CHAPTER TWO
CHAPTER TWO
A COMPARISON OF THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE WRITER
OF EVANGELIUM VERITATIS AND OF
JUSTIN MARTYR IN RELATION TO THE
NATURE OF TRUTH
I. THE WRITER OF Ev. Ver.
The writer of Ev. Ver. discloses neither his name nor his relation to the Christian church. He indicates nothing definite concerning non-Christian or Christian sources upon which he draws for the development of his message of redemption.
Internal evidence, however, indicates the presence of both philosophical and Christian elements underlying the writer's understanding of truth.
A. The Writer's Philosophical Background in Relation to his Idea of Truth The writer of Ev. Ver. was apparently influenced by both Stoic and Platonic ideas.} I. Stoic background. An influence of Stoicism upon the writer of Ev. Ver. is apparent in the area of anthropology. The original
Stoic teachings come into sharp focus in the discourses of Epictetus (first century A.D.) who, in turn, was an important influence in the thought of the Stoic emperor, Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 161180).2 Epictetus claimed that while man possesses a material body in common with the animals, he shares his vod¢ with the gods.®
That is, man is part of the Divine being, a fragment of God himself.* Thanks to his vod¢ or mind, man can overcome the miserable existence in which he finds himself. Thus, man exists in the world as a kinsman of the gods but strays through ignorance.® He is
1 Trenaeus tried to discredit gnostic tenets (e.g. those of Valentinus) by tracing their basic principles to certain comic poets and to certain philosophers (Adv. H., II, 14). Historical research calls for an honest inquiry into possible contributory influences to the gnostic faith. Hence, the question of the moment is: Who or what influenced the writer of Ev. Ver. and how ?
2 Cf. W. J. Oates, The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers (New York:
Random House, 1940), p. xxii f.
3 "Discourses of Epictetus,'' Book I, chap. III (Oates, 2b7d., p. 229).
ING. (De PS.
MBE! De. BOO.
A COMPARISON OF THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE WRITERS
slow in understanding his own nature, slow in sensing his estrangement from God, yet, through his innate powers of goodness, he can indeed realize the good life, i.e. a life in harmony with the universe.?
Greek anthropology, generally, is present in Epictetus' discourses.
In particular, however, his anthropological emphasis is reflected in Ev. Ver. Like Epictetus, the writer of Ev. Ver. claims that men exist in the thought (Nowe) of the Father and are joined to his thought even after they have come forth from him, i.e. appeared
(37:5-10). It will be seen later that the theme of man's ignorance and error recurs throughout Ev. Ver. Yet, there is hope, though man is slow to understand his estrangement from God ® and his destiny of harmony or 'oneness' * found in the Father. This destiny means, of course, a fiery destruction of man's hulic nature
(25:8-17).§ 2. Platonic background. The writer of Ev. Ver. does not mention Plato but in several areas of thinking, he shows the influence of Plato's writings. a. The idea of true revelation In 23:3-18, the writer of Ev. Ver. contrasts two possible types of revelation® which may conveniently be termed 'outer' and "Inner." Categorically he rejects outer revelation, that is, revelation in a book of consonants and vowels (23:3-7). To read such a book, he says, leads one to empty thoughts. True revelation is entirely different. It is a living book (22:38-39) containing letters of truth
(Oncoeer Ne NTe YanTane, 23:8-9), the Father's revelation in the hearts of his chosen ones (cf. 19:34-20:1; 23:14-16). To these references, 26:4-6 should be compared; '"'the Word which was in the heart of those who speak it.'' Here is to be found the true inner revelation.
In contrast to an emphasis upon single sayings of Jesus which occur in the gospel of Thomas and the gospel of Philip, the writer of Ev. Ver. senses that true revelation
SLO Da 2Os.
2wOUd., Ps 200:
® See, e.g. the parable of the drunkard (22: 16-19)
eV SOEs (YS; AG RAST.
5 Cf. the Stoics who adopted the view of Heraclitus to the effect that fire is the final principle. The Stoics believed that the various physical worlds are dissolved successively into fire (Oates, ibid., p. xx).
6 The compound verb eqorangd ahbad "is manifested" appears in the context (23:2).
THE WRITER OF EV. VER.
begins with the one God. The letters of this Divine book are written by Oneness (23:14-15). It is a revelation in his people that reveals the essential oneness of God. This means that if God is to be known, one must discover him through those whom he has called (cf.
Eph. 3:10). Thus the writer of Ev. Ver. believes that revelation is found not in Scriptures but in the nous or in the mind of man.!
The basic idea is not at all original with the writer of Ev. Ver.
It reflects both a Stoic (see above) and a Platonic principle. Near the close of Plato's Phaedrus, Socrates extols the dialectical method but belittles the written word. The word in ink, he says, is weak for it always gives the same answer to the one who questions it.
But the word of a better and more powerful nature, says the sage, is, ""The word which is written with intelligence in the mind of the learner which is able to defend itself and knows to whom it should speak and before whom to be silent." 2
To be sure, the Platonic idea undergoes change in Ev. Ver.
The dialectical method is replaced by the Divine work of the Father. The connection, however, remains. Revelation (Ev. Ver.) or the living word (Plato) is not the word in ink but the word written in the mind of the learner (Plato) or "'in the heart of those who speak it" (Ev. Ver. 26:5-6). b. The idea of transcendent knowledge of truth
According to Ev. Ver., the basic need of man is gnosis, gnosis of the unreality of all life apart from the Father, of the Father's nature, and of man's true origin and being in the Father. This gnosis, according to Ev. Ver., is transcendent:
(x) Because man lives in ignorance, (2) Because he has forgotten his true being,* and,
(3) Because he acquires knowledge only as gnosis—from the outside—comes to him where he is, i.e. in Error.
1 In a somewhat similar fashion, the Corpus Hermeticum recognizes no inspired or infallible writings but stresses the Divine nous which enters man's mind and becomes identical or co-existent with it. Cf. W. Scott,
Hermetica, I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 7-8.
2 "'Phaedrus,'' 276A in the Loeb Classical Library, Plato, 1, 567.
8 Cf. 17:9-14 where Ignorance of the Father is said to imprison man in a fog of Terror.
4 Cf. 18:7-9 where Forgetting (+Buye) arises because men do not know the Father. There is no neutral territory.
5 Cf, 18:4-5 where gnosis originates from the Father and 26:23-26 where it is said to draw near and to defeat Error.
A COMPARISON OF THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE WRITERS
The idea harks back to the theory of AyOy "forgetfulness," and dvéuyyous "recollection, remembrance," expounded in Plato's
Meno (especially 81-86). As developed by Socrates, the theory says simply that the soul, being immortal, can remember all that it knew prior to its birth into the life that it now lives. According to N. Gulley, this Platonic process of é&vdpvyotg involves three stages—disillusionment with knowledge one has previously held, a recollection that certain propositions are true, and a comprehension of these recognized propositions in a coherent system. Gulley feels that the introduction to the theory, i.e. the dialogue with the slave concerning a problem of mathematics, is very significant since mathematics is independent of life experience. This fact denotes for Plato the truth that there is existence "in us'' independent of this life entirely,2 and thus the theory "implies a distinction between the embodied soul and the soul s¢mpliciter,"' as well as '"'a transcendent reality as the object both of true belief and of knowledge." ® In spite of the differences in the way in which transcendent knowledge is acquired in Meno (through the dialectical process) and in Ev. Ver. (through an existential encounter with the Father's gnosis), it seems rather obvious at this point also to discern some
Platonic influence in the writer of Ev. Ver. The logical sequence of "events" whereby the knowledge of truth is acquired is essentially the same in both Meno and Ev. Ver., i.e. ywaorg—AnOn—davauyyorc
= yvaous in Ev. Vere). c. The idea of true existence or being The extensive use in Ev. Ver. of the qual. form woomn "to exist"
(= civat) and the infin. form wwne "to become"
(= yevéo0at) of the same Coptic verb, has a definite bearing on the author's idea of the nature of true existence. W. Till underlines the importance of distinguishing between these two Coptic forms which are never used indiscriminately in Ev. Ver.5 The writer of Ev. Ver.
1 Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London: Methuen & Co Ltd., 1962), pp.
13-16.
2 bid, ps £8 3 Ibid., pp. 18-19, cf. p. 22.
* There are no fewer than 23 occurrences of the qualitative and 36 of the infinitive forms in the whole of Ev. Ver.
> Onientalia, N.S., 27 (1958), 276. Grobel's translation of Ev. Ver., among others, is marred by a failure to observe this distinction. Cf., e.g. 39:14-16 where he renders the three qual. forms by ''become"' or '"'becomes"' (Grobel,
THE WRITER OF EV. VER.
discovers that the basic pattern of gnostic existence or being is set by Jesus himself. In contrast to the Father who exists TLETWOOTT,
28:13) but who has not become (ovattywne, "uncreated," 38:32), the Son who was existing (meeyuyoor, 39:22), became (acyuywrte)— a Guide (19:17), a Way, Gnosis, a Discovery... (31:28-35).2
So too, like Jesus, Gnostics are those who, through having their existence (cewoor, 27:36) 2 in the Father, experience "becoming"
(wjwrte). This becoming means being determined by outside forces.
On the one hand these forces are those of Error which operate in a world of confusion and diversity (cf. 26:8 ff.), forces which all men experience in a very painful way (25:19-24). These forces aim to draw men away (17:33-36) from recognition of their true existence in the Father. But, on the other hand, there is the outside creative power of the Father's will exercised in behalf of his chosen ones (27:36-28:2; 37:21-24). Not to be subject to this power of the Father means to remain a-gnostic (27:30-33) and to reveal the lack of true existence in him (28:22-24). Contrariwise, to be receptive to the Father's will means to have the Divine nature within and to be brought (wwe) by Divine agency at the opportune time into the experience of spontaneous existence in the Father
(cf. 27:36-28:5 including the brief parable on the Rarpoe "'the opportune moment''). It means also that the Father's name comes to be (wwe) on the heads of the Gnostics (38:36-37) ? while they experience (wiwme) joy in the discovery of the gnosis of the cross (18:28-29). Finally, it means that at the end, in the ideal state, in the Father's place, the Gnostics enter upon the meaning of true existence in the Father which once they possessed without knowing it (22:28-29). This destiny of the Gnostics means that op. cit., p. 186). Similarly, the French, German, and English translations of the Ev. Ver. text of 39:14-16 err (pp. 41, 81, 107). Cf. also W. Isenberg, op. cit., p. 153, who, when translating 28:22-24, fails to observe the shift from the qual. to the infin. form.
1 The change from the qual. to the infin. form must indicate some change in the status of Jesus. Possibly the writer has in mind the passage in Phil.
2:5 ff. where Paul employs tréeyev (v. 6) to mark out Jesus' pre-incarnate position, and later yevéuevoc (v. 7) to show that at a specific time he definitely assumed human form. Thus the writer of Ev. Ver. indicates that, in order for Jesus to bring the Father's gnosis to his chosen ones, he had to exchange his
"being"' (ujoort) for "'becoming'' = he had to come "into the midst" (19:19; 26:4-5) where he experienced, at least to a degree, what men experience.
2 Cf, also 21:18-19; 28:11-12; 37:13-14; 39:15-16; 42:26-28; 43:10f.
3 The Father's name bestowed in this way indicates Divine life or being.
A COMPARISON OF THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE WRITERS
the Father exists (woor) in their midst without lack (43:7-8), and that they exist (woor) in the life that is true (43:10-11) and find their rest (atan) in him (41:13-14, 29; 43:1).
It is quite clear that the over-all emphasis is Platonic. It is precisely the tension between Being and Becoming (or Sameness and Change) which concerns Plato to no small extent. The philosopher senses that it is impossible for the world of Becoming and Change to provide criteria of truth. On the other hand, to isolate the true world of Being and permanent Forms from the physical world can hardly have any basic significance for man living in the physical cosmos. F. Solmsen observes that an entire series of dialogues (e.g. Theaetetus, the Sophist, the Statesman, Parmenides) reveals the basic tension.! Out of the tension comes the recognition of a new idea, i.e. Being includes both Movement and Rest.?
Thus, for example, in the Sophist (247 D-E), Being is defined as that which possesses power of any kind.* That is, Being in its fullness implies Life, Movement, Soul, and Activity. Plato found the perfect pattern for the combination of Being and Becoming in the stellar universe. Here one could observe sameness and also orderly change, both of which presuppose the presence of Mind or nous.> The problem remained, however, of a bridge between the world of Being and the world of Becoming. The voc had its relation to the former but lacked the right contact with the world of flux and change.® It is right at this boundary-line between Being and Becoming that Plato introduced his idea of the soul as the principle of life, and the source of all movement. In the Timaeus, it is the World
Soul that occupies the scene while in the Phaedrus the individual human souls dominate the discussion. The relationship between the two types is not made clear though probably Plato regarded individual souls as parts of the World Soul, or, at least, of the same stuff.'
1 Plato's Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1942), p. 77.
® Ibid., p. 81. Cf. Logion 50 in the Coptic Gospel of Thomas where '"'Movement and Rest' form the answer to the question, '""What is the sign of your Father in you ?"
3 The Loeb Classical Library, Plato, I1, 378-379.
4 Solmsen, op. cit., p. 79.
ST LOtd poo.
& oid... p. 89. bids p93.
THE WRITER OF EV. VER.
Summary. The writer of Ev. Ver. makes no direct appeal to either philosopher or poet. His claim, however, that gnostics have come from the "thought" of the Father and that they are ultimately to find their "harmony" with the Father or in the Father is a basic anthropological idea of Stoicism (Epictetus). Moreover, in his concepts of revelation, knowledge, and true existence, the writer of Ev. Ver. evidences certain influence from Platonism. He lived in the wake of the recognition by Jesus of the tri-partite division of the Jewish Scriptures (Luke 24:44) and the formal recognition of the Old Testament canon by the synod of Jamnia (ca. A.D. go).
He wrote during a period when the authority of the New Testament gospels enjoyed a growing acceptance by the church as a whole.
And yet, the only acknowledged revelation by the writer of Ev. Ver. is that revelation which is imbedded in the nous of the community of truth which community he represents. It is the prominence which he gives to the nous that relates him not only to Epictetus but to Plato. Similarly, it was seen above that there is a common concern for gnosis in both Plato and Ev. Ver. Whereas the idea of "faith" scarcely figures in Ev. Ver.,1 both noun and verb formations of carne "to know'
(also covwn) occur in great abundance.
The writer is concerned with gnosis—transcendent gnosis—to which the man who is engulfed in ignorance has no access until the Divine awakening occurs (cf. e.g. 30:6-14). A similar idea was observed in Plato where Socrates insists on the twin ideas of his own ignorance and the recollection of a pre-incarnate knowledge.
The closest relationship, however, between the writer of Ev. Ver. and Plato was found in the idea of true existence. The Gnostics believe that men have being or spontaneous existence in God.
They are unaware of this, however, because of involvement in a world of becoming where Error holds sway. Their deliverance into the experience of being in the Father comes through the gnosis of the Father (cf. the Platonic World Soul) which Jesus mediates. They respond by virtue of the Divine nature within (cf. the Yvyat of Plato), purge themselves of the Aulic nature
(cf. the way in which Socrates regarded the body as a hindrance), and ascend to the Father to possess their real existence in him
(cf. the purgation of souls, according to Plato, by means of contemplating the heavenly bodies and the eternal Ideas).
1 The verb MAQTE (oOTT) occurs in 20:7 only, the noun in 23: 31-32 (possibly also in 34:28-29).
Suppl. to Novum Test., XXV
A COMPARISON OF THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE WRITERS
B. The Writer's Relation to Christian Truth 1. New Testament writings. There are indications throughout
Ev. Ver. of the writer's familiarity with the New Testament.
He quotes no gospel passage nor does he refer to any New Testament writer by name, and yet, his indebtedness to New Testament truth is implied on every page of his work. He makes some allusion to the vast majority of these Christian books.? His familiarity with New Testament writings is evident in the way he weaves together in a mosaic-like form snatches of various passages. An example occurs in the single reference in Ev. Ver. to the resurrection of Jesus, a reference found in 20:28-34 where the text reads,
"He draws himself downward to death while being clothed with eternal life. He put off the rags of corruption. He put on Incorruptibility which no one can take from him."
The textual notes of Ev. Ver. refer to Phil. 2:8; 1 Cor. 15:53-54; 2 Cor. 5:2-4, and Col. 2:14-15, as the texts alluded to in this brief passage.? It should have been added that the final clause is a clear echo of the first part of John 10:18 where Jesus says concerning his buy, "No one takes it from me." Similarly the ideas of ""putting off' and "putting on'' show some affinity to Eph. 5:22-24 and Col. 3:9-10. Other examples of such a conflation of New Testament texts are found in 19:34-20:3; 30:30-35; 18:15-21. 4
2. The New Testament preaching message. The writer of Ev. Ver. is no less familiar with the preaching message of the early church as it appears in the New Testament. He implicitly recognizes some of the important basic elements of the gospel such as, the incarnation of Jesus, his life and teaching, death, resurrection, and ascension. To be sure, the writer takes these kerygmatic
1 With little qualification, it must be said that the Old Testament background in Ev. Ver. is exceedingly weak. In particular, Ev. Ver. lacks completely the setting of the Old Testament for the appearance of Jesus. Cf. W. C. van
Unnik, The Jung Codex, p. 95.
2 Allusions to the gospel of John are found in abundance.
Cf. C. K.
Barrett, ""The Theological Vocabulary of the Fourth Gospel and the Gospel of Truth," Current Issues in New Testament Interpretation (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1962), pp. 210-223.
To a considerable degree also, the writer of Ev. Ver. uses 1-2 Corinthians, Romans, Philippians, Matthew,
Luke, Ephesians, Hebrews, 1 John, and Revelation. Other New Testament books are alluded to in a lesser degree.
Sebo 4 Cf. van Unnik, "The 'Gospel of Truth' and the New Testament, "' The Jung Codex, pp. 108-111.
THE WRITER OF EV. VER.
elements and re-interprets them and re-shapes them into a preaching message far different from the one which is the basic message of the early church.
Yet, in agreement with van Unnik,! it can justifiably be claimed that Ev. Ver. is a gospel in that the writer attempts to relate a decisive action of God for man which transpires through the appearance of Jesus Christ.2 This fact centers one's attention immediately upon the writer's relation to the Christian heritage or to Christian truth. The writer is certain of his remedy for the ills of mankind. To him, the Gospel of Truth is no "fifth" gospel to be added to the four of the New Testament.? Rather, it is the gospel as over against all others.t The gospel, he claims, carries with it the gnosis of the Father's true nature and of man's true origin and destiny in the Father. This is throughout the unifying theme of Ev. Ver., a theme which makes its literary format so different from that of the other published "gospels" of the Nag Hammadi library (i.e. the gospel of Thomas and the gospel of Philip). The writer's presentation of the gospel is thus made with a great deal of assurance. At the same time he is no stranger to religious emotions. He is full of awe and amazement at his theme (e.g. 20:27-28; 22:27-30).° Moreover, he claims that the gospel produces joy within the heart of man. This feature is sustained in Ev. Ver. from beginning to end.§ 1 Newly Discovered Gnostic Writings (Naperville, Ill.: Alec R. Allenson,
TGs) L900); p. 07.
2 The Christocentric character of Ev. Ver. will be noted in detail in chapter III, propos. IT.
3 In agreement with van Unnik, "The 'Gospel of Truth' and the New Testament," The Jung Codex, p. 106, note
I, as against Puech-Quispel.
4 Paradoxically, the writer is opposed to books (23:3 ff.)—except for "the living book'' (19:35-36)—and yet he himself writes a.book, a book which claims to be ''the gospel of Truth" (16:31). H. Jonas tries to avoid the paradox. In view of 23:3 ff., he suggests that the name of Ev. Ver. in its original Greek form was Ilept tod ebayyeatov tig "Adnetac, which name through a natural process became simply Té Evayyédtov tig 'AAnDetac. That is, edayyéAtov does not mean "'literary document'' as the present title in Coptic suggests, but ''good news" as the presupposed original Greek title would suggest. Cf. H. Jonas, ''Evangelium Veritatis,'"" Gnomon, 32 (1959),
328 f. It would appear, however, that both things are true. The "Gospel of Truth" is good news; it is also a literary work in that from beginning to end it manifests ''the gospel.'' Thus, the paradox remains.
5 To these references one should compare 17:7-8, 22; 18:31-32; 30:33-34, where the writer attempts to describe the indescribable Father.
6 The word "joy" is found in the opening sentence (cf. TeAHA in 16:31), is seen to be the fruit of the gnosis of the cross (peuy€ in 18: 28-29), forms an
A COMPARISON OF THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE WRITERS
3. The cosmic realism of the New Testament. The parables of Ev. Ver.* probably reflect the writer's knowledge of the parabolic teaching in Jesus' ministry. They show at the same time, however, a depth to the writer's imagination. His detailed analysis of dreams
(28: 32-30:14) indicates, in addition, that he is a careful observer of the evil that engulfs men and the desperate need which men have for the gospel—the gospel as the writer understands it.
One must admit that, in one sense, the writer takes evil in great seriousness. Evil, he says, is not mere appearance but a dreadful cosmic reality. Pl. 20:6-9 is only one illustration of many. In this text the writer cites the hopelessness of all men before the appearance of Jesus. The writer is not concerned with ethical behavior
—good or bad—but with the total existential situation of men in the light of the gospel. Understood thus, an inevitable tension appears in Ev. Ver. between two factors. First, the writer believes that the gospel concerns the world at large. The "All" moves out from the Father (17:4-7) and must of necessity ascend up to him (21:8-11). This corresponds to the Johannine statement, mavTa du' adtOd éyéveto (John 1:3). Second, however, as the following pages will attempt to show, the writer of Ev. Ver. is concerned with the chosen ones of the Father, those who have existence in him (27:36; 28:11-12), while at the same time he remains unconcerned for hulic or material men who are and remain strangers to the gospel (31:1-4) and who have no essential being in the Father (28:22-24). It can be said then that the writer of Ev. Ver. sees only a universe of predestined persons outside of whom there is no real being or existence. This corresponds to the way that the New Testament contrasts the cosmos with the redemptive work of God (cf. e.g. John 17:6, 14, 16; r John 2:15; 5:19) but, at the same time, fails to capture the paradox—the love of God for all men in the cosmos (e.g. John 3:16; 2 Pet. 3:9).
4. The authority of the New Testament. Like the writers of the New Testament—perhaps in imitation of them—the writer of Ev. Ver. speaks as one who knows. Implicitly he believes that he occupies a position of special authority over his readers, the community of truth. He appeals to no prophets or apostles other than important part of the hymn concerning the Logos (23:24-26), figures in the parable of the good shepherd (32:3-4), and is an inner motivating factor with respect to the destiny of the chosen ones (43:16-18).
1 Cf. chapter III, propos. II.
JUSTIN MARTYR
himself. By the use of the first person plural, the writer occasionally shows himself to be part of the community of truth (cf. e.g. 25:10925; 27:34-35; 40:3-5). Quite often, however, he uses the second person plural, indicative mood as well as imperative, to indicate his knowledge of the nature of the congregation which he addresses
(e.g. 32:22-24, 26 ff.), and/or his desire to make them responsible members (e.g. 17:28-29; 32:31, 35; 33:1-35).
Summary: The writer of Ev. Ver. is familiar with the New Testament writings, with the gospel and its cosmic realism, and with the authority of the New Testament. These things, however, are only preliminaries to his own production. His is a unique book (xwwae eqxuHk abad, 23:12-13).2 There is no other type of literature to which it may be compared. It presents no system but bears witness to the gospel—what it means to the writer and what it can mean to others. On the whole, the writer does not engage in polemics against other works. Ev. Ver. shows throughout that its writer feels that he is above and beyond literary discussion.
Perhaps this explains the puzzling feature that Ev. Ver. reveals only a minimum of Valentinian doctrines.? The writer is content to describe what the gospel means to him—it is reality that is experienced.
II. Justin MARTYR In contrast to the writer of Ev. Ver., Justin discloses not only his name but his identity with the Christian church. Moreover, he shows very clearly that both non-Christian writings and the writings of prophets and apostles have contributed to his understanding of truth.
A. Justin's Philosophical Background in Relation to his Idea of Truth.
Justin's writings reveal his conviction that a heritage of truth stems from the philosophers of ancient Greece. The Apologist
1 The references in the first person singular strengthen the argument (e.g.
27:34-36; 42:40-43:2). The writer is conscious of his authority (cf. especially 42:40-43:8). He says that he has been in the place of rest
(= he has entered the new life) and thus now is occupied all the time with the Father and with the true brothers.
2 In this context the words refer primarily to ''the living book'' (= the Father's chosen ones or the Gnostics). A secondary sense, however, to Ev. Ver. itself, i.e. the writer's own production, is quite obvious.
3 The attempt of H. Jonas, "Evangelium Veritatis,"" Gnomon, 32 (1959), 334 f., to present Ev. Ver. as a condensed version of the Valentinian system as described by Irenaeus, is ingenious but unconvincing.
A COMPARISON OF THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE WRITERS
himself claimed to be a philosopher. In the meeting with Trypho, at the outset of his longest extant work, the Dialogue, Justin appears wearing the philosopher's mantle,' while. he proceeds to show his deep respect for philosophy (D. 2:1-2) by making the following claims:
1. Philosophy is the greatest and most valuable possession before God (i.e. in the sight of God).
2. Philosophy alone introduces men to God.
3. Men who have turned their mind to philosophy are truly holy (Sotot).2
4. Philosophy was sent down (by God) to men.?
5. Philosophy was originally one (D. 2:1) but became "'manyheaded" (zoAvxpavoc, D. 2:2).
The main emphasis of these statements is that philosophy is essentially the message of truth, that it proceeds from God to man, that it demands from man continuous and total commitment
(cf. mpocecyyxévat in D. 2:1) and careful investigation (cf. éetaoat in D. 2:2), and that it introduces man to ultimate reality, e"God (D22"1).
The fact that truth is said to originate in God (xatexéupOy, "was sent down'') shows that Justin speaks as a Christian. It is only when the one who is ultimate Truth and Reality makes himself known to man that man can investigate the Truth and know it.
At this point, Justin does no more than suggest the way in which God has revealed the truth. He simply says, "It was sent down unto men" or "into men" (cig tobe &vOemmouc, D. 2:1). Elsewhere he is more specific. In II. 8:1, for example, he states how the seed of the Logos is implanted in every race of men, making possible thereby a reception of Divine truth. The real problem which he faces
1 Cf. the words téd_e 7d oyju« in D. 1:2 witha phrase in Euseb., Hist. Eccl., IV. 11:8, év prAocdgov oyjuat mecoBedov tov Oedy.
2 Carolus de Otto, Justini Philosophi et Martyris Opera (Jena: Prostat in Libraria Hermanni Dufft, 1876), Vol. I, Part II, 6, note 2, rejects both an earlier (A.D. 1565) apparent reading 6®vor. in Langius' Latin translation
(felices), and the conjectured reading of cogot in Maranus' edition (1742).
Otto interprets Justin's meaning in the light of D. 8:1 where the Apologist affirms Christianity to be the only safe and profitable philosophy. It is reasonable to think, however, that in D. 2:1, "philosophy" is used in a general sense; in D. 8:1, it is specific, meaning Christian doctrine.
The adjective éovor constitutes no problem. Just as the Apologist can call Heraclitus and Socrates yerotiavot (I. 46:3), so, in general, he can describe those who devote themselves to philosophy as éotor.
3 A similar statement is made in de Resurrectione, I. 1.
JUSTIN MARTYR
in D. 2 is why philosophy, originally one, just as Truth is one,! became many-headed, i.e. why there are Platonists, Stoics, Peripatetics, Theoretics,2 and Pythagoreans (D. 2:1). In posing the problem, Justin shows no less than any philosopher of his day, a basic concern with the quest for a central principle of oneness amid diversity. His own answer to the problem is simply—perhaps too simply—given. He says that illustrious teachers who investigated philosophy seriously were succeeded by those who investigated nothing concerning the truth (of émerta undev tEetaoauvtes arrPetac meet, D. 2:2), being content merely to receive and transmit the truth which their esteemed teachers taught.
Justin's answer is not altogether clear. At what point in time did truth or philosophy become "'many-headed?"
It will be noted below that Justin claimed a special philosophical kinship with Socrates and Plato.
Chronologically, however, Heraclitus (ca. 540-475 B.C.) and Pythagoras (fl. 530 B.C.), to whom Justin shows deference, preceded
Socrates (ca. 470-399 B.C.) and Plato (ca. 428-347) by almost a century. Thus, in view of the fact that for Justin, Plato and his master were no mere traditionalists but creators of philosophical thought, one may ask, did they simply add two more "'heads'' to the already-diversified philosophical field of inquiry? Whatever may be the Apologist's answer to this question, one thing is certain, i.e. his sense of obligation to some of the Greek sages in view of the truth which he found to be in them.
First, however, there were philosophers whose claim of true doctrine Justin rejected outright, among them Epicurus and the Cynics. In II. 7:3, he contrasts the persecuted and martyred
Socrates to the happy and peaceful Epicurus about whom the evil demons were never worried. In II. 12:5, he criticizes severely the shameless immoral teachings of Epicurus, while in II. 15:3, he simply states that Christian doctrines are at variance with those of the Epicureans. No less forthrightly does Justin reject the Cynic philosophy which gained a new influence in the first and second Christian centuries.? Justin's reference to the school
1 Otto, ibid., 7, note 4, compares the statement of the emperor Julian in Oration VI, orep yap d&ANDera pia, oStw 5é xual prdocopta pla. cf. 'Julian'
II, The Loeb Classical Library, p. 14.
2 Otto, ibid., p. 7, note 3, thinks Justin means Skeptics or Pyrrhonists.
8 E. de Faye, "'L'influence du Timée de Platon sur la Théologie de Justin Martyr," Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des hautes Etudes, Sciences Religieuses, VII (1896), 171.
A COMPARISON OF THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE WRITERS
is brief but revealing. In II. 3:1 ff., he speaks frankly of his anticipated persecution by a certain Crescens, one full of bias against the Christians. He is not a gtAdcogoc, says Justin, but a prdddogog
"glory-lover," or "'opinion-lover''
(i.e. lover of the opinions of others). And, with a clear reference to Crescens, Justin concludes,
"It is impossible for a Cynic, one who sets himself forth as indifferent [&Sizpopoc] with respect to his goal [to téAoc], to know good except indifference"
(II. 3:7). In brief, Justin affirms that just as there are Christians unworthy of the name they bear, so there are philosophers who bear the name and wear the mantle and yet are unworthy of their profession (I. 4:8-9). It is to this class that Justin relegates both Epicureans and Cynics.
Second, there were philosophers with whose doctrine Justin was in basic agreement. With some, his agreement was partial, with others (Socrates and Plato), almost complete.
1. Pythagoras. The references Justin makes to the sixth century philosopher or to his school are brief and reveal little more than a basic regard for the philosopher and the truth which he taught.
In D. 2:4, in recounting his spiritual pilgrimage, the Apologist tells of a brief encounter with a celebrated Pythagorean philosopher.
He anticipated help from him thinking that the man had much to offer. He lingers over the account of his rebuff by the philosopher's questions, "Are you acquainted, with music, and astronomy, and geometry,' to all of which Justin confessed his ignorance.
Whereupon the philosopher dismissed Justin seeing he was illprepared for the Pythagorean doctrine.
2. Heraclitus. The two references to Heraclitus (I. 46:3; II. 8:1), the other sixth century philosopher whom the Apologist mentions, are brief but positive. In view of the pantheistic leanings of this early sage, it is quite striking that Justin calls him a Christian.
Heraclitus held to two main ideas which the Stoics later adopted— the primal element of fire and the cosmic reasoning power or Abyos.2
3. The Stoics. Unlike his attitude toward Heraclitus, Justin questions the idea of truth held by the Stoics. Admittedly, he says, the Stoic moral teachings are admirable (II. 8:1) and their idea of the end of the cosmos approximates Christian eschatological
Ci £85), 2 ae 6G T.
* Cf. E. R. Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr (Jena: Verlag Frommannsche Buchhandlung, 1923), pp. 2-3.
JUSTIN MARTYR
Bye teaching (I. 20:4). At this point, however, Justin's recognition of any truth in Stoicism ends. He categorically denies their doctrine of fate (ctuapyévy) as well as their pantheistic outlook which fails to make a clear distinction between God and his creation (cf. II.
7:3-4, 8; I. 20:2). Moreover, his description of their doctrine in D. 1:4 is completely negative.! He says that: a. They are unconcerned whether there is one God or many. b. They are unconcerned whether or not God cares for men. c. They believe that God has nothing to do with human happiness. d. They believe that God cares for the cosmos, not for individuals. e. They entertain no dread of punishment, no hope of reward. f. They believe that nothing changes for the better or for the worse.
Despite the detailed information, Goodenough believes that Justin's knowledge of Stoicism is a man-in-the-street, conversational acquaintance. In particular, he thinks that Justin has erroneously classed Heraclitus with the Stoics and confused (cf. Apol. I. 20:1) the Stoic theology and cosmology.? To the contrary, Gildersleeve claims that Heraclitus was "the spiritual ancestor of the Stoics."' 3
F. Ueberweg expressed this view in a more definite way, ''The Stoics in their philosophy of nature and in their theology, reproduced the doctrine of Heraclitus." 4 With reference to Stoic cosmology, one wonders if Goodenough's evaluation of Justin is made on the basis of a "normative Stoicism"' and thus fails to allow for any flexibility. Otto points out, for example, that Panaetius of Rhodes (180-111 B.C.) introduced a change in Stoic doctrine by abandoning the doctrine of the destruction of the world by fire. Since Stoic theological speculation did not distinguish between God and the cosmos, there is certainly some point to Justin's argument in I. 20:1.
4. Socrates and Plato. Among the philosophers who represent a source of truth, these two sages stand first in Justin's estimation.
In I. 5:3, the syntactical combination of the dative of means, 1 There is general agreement that by of mActoto. in D. 1:4, the writer refers to the Stoics. Cf. Otto, op. cit., vol. I, part II, 4, and G. Archambault,
Justin, Dialogue avec Tryphon (1909), I, 6.
BOP ctl s,paOk.
3 B. L. Gildersleeve, The Apologies of Justin Martyr (1877), p. 221.
4 History of Philosophy, transl. from 4th Germ. ed. (1872-4), I, 42.
5 Op. cit., vol. I, part I, 63, cf. also Ueberweg, op. cit., I, 189.
A COMPARISON OF THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE WRITERS
A6y@ G&AnOet, and the imperfect tense of mevp%v indicate Justin's conviction that the whole life of Socrates was given over to an attempt by means of the true Logos to expose the false activity of demons and to lead men away from their control. Justin sees mirrored in Socrates the pattern of bold witness
(II. 3:6) and patient suffering which true Christians experience (II. 7:3; 10:5).
But beyond this, he believes that Socrates represents a pre-Christian Christian, even though he be considered a pagan (I. 46:3; II. 10:8).
With Socrates, says Justin, truth always comes first (II. 3:6).
Some attention needs to be paid to the references in Justin's writings to Plato's works. These references are of two kinds— quotations and allusions. E. de Faye claims that there are about forty such textual citations or allusions in the two Apologies and the Dialogue, but he gives no listing nor other information as to how he arrived at this figure.| Whatever the total figure,
Justin's use of Plato is evidently confined to a few works. De Faye believes the Apologist shows familiarity with the Apology, Crito,
Phaedrus, Phaedo, Republic, and especially, with the Timaeus.?
Goodenough 1s more cautious, eliminating the C7ito and the Phaedrus from de Faye's list. This limited use may mean, as both de Faye* and Goodenough® are quick to point out, that Justin's knowledge of Platonism was neither profound nor complete. At the same time it needs to be remembered that Justin writes as a Christian Apologist, choosing and using those Platonic teachings which will best serve his purpose.® This point is borne out by the discovery that, apart from two references (both from the Republic), all of the Platonic texts in Justin appear in connection with specific Christian teaching.' The two exceptions are found in I. 3:3 and II. 3:6.
1 "L'Influence du Timée de Platon sur la Théologie de Justin Martyr,"
Bibliothéque de l' Ecole des hautes Etudes, Sciences Rel., VII (1896), 172.
CINK, Os Gy Oe. cit., Deze (OD ie (Os SET 5 Op. cit., pp. 61-62.
8 Cf. Goodenough, op. cit., p. 70.
" De Faye's claim ("'L' Influence du Timée de Platon sur la Théologie de Justin Martyr," Bibliotheque del' Ecole des hautes Etudes, Sc. Rel., VII [1896],
176) that Justin's use of Plato, following the pattern of thought i in the second Christian century, is heavily mented on the ethical side and that his references show little concern with the other two divisions of philosophy—Logic and Physics—is true as far as it goes. The claim, however, needs the balance of Justin's Christian conviction out of which he writes.
JUSTIN MARTYR
In the first exception (I. 3:2-4), Justin makes a general appeal for a fair judgment as Christian life and teaching (@to¢ xat dyoc) are presented. To substantiate his appeal he cites the general maxim in the Republic (V, 473 D-E), 'Unless the rulers and those being ruled become philosophers,! states cannot become prosperous."" That is, the Roman rulers will do well to take the path of practical expediency and give a fair hearing to Christianity before pronouncing judgment.
The second exception (II. 3:6) is set in the context of Justin's strong denunciation of Crescens and the Cynic school of philosophy which Crescens represents. He fails, says Justin, to regard the Socratic saying, '"Truth must be honored before man"' (the Republic,
X, 595 C). By means of his statement Socrates shows that, in spite of his respect from childhood for the poet Homer, he must regard truth first and foremost. It is not so with Crescens. That Cynic is possessed by a blind, slavish obedience to the masters of his school. The truth means nothing to him.
The references to Plato in Justin's works which are related to specific Christian doctrine. a. God. In IT. 10:4-8, the writer observes that Socrates, when accused of introducing new divinities (cf. Plato's Apology, 24 B), used to urge (xpovteémeto) men on toward the full knowledge of the unknown God by saying, "To find the Father and Demiurge of all is not easy, neither is it safe having found him to declare him unto all." The quotation comes from the Timaeus, 38 C, and it should be noticed first, that, according to the Timaeus, the statement was made not by Socrates but by Timaeus, and second, the quotation is quite free in form having one difference especially noteworthy.
Justin substitutes the adjective, "'safe''
(zoparéc) for the adjective, "impossible"
(a&dvvatov), which is found in the text of the Timaeus. But apart from these differences, the appeal of Justin is clear. Socrates' attempt to declare God to men, at best, met with partial success since he experienced a limited operation only, of the Logos. But Christ, the full Logos, has done what Socrates could not do, i.e. make the Father known.
So successfully has Christ done this that men of all positions in life have been won over to him—even at the price of death.
1 Gildersleeve, op. cit., p. 110, thinks that the form g:Aocogjowor is an ingressive aorist.
A COMPARISON OF THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE WRITERS
D. 4:1 contains another reference to the nature of God in Plato.* God is said to be something beyond all substance
(6v énéxeua macys ovotac, D. 4:1). This is, however, the "unconverted" Justin who speaks. His view forthwith changes under the influence of the old man.
. b. The Holy Spirit. In describing the Holy Spirit or the third person of the Godhead (I. 60:7), the Apologist uses an obscure portion of Plato's Second Epistle (312 E). Justin's text (ta dé tetr« mept tov telrov) reverses the singular and plural in the text of Plato ( = xat tetrov mépu [sic!] t& tettx).2 In view of the enigmatic character of this passage from Plato,? it can merely be said that Justin somehow assumed the third Principle of Plato to be a borrowing from Gen. 1:2. c.
Creation. Justin makes no fewer than four references to Platonic texts (all from the Timaeus) in support of the Divine origin of the universe. To understand the Apologist's references at this point it is important to see the controlling principles in the Timaeus (especially 27 C-29 D). Those principles are:
(x) The eternal is intelligible; what comes to be is the sensible.
(2) Whatever comes to be must have a cause.
(3) The work of a maker is good only if he fashions it after an eternal model.
(4) What the maker forms comes from a formless, invisible substratum (cf. especially the Timaeus, 50 E-51 A) similar to formless clay before it is molded.
(5) Whatever comes to be is corruptible, yet the maker wills to sustain what he creates.
The references in Justin show that, while he refers to no eternal model of creation, he does subscribe to principles (2), (4), and (5), as noted above. His very language approaches that of Plato as he affirms that God worked on é&uopgog bAy, "formless matter"
(I. 10:2; 59:1), and that he wrought a change in +6 oxétog xat 7 ban, "darkness and matter" (I. 67:8). Like the Timaeus (29 E),
Justin ascribes the work of creation to the bounty of God (I. 10:1).
Justin has, however, the Christian addition; creation is for the sake of man (I. 10:2).
* The reference apparently is to the Phaedo, 65 E—66 A, and/or to the Republic, VI, 509 B.
® The Loeb Classical Library, Plato, VII, 410.
° Cf. the discussion in The Loeb Classical Library, ibid., 400-401.
AMT. 20223 $9218 67285. Sa:
JUSTIN MARTYR
d. The cross. In I. 60:1, Justin quotes loosely a passage from the Timaeus (36 B-C) portraying the yi which the Demiurge places in the cosmos. The yi is none other than the World Soul which forms the bridge between the two worlds—Being and Becoming. Justin's words are, ''And the matter treated physiologically in the Tzmaeus from Plato concerns the Son of God, when it says,
'He made him a yi in the All'." At first, Justin thinks that the World Soul of Plato is a borrowing from Moses who affirmed that the Son of God partakes of two worlds. How does the Son do this?
In answer, Justin's thought shifts from the Son to the cross.
The shift is significant and forms an effective sequel to his exposition in I. 55 on the dbvayc of the cross.! The yt now viewed as the cross is seen to partake of two worlds—the world of death as evident in the people of Israel dying from the deadly serpents, and the world of life as seen in the deliverance of the people who in faith looked to the figure of the cross (= the brass serpent) which Moses erected at God's bidding (cf. Num. 21:8-9). e. Man.
(rt) His free will. In I. 43-44, Justin defends with vigor man's responsibility before God since man possesses innate freedom of choice. The ability to choose has been inherent in man from the beginning (I. 44:1). Thus, Justin affirms that the oft-quoted line from the Republic (X, 617 E), "'The blame is the one who chooses;
God is free from blame,"' was gleaned by Plato from Moses.?
(2) The destiny of evil men. In I. 8:4, Justin affirms that the punishment to be meted out to the wicked, is the same as that which Plato predicted (Republic X 615 A; Phaedrus
249 A).
He adds, however, that Christians believe that Christ will do this and that the punishment will be of unlimited duration.
These then are the quotations from Plato and the less ambiguous allusions to his works which Justin employs. E. R. Goodenough,? and R. E. Witt,4 both point out that Justin's Platonic views are very close to those of the middle Platonist Albinus who flourished during the first half of the second Christian century. Middle
Platonism was a time marked by the weakening of the original 1 Cf. chap. III, propos. III for a further treatment of I. 60.
2 Cf. Deut. 30:15, 19 with Apol. I. 44:8.
8 Op. cit., pp. 21-32.
4 Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Cambridge: University Press, 1937), P144.
A COMPARISON OF THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE WRITERS
creative thought of Plato. The change may be seen in three distinct ways:
1. First, it was the era of skepticism in the Academy, particularly epitomized in Carneades (ca. 214-129 B.C.). Carneades' basic theory stated that knowledge was impossible. Beyond this base, however, he advanced the two-pronged theory of suspended judgment (émoyy) and degrees of probability.t
2. Second, it was the era of commentaries and introductions both to Plato and to Aristotle. That is, the anti-dogmatism and anti-conformity so essential to the Platonic and Aristotelian schools gave way to the teaching of transmitted doctrine.'
3. Third, it was an era of syncretism. Goodenough comments, "The teaching in the Academy at that time was by no means fixed, and the amount of Stoicism and Aristotelianism intermixed into the Platonic substrate would vary widely with the different teachers." 3
Albinus is no skeptic but he fitly combines the second and third ideas of his day (as given above). He wasa Platonic commentator as witnessed by his introduction to the Dialogues of Plato.
He was also an instructor in Platonic doctrine and synthesizer of those doctrines and those of the other main schools of his time, as witnessed by his second main work called the Didascalicus or Epitomé.4 Thus Albinus' purpose is to declare the Platonic doctrines to students and the listening public. Where Albinus' teaching shows mixture from Aristotle and others, it means that he sees in the borrowed material a continuation of the Platonic teaching.® The interpretative and synthesizing work of Albinus and its reflection in Justin appears in the idea of ultimate Truth, i.e. God. God is one and incomprehensible
(Kppntoc),® kxepntos being the same term for which Justin shows a predilection." God,
1M. M. Patrick, The Greek Sceptics (New York: Columbia Univ. Press,
1929), PP. 153-173.
» René Le Corre, "Le prologue d'Albinus" in Revue Philosophique, 146, 1 (1956), 28-38.
PROPS cCitawpyee te 4 For the text of this work, cf. Pierre Louis, Albinos Epitomé (Paris: Les belles Lettres, 1945).
° Cf. R. E. Witt, op. cit., p. 118.
8 Epitomé, X, 4.
7 Cf. the pleonasm of I. 61:10-11 where the writer insists on the namelessness of God as well as the unutterableness of his name. Cf. also chap. III, propos. I.
JUSTIN MARTYR
says Albinus, is comprehensible by the mind alone, an idea which is substantially the same as D. 4:1 expresses. At the same time God is the origin of all truth as the sun is the origin of all light (danOevn dé Srdte maoyng adrnPelag a&pyn Smdoyer ao 6 HAvog mavtds purtdc).2
The description comes very close to de Resurrectione, I. 12 which reads Adyog S& dAryPetac and Ocod méunetoar. But the affirmation is even closer to D. 121:2, where the text of Goodspeed reads,
Tupwdéatepos yap adTod 6 THC dAnDelag xal copiag Adyo> xal pwrtervdTENG LAAAOV THY YALov Suvdwewy gott, xal sig ta BAOH Tho uaedtac xaL TOD vod ctoddvev,? "For his word of truth and wisdom is more aflame and more light-giving than the rays of the sun, even sinking down into the depths of the heart and the mind." All of the elements in Albinus' idea of God are here; (a) God, the origin of all truth,
(b) God, the one comprehensible to the nous alone, and (c) God, the one who is like to the penetrating power of the sun.
Summary: Justin's idea of truth is affected by his philosophical background to which both he and his writings bear witness. His two acknowledged masters were Socrates and Plato.
Internal evidence reveals that the Platonic philosophy was mediated to him through the philosophical thought represented by the middle
Platonist, Albinus.
Justin's particular debt to Plato is found in the field of ethics, a debt which is apparent not only in the Platonic quotations and allusions but also in the wide appeal
Justin makes in his works to ethical standards of truth (cf., e.g. ee seree 5:5 945-0505 97 125) 5004 F11NS 35-0 4nd D24i2 etval)).
B. Justin's Christian Background in Relation to his Idea of Truth At the beginning of his First Apology, Justin claims to belong to the Christians (ci¢ adtév dv, I. 1:1). He ascribes his Christian conversion to two factors. In the Second Apology (12:1-2), he cites briefly the irreproachable life of Christians and their disdain of persecution as direct influences in his conversion. He says that though he was at one time rejoicing (yatowv) in the teachings
1 Epitomé, X, 3.
2 Written possibly by Justin or one of his followers.
3 Die dltesten Apologeten, (GOttingen: Vandenhoeck 6 Ruprecht, 1914), . 240.
? = Heiney? idea of God in his Epitomé (chap. X) contains other features that are paralleled in Justin. One example is the term "the first God,"' a term implied in Justin by his frequent reference in the Dialogue to Christ as "second God."
A COMPARISON OF THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE WRITERS
of Plato, he was led to examine the claims of Christianity only to find that Christian teachings alone were true and that all other doctrines were of demonic origin. In the Dialogue, however, he describes his Christian conversion at length (D. 1-8). He states that he visited various schools of philosophy finding at last that the school of Platonism was the most satisfactory of all. But, through an old man, a Christian whom Justin met by the sea, the philosopher was led to the truth of Christianity which, he said, was the only safe and profitable philosophy (D. 8:1). Goodenough has declared that the two accounts (II. 12:1-2 and D. 1-8) are in no way at variance. He writes, "There is here no fundamental contradiction between the Apology and the Dialogue, even taking the passage in the Dialogue as a record of Justin's actual experiences. It may well have been that just at the time when his attention was called to the Christians by some remarkable instance of Christian fortitude during a persecution, he was in a state of discouragement at the discovery of new teachings in Platonism which he had found difficult to understand." + The account in the Dialogue has been taken as true,? as ideal and fictitious,? and as authentic but not without fictitious elements.'
G. Misch describes Justin's report as the first Christian account of conversion to be put in "conversion-form," a form of writing which was current in the Hellenistic world of culture of Justin's time.® Goodenough cites the remarkable parallel to Justin's experience in Lucian's Menippus, which R. W. O. Helm first noted.®
A' similar experience is described by the Tannaim, cited by H. Goldfahn.'? A. D. Nock finds two elements mirrored in Justin's autobiography; a literary commonplace, and the attitude of the time, an attitude fostered by the confusion of widespread and accessible, yet divergent, philosophical ideas.8
SOD=Cits, P72 2 James Donaldson, A Critical History of Christian Literature and Doctrine,
II (London: Macmillan and Co., 1866), 63.
3 E. R. Goodenough, op. cit., p. 71.
4 J. Riviére, Saint Justin et les Apologistes du second siécle (Paris: Librairie
Bland et Cie, 1907), pp. 129, 131.
° Geschichte der Autobiographie (Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1907),
PP. 295-296.
® Lucian und Menipp (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1906), pp. 40 ff.
" Justin Martyr und die Agada (Breslau: Verlag von H. Stutsch, n. d.).
Ppa watt.
8 Conversion, the Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 256.
JUSTIN MARTYR
The account of Justin is clothed in a vivid style of grammar.
In D. 2:6-3:1, a succession of verbs in the imperfect tense! underscores the habitual life Justin was living as a Platonist, while the ingressive aorist évje0y in D. 8:1 points to the beginning of the new life in Christ. Without doubt the colloquy with the old man by the sea assumes a special meaning."
The structure of the colloquy revolves around one main question, "How can man know the Ultimate Truth, ie. God?'' The wrong answer (given by Justin) is, "by the power of the nous." The true answer (given by the old man) is, "by the power of the Holy Spirit who gives illumination into the words which the prophets wrote concerning Christ." Other questions arise in the colloquy only as they bear on this main question of knowing God.
In the introduction to the heart of the conversation, Justin claims that philosophy is the most valuable occupation of man because it is concerned with God (D. 3:4-4:1). In his argument,
Justin represents God in three ways:
(1) He is that which is, and the True (D. 3:4).3
(2) He is that which always maintains the same nature and way, and the cause of all other things (D. 3:5).*
(3) He is that something which the vovd¢ of man can perceive, and which comes suddenly into souls which have a basic kinship
(cuyyevéc) with It and a desire to see It (D. 4:1).
1 Thus ovvdtéterBov, "I used to spend time with,'' mpoéxomtoyv, "I was progressing,' émedidovv, "I was improving," feet "(the perception of incorporeal things) continued to grip (me exceedingly),'' avertépou, "(the contemplation of forms) was furnishing (me) with wings," dynyv, "I was supposing (that I had become wise),'"' #AmCov, "I was hoping''—all in D. 2:6 while éropevéuny, "I used to go (to acertain field),'' occurs in 3:1.
2 Cf. the spiritual autobiography of Paul in Gal. 1:13-19. A series of three verbs in the imperfect tense (édiwxov, éxédefovv, and mpoéxomtoy, vs.
13-14) depict his daily life in Judaism as an enemy of Christ, while another series of verbs (13 in number), all except one in the aorist tense, points to the decisive nature of the change which God wrought in him (cf. vs. 15-19).
3 Goodenough, op. cit., pp. 63-64, senses that Justin's full statement, prrocogta ... émiothnun... Tod dvtog xal... &AnO. éxtyv., differs significantly from Plato. 'Justin is in this section obviously drawing in general upon conceptions to be found in the Phaedo, yet Plato in the Phaedo speaks of zx dvtx, Justin of td dv. The change is not an insignificant one, for t& dévt« meant to Plato a scientific field of inquiry, while +4 dv to Justin meant simply
God"' (zbid.).
4 This statement shows the influence of Albinus who represents God as both dxtvytosg vot and effective Cause of all things in the physical world.
Cf. the Epitomé, X-XI (P. Louis, op. cit., p.
133). Albinus in turn reflects Aristotle's definition, ''the unmoved Mover."'
Suppl. to Novum Test., XXV
A COMPARISON OF THE BACKGROUNDS OF THE WRITERS
Justin's definition—especially the third part—does not go unchallenged. He has implied that man can know God through philosophers who have seen him and heard him, and through the natural kinship which souls have with him. The old man proceeds to question both implications. He denies to any man
(philosophers included) the possibility of knowing God through the nous, if that nous is "unadorned" (uh... xexoounuévoc) by the Holy Spirit (D. 4:1). Moreover, he denies the soul's kinship with God and proceeds to correct Justin's idea of the soul. The soul, says the old man, is not immortal but begotten just as the world is begotten (D. 5:1-2). It will not, however, die but live on in a better or in a worse place (D. 5:3). It lives not because it is life but because it shares in life. Moreover, it is wholly different from that of which it partakes (D. 6). At this point, as Justin is in despair of knowing any truth at all (D. 7:1), the old man introduces him to the Hebrew prophets, and, through the prophets, to Christ.
It is through Christ that the answer to the question on Ultimate Truth or God can be given. At the conclusion of the old man's final speech, Justin records that, ''a fire was kindled in (my) soul'
(xe év tH Pox} avynpOy), and then he proceeds to affirm that love for the prophets and for the friends of Christ took hold of him
(D. 8:1). Here, he says, is the true philosophy (D. 8:1), and for this reason, he adds, "I am a philosopher" (D. 8:2).
Summary: Whether the conversion account be viewed as genuine or not, its significance for the present purpose is found in the way it places Justin before his readers as a Christian. Especially does the final speech ascribed to the old man (D. 7) indicate unequivocally the conviction of the Apologist relative to Christian truth. The following summary will serve to demonstrate the point.
1. Christian truth has the advantage of antiquity (D. 7:1).
The prophets preceded the philosophers: Moses preceded Plato.
In the First Apology as well as the Dialogue, the emphasis recurs (cf., eg. I. 59:1; 60:1). Because Christian truth is older, the discovery of parallels to it in the writings of philosophers means either that the truth was imitated by them, or, as the case of Socrates shows, that the Logos was at work in them just as he was among the Old Testament saints.
2. Christian truth originates from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit made it possible for the prophet to see the vision of God and to hear the voice of God and to put the truth which
JUSTIN MARTYR
he saw and heard into written form. It is noteworthy that 'the prophetic Spirit'' becomes the title by which Justin refers to the Holy Spirit in all of the Apologist's works. The emphasis is Christian in that it shows revelation to be a Divine work. At least a trace of Hellenism, however, may be present in the clause "'see and hear."
To see the truth with the eye of the nous was at once the aim and goal of Greek philosophy. Justin expresses the idea well in D. 2:6, "I was hoping directly to behold [xatévecOu] God, for this (is) the goal [téAoc] of Plato's philosophy.' Biblical revelation has another emphasis. Although they speak of ''seeing God" (e.g.
Exod. 24:10; Job 42:5-6, though cf. Exod. 33:20), Biblical authors indicate that the vision is not related to an inherent power of the nous but to God's presence or glory, for example, that filled the tabernacle (Exod. 40:34) and the temple (1 Kings 8:10), and especially to God's presence in Jesus Christ (John 14:9).
3. Christian truth is to be found in the Old Testament. The prophets, says the old man, were trustworthy witnesses of the truth which is above all demonstration (D. 7:2). The fact marks the basic reason for the extensive and consistent use the Apologist makes of the Old Testament. "Not your Scriptures but ours, for we are won over to them," is his avowed claim to the Jew
Trypho (D. 29:2).
4. Christian truth concerns Divine events which have turned out (&roBévt«) and continue to turn out (droPatvovta) just as the prophets, by means of the prophetic Spirit, predicted (D. 7:2).
It will be observed subsequently! that the prophecy-fulfillment stress is a most important part of Justin's First Apology and of his Dialogue with Trypho.
5. Christian truth concerns God and Christ his Son (D. 7:3).
It is the total impact of Christian truth as the old man expounds it and as Justin receives illumination into it, that effects the marked change in his life. Accordingly, when Justin states (D. 8:2), obtws Sh xat Suid tadta pirdcoposg éyo, he probably denotes what has transpired as recorded in D. 7:1-8:1—the climactic speech of the old man and Justin's own spiritual awakening. Thus guAdcogoc in D. 8:2 means basically, Christian philosopher. Justin, the former
Platonic philosopher has become Justin the Christian philosopher.
1 Cf. chapter III, propos. II.