly and willingly commits a wrongful act, will punish them. The magistrate will not then inquire whether they had a free will or were moved by passion in such a way that reason could not resist. And even people not yet regenerated, without faith, hope, and charity, if they were to die, God would punish them; he would not consider whether they could have had these qualities in that state or not. And God himself punished original sin; he does not inquire at our birth whether we may be without it. Augustine, in his book of confessions, says that infants at that age have their vices and sins, for they are tainted with envy.
These are sins even though they have no power to resist those impulses, nor do they have the reasoning to do so.
The powers of free will are not to be gathnered out of the law and commandments of God. I admit that when something is commanded, free will is involved, since whether we obey or resist, we do so with the will. For we do not assent or dissent with our nostrils, fingers, or other body parts, but with our judgment. However, it is
not thereby proven that we are able to do as much as is commanded of us. Therefore, although I am not convinced by this reasoning to affirm this freedom, I grant the same, being convinced by experience; not every experience, but that which has testimony from the holy scriptures, which do not deceive.
In the first chapter of Romans, it is discussed those who were not renewed, who are said to have known the invisible things of God
(meaning the Godhead and eternity) through the created world. This is affirmed by David; "The heavens declare the glory of God," etc.
And in the same epistle, it is stated that the Gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally do those things that are contained in the law.
And as for actions to be done, they were said to have had knowledge of equity. For "When they should have known the righteousness of God, and that those who do such things are worthy of death, they not only do those things but also approve of those who practice them, and thus are made inexcusable." For they cannot claim ignorance since they knew that they did not even attain to that small thing they were capable of. Nor can they rightly excuse the weakness of their strength, seeing they themselves made a way for it through the sin of Adam, in whom all men sinned. Also, Christ said, "If you love only those who love you, what reward have you?" And no one doubts that generally, good manners are to be praised, and regarding friendship is a righteous thing, for those who betray or harm their friends are despised. Also, in the seventh chapter of Matthew, the Lord says, "If you, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children," etc.
Nor do I think it is to be doubted that the natural affection of parents towards their children, wishing well unto them, is good, for those who despise their own children or treat them very cruelly are greatly despised.
Moreover, Paul, when he was still an enemy of God and persecuted the church, excelled in outward justice above many of his peers, as he testifies to the Galatians. And to the Philippians, he shows that he was blameless and faultless according to the righteousness of the law. Also, the histories of the pagans show many instances where
Scipio, Pompey, Caesar, Cato, and Cicero spoke, decreed, and executed things beneficial to their countries and public welfare, even though they were strangers to Christ. Thus, it appears, both from the holy scriptures and from the writings of the pagans, that something must be granted to this liberty, although distinctions must be made therein, as it does not seem to be granted equally to all. The differences may be according to bodily temperament, education, country, exercises, and the like.
It is also worth mentioning that these notable acts mentioned in history of the unbelievers happened by some motion and peculiar instinct of God, who desired such examples to be extant so that commonwealths and kingdoms might be preserved. And to prevent everything from descending into chaos, some were adorned with excellent qualities so they could do good to others by keeping them in their duty. Therefore, just as we acknowledge that the spirit of prophesying and other graces are sometimes given by God to wicked men, so likewise, without a justifying grace, God might bestow, in addition to the common influence, some spirits of fortitude, chastity, severity, and the like. This is the free will which I believe should be acknowledged, yet it is accompanied by remarkable weaknesses and limitations. Firstly, in the understanding, there is great darkness and blindness, so that it scarcely understands what is to be done. And in the will, there is great lack of strength to resist lusts. Moreover, since there is a perpetual conflict between the higher and lower parts, it cannot be avoided that men sometimes falter in courage, and those who fight thus cannot avoid wounds, which are often fatal.
Herein lies the infirmity of the body, which is both corrupted and burdensome to the soul, and often the cause of why we cannot accomplish those things which we deemed necessary. For it is true, as Paul said of the regenerate, that "They feel another law in the members, striving against the law of the mind, and leading them captive whither they would not." And also, "If the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, so that they do not do what they would." Again, "If they do not do the good thing they desire, but the evil which they hate, what more grievous things do we think happen in those who are not regenerate?"
Moreover, let us consider the natural end that philosophers have designated, that men should live according to reason and excellent virtue, and let us see how few have achieved it, thereby learning the weakness of man's strength, even in those things which do not exceed the capacity of man's reason. Another necessity to be considered is the one to which men in this state are subject: the necessity of sin. Because whatever they do without the grace of God and faith, it is necessarily sinful, for "They are the children of wrath."
And since they do not believe in Christ, the wrath of God remains upon them; therefore, they cannot do any good thing that pleases
God, for God regards men more than their gifts. They are evil trees, thus they can bear no fruit except evil. And Paul calls those his
Jewish good works not only dung but also loathsome because they were offensive to him. Furthermore, that which is of the flesh cannot be anything but flesh, and it needs no proof that unregenerate men are of the flesh. Indeed, in the book of Genesis, the sixth and eighth chapters declare that the imaginations of men, from their infancy, are evil.
Moreover, the works done by the regenerate lack their proper end because they are not referred to God, so they cannot love God above