Some Objections

Big idea

Summary

This chapter answers reader pushback to the first chapter's claims. The first objection treats the Moral Law as nothing but 'herd instinct,' a built-in urge to help others. Lewis counters that instinct only supplies desire, while conscience supplies obligation, the felt sense that we ought to act a certain way regardless of what we currently want. He uses the case of hearing a stranger's cry for help to show that a person can feel two competing instinctive pulls, to help and to flee, and a third, different voice that judges between them; that judging voice cannot itself be one of the instincts it is adjudicating, any more than sheet music is one of the piano keys it directs.

Lewis reinforces this with two further observations: the Moral Law sometimes sides with our weaker impulse against our stronger one, which no instinct alone would do, and it can command us to strengthen an impulse that is currently too weak, something instinct cannot do to itself. He also rejects the idea that some instincts are simply 'good' and others 'bad' in themselves; every impulse, from parental love to sexual desire, is right or wrong depending on the situation, much as every note on a piano can be played rightly or wrongly depending on the tune being played.

Turning to the second objection, that morality is merely something instilled by parents and culture like table manners, Lewis distinguishes between things we learn that are arbitrary conventions, like which side of the road to drive on, and things we learn that are objective truths, like arithmetic, pointing out that learning something from teachers does not by itself tell you which category it belongs to. He argues the moral law belongs with mathematics: cross-cultural moral differences are minor compared to the shared core, and, crucially, people do judge some moral codes as improvements over others, which only makes sense if there is a real standard external to any particular culture against which those codes are being measured.

He closes by distinguishing disagreements about morality from mere disagreements about facts, using the historical practice of executing witches as his example: people stopped executing witches not because their moral standard changed but because they stopped believing witches existed at all. This distinction matters for the whole argument, because it prevents an easy slide from noticing that societies act differently to concluding that societies actually hold different moral principles.

Key points

• Instinct produces a felt desire; conscience produces a sense of obligation, and Lewis shows these are different things.
• A 'judge' that arbitrates between competing instincts cannot itself be one of those instincts.
• No single impulse is intrinsically good or bad; rightness depends on the situation and degree.
• Learning morality from parents and culture does not prove it is a mere human invention, since we also learn objective truths, like mathematics, the same way.
• The fact that we judge some moralities as improvements over others implies a real standard beyond any culture's opinion.
• Differences over facts, such as belief in witches, should not be mistaken for differences in moral principle.

Illustrations & analogies

• Lewis compares the Moral Law to sheet music directing which piano key to play, showing that the 'judge' of our instincts cannot be reduced to any one instinct, since a tune is not itself one of the notes.
• He describes a man hearing a drowning stranger's cry for help, torn between the instinct to help and the instinct for self-preservation, to illustrate a third element deciding between competing impulses.
• He compares learning morality to learning the multiplication table, arguing that both are taught by others yet remain objectively true rather than arbitrary conventions like which side of the road to drive on.
• He uses the abandoned practice of executing witches to illustrate that a change in behavior can come from a change in factual belief rather than a change in moral standards.

Notable lines

The Moral Law tells us the tune we have to play: our instincts are merely the keys.

C. S. Lewis Book I, Ch. 2 — Some Objections

Strictly speaking, there are no such things as good and bad impulses.

C. S. Lewis Book I, Ch. 2 — Some Objections

there is no moral advance in not executing them when you do not think they are there.

C. S. Lewis Book I, Ch. 2 — Some Objections

For reflection and discussion

1. Lewis argues that conscience is distinct from any instinct because it can command us to strengthen a weak impulse. Can you think of an example from your own life?
2. Do you find the comparison between moral truths and mathematical truths convincing? Why or why not?
3. How does distinguishing 'differences of fact' from 'differences of morality' change the way you evaluate claims that morality varies wildly across cultures?