CHAPTER III: The most perfect creature could not be our redeemer.
debt be paid with another? God says of them, Job 4:18, 'that he finds folly in them.' If God's curious eye inquire and search into them, they will be found defective of that holiness which he desires, though they be the works of his hands, and though they have such a holiness as is the perfection of their natures; and (so far as such creatures can be), they be perfectly righteous. But yet if they be compared to that holiness wherewith God is delighted, and that which the curious eye of his purity would require, he finds a folly in them. And therefore they need not only a mediation of union to confirm them in grace, but further, for this end, that God may be pleased with them and their works; he being so curious, that but for a mediator (whose holiness wholly satisfies his exact eye), he would be pleased with no works of his own hands whatever, but would rend, and tear, and throw all away, as not yet worthy enough of him, even as curious artists do their best draughts, as not satisfied with them. Yea, if the angels were but one grain wanting, scruple not to say, they would be cast down, yea, fall down, and become devils. And therefore how can all that they can do be able to help you, seeing they have little enough for themselves?
So you see, upon a survey of all particulars, that no creature could make satisfaction to God for sin.
CHAPTER III
That the most perfect creature, though having all the perfections of Christ's human nature, yet could not be our redeemer.—The utmost extent to which the power of any creature can reach, to save himself or others, which yet all fall short of that which was to be performed for our redemption.
Add to all these the utmost supposition that can be made, of the most transcendent perfection of grace that may possibly be bestowed upon any mere creature. Take the supposition which some of the schoolmen have made, that as God appointed Adam, a mere
creature, to convey and derive grace to all his posterity, so if we with them suppose, first, some one mere creature as a head, appointed to satisfy for sin, and convey grace to sinners (as Christ doth); and, secondly, suppose this mere creature filled with as much grace habitual as Christ had, as much love, humility, &c., only that grace of union to a divine person set aside, which so transcendently elevates all in him above created perfections, and then such a supposition cannot be denied. Thirdly, Suppose a transcending degree of favour and glory appointed as the reward of that grace, more than is borne towards all other creatures; yet though this creature should lay down all that glory, quit itself of all that happiness, and subject itself to all those torments which Christ's soul underwent for us, to the end that our punishment might be cut off, and we brought unto favour, all this could no way deal with justice to satisfy for sinners, and restore them to favour. Which now we will endeavour to make good from those more near and intimate demonstrations, which hold forth in them the true grounds why no mere creature can satisfy for sin, upon no supposition, how high soever. By all which the superabundant grace and glory of Christ will the more appear, whose cause herein we plead, and who pleadeth ours in heaven.
And, first, to make the clearer entrance, and the better explication and stating of this point, let us consider and examine how far the graces of a mere creature, how great soever, have gone, or can go, to advantage and promote either the owner of them, or another, in the way of salvation; and so see the utmost extent of their abilities, and where they have and must fall short. Which will likewise afford us evident demonstrations how far short they come of satisfaction for sin, or justifying of a sinner.
I. Let us see what they can do for the owner and possessor of them.
1. They can and do justify the possessor of them, if he have never sinned. Thus the grace and works of the angels do justify them before God; which yet is much for God to accept of, for he 'seeth folly in his angels;' yet this privilege he vouchsafes to their own grace. And thus
to be justified, is no more than to be accounted righteous before God's tribunal, and so worthy to live in his sight, and by means of it to enjoy their present condition of happiness. And thus Adam's grace in innocency did justify him: God by his law and ordination pronouncing him righteous by it (whilst he continued in it), as wanting nothing which his law required in him for happiness and life. And though grace in Adam and in the angels did, by a natural law and just ordination of God, justify them before him, so as, God looking on their works, did pronounce them righteous in his sight, according to his law, yet this law or ordinance was founded upon no other obligation from God than the ordinances and laws of providence towards other creatures, even such as the ordinances of day and night (as he speaks of them); and so it was but such as when
God saw all the creatures which he had made keep the ordinances which he had set them in, he pronounced that they were all good, namely, in their kind, Gen. 1:31, they continuing (as the psalmist says, Ps. 119:91) according to their ordinances. So whilst man continues in the ordinances which God hath set him in, he pronounceth him good in his kind, that is, righteous; righteousness being his proper goodness, and such to him, as the proper goodness of all creatures are in their kind unto them. And as this righteousness was due to him, and so created in him, not by merit, but as the native perfection without which he could not be a man, so was this pronouncing of him righteous (and to be in God's favour whilst he continued in that goodness) not due of merit (for what can we do towards it?), but only as a due approbation and suitable reward and consequence of his goodness, meet for God to bestow, according to that special law of nature which God had created him in. And so I understand that same ex debito, Rom. 4:4, where the apostle, speaking of the covenant of works (which was the covenant of nature), he says, 'the reward was of debt, not of grace;' that is, there was a reward that was a natural due to it (which is opposed to mere grace), which notwithstanding is not of merit, nor could that deserve it at God's hands; only it was meet and due, in a natural way, that God should so reward it.
2. The grace of such a mere creature can preserve itself, and increase itself. Therefore Christ compares it unto mustard-seed, the least of all seeds, which yet grows up to be a great tree; and so the stock that Adam had he might have kept, by the power that God had given him.
As Adam might have maintained his bodily life unto eternity by food, so his spiritual life by keeping the law—'do this and live.' So that grace in a pure creature before the fall might possibly have kept its station. Yet, 3. It could not, nor cannot absolutely confirm and establish such a creature in a state of justification, which is a further thing than simply to justify, as to give perseverance in grace is more than to give grace. Thus the angels, though always they be justified by their own grace, yet no acts of their own did, or could, procure a confirmation in that grace, or strength and security that they should not, nor could not, fall. It is an incommunicable property of Jehovah not to change, and to have no 'shadow of turning,' James 1:17. It is therefore judged by all divines that this benefit they have by Christ.
4. Much less can the grace of a mere creature (or ever could) merit a higher condition; to do which is more than to confirm the continuance of the present condition. Adam could not earn a condition of a higher rank, nor by all his works have bought any greater preferment than what he was created in. To compass it was ultra suam sphæram, above his sphere; he could never have done it.
As, for instance, he could not have attained that state in heaven which the angels enjoy. What says Christ? 'When you have done all you can, say, You are unprofitable servants,' Luke 17:10. This he could no more do than other creatures by keeping those their ordinances can merit to be 'translated into the glorious liberty' which they wait for, and shall have at the latter day. The moon, though she keep all her motions set her by God never so regularly, yet she cannot thereby attain to the light of the sun as a new reward thereof. And thus no more can any pure creature of itself, by all its righteousness, obtain in justice a higher condition to itself. And therefore the angels, by all their own grace, have not to this day earned a better condition
than they were created in. And yet all this falls short of satisfying for sin, as we shall see anon.
II. We have taken a view of all that which all the grace of a mere creature can do for the owner of it; let us now, secondly, see what it can do for another. And, First, We may safely say, it can avail less for another than for the person himself. For what it doth for another it doth by virtue of what it first doth for itself. If it brings another into favour, it must needs be much more beloved itself.
Secondly, We grant that it might have been a means of conveying righteousness, through God's goodness and appointment of it, unto another. For so Adam's grace should have done to all his posterity.
For as he falling we now inherit his sin, so if he had stood we by the same law should have had his righteousness conveyed unto us; and so much indeed may the grace of a creature that never fell do for another. But then take in these cautions with it.
1. That other must be one who also never fell, it could not do thus for those that were once sinners, though it might convey righteousness to another that never sinned.
2. Though a creature that never sinned might have a stock of righteousness conveyed from another (as we should have had from Adam), yet that creature must still continue to be justified by its own righteousness, besides by what was conveyed from that other (even as well as the conveyer himself was by his own righteousness to have lived), and so might notwithstanding have fallen away. For Adam's righteousness, and the imputation of it, would not alone have been sufficient to justify us eternally; but our justification must have been continued by our own righteousness. For as although we have
Adam's sin conveyed to us, yet we are condemned for our own sins besides, and not only for his; so Adam's righteousness being conveyed to us, we must afterwards have had, and must have
continued to work, a righteousness of our own. He was only a means to give us a stock wherewith to begin, all which we might have spent, and it was likely we should.
So that, in the last place, to draw up all, by a comparison from the less to the greater, it will appear how far short the power of grace in mere creatures doth come of satisfying for another's sin. You see how little it can do for itself; and it must needs be able to do less for another than for itself, and less for a sinner than for either. It may justify itself, and the possessor of it may actually live by it, but not so another. For though that other may have righteousness conveyed to him at first, yet he must ever after live upon his own. The creatures' grace cannot confirm itself in a perpetual state of justification for time to come, much less merit a better condition. But to satisfy for sin is beyond all these; it is as much as to merit a better condition, and more.
(1.) It is as much, for satisfaction hath to do with justice as well as merit; for to merit is to do that which justice itself shall count truly worthy of such a reward. And so to satisfy is at least to offer that for a satisfaction, which justice itself offended cannot but think worthy to be accepted in recompence. The one undertakes to deserve of justice rewarding, the other to pacify and fully content justice offended.
And, (2.) It is more; and therefore the papists themselves, who say that a man's own grace may merit for himself, yet deny it to be able to satisfy for another's sin. And reason is for it; for,
First; In meriting a better condition, a man earns but of another's goods, and undertakes to do something worthy of a better reward; and there is in it but comparatio rei ad rem. But in satisfying for injuries, he undertakes to repair personal wrongs; which it is so much harder to repair, as men love their own persons more than their goods. A poor man may earn some of a nobleman's goods by a day's work; but can never satisfy him for a disgrace.
Secondly; To satisfy for sin is more than to do something worthy of a higher and better condition; because there is a greater distance between a sinner's estate, and justification to be attained, than is between the estate of one already justified, and a higher condition of favour; such as was between the estate of Adam and that of an angel.
There was not such a gulf (as Christ says) or distance between Adam's earthly state and theirs, as is between an offender and the favour of God; which by his offence is wholly forfeited. He when innocent was much nearer the most glorious condition which any creature was capable of. Even as a good subject, though never so poor and mean, who yet never offended, is nearer the dignity of a duke, and more capable of it, than one who is a traitor, and so hath forfeited not only his honour, but his life and the privilege of a subject.