5.2.2 The Activity and Effect of Wisdom

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit Power' would approximate 'founding and making all things . . . by the Word of his power.'116

Assuming the ﬁrst sentence does function in this way, Irenaeus utilizes three verbs to convey the creative activity of Wisdom: disponere ('to arrange'), perﬁcere ('to ﬁnish'), and aptare ('to ﬁt'). The partial overlap and general semantic agreement of these terms with those ascribed to the wisdom of God in AH 2.25.1–2 (apta, ornata, aptare, and consonare) and AH 2.30.3

(gubernare) shows that in the expansion of his wisdom language, from wisdom as a quality or attribute of God to also include Wisdom as the third member of the Godhead, Irenaeus ascribes to Wisdom the activity originally used to characterize the wisdom of God in creation. Thus, Irenaeus' concept of the wisdom of God prepares the way for, and to a certain extent leads to, his idea of the Wisdom of God—his understanding of the Spirit as Wisdom.

Having charted the reclamation of wisdom language from Gnosticism, and the development of that language to include not only wisdom as an attribute of God, but also as a name of the Holy Spirit, it is left for us to offer a more detailed consideration of the activity and the effect that Irenaeus links to his concept of wisdom.

5.2.2 The Activity and Effect of Wisdom Earlier in this examination I pointed out the difﬁculty in erecting an artiﬁcial partition between the identity of Wisdom, and its activity and effect, in the thought of Irenaeus: the identiﬁcation of the Spirit as Wisdom is directly linked to the particular creative activity that Irenaeus connects to the concept of wisdom. To put it another way, Irenaeus refers to the Holy Spirit as Wisdom in order to attribute to the Spirit a particular role in creation.

For this reason, it becomes crucial to recognize the speciﬁc activity and the effect of that activity that Irenaeus links to Wisdom, otherwise we will not understand the signiﬁcance of the title.117 This task is complicated by the number of terms used to convey the wise activity of God or the activity of the Wisdom of God.

Six different verbs along with three adjectival cognates are connected to the idea of wisdom in eight passages in Against Heresies: adornare ('to prepare, adorn;' AH 4.20.2)118 and its cognate, ornata ('prepared, ornate;' AH

116 By not referring to the two agents of creation in the ﬁrst sentence, Irenaeus would be emphasizing the exclusivity of the creative act—the one God accomplishes creation, the ubiquitous theme in these passages.

117 For a brief treatment of the verbs Irenaeus uses to describe the activity of Wisdom in creation see Jaschke (1976: 261–5).

118 AH 4.20.2: qui omnia Verbo fecit et Sapientia adornavit.

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2.25.1)119; aptare ('to adapt, ﬁt;' AH 2.25.2, 2.30.9, 4.20.4)120 and its cognate, apta ('adapted, suitable;' AH 2.25.1, 4.38.3)121; compingere ('to join, bind together;' AH 3.24.2)122; consonare ('to harmonize, agree;' AH 2.25.2)123 and its cognate, consonantia ('harmony, agreement;' AH 4.38.3)124; disponere ('to dispose, order, arrange;' AH 2.30.9)125; and gubernare ('to govern, control, guide;'

AH 2.30.3).126 In addition to these terms, Prf 5 associates two verbs with the activity of Wisdom: յարդարել ('to arrange'), and կերպարանել ('to form').

Despite the number and variety of these terms, they are linked together by the effect on creation that Irenaeus associates with the concept of wisdom.

In AH 2.25.1–2 Irenaeus deﬁnes the particular type of activity in creation and the particular effect of that activity in creation that he connects from there forward to his concept of wisdom. He begins by confronting the Gnostic proclivity for arithmology, but as I stated earlier, in so doing, he does not want to suggest that either the details of Scripture or the overall structure of the world are 'a meaningless and accidental thing.'127 Indeed: with great wisdom and diligence, all things have clearly been made by God, ﬁtted and prepared (apta et ornata); and his Word has produced (operatum est) both things ancient and those belonging to the most recent times . . . For all things

[originate] from one and the same God.128

The key to his response is located in the idea that 'with great wisdom and diligence' have 'all things . . . been made . . . ﬁtted and prepared.' The wisdom

119 AH 2.25.1: cum magna sapientia et diligentia ad liquidam apta et ornata omnia a Deo facta sunt.

120 AH 2.25.2: quia autem varia et multa sunt quae facta sunt, et ad omnem quidem facturam bene aptata et bene consonantia; AH 2.30.9: et omnia aptavit et disposuit Sapientia sua;

AH 4.20.4: Unus igitur Deus, qui Verbo et Sapientia fecit et aptavit omnia.

121 See n. 119 for AH 2.25.1; AH 4.38.3: circa Deum autem virtus simul et sapientia et bonitas ostenditur . . . sapientia vero in eo quod apta et consonantia quae sunt fecerit ( ç Æ b K ﬁH hæıŁÆ ŒÆd KºB ŒÆd KªŒÆŒıÆ a ªª Æ ØÅŒ ÆØ—see p. 141 n. 138 on the Greek text).

122 AH 3.24.2: Verbo suo conﬁrmans et Sapientia compingens omnia. Compingere ('to bind together') may at ﬁrst seem to stand apart from these other terms, but Rousseau's observation

(SC 210, 1974: 393) that in AH 2.33.5, ±æ Æ is translated by the couplet compago siue aptatio shows that it ﬁts into the group.

123 See note 120 for AH 2.25.2.

124 See note 121 for AH 4.38.3.

125 AH 2.30.9: et omnia aptavit et disposuit Sapientia sua.

126 AH 2.30.3: et reliqua omnia quae per virtutem Dei sunt constituta et per sapientia eius gubernantur quis poterit per singula enumerare, vel investigare magnitudinem sapientiae eius qui fecit Dei?

127 AH 2.25.1. The passage reads, 'Is it a meaningless and accidental thing, that the positions of names, and the election of apostles, and the working of the Lord, and the arrangement of created things, are what they are?—we answer them: Certainly not' (ANF translation).

128 AH 2.25.1; my translation with reference to the ANF.

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit and diligence of God result in each individual piece of creation being 'ﬁtted and prepared' so that all the elements join together to form a meaningful whole. Irenaeus elaborates upon this idea in AH 2.25.2:

But because various and numerous (varia et multa) are those things that have been made, they are indeed well ﬁtted and adapted (bene aptata et bene consonantia) to the whole creation; but when considered individually, are mutually opposite and not harmonious (invicem contraria et non convenientia). Just as the sound of the lyre

(citharae),129 by means of the interval that separates (distantiam) each one from the others, produces one harmonious melody (consonantem unam melodiam), [but] consists of many and opposite (multis et contrariis) sounds.

The number and variety of created things, when considered individually, are 'mutually opposite and not harmonious.' Still, 'just as the sound of the lyre. . . consists of many and opposite sounds' and yet 'produces one harmonious melody' by means of their relation to each other, so too can the 'various and numerous' things of creation be recognized as 'well ﬁtted and adapted to the whole creation.'

According to this logic, the characterization of the whole as bene aptata et bene consonantia ('well ﬁtted and adapted') stands in distinction from the characterization of the individual pieces as invicem contraria et non convenientia ('mutually opposite and not harmonious'). To be more precise, the activity or activities conveyed by the verbs aptare and consonare produce

'one harmonious melody' (consonantem unam melodiam) out of 'mutually opposite and not harmonious' (invicem contraria et non convenientia) parts of creation. The key to comprehending how Irenaeus understands this activity and the effect produced by this activity lies in making sense of the state in which the 'various and numerous' parts of creation exist prior to being acted upon—that is, understanding what Irenaeus means by invicem contraria et non convenientia.

In AH 2 the term contraria plays a signiﬁcant role in Irenaeus' argument against the Gnostic assertion that creation is an image of the aeons of the pleroma. In AH 2.7.3 he argues that created things do not correlate to the aeons of the pleroma as the Gnostics claim, for while the aeons of the pleroma are said to be of one nature (unius naturae), the numerous components of creation 'stand in opposition to each other (contrariis subsistentia), and mutually resist each other, and destroy one another.'130 The contrast with the one nature of the pleroma suggests that the opposition which exists between the constituent parts of creation, and which causes them to conﬂict,

129 Citharae can refer to a cithara, lyre, lute, guitar, or a stringed instrument in general. I take it to refer to a lyre here, given the similarity of Irenaeus' statement to Greek musical and cosmological theory that utilizes the imagery of a lyre.

130 AH 2.7.3: Quomodo igitur ea quae tam multa sunt conditionis et contrariis subsistentia et repugnantia invicem et interﬁcientia alia alia; see also, AH 2.7.4, AH 2.7.6, and AH 2.8.3.

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is due to their differing natures. This inference ﬁnds its conﬁrmation in AH 2.18.5, where Irenaeus offers the following principle with respect to substances: when that which is similar is [placed] in a similar thing it will not be dissolved into nothingness, nor will it be in danger of being destroyed, but it will rather persist and increase, just as ﬁre in ﬁre, and spirit in spirit, and water in water; on the other hand, those which are contrary to each other (contraria a contrariis) suffer and are changed and are destroyed.

The animal kingdom provides an illustration of this principle: 'Whatever animals are foreign and strange to each other, as well as of contrary nature

(contrariae naturae), fall into danger (when they come together) and are destroyed (by each other).'131 In addition to illustrating the conﬂict that befalls the combination of opposites, the use of naturae in parallel with the earlier use of substantiae in AH 2.18.5 reveals we can also understand naturae in AH 2.7.3 to be equivalent to substantiae in AH 2.18.5. Thus, according to Irenaeus, the constituent parts of creation possess an intrinsic opposition to each other that will result in their conﬂict and eventual destruction. In terms of AH 2.25.2, they are invicem contraria.

The individual pieces of creation are not only invicem contraria, but also non convenientia. Whereas contraria highlights the opposition of particular aspects of creation to each other, in AH 2.25.2 non conveniens stresses that the individual pieces do not ﬁt together into or come together as a meaningful whole. In Against Heresies, the terms convenire and conveniens come to prominence in the chapter just prior to the one in which we are interested.

In AH 2.24.1–5 Irenaeus uses this terminology nine times, nearly one-third of its total uses in Against Heresies.132 Seven of those nine occurrences express that a particular piece of information does not 'ﬁt into' or 'agree with' the Gnostic theory or interpretation that is intended to account for all the data and make sense of that individual datum.133 For instance, in AH 2.24.1 Irenaeus declares the Gnostics pass over in silence the name Soter 'because it does not ﬁt into their theory (non convenit ﬁgmento eorum), neither according to numerical value nor according to letters.' In the same way, the ﬁrst occurrence in AH 2.24.5 reads, 'If, indeed, the year were divided into thirty parts, and the month into twelve, then a ﬁtting (conveniens) type might be regarded as having been found for their ﬁctitious system (mendacio).'134

131 AH 2.18.5.

132 A Library of Latin Texts search reveals that convenire and its cognates occur 31 times in Against Heresies.

133 AH 2.24.1, the third instance in AH 2.24.2, both occurrences in AH 2.24.3, AH 2.24.4, and both in AH 2.25.5.

134 ANF translation.

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit Therefore, when Irenaeus characterizes the individual pieces of creation as invicem contraria et non convenientia ('mutually opposite and not harmonious') he is stating that they possess an intrinsic opposition to each other and that they do not form a harmonious whole. It is, then, the wise activity of God that effects a meaningful or harmonious whole; an activity that results in all things being apta et ornata omnia in AH 2.25.1 and is expressed by aptare and consonare in AH 2.25.2. Or in line with the illustration from music in AH

2.25.2, the wise activity of God produces consonantem unam melodiam ('one harmonious melody').135 Furthermore, I have observed that the creative activity Irenaeus ascribes to the Spirit as Wisdom develops out of his understanding of the wise activity of God in creation that he expresses here. This means that the harmonic effect of the wise activity of God in creation is also the effect of the creative activity of Wisdom.

The variety of verbs that Irenaeus uses to express the wise activity of God in creation or the creative activity of Wisdom is explained by Irenaeus' concern with the effect of that activity rather than with the activity itself. As I stated earlier, the initial motivation for ascribing a particular effect to the wisdom of God in creation was Irenaeus' desire to afﬁrm that creation is not a 'meaningless and accidental thing.'136 Creation has meaning because of the wise activity of God that renders the individual constituents of creation a harmonious whole. The purpose of AH 2.25.1–2 is to afﬁrm the harmony of creation and to explain its existence by reference to the wisdom of God in creation. The different terms used to express the activity are just the means to connect the cause (the wisdom of God) to the effect (a harmonious creation). Irenaeus is not concerned about the particular words he uses to convey the activity that produces the effect. As a result, the signiﬁcance of the verbs he uses does not lie in the particular verbs used, but rather in the common effect associated with the terms. Therefore, Irenaeus' goal in referring to the wisdom of God in creation and in identifying the Spirit as Wisdom is to afﬁrm the harmony of creation, and thereby, to conﬁrm that creation is a meaningful whole.137 As he

135 Irenaeus is arguing for the simultaneous characterization of the constituents of creation as contraria and conveniens. Harmony is the arrangement of contrary elements into a meaningful whole, consonantem unam melodiam. Just as the notes remain different though they are ﬁtted together to form a harmonious melody, so too do the constituents of creation remain contraria—they are not changed, they are just arranged. If the opposite were true, and the harmonization of creation entailed the alteration from contraria to similis, then his preceding arguments against the Gnostics (e.g. AH 2.7.3, 2.7.4, 2.8.3), which depend on an opposition intrinsic to the different parts of creation, would fail.

136 AH 2.25.1.

137 The wisdom of God that renders the individual parts of creation into a harmonious whole—giving meaning to creation—stands in stark contrast to the Gnostics, who 'will not even be able to adapt (adaptare) [the variety] of any single part [of creation], either celestial, terrestrial, or aquatic, to the smallness of their Pleroma' (AH 2.7.3). Insofar as the language that expresses the creative activity of Wisdom was developed in response to Gnostic theory, we can say that the identiﬁcation of the Spirit as Wisdom serves as a continuing means to oppose

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states in 4.38.3, '[God's] wisdom (sapientia) [is shown] in his having made created things ﬁtted (apta) and harmonious (consonantia).'138

Up to this point I have shown that the activity expressed by the verbs Irenaeus connects with his wisdom language ought to be understood in light of their effect—the rendering of a harmonious, and therefore meaningful, creation. It remains to explain how Irenaeus connects the concept of wisdom itself with the harmony in creation. While wisdom language is associated with the idea of harmony in the sapiential literature of Scripture,139 Irenaeus himself never reasons from a text of Scripture to associate the two.140 Instead, Greek philosophy and culture are the means by which he connects the harmonizing activity in creation with the idea of wisdom. In AH 2.25.2 he states:

Just as the sound of the lyre (citharae), by means of the interval that separates

(distantiam) each one from the others, produces one harmonious melody (consonantem unam melodiam), [but] consists of many and opposite (multis et contrariis) sounds. The lover of truth, therefore, should not be deceived by the interval that separates (distantiam) each one from the others, nor should it be supposed that one [comes] from one artist and maker, but another [comes] from another, nor that one ﬁtted the treble, another the bass, and yet another the tenor

[strings], but [he should believe] that one and the same [person prepared the whole], [so as to give] clear proof of the justice, goodness, and muniﬁcence belonging to the whole work and [thing of] wisdom.

Irenaeus illustrates his idea of a harmonious creation by reference to the lyre. The opposition of the notes and the harmony of the melody (consonantem unam melodiam) that belong to a lyre constructed by one artist illustrate how opposition and harmony can be present in the creation of one God.

Gnosticism. This is close to, but not quite the same as, Fantino's position that the critique of Gnosticism is a key motivation in Irenaeus' incorporation of the traditional identiﬁcation of the Spirit as Wisdom (Fantino 1994: 291).

138 The Greek from John of Damascus' Sacred Parallels is slightly different: ç Æ b K ﬁH hæıŁÆ ŒÆd KºB ŒÆd KªŒÆŒıÆ a ªª Æ ØÅŒ ÆØ ('and wisdom in his having made created things ordered and harmonious and proportional').

139 e.g. Prov. 8:30 (LXX), 'I (Wisdom) was beside him, arranging [all things] (±æÇ ıÆ),

I was the one in whom he took delight; and daily I rejoiced in his presence at every moment.'

140 This fact has not prevented the suggestion of Scripture as the basis for this connection; see for instance, Rousseau, SC 210, 393 (1974: 477 n. 2); and Bacq (1978: 168 n. 3). Though Irenaeus uses Ps. 33:6 (32:6 LXX) in Prf 5 to support the activity of Wisdom (which we have shown produces harmony in creation), Irenaeus approaches Ps. 33:6 with this understanding already in place. Three observations show this to be true: (1) the idea of harmony does not appear in Ps. 33:6; (2) the verbs connected to this activity do not appear in Ps. 33:6; and (3) Ps. 33:6 does not refer to wisdom. Thus, Ps. 33:6 cannot be regarded as the basis for Irenaeus' association of the idea of harmony or of a particular type of activity with the concept of Wisdom. It is enlightening to contrast Irenaeus' approach to wisdom with his approach to the Word: passages in Scripture are the clear basis for his ascription of creative activity to the Word, see for instance, AH 2.2.4–5.

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit Moreover, he describes this work of creation, illustrated by the lyre, as a '[thing of] wisdom.' It is this image of the lyre, its harmony and its construction, that Irenaeus uses to support his assertion that the harmony in creation is the product of the wise activity of God in creation. His utilization of the lyre to establish this connection reveals his familiarity with Greek philosophy and culture: the idea of the harmony of the lyre occupies a central place in Greek musical theory, and often illustrates principles in Greek cosmology. As a result, it is a reference to Greek philosophy that undergirds Irenaeus' initial association of harmony with the concept of wisdom.

To be more speciﬁc, Irenaeus' reference to the harmony of the lyre in this passage suggests he was aware of the Greek concept of ±æ Æ ('harmony'). The most basic meaning of ±æ Æ is 'ﬁtting together,' a meaning that extends back to Homer.141 The concept of ±æ Æ as the principle of agreement or concord that joins together disparate elements in musical theory or cosmology has a long history descending from early Pythagorean reasoning.142 In addition to having a long history, its importance to Platonic philosophy gave the principle of harmony a place in the curriculum of classical education, ensuring a wide audience for the concept and guaranteeing it a place in basic Greek thought.143

Thus, Irenaeus'utilization of the conceptofharmonyin musical theorytoexplain his understanding of cosmology is a move common to the thinkers of his time.

The use of a lyre144 to illustrate harmonic principles has a lengthy history itself,145 and the particular use of a lyre to illustrate the harmonization of disparate elements in creation also belongs to a long-standing tradition.146

Plato uses the image of a lyre in a well-known passage from his Symposium:

141 The term is found in Od. 5.248, which describes the process of ﬁtting together different parts in the construction of Odysseus' raft. See: Lippman (1964: 1–2, 3); Anderson (1966: 37); and Faulkner (1996: 30).

142 This is not to say that the term itself originated with Pythagoras, but rather that the Pythagoreans developed its signiﬁcance: 'The Pythagoreans gave [harmonia] new importance. In the ratios of music, they felt they had found an actual link between harmonia on the everyday level and the harmonia that helped create the universe and that bound it together' K. Ferguson

(2008: 107).

143 Faulkner includes among Plato's primary ideas about music that 'the universe is characterized by a quality of interrelatedness (harmonia) that is highly evident in music.' He then goes on to state that while 'Plato had his detractors . . . what is essential is that his ideas on music were widely disseminated and heeded in pagan antiquity, and were incorporated into the classical educational curriculum, the proto-quadrivium' Faulkner (1996: 46–7).

144 The lyre, in and of itself, occupies a long-standing position in Greek music and culture.

The earliest representation of the instrument is on a vase that dates to c.700 BC, and the attribution of its invention by Hermes can be found in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, which dates to the early sixth century BC at the latest (Landels, 1999: 61).

145 For examples, see: Lippman (1964: 42, 87); Levin (1975: 41); Joost-Gaugier (2006: 106).

Aratus ofSoli (Phaenomena 5.268)referstothe constellation Lyra, about which Hippolytusof Rome says, 'It consists of seven strings, signifying by these seven strings the entire harmony and construction of the world as it is melodiously constituted' (Ref. 4.48.2; tr. J.H. MacMahon, ANF 5).

146 'Harmony does not necessarily involve either number or measurement. It means simply

"ﬁtting together," as manifested typically in carpentry in the joining of two pieces of wood, and

His Hand and Wisdom

. . . [that music is under the sole direction of the god of love] is, perhaps, what

Heraclitus meant us to understand by that rather cryptic pronouncement, 'The one in conﬂict (ØÆçæ ) with itself is held together (ıç æŁÆØ), like the harmony (±æ Æ) of the bow and of the lyre.' Of course it is absurd to speak of harmony as being in conﬂict, or as arising out of elements which are still conﬂicting, but perhaps he meant that the art of music was to create harmony by resolving the discord between the treble and the bass (O ŒÆd

Ææ ). There can certainly be no harmony of treble and bass while they are still in conﬂict, for harmony is concord (ıçø Æ), and concord is a kind of sympathy (› º ª Æ), and sympathy between things which are in conﬂict is impossible so long as that conﬂict lasts. There is, on the other hand, a kind of discord that is not impossible to resolve, and here we may effect a harmony—as, for instance, we produce a rhythm by resolving the difference between fast and slow.147

As in Irenaeus, here we ﬁnd references to the lyre, the treble and bass, and the creation of harmony out of discordant elements. A similar statement is found in a passage much closer in date to Irenaeus: Philo,

Cher 109–112:

. . . God has made none of these particular [created things] complete ( ºØ ) in itself, so that it should have no need at all of another. Thus through the desire to obtain what it needs, it must perforce approach that which can supply its need, and this approach must be mutual and reciprocal. Thus through reciprocity

(KÆºº Æ) and combination (KØØªÆ), even as a lyre is formed of unlike notes, God meant that they should come to fellowship (Œ Øø Æ) and concord (ıçø Æ) and form a single harmony (æ Å), and that a universal give and take should govern them, and lead up to the consummation of the whole world. So love draws lifeless to living, unreasoning to reasoning, trees to men, men to plants . . . heaven to earth, earth to heaven, air to water, and water to air. So natures intermediate yearn for each other and those at either extreme . . . Thus each, we may say, wants and needs each; all need all, that so this whole, of which each is a part, might be that perfect work worthy of its architect, this world.148 the basic prerequisite of the conception is thus the existence of two or more distinguishable entities somehow capable of mutual adjustment. From the beginning, the idea was connected with music. The process of ﬁtting together is peculiarly applicable to spatial or simultaneous constituents, and Greek music was in essence purely melodic; but in the tuning of the lyre there existed a simultaneity that was possibly not just an example but the true model of the whole conception' (Lippman 1964: 1–2).

147 Symp. 187A–B; trans. by M. Joyce in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters,

Bollingen Series, 71; (1961); Greek from Plato, 3: 166 (1925, repr. 1991).

148 Philo in Ten Volumes, 2 (tr. F.H. Colson; Loeb Classical Library, 227; Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press, 1927, repr. 1979). Runia notes Philo's fondness for the example of the harmony of the lyre: Philo of Alexandria (2001: 294).

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit Though certain differences exist between these selections and that of AH

2.25.2, including terminology and level of detail, their basic similarities are clear. Irenaeus' use of a lyre to illustrate the harmonization of disparate elements in creation ﬁts easily within this tradition.

The possibility exists, moreover, that Irenaeus' choice of the harmony of the lyre to illustrate his concept of harmony may be due to more than just a philosophical commonplace. Though we cannot identify with certainty the speciﬁc source from which Irenaeus borrowed this traditional image of the lyre, two possibilities have more potential than the rest. The ﬁrst is a classical education.149 On various occasions Irenaeus betrays a training in rhetoric and an ability to utilize philosophical method, as I pointed out earlier in this study.150 The most interesting possibility, however, is the availability to Irenaeus of a source containing writings of Heraclitus.

We have already seen that Plato (Symp. 187A) quoted from Heraclitus to introduce the harmony of the lyre as an illustration of bringing harmony out of discord. The same passage from Heraclitus reappears in Hippolytus of Rome, who wrote soon after Irenaeus.151 In his Refutation of All Heresies

9.9.2 we ﬁnd the quotation, '[People] do not understand how, what is diverse (ØÆçæ ) is in agreement (› º ª Ø) with itself: a back-turning harmony (Æº æ ±æ Å) like that of the bow and lyre.'152 Hippolytus' use of the illustration of the harmony of the lyre to make a different point153 than does Irenaeus poses no real difﬁculty, given the originality of Hippolytus' appropriation of philosophical texts and Plato's earlier use of the same passage in a way that generally agrees with the approach of Irenaeus.154 The presence of this quotation in Hippolytus is signiﬁcant not because of the way he uses it, but rather because the numerous quotations of Heraclitus in Ref 9.9.1 through 9.10.8 show Hippolytus was working from a written source that contained the writings of Heraclitus.155

The availability of such a source to Christians close to the time at which Irenaeus wrote, and the willingness of the Christian Hippolytus to utilize that source, creates the possibility that Irenaeus could have taken his illustration of the lyre from the same passage of Heraclitus we ﬁnd quoted in Plato and 149 Either formal or informal.

150 Chapter 4, pp. 89–95.

151 C. Osborne (1987: 149) asserts that this quotation 'almost certainly refers to the same passage in Heraclitus (that is found in Plato's Symp. 187A)'.

152 Ref 9.9.2: P ıØAØ ‹Œø ØÆçæ !øıﬁH › º ª Ø· Æº æ ±æ Å, ‹Œøæ ı ŒÆd ºæÅ; Greek from Hippolytus (1986); my translation.

153 For Hippolytus' use of this quotation see Osborne's discussion of fragment B51 in C. Osborne (1987: 148–53).

154 'Hippolytus' handling of [Greek philosophical] material is sensitive rather than mindless and original rather than second-hand' (C. Osborne 1987: 14).

155 Sixteen of the nineteen quotations that occur in these sections 'are not cited explicitly in any other extant text' (C. Osborne 1987: 132).

His Hand and Wisdom

Hippolytus.156 The likelihood of this possibility increases or decreases depending on the type of relationship one believes existed between the two theologians. Photius described Hippolytus as the disciple of Irenaeus (ÆŁÅc b

¯NæÅÆ ı),157 which could refer to interpersonal contact between the two, or it could mean that Hippolytus just depended upon the writings of Irenaeus.158

However, in the same passage, Photius also states that the Syntagma composed by Hippolytus is based on lectures of Irenaeus (›Øº F ¯NæÅÆ ı), which must refer to messages he heard Irenaeus deliver and not to Irenaeus' written works.159 This last point suggests that Hippolytus and Irenaeus had personal contact in either Lyons or Rome, making the possibility of a shared source much more tenable.

Section Conclusion In the end, due to lack of detail we remain in the realm of speculation.160

Though several possibilities for Irenaeus' source exist, we are unable to ascertain the origin of his illustration of the lyre. On the other hand, this examination of Irenaeus' concept of wisdom has yielded several informative points. First, his identiﬁcation of the Spirit as Wisdom is restricted to the context of the Spirit's role in creation. Second, the polemic with Gnosticism is the initial setting for the development of his wisdom language: both the reclamation of the ﬁgure of Wisdom and the connection of the harmony in creation with the wisdom of God occur in the midst of anti-Valentinian arguments. Third, the overlap and general semantic agreement of the verbs used to convey the wise activity of God in creation and the creative activity of Wisdom shows that Irenaeus' understanding of the Spirit as Wisdom develops, insofar as activity is concerned, from his concept of the wisdom of God in creation. Fourth, the purpose of referring to the wisdom of God in creation or 156 The early Christian use of Heraclitus is not limited to Hippolytus; Clement of Alexandria was also familiar with the philosopher, see for instance Stromateis 6.17.2, which contains fragment 36. The signiﬁcance of this observation to our present discussion is unclear, since

Clement's access to sources was likely different than that of Hippolytus and Irenaeus.

157 Photius, Bibliotheca (1959–77: 121). All Greek quotations of Photius are from Photius,

Bibliothèque (1959–77).

158 Hippolytus refers to the work of Irenaeus at Ref 6.42.1 and 6.55.2; his discussion of Marcus that occurs between these references exhibits a substantial dependence on the discussion of Marcus in Irenaeus' Against Heresies.

159 As pointed out long ago by Döllinger (1876: 13–15, and esp. 259–60).

160 For instance, both Platonic and Aristotelian traditions incorporate the principle of harmony into their cosmologies. The ﬁrst deﬁnes the disparate elements that are harmonized by their numerical ratios and the second deﬁnes them by their magnitude or quantity (Faulkner

1996: 34, 47.). Irenaeus' own use of the term 'interval' (distantia), and his lack of reference to numerical ratios, suggest that his way of thinking is closer to the Aristotelian tradition we ﬁnd in Aristoxenus, though the limited details he provides render this conclusion suspect at best.

Landels discusses the deﬁnition of interval in Aristoxenus' Elements of Harmonics in his Music in Ancient Greece and Rome (Landels 1999: 87–8). For a more thorough discussion of these points, see Winnington-Ingram, CQ 26 (1932: 195–208).

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit the creative activity of Wisdom is to relate the harmony in creation, and its meaningfulness. Fifth, the variety of terms Irenaeus uses to convey or describe the wise activity of God in creation and the creative activity of Wisdom ﬁnds its explanation, and the signiﬁcance of the terms themselves, in the harmonious effect of the activity to which they refer, rather than in the activity itself.

Sixth, Irenaeus uses the Greek philosophical image of the harmony of the lyre to support his initial connection of the concept of wisdom with the production of harmony in creation.

Prior to concluding this section, I would like to make a brief observation on Irenaeus' conception of the roles of the Word and Wisdom in creation. The ﬁrst and last places in which Irenaeus speaks of the Word and Wisdom and their respective roles in creation will be sufﬁcient for my present purpose.

Irenaeus writes in AH 2.30.9, 'Founding and making all things (condens et faciens omnia), visible and invisible, those detected by senses and those not, heavenly and earthly, by the Word of his power, and he has ﬁtted and arranged all things (omnia aptavit et disposuit) by his Wisdom.' And when commenting on Ps. 33:6 in Prf 5, he writes, 'Thus, since the Word "establishes"

(հաստատէ; KæŁÅÆ, Ps. 32:6 LXX), that is, works bodily and confers existence, while the Spirit arranges and forms (յարդարէ եւ կերպարանէ) the various "powers," so rightly is the Son called Word and the Spirit the Wisdom of God.' These passages illustrate that with regard to the activity of the Word and Wisdom of God, Irenaeus conceives of a two-stage creation in which the Word causes creation to come into existence (condens et faciens in AH 2.30.9; հաստատէ / KæŁÅÆ in Prf 5), while as we have seen,

Wisdom acts (aptavit et disposuit in AH 2.30.9; յարդարէ եւ կերպարանէ in Prf 5) to render what is created a harmonious whole.161 The activities of the Word and Wisdom in creation are, at least logically, sequential. Both are required for a complete and meaningful created order.

Chapter Conclusion The importance of the identiﬁcation of the Spirit as one of the Hands of God and as Wisdom to Irenaeus' theology of the Spirit cannot be overestimated.

Each of these titles entails the creative activity of the Spirit, the divinity of the Spirit, and the distinction and equality of the Spirit in relation to the Son. The attribution of creative activity to the Holy Spirit is the most foundational and signiﬁcant aspect of Irenaeus' pneumatology.162

161 This characterization of the roles of the Word and Wisdom in creation holds for every occasion in which the dyad appears. Irenaeus, however, does not maintain the same precision or consistency when speaking of the Word alone, as for instance in AH 5.18.3: Verbum Dei gubernans et disponans omnia. Cf. Steenberg (2008: 70).

162 Contra the usual reading of Irenaeus' theological account that stresses the sanctifying role of the Spirit, as for instance J. Daniélou writes: 'Another characteristic feature of the theology of Irenaeus is the place which he gives to the Spirit as sanctiﬁer alongside the Word as revealer. Of

His Hand and Wisdom

The identiﬁcation of the Spirit as a Hand and as Wisdom reveals the Jewish character of Irenaeus' pneumatology. It also shows that he adapts and develops the traditions he adopts to his own purposes. In the case of his identiﬁcation of the Spirit as Wisdom the adaptation of the tradition involves the use of Greek philosophical concepts. The utilization of these traditions by Irenaeus goes far toward showing his theology of the Spirit to be the most complex

Jewish-Christian pneumatology of the period. the three major works of God, creation is attributed particularly to the Father, revelation to the Son, and sanctiﬁcation to the Spirit . . . It will be noted that the operation of the Spirit is already present at the creation, but that the emphasis as regards his role is placed on sanctiﬁcation

(commenting on 5.18.2, and 3.17.1–2)' (Daniélou 1973: 362).

The Salviﬁc Spirit 'c'est cette communication de l'Esprit Saint qui est le salut de l'homme'

A. Rousseau1 As I indicated in the introduction to the previous chapter, the remaining chapters in this study will focus on a few distinctive or signiﬁcant aspects of Irenaeus' pneumatology. In this vein, the present chapter, which has as its subject matter the ﬁfth Book of Against Heresies, will study just one feature of his theology of the Spirit, for the ﬁrst half of AH 5 has more to say about the life-giving activity of the Holy Spirit than any other portion of Irenaeus' work.2 Scholarship often features, even in a signiﬁcant way, Irenaeus' identiﬁcation of the Spirit as the particular agent by whom life comes to human beings. Even so, a full and accurate statement of Irenaeus' conception of the life-giving activity of the Spirit had yet to be provided as recently as the year 2000, as is evident from the great deal of time John Behr spent in his study of that date on Irenaeus' conception of this aspect of the Spirit's activity.3 This chapter will not attempt to detail in full

Irenaeus' understanding of the life-giving activity of the Spirit, but I hope it will present an even more accurate account by building upon and amending previous scholarship, in particular the work of Behr just noted.

The sheer number of pages that have been devoted since the late nineteenth century to explaining Irenaeus' understanding of the presence of the Spirit to human beings, and its life-giving activity in human beings, suggests the work of Irenaeus in this regard either lacks the clarity that comes from sufﬁcient detail or is very complex. In fact, both are true. Irenaeus does not provide the clear and detailed explanations that would enable an easy statement of his thought on this matter. And this aspect of his pneumatology entails intricate connections with his anthropology, soteriology, and broader conception of the divine economy.

1 Rousseau, SC 152 (1969: 234); referring to AH 5.6.1 and 5.9.1.

2 In chapter 4, I ﬁrst addressed Irenaeus' discussion of the role of the Spirit in salvation: the Spirit is Unction of Christ that overﬂows to believers and so brings the gloriﬁed Jesus Christ to human beings. The Spirit in this sense is the bearer of life, and so Irenaeus can refer to the lifegiving agency of the Spirit later in AH 3.24.1.

3 Behr (2000: esp. 86–115).

The Salviﬁc Spirit

Several interconnected issues stand out. First is the question as to whether Irenaeus' anthropology is trichotomous or dichotomous. All agree that Irenaeus holds both the body and soul to be parts of the human being; the concern is to determine whether he also includes a human, created spirit, or even if the presence of the Holy Spirit is essential to the human being.4 The second issue revolves around whether Irenaeus conceives of only one type of life, a biological or physical life that can be either temporal or eternal, or if Irenaeus thinks of a physical life given to the body by means of the soul and distinguished by kind from a supernatural life given to the animated body by means of the Holy Spirit.5

4 According to Klebba's account (1894: 164), prior to his study the assumption was that Irenaeus possessed a trichotomous anthropology, as he illustrates with reference to Zöckler

(1879: 115). Klebba presents a passionate argument for a dichotomous reading of Irenaeus, in which all human beings consist of a body and a soul, with the perfect person receiving the addition of the Holy Spirit: 'If, however, our substance is called a combination of soul and ﬂesh by Irenaeus, which only receives the Spirit of God, in order to make human beings spiritual, then clearly the two-part division of human beings is taught, beside which the third only exists as an accident' (1894: 164; 164–6 esp. for his arg.). The dichotomous interpretation has been maintained by: Koch, TSK (1925: 183–215, here 206); Slomkowski (1928: 32–3, 45–6); Jenkins, SP 6

(1962: 91–5, here 94), insofar as the Spirit or spirit is not a part of the original 'make-up' of man which includes the body and breath of life; Orbe, Greg 48 (1967: 522–76, here 548–54), and (1969: 16–20), though Orbe offers (1969: 58–77) the odd reading of the power of God mixed with dust to form man in Prf 11 to be the Spirit of God in Gen. 1:2 as an anima mundi; Jaschke (1976:

296–7); Fantino (1986: 121, 124–5, 127, 130), where he says Gen. 2:7 is the basis for Irenaeus' anthropology; de Andia (1986: 74–5, 80–1, 85–7); and Fantino (1994: 216). D'Alès RSR (1924:

532) suggests that the human spirit is the gift of grace deposited in a person by the divine Spirit, which he supports, as Jaschke (1976: 297 n. 15) has pointed out, by reading Irenaeus in light of the scholastic paradigm donum creatum (the human spirit) and causa increata (the divine Spirit)

(d'Alès, 1924: 525)–much of d'Alès' work is marred by reading Irenaeus through the lens of later theological approaches. M.A. Donovan suggests that there is a clear distinction between the human spirit and divine Spirit in AH 5.8.2, but the word she translates 'spirit' in 5.8.2 is in fact anima (Donovan, TS 49, 1988: 283–97, here 295). De Lubac (1990: 129–34) includes Irenaeus among those who develop a trichotomous anthropology from 1 Thess 5:23, but Rousseau (SC

406, 1995: 357–64) shows his discussion of Irenaeus to be incomplete and his conclusion incorrect. Wingren (1956: 153–4, 157–8) would prefer not to place Irenaeus' thought in either category, saying it is better to think of the Spirit as 'something which grows together with man,' than to think of it as 'divine and superhuman.' In his ﬁnal analysis, though, Wingren opts for a trichotomous reading. Rousseau too refuses to categorize Irenaeus' thought. He contends, 'it is one thing to consider man from an abstract point-of-view, in his common nature with all humanity; it is another thing to consider man from a concrete point-of-view, in his existential comportment, in the drama of the option by which, in opening himself (or in closing himself) freely to the appeal of God, he receives (or refuses) the full realization of his being in view of which he has been created. From the ﬁrst point-of-view, man is body and soul; from the second point-of-view, he is—or, at least, he is invited to be—inﬁnitely more', (Rousseau, SC 406, 1995:

357–8). Behr's thought is also difﬁcult to categorize: he afﬁrms that the Spirit is not a part of the 'constitution' of human beings, and yet holds that the 'continual nourishing presence' of the Spirit renders the human being living (Behr 2000: esp. 97–100).

5 The idea that a distinction can be drawn in Irenaeus' thought between two types of life, the supernatural and the physical/biological, was a commonplace that still persists in some authors:

Klebba (1894: 33); Vernet (1923: 2394–535, here 2454–7); d'Alès, RSR 6 (1916: esp. 532);

Bonwetsch (1925: 74); Jaschke (1976: 257 n. 29); Rousseau, NRT 99 (1977: 834–64, here

842–3, 854) and SC 293 (1982: 345–9, esp. 347); de Andia (1986: 79); Donovan, TS 49 (1988:

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit The third questions the compatibility of the two strains of thought Irenaeus exhibits with regard to the salvation of human beings: he says both that salvation involves the restoration of the likeness which was lost by Adam and Eve, and that salvation involves the continual growth or increase of the created human being toward the perfection of the uncreated God.6 The fact that he associates the presence and activity of the Holy Spirit with both the restoration of the likeness and the achievement of human perfection, generates the fourth question as to whether the Holy Spirit was present in Adam and Eve prior to the Fall, and whether the likeness of God lost at the Fall refers to the presence of the Holy

Spirit.7 These questions do not form the structure of this chapter; rather they and their answers form its content.

Behr's work, mentioned above, is an insightful analysis helpful to all who seek to better understand each of these questions. Indeed, two points-of-view that he articulates render his study the new starting place for any consideration of these long-standing issues. First, and most essential, he observes that Irenaeus conceives of the divine economy as a movement from animation of the human being by the soul to viviﬁcation by the Holy Spirit. Second, to this observation he connects the idea that Irenaeus envisions only one kind of life—the physical life lived by the human being and received from the Holy Spirit. As a result, the temporal life belonging to the animated human being and the eternal life

289). These later statements occur despite the existence of a growing body of scholarship showing the inaccuracy of such a characterization of Irenaeus' thought. Wingren established that in Irenaeus' theology all life comes from God; moreover, 'the resurrection life is not an unnatural addition to what is truly human, but is the uncorrupted life of Creation' (Wingren

1959: esp. 14, 54 n36, 108; quotation from 120). Fantino observed that created life is already a gift from God, and that there is a strong relationship between the created life and the incorruptible life (1994: 319–21). Behr develops and clariﬁes the observations of Wingren and Fantino (Behr

2000: 56 n. 76, 92–7); his argument will receive detailed attention later in this chapter.

6 Many have followed the conclusion of Wendt (1882: 21–6, 29) that these two strains of thought are incompatible. Wingren identiﬁed Wendt's argument on this topic as 'the source of all subsequent division of the theology of Irenaeus and his writings,' and proposed a harmonious reading of these two lines of thought (Wingren 1959: esp. 26–32, 50–4, 52 n. 33, 27 n. 78). Bacq's analysis of AH 4, and in particular his appendix devoted to 4.37–9, ﬁnally established the unity in Irenaeus' writing and the harmonious existence of these two ideas (Bacq 1978: esp. 363–88, see

364–9 for a discussion of past scholarship on this issue).

7 Here we can divide scholarship into three general categories. First, those who afﬁrm the prelapsarian presence of the Spirit: Klebba (1894: esp. 33–4); Vernet (1923: 2454–5); d'Alès, RSR 6

(1916: 512–13); Jaschke (1976: 256–7); Fantino (1986: 115–17, 160–2); de Andia (1986: 71–2,

96–7); Fantino (1994: 217); Behr (2000: 115). Second, those who reject the pre-lapsarian presence of the Spirit: Von Harnack (1958, vol. 2: 269 n.1); Koch (1925: 206–8); Slomkowski

(1928: 44–6). Third, those who attempt to ﬁnd the middle ground and afﬁrm the pre-lapsarian presence of the Spirit insofar as either Adam and Eve had the potential to receive the fullness of the Spirit had they not been disobedient, and/or there is a sort of increase or growth in the Spirit:

Bonwetsch (1925: 66–9, 74); Prümm, Scholastik 13 (1938: 206–24, here, 219); Wingren, who identiﬁes the Spirit as the principle of life as well (1959: 54–5, 55 n. 37). Among those who afﬁrm the pre-lapsarian presence of the Spirit, Fantino identiﬁes the presence of the Spirit with the likeness of God (1986: 115–17, 160–3).

The Salviﬁc Spirit

belonging to the viviﬁed human being differ only in strength, not in kind.

Working from this evaluation, he posits that the Holy Spirit, as the source of this life, must have a continual nourishing presence in every human being throughout all time in order for a human being to be living. This continual nourishing presence of the Spirit in all people grants temporal life to each one, but this presence occurs in a new fashion for those believers in Christ who receive the Holy Spirit sent to them in the last times, and who receive eternal life.

In this chapter I will adopt both Behr's understanding of the divine economy as a movement from animation to viviﬁcation, and his determination that temporal life and eternal life differ in strength, not in kind. On the other hand,

Behr goes too far in arguing for the nourishing presence of the Spirit in all human beings, regardless of the status of their relationship with God. I will argue that Irenaeus believes the presence of the Holy Spirit is limited to the followers of God, whether the pre-lapsarian Adam and Eve, the patriarchs and prophets between the Fall and the completion of the Christological mission, or the believers in Jesus for whom the Spirit was poured out. This position entails a reading that limits the constitution of the human being to the body and soul alone: temporal life comes to human beings by the instrumentality of the Spirit, not its presence. I will also contend that the likeness lost at the Fall and restored to human beings by Christ should be understood as eternal life. Lastly, I will show that Irenaeus understands the difference in strength between the two modalities of life, temporal and eternal, to be due to a dynamic of grace or power. According to this dynamic, each person who possesses temporal life has received from the Holy Spirit a minimal amount of grace/power, whereas those who possess eternal life have received an additional amount of grace/power. So eternal life is stronger than temporal life because the Spirit has (further)

'empowered' temporal life, causing it to modulate to eternal life.

We turn, then, to the ﬁrst part of this analysis in which I will contend that Irenaeus always limits the presence of the Spirit to the followers of God. In so saying, I am disagreeing with Behr's notion of a continual nourishing presence of the Spirit in all people.

6.1 THE PRESENCE OF THE SPIRIT TO HUMANITY

One of the chief concerns of Behr's work is to show that both the indirect animation of all people by means of the breath of life and the direct viviﬁcation of the elect entail the presence of the Holy Spirit in those individuals.

Those who have not received the Spirit through adoption possess only the breath of life. Not being adopted sons of God, they can receive only the Spirit in a manner pertaining to their created state, and so, apropos of Isaiah 57:16, Irenaeus

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit describes this as created breath . . . Unlike those who were animated by the breath of life, created by the presence of the life-creating Spirit, the adopted sons of God receive the vivifying Spirit itself, 'communion with the Spirit.' Thus there are not two sources of life, independent from each other; only the Spirit is life-creating.8

Behr provides additional insight into his understanding when he states that the Holy Spirit is 'present with creation, and especially with man' at all times:

'not only in the protological time of Adam's pre-lapsarian existence, but also throughout the apostasy.'9 To afﬁrm the presence of the Spirit 'to the human race during the course of the apostasy,' Behr turns to a depiction of the divine economy at large: 'when looking at the economy . . . Irenaeus does, in fact, envisage the continual nourishing presence of the Spirit, which, nevertheless, was bestowed in a new manner in Christ at the end of time, and therefore, in its fullness, remains an eschatological reality, of which the adopted sons at present receive a pledge.'10

Acccording to Behr, the presence of the Spirit at all times is necessary, for 'although Irenaeus occasionally describes man as a "compound being," a "mixture" or "union" of ﬂesh and soul, because the soul, and through it the body, must participate in life to be a living man, such descriptions (of man as just body and soul) are not sufﬁcient deﬁnitions of the living man.'11

Whether temporal or eternal, the human life is the result of the constant presence of the life-creating Spirit in human beings. Moreover, since Irenaeus only conceives of a life lived in the ﬂesh, and since that life is always dependent upon the presence of the Holy Spirit, then neither the Spirit nor the gift of life itself can be reckoned as superadded.12 Rather, the Holy Spirit

'is essential to Irenaeus's understanding of man, yet (it) is not a "part" of his constitution,' because (AH 5.6.1 reveals) 'the body and soul can be called

"parts" of man in a way in which the Spirit cannot—for it is the Spirit, something other than man.'13 So, while 'the Spirit is not a man, nor even a part of a man, [it] is itself given to man in such a manner that it can be legitimately described as his Spirit.'14 Therefore, all living human beings are body and soul made alive, indirectly (in temporal life) or directly (in eternal life), by the presence of the Holy Spirit.

The central claim of this summary of Behr's reading of Irenaeus is that both temporal and eternal life depend on the presence of the Holy Spirit.

This means the Holy Spirit is present to human beings despite the state of 8 Behr (2000: 106, 107); discussing AH 5.12.1–2. Irenaeus identiﬁes the 'breath of life' with the soul.

9 Behr (2000: 97).

10 Ibid. 97.

11 Ibid. 98.

12 Ibid. 96–105.

13 Ibid. 99, 100.

14 Ibid. 100.

The Salviﬁc Spirit

their relationship to God. So, Behr can say the Spirit was and is present to human beings during and following Adam's apostasy, and people show themselves worthy for punishment 'in their body, soul, and Spirit.'15

In making this claim, Behr departs from the thought of Irenaeus. In this ﬁrst section of this chapter I will show that Irenaeus only conceives of the presence of the Spirit with those who maintain a right relationship with God. Irenaeus does not envision a presence of the Holy Spirit to every person, a presence with all human beings in such a way that people show themselves worthy for punishment in their Spirit. Rather, those who are worthy of punishment do not possess the Spirit.16

Behr notes ﬁve passages to support the 'continual nourishing presence' of the 'life-creating Spirit' to all human beings: AH 4.33.1, 4.33.7, 4.33.15, 5.1.3, and 5.28.4. Yet, none of these passages refer to the presence of the Spirit in those that do not follow God; some passages do not refer to the presence of the Spirit at all. A brief look at each one will demonstrate this to be the case. In AH

4.33.1 Irenaeus states:

Such a truly spiritual disciple, who receives the Spirit of God, who, from the beginning in all the dispensations of God, was present with human beings, and has announced the future, and has revealed the present, and explains the past . . .

At question is whether 'present with human beings' refers to the whole human race without distinction or to a select portion of humanity. The answer lies in the qualifying phrase, 'in all the dispensations of God,' which refers to the preceding section in which Irenaeus discusses the rationale for the giving of two different testaments, one to the Jews and one to the Church. In AH 4.32.2

Irenaeus states that the two testaments, which correspond to the different dispensations of God spoken of in AH 4.33.1, were 'appointed . . . for the advantage of human beings . . . who were coming to believe in God.' So, the context for his reference to the presence of the Spirit with mankind, 'from the beginning in all the dispensations of God,' is the giving of the Old and New Testaments for the aid of those who believe in God. This suggests that in AH 4.33.1 Irenaeus is not speaking of the presence of the Spirit with the whole human race, but only with 'those who were coming to believe in God.'

We ﬁnd conﬁrmation for this reading in the parallel between the revelatory activity of the Spirit in AH 4.33.1 and the content of the Scriptures in AH

4.32.2, a connection that ties the two passages together. The Spirit's revelatory

15 For the latter statement, see Behr (2000: 101); author's emphasis.

16 This is not to deny that the Spirit is the source of all life for all things, including and in particular for human beings, but rather to oppose Behr's understanding that the Spirit must in some way always be present in each human being in order to be the source of all life (Behr 2000:

97). The third section of this chapter will address this issue.

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit activity with regard to the future, present, and past in AH 4.33.1 corresponds in reverse order to the content of the Scriptures given to those coming to belief in AH 4.32.2: 'exhibiting a type of heavenly things' equals Irenaeus' past,

'foreshadowing the images of those things which exist in the Church' equals his present, and 'containing a prophecy of things to come' equals his future.

Thus, in both passages Irenaeus is speaking of the activity of the Spirit among believers, which conﬁrms that he also has in mind here the presence of the Spirit with believers alone.

AH 4.33.7 is difﬁcult to interpret because of the differences between the Greek and Latin texts.17 I will provide a translation of the ﬁrst half of the selection and then provide the Greek and Latin for the second half, where the difﬁculty lies.

For all things are plain to him (the 'spiritual disciple' from 4.33.1): [to him who has] a full faith in one God Almighty . . . and a ﬁrm belief in the Spirit of God, who gives the knowledge of the truth, e a NŒ Æ —Ææ ŒÆd "ƒ F ŒÅ Æ F ŒÆŁ' !ŒÅ ªa N f

IŁæ ı ŒÆŁg ºÆØ › —Æcæ. qui dispositiones Patris et Filii exposuit secundum quas aderat generi humano, quemadmodum vult Pater.

For this passage to be helpful, Behr must follow the Latin and understand it to say something like: 'who sets forth the dispensations of the Father and the Son, according to which he (the Spirit) dwells in the human race (or, "he dwells in [each] generation of human beings"), as the Father wills.' The Greek text, on the other hand, does not indicate that it is the Spirit who dwells among human beings. We can translate the Greek as, 'in order that the economies of both the Father and Son may dwell, according to each generation, among human beings, as the Father wills.'

The main difference between the Latin and Greek texts is that the Latin text contains two verbs (exponere and adesse), while the Greek contains one

(ŒÅ Æ F). It seems to me that the presence of the two Latin verbs reﬂects the difﬁculty of interpreting the inﬁnitive ŒÅ Æ F, which literally means 'to dwell' but in this context means 'to make known.' When Irenaeus writes, 'in order that the economies of the Father and Son may dwell . . . among human beings,' he means, 'in order that the economies of the Father may be known. . . among human beings.' Each verb in the Latin text conveys one of these meanings: exponere brings out the contextual meaning ('to make known'), while adesse brings out the literal meaning ('to dwell'). The Latin translator recognized the 17 The numerous textual additions and subtractions in the Armenian translation render it unhelpful (for instance, it entirely omits the reference to the Spirit). This state of the Armenian more than likely reﬂects the difﬁculty this passage poses for the translator and interpreter alike.

The Salviﬁc Spirit

two meanings, but was unable to produce an adequate translation and so included verbs to cover both meanings. Nevertheless, only the contextual meaning is appropriate. Therefore, we should disregard adesse, which reﬂects the literal meaning of the Greek. As a result, we should not understand Irenaeus to be saying that the Spirit dwells among human beings. Instead, the Spirit gives the knowledge of the truth in order that the 'economies' of the Father and Son may dwell, that is, be made known, among human beings.

Yet, even if we were to follow the Latin text, the context of the passage suggests Irenaeus does not intend for his reader to think that the Spirit rests in the human race indiscriminately. The beginning of AH 4.33.7 contains a sharp divide between the spiritual disciples and those outside the Church who manufacture schisms within it. When read in light of AH 4.33.1, the difference between the two groups must be the reception of the Spirit by the former.

Moreover, at the end of AH 4.33.9 Irenaeus says the Spirit rests on the Church, and the logic at the beginning of AH 4.33.10 entails the resting of the Spirit on a certain group of people, likely a reference back to the Church in AH 4.33.9.

As a result, whichever text one follows, AH 4.33.7 should not be interpreted as stating that the Spirit dwells among the entire human race.

AH 4.33.15 continues the discussion that began in AH 4.33.1, and contains a similar statement as AH 4.33.7: he who is truly spiritual will interpret (prophecies) . . . always knowing the same

God, and always acknowledging the same Word of God, even if he has been made known to us (just) now; and always acknowledging the same Spirit of God, even if he has been poured out on us in a new manner in the last times.18

This passage is straightforward. Irenaeus is not saying the Spirit is always present with the whole human race, but rather that the truly spiritual person will always acknowledge the same Spirit of God, just as that one always acknowledges the same Word and always knows the same God. His point is that regardless of the dispensation during which the truly spiritual individual lives, he or she will always know the same God,19 in contrast for instance to those who claim that the prophets of the Old Testament were sent from another God.20

18 I agree with Rousseau that the phrase following this one does not modify the pouring out of the Spirit (as the ANF translator takes it), but rather begins a new thought. This is evident from the presence of 'et' at the beginning of the phrase, since 'et' also begins the statements having to do with the Word and the Spirit.

19 That the Spiritual disciple always acknowledges the same God correlates to Irenaeus' purpose in this section of AH 4, which, according to Bacq, is to establish the 'uniqueness of the Creator God' by showing that the 'Old Testament is a prophecy of the New' (1978: 28–30, see also, 217–26).

20 The beginning of AH 4.34.1 reveals that Irenaeus has in mind the doctrine of the Marcionites in particular.

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit I have already discussed in chapter 5 the portion of AH 5.1.3 that concerns us, and since my comments there remain apropos, I will offer only brief comments at this time and refer the reader back to the previous discussion.21

Irenaeus states in AH 5.1.3, 'For at no time did Adam escape the Hands of God (the Son and Spirit), to whom the Father speaking, said, "Let us make man after our image and likeness" [Gen. 1:26].' By 'at no time did Adam escape the Hands of God', Irenaeus does not intend to suggest the Son and Spirit were present with humanity at all times, rather he is referring to the providential authority of the creative Hands over the salvation of their creation. He elaborates upon this point in AH 5.5.1, which declares that the 'assumption and translation' of Enoch and Elijah, which entail their viviﬁcation, occurred by means of the same Hands that formed them in the beginning. He then states, 'For in Adam the Hands of God were accustomed to set in order, to rule, and to sustain his own formation, and to bring it and place it where they wish.' Thus, the point of these passages is that the authority of the Hands over their creation guarantees the viviﬁcation of human beings.

The ﬁnal passage to which Behr refers is AH 5.28.4, wherein Irenaeus writes:

And on account of this throughout all time, man, having been formed in the beginning by the Hands of God,22 that is, by the Son and Spirit, is made after the image and likeness of God: the chaff, indeed, which is the apostasy, being cast away; but the grain, that is those who bring forth the fruit of faith to God, being gathered into the storehouse.

It seems to me that for this passage to be relevant to Behr's discussion, he must read it as saying that the Son and Spirit, the Hands of God, who molded man at the beginning also make man 'throughout all time . . . after the image and likeness of God.'23 Two points stand against this reading. First, at most, this passage refers to the activity of the Son and Spirit directed toward, rather than their presence with, human beings 'throughout all time.' Second, the combination of a later phrase in AH 5.28.4 with a statement in AH 5.29.1 reveals that Irenaeus here associates God (the Father), and not the Son and Spirit, with the tribulation that separates the wheat from the chaff and causes human beings to be made after the image and likeness of God. In AH 5.28.4 Irenaeus says, 'And for this cause (propterea) tribulation is necessary for those who are saved

(salvantur)' and in AH 5.29.1 he writes, 'In the previous books I have set forth the causes for which (propter) God permitted these things to be made, and have pointed out that all such have been created for the beneﬁt of that human nature which is saved (salvatur).'24 Despite the reference to the 'previous

21 See chapter 5, pp. 123–4.

22 —ºÆŁd K IæåﬁB › ¼Łæø Øa H åØæH F Ł F/plasmatus in initio homo per manus Dei.

23 This is, in fact, how Fantino (1986: 141) understands it.

24 ANF translations, both.

The Salviﬁc Spirit

books,' the similar language shows that AH 5.29.1 continues the discussion of AH 5.28.4, thereby identifying God (the Father) as the one who permitted tribulation for the salvation of human beings. The correct reading of this passage restricts the activity of the Son and Spirit as the Hands of God to the original formation of the human being; thus this passage does not indicate the presence of the Son and Spirit with human beings, nor even their activity toward human beings, 'throughout all time.'

Thus, of the ﬁve passages Behr notesto support his declaration of the 'continual nourishing presence of the Spirit' with the human race, two of the passages do not refer to the presence of the Spirit at all (AH 5.1.3, 5.28.4). One passage, AH 4.33.7, may be interpreted to refer to the presence of the Spirit in humanity if one prefers the testimony of the Latin text to the testimony of the Greek text. Yet, even if one follows the Latin here, the context indicates we should understand the presence of the Spirit to be restricted to the Church. The two passages that clearly refer to the presence of the Spirit with humanity, AH 4.33.1 and AH 4.33.15, concern only the activity and presence of the Spirit among believers. Therefore, none of these passages supports Behr's reading that the Spirit is present with all human beings despite the state of their relationship with God. Rather the opposite is the case:

Irenaeus speaks of the presence of the Spirit with believers alone.

In addition to the passages that Behr appropriates to substantiate the 'continual nourishing presence of the Spirit' with the human race, he utilizes three passages to argue for 'the presence of the Holy Spirit in the human formation'25: AH 5.6.1, AH 2.33.5, and AH 5.18.2. Of these, however, only his readings of AH 2.33.5 and AH 5.18.2 result in the presence of the Spirit in all human beings regardless of their standing with God. So, for the time being, I will address just these two passages.

Behr turns to the opening sentences of AH 5.18.2 as the capstone for his argument, but for the convenience of my own argument, I will treat this passage ﬁrst and address the other passages as we proceed. The passage at issue reads (I will give the ﬁrst part of the sentence in English, and the second, debated, part in the Latin and the rest in Armenian):

For the Father simultaneously bears the creation and his Word, and the Word borne by the Father gives the Spirit to all as the Father wills: quibusdam quidem secundum conditionem, quod est conditionis,26 quod est factum; quibusdam autem secundum adoptionem, quod est ex Deo, quod est generatio. այնոցիկ, որ ըստ աչխարհիս են, զաչխարհ, որ է եղեալն, իսկ այնոցիկ, որ ըոտ որդեզրութեանն են, զ'ի Հաւրէն, որ է ձնունդն նորա:

25 Behr (2000: 98).

26 This phrase, quod est conditionis, is not present in two important manuscripts, Claromontanus and Vossianus.

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit Behr translates the second half as, 'to some, who are in a created state, which is made, he gives the Spirit pertaining to creation, to others, who are according to adoption, an engendering, he gives the Spirit of the Father.'27 Rousseau, whose reading Behr opposes, translates it as, 'aux uns, en rapport avec leur création, il donne l'esprit appartenant à la création, esprit qui est une chose faite; aux autres, en rapport avec leur adoption, il donne l'Esprit provenant du Père,

Esprit qui est Progéniture de celui-ci.'28 At debate is whether we should understand Spiritum to refer to both a created 'spirit,' which Rousseau holds to be the soul or breath of life, and the Holy Spirit, or if we should understand

Spiritum to refer only to the Holy Spirit who is present to human beings in two different ways.29

The strongest aspects of Rousseau's argument for Spiritum to have two different referents are the close similarity of this passage to a description of the soul and Spirit that Irenaeus offers in AH 5.12.2, and to a lesser degree his interpretation of generatio as expressing 'the divine and transcendent character of the origin of the Spirit' (and that alone)—a reading for which he ﬁnds a parallel in the description of the Word as progenies in AH 5.36.3.30

The strength of Behr's argument for the Holy Spirit as the one referent of Spiritum, though present to humanity in two different ways, lies in his observations that (1) Irenaeus does not elsewhere use spiritus to refer to the soul, despite Rousseau's reference to AH 5.6.1;31 (2) Irenaeus seems to be speaking of only one Spirit given in two different ways;32 and (3) nowhere else does Irenaeus apply the term generatio to the Spirit.33

A simple comparison of their arguments would favor Behr because the reliance of Rousseau's argument on comparisons to other passages is less persuasive than Behr's analysis of the grammatical structure and pattern of terminological usage. Yet, neither Rousseau nor Behr gives due attention to 27 Behr (2000: 105).

28 SC 153 (1969: 239, 41); 'to some, in connection with their creation, he gives the spirit belonging to creation, a spirit which is a created thing; to others, in connection with their adoption, he gives the Spirit coming from the Father, a Spirit who is the Offspring of that one.'

29 Orbe understands this passage as referring to the Spirit as both (1) the natural spirit of cohesion of the world (i.e. the anima mundi) and (2) the Spirit of adoption given exclusively to men (Teología de San Ireneo, Commentario al Libro V del 'Adversus Haereses' [1985, 1987, 1988],

2: 213–18). The interpretation of the Spirit as the anima mundi, however, has no textual basis in Irenaeus.

30 SC 152 (1969: 286–95). Rousseau also attempts to support his interpretation of Spiritum as referring to the soul by reference to 'spiritus hominis' of AH 5.6.1, which he understands to mean the soul as well, but which I take to refer to the Holy Spirit. In addition, he understands progenies in AH 4.7.4 to refer to both the Son and Spirit, an identiﬁcation with which I disagree.

31 This is the case by the time of the composition of AH 5, though in AH 2.31.2 his description of the spirit departing from and returning to a person bears questioning. Cf. Behr's comment on this passage that attributes this particular use of 'spirit' to an earlier quotation of Luke 8:55

(Behr 2000: 99 n. 51).

32 Behr (2000: 104).

33 Ibid. 103.

The Salviﬁc Spirit

the immediate context of the sentence being considered—a context that stands against Behr's analysis and supports that of Rousseau.

Right after the debated passage, Irenaeus explains the purpose for the sending of the Spirit by the Word:

And thus 'one God the Father' is revealed, 'who is above all, and through all, and in us all' [Eph. 4:6]. Indeed, the Father is above all, and is himself the head of Christ; while the Word is through all, and is himself the head of the Church; moreover the Spirit is in us all, and is himself the living water [John 7:39], which the Lord grants to those who rightly believe in him, and love him, and know that there is 'one Father, who is above all, and through all, and in us all.'

This explanation contains no indication that Irenaeus conceived of two different modes of the sending of the one Spirit as Behr argues. Rather, he speaks of one sending alone. In addition, it is clear that the Spirit is only sent to the Church of which the Word is the head: the Spirit is that which is given to those who believe in and love the Lord, and recognize the status of the Father relative to creation.

The limitation of the Spirit to the members of the Church ﬁnds an additional subtle emphasis through Irenaeus' use of the word nobis, 'us.' In the middle of this selection, the Spirit is the living water who is 'in us all,' which refers back to the Church in which Irenaeus includes himself. This Spirit is the living water granted to the Church, those 'who rightly believe in him, love him, and know' the truth of Eph. 4:6. The text of Eph. 4:6, itself, reinforces the restriction of the Spirit to the Church, since the phrase that pertains to the Spirit reads in omnibus nobis, 'in us all.'34

As a result, the immediate context of the passage in question enjoins us to acknowledge that the ﬁrst sentence of AH 5.18.2 refers to only one sending of the Spirit, to the Church alone. We are then left with a very confusing passage, because as far as I know Behr's three observations mentioned earlier are correct, and yet the elucidation that Irenaeus provides in the immediate context indicates that we should follow Rousseau's reading. It is clear, then, that we must follow Rousseau's reading, insofar as he afﬁrms only one giving of the Spirit and that to the believers in Christ. Yet, our inability to understand how this passage harmonizes with the rest of Irenaeus' logic means we should not draw upon it to substantiate any particular reading of Irenaeus.

The conclusion generated so far by our analysis, that Irenaeus limits the presence of the Spirit to believers alone, calls into immediate question the 34 I have rendered the quotations of Eph. 4:6 in this text according to the Armenian version which includes 'us' in both texts (in fact, the Armenian reads 'is in us all,' but the predicate construction seems to be an addition of the translator), whereas nobis does not appear in the Latin of the ﬁrst text.

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit inference Behr draws from AH 2.33.5: 'that those who did not please God had

"their" Spirit before their death.'35 AH 2.33.5 reads: all those who have been enrolled for life will rise again, having their own body, and their own soul, and their own Spirit, in which they had pleased God. On the other hand, those who are worthy of punishment will depart into it, having themselves also their own soul and their own body, in which they withdrew from the goodness of God.36

Behr summarizes this passage as 'those who have pleased God in their body, soul, and Spirit will be raised in their body, soul, and Spirit.'37 The corollary, however, that he draws from the post-resurrection possession of the body, soul, and Spirit by those who please God is difﬁcult to sustain. He declares, 'the parallel dynamics of these texts, and the fact that it is in their body, soul, and Spirit that they have pleased God, demand that it is also in their body, soul, and Spirit that the others have shown themselves worthy of punishment.'38 Though Behr does not say so here, such a reading of this passage supports his contention that the Spirit is present to Adam throughout his apostasy.

Yet, this text only 'demands' that the Spirit is present in an individual while that person engages in sinful activity if one assumes that the Spirit is present in all human beings—those who are adopted as children of God and those who are not.39 I have, however, just shown that such an assumption is untenable because it lacks adequate textual support. Therefore, it is unnecessary to read

'Spirit' into the second sentence.

That being the case, an alternative interpretation emerges. We can just as well understand Irenaeus to differentiate here between that which constitutes the person resurrected to eternal life and that which constitutes the person who departs into eternal punishment. That is to say, those who are enrolled for life shall rise again having their body, soul, and Spirit, in which they pleased

35 Behr (2000: 101).

36 I have followed Rousseau in rendering corpora/ÆÆ, animas/łıåa, and Spiritus/ —ÆÆ in the singular. Rousseau explains the plural uses of Spiritus/—ÆÆ as conforming to Irenaeus' understanding of the Spirit as the third element of the perfect person: insofar as each person has his or her Spirit, then there are many Spirits (SC 293, 1982: 341).

37 Behr (2000: 101).

38 Ibid. 101; author's emphasis.

39 The reader should note that Irenaeus does not entertain the possibility that the person who possesses the Spirit will continue to engage in activity worthy of punishment. The discussion in AH 5.8.2 is a good example of his thought: 'Those, then, who have the earnest of the Spirit and are not enslaved to the desires of the ﬂesh, but are themselves subject to the Spirit and are living according to reason in all things, does the apostle rightly call "spiritual," because the Spirit of God dwells in them . . . But those who do indeed reject the counsel of the Spirit, on the other hand, are enslaved to pleasures [of the ﬂesh] and live contrary to reason and without restraint plunge into their desires, [are those who] have no desire for the Spirit of God at all.' He does not imagine a middle state, in which a person possesses the Spirit and yet continues to engage in sinful activity.

The Salviﬁc Spirit

God, while those who are worthy of punishment will endure it in their soul and body, 'in which they withdrew from the goodness of God.'40 According to this reading, AH 2.33.5 contains a considered statement expressing the absence of the Spirit in those who do not please God and will not experience the resurrection to eternal life: the exact opposite of Behr's understanding.41

To this point, we have shown that the passages thought to establish that Irenaeus held the Spirit to be present to all human beings regardless of their relationship with God are inadequate to the task.42 There are no grounds for saying that those 'who remain in their created state,' those who have not been adopted as sons of God, can receive 'the Spirit as the Spirit is present throughout creation.'43 As a result, there is no basis to declare that it is the presence of the life-creating Spirit in every human being that creates the soul or breath of life which animates each person, that is, gives to them temporal life.44

On the other hand, several passages we have discussed indicate Irenaeus understood the Spirit to be present with believers throughout the divine economy. Prior to the Fall, Adam and Eve enjoyed unbroken communion with God.

Irenaeus says the Word walked and talked with them in the Garden,45 and in AH 3.23.5, he states that Adam had received 'a robe of sanctity' from the Spirit: 'this robe of sanctity which I (Adam) had from the Spirit (eam quam habui ab Spiritu sanctitatis stolam), I have lost by disobedience.'

The 'robe of sanctity' is often identiﬁed with the Holy Spirit, producing the reading that Adam and Eve possessed the Holy Spirit until their Fall.46 Yet,

Irenaeus does not make this identiﬁcation himself. The grammatical construction of the sentence is straightforward: stolam is the direct object since it is in the accusative, whereas ab Spiritu modiﬁes the verb since it is in the ablative. Since the context of the sentence contains no reason to take the extraordinary step of dismissing the signiﬁcance of the grammatical structure in order to identify the 40 According to this reading the parallel that exists between these two sentences consists in the common cause and effect, or condition and consequence, that governs the outcome of a person's life. The parallel, however, does not extend beyond this governing structure to that which is involved in the cause and effect, to the terms of each sentence: soul, body, and Spirit, or soul and body.

41 The added beneﬁt of this reading is that it regards the text as containing a careful statement by Irenaeus, rather than approaching it as containing a careless parallel that needs interpolation to be understood.

42 I have not yet dealt with AH 5.6.1, but other than de Andia's misguided reading (1986: 71), all agree that the presence of the Spirit in that passage refers to believers alone.

43 Behr (2000: 105).

44 This conclusion agrees with Irenaeus' comment in AH 3.24.1: 'For where the church is, there is the Spirit of God; and where the Spirit of God is, there is the church and every grace: indeed, the Spirit is truth.'

45 Prf 12; Theophilus makes a similar statement in Autol 2.22.

46 e.g. Klebba (1894: 33–4); Jaschke, Der Heilige Geist (1976: 256–7); de Andia (1986: 96–7);

Fantino (1986: 160–2). The identiﬁcation of the 'robe of sanctity' as the pre-lapsarian possession of the Holy Spirit is often combined with the restoration theme in Irenaeus in order to say that the presence of the Holy Spirit lost by Adam is regained following the work of Christ.

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit robe and the Spirit, we should understand Adam to be saying he had received from the Spirit a 'robe of sanctity.' Both Wingren and Behr have drawn the same conclusion and offer similar understandings of what the 'robe' represents.

Wingren holds the 'robe of sanctity' to be the righteousness received by the Spirit,47 and Behr states the 'robe' represents the holiness of God that Adam and Eve received from the Spirit and continued to possess until the Fall.48

Less often, the pre-lapsarian presence of the Spirit is afﬁrmed by means of Irenaeus' statement in Prf 11 that God mixed 'his own power' with the earth in order to form Adam.49 Yet, Behr has shown that the 'power' in Prf 11 should not be identiﬁed with the Holy Spirit either.50 Rather than afﬁrming the pre-lapsarian

'possession' or 'indwelling' of the Holy Spirit by Adam and Eve, a position that has no supporting texts in Irenaeus,51 it is better to afﬁrm the pre-lapsarian

'communion' of Adam and Eve with the Spirit, as illustrated by their reception of the 'garment of sanctity;' a communion they also shared with the Word, who walked and talked with them in Paradise.52 Prior to their Fall, the relationship of Adam and Eve with God was undamaged and they enjoyed the beneﬁts of that relationship: the holiness of the Spirit and personal interaction with the Word.53

As with the presence of the Spirit prior to the Fall, Irenaeus does not describe in detail his understanding of the presence of the Spirit following

47 Wingren (1959: 31–2).

48 Behr (2000: 112). Behr, of course, continues to hold that the Holy Spirit was present with Adam and Eve prior to the Fall, since the Spirit maintains a 'continual nourishing presence' with all people at all times (Ibid. 115).

49 Fantino (1986: 156–7, 160); As noted earlier, Orbe understands this power to be the Spirit referred to in Gen. 1:2, which he regards as an anima mundi (Orbe 1969: 58–77).

50 Behr (2000: 88–9). The identiﬁcation of the power mixed with earth to form Adam in Prf

11 as the Spirit stems from Irenaeus' somewhat similar identiﬁcation of the Spirit with the 'willing rain' of AH 3.17.2 (a passage I discussed in chapter 4, p. 78, 83–5). Rather than comparing Prf 11 with AH 3.17.2, Behr draws a better comparison with AH 5.3.1–3, where

'Irenaeus claims that the ﬂesh which, at the beginning, was skillfully formed by God into its various parts, will by the same power of God be raised from the dead . . . the idea behind both

Dem 11 and AH 5.3.1–3 seems to be that whatever is created receives, and so participates in, the art, the power, and the wisdom of the Creator' (88–9). To this determination, I will add that prior to his reference to power in Prf 11, Irenaeus refers to the Hands as the agents of the formation of Adam's physical aspect. The Spirit as one of the Hands, one of the agents of formation, must be regarded as distinct from that which he is forming.

51 De Andia (1986: 101–3) offers a unique interpretation of AH 5.5.1 as saying that Adam possessed the Holy Spirit since Irenaeus states that paradise 'has been prepared for righteous men, such as have the Spirit'. Her argument would have more weight if Adam was the subject of Irenaeus' discussion. As it is however, Irenaeus introduces Adam to establish the providential authority of the Hands of God over the assumption and translation of Elijah and Enoch, and to introduce the topic of paradise. He is not talking about Adam's constitution in paradise, but the constitution of the righteous, who shall go to paradise.

52 If one discounts his notion of the 'continual nourishing presence' of the Spirit, which I have shown to lack a textual basis, then Behr's comments on Irenaeus' protology (2000: 110–12) support the conclusion that Adam and Eve did not possess the Holy Spirit prior to their Fall.

53 Cf. Steenberg's helpful description of Irenaeus' conception of the Fall as 'largely a misdirection of the course of [human] growth' (2008: 153–4; see also, 167–9).

The Salviﬁc Spirit

the Fall and prior to the fulﬁllment of the Christological mission. He is far more interested in the activity of the Spirit following the Christological mission. Nevertheless, we can say Irenaeus maintains that the Spirit was present with the followers of God but not in the same way that the Spirit dwells in believers in Christ. The Spirit enabled the prophetic vision of God,54 helped to establish faith through revelation of Scripture,55 and enabled the recognition of the one God.56 Two of the clearest statements of the Spirit's activity during this period occur in Prf 6 and Prf 56.

Prf 6 offers a concise summary of the Holy Spirit's activity prior to Christ, while distinguishing this activity from his later work after being sent by Christ:

'the Holy Spirit, through whom the prophets prophesied and the patriarchs learnt the things of God and the righteous were led in the path of righteousness, and who, in the last times, was poured out in a new fashion upon the human race renewing man, throughout the world, to God.' The key to differentiating the work of the Spirit after the Fall and prior to the redemptive work of Christ is

Irenaeus' statement that, after being 'poured out in a new fashion,' the Spirit renews human beings—a declaration he never makes about the activity of the Spirit which took place prior to the completion of the Christological mission.57

Prf 56 offers additional insight into the signiﬁcance of the presence of the Spirit prior to versus after Christ, 'For those who died before the manifestation of Christ there is hope, [when raised] at the judgment, to obtain salvation, whoever feared God and died in righteousness, and had the Spirit of God within them, such as the patriarchs, the prophets and the righteous.' Those who had 'the Spirit of God within them' prior to the coming of Christ have hope of salvation at the judgment. While positive, having hope for salvation is not at all equal to becoming 'spiritual even now' and already having 'part of the honor' that has been promised by God, both of which come about by the reception of the Spirit sent by Christ.58

According to Irenaeus, the effect of the presence of the Spirit in the righteous changes because of the historical moment of the Christological mission.59 The

54 AH 4.20.5, 8–10.

55 AH 4.32.2–33.1.

56 AH 4.33.15.

57 I explain why this is the case in chapter 4—the Spirit had to become accustomed to humanity by means of the Incarnation, and only after the completion of Christ's redemptive work is the Spirit able to bring Jesus Christ, Salvation, to believers.

58 AH 5.8.1: 'But we do now receive a certain portion of his (the Lord's) Spirit, [disposing us] towards perfection and preparing us for incorruption, being little by little accustomed to receive and bear God; which also the apostle terms "an earnest," that is, a part of the honor which has been promised to us by God . . . If, then, this earnest is dwelling in us, it renders us spiritual even now, and the mortal is swallowed up by immortality.'

59 The descent of Christ in order to bring salvation to the dead is a good example of the dependence of salvation on the historical moment of the Christological mission: 'For this reason, too, He administered food to them in a recumbent posture, indicating that those who were lying in the earth were they to whom He came to impart life. As Jeremiah declares, "The holy Lord

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit completion of Christ's redemptive work enables the Spirit sent by Christ to renew human beings, that is, to restore eternal life to the fallen human race.

Irenaeus is far more interested in this period of the Spirit's activity, and it is toward a discussion of this addition of the Spirit to the believer in Christ that we now move. The next section of this chapter will show that Irenaeus conceives of the human being as constituted by body and soul alone.

6.2 THE BIPARTITE CONSTITUTION

OF THE HUMAN BEING

The majority of the passages containing the clearest statements with regard to the composition of the human being occur in AH 5, so it is ﬁtting that the ﬁrst section of the book contains a pertinent passage. AH 5.1.1 reads, 'the Lord thus has redeemed us through His own blood, giving His soul for our souls, and His ﬂesh for our ﬂesh.'60 Irenaeus' description of the dynamic of redemption implies that the redemption of human beings is a matter of the soul and ﬂesh alone: Jesus gave 'his soul for our souls, and his ﬂesh for our ﬂesh.' Since the redemptive work of Jesus covered the need of the whole human being, and since Irenaeus only refers to the giving of Jesus' soul and ﬂesh for our soul and ﬂesh, we can infer that the soul and ﬂesh constitute the whole human being.61

A similar statement occurs in AH 5.20.1, where the soul and body compose the 'complete man' (totius hominis) who awaits salvation:

But the path of those belonging to the Church circumscribes the whole world . . . and gives unto us to see that the faith of all is one and the same, since all receive one and the same God the Father . . . and await the same salvation of the complete man (totius hominis), that is, of the soul and body.62

If we are correct to understand these passages as revealing that the salvation of the whole human being concerns the body and soul alone, reﬂecting thereby remembered His dead Israel, who slept in the land of sepulture; and He descended to them to make known to them His salvation, that they might be saved"' (AH 4.22.1, ANF translation). See also, AH 4.27.2.

60 ANF translation. Cf. Clement of Rome (1946: 49): 'Jesus Christ our Lord gave his blood for us by the will of God, his body for our bodies, his soul for our souls' (tr. Kleist; ACW 1).

61 An earlier statement in AH 3.22.1 supports this conclusion. In arguing that Jesus is human as we are, he writes: 'But every one will allow that we are a body taken from the earth, and a soul receiving Spirit from God. This, therefore, the Word of God was made, recapitulating in himself his own formation' (my translation with reference to the ANF). Jaschke shows that this text refers to the Holy Spirit and not a human spirit (Der Heilige Geist, 1976: 298), an argument constructed against Orbe's reading of the passage (1969: 76–7).

62 ANF translation.

The Salviﬁc Spirit

the composition of the whole human being,63 then we would expect to ﬁnd the same understanding of the composition of the human being in Irenaeus' comments with regard to its creation and its future resurrection from the dead and consequent reconstitution. Just such a passage exists in AH 5.3.2:

For if he does not vivify what is mortal and does not bring back the corruptible to incorruption, he is not a God of power. But that He is powerful in all these respects, we ought to perceive from our origin, inasmuch as God taking dust from the earth, formed man. And surely it is more difﬁcult and incredible, from non-existent bones, and nerves, and veins, and the rest of man's organization to bring it about that all this should be, and to make man an animated and rational creature, than to reintegrate again that which had been created and then afterwards decomposed into earth, for the reasons already mentioned, having thus passed into those

[elements] from which man, who had no previous existence, was formed.64

Irenaeus argues that the power exhibited by God in the original creation of the human being proves that the same God is able 'to reintegrate' a person at the time of the resurrection. For this logic to hold, that which is reintegrated must be the same as that which was ﬁrst created. Though his description of creation focuses a bit more on the ﬂesh with the statements, 'inasmuch as God taking dust from the earth, formed man' and 'non-existent bones, and nerves, and veins,' he also refers to the bestowal of the soul at the time of creation: 'and to make man an animated and rational creature.'65 Thus, the human origin that reveals the power of God and guarantees the future resurrection and reconstitution of the same human being refers to the ﬂesh that was formed from the dust and the bestowal of the soul on that which was formed.66 So, the human being that was created and will be recreated, consists of the body and soul.67

63 Behr dismisses passages that occur 'in the context of exhorting his readers to live righteously in both soul and body, or, alternatively, of defending the resurrection of both,' declaring they are 'not sufﬁcient deﬁnitions of the living man' because both the soul and the body must participate in life to be living (2000: 98). There is, however, a difference in deﬁning the constitution of the human being versus explaining how that which constitutes the human being comes to life. Unless, of course, one presumes, as Behr does, that the Spirit must be present in the human being for the reception of temporal life. Long ago, Klebba (1894: 164–6) used almost all of the passages I do here, plus many others, to afﬁrm the bipartite composition of the human being as body and soul.

64 ANF translation.

65 On the soul making the human being animated and rational, see for instance AH 5.1.3: 'at the beginning of our formation, that breath of life which proceeded from God, having been united to what had been fashioned, animated the man and manifested him as an animal being endowed with reason (animal rationabile)' (my translation with reference to the ANF).

66 Cf. Prf 42, 'for it is [also] by this Spirit that the resurrection comes to believers, the body receiving back again the soul and, together with it, is raised by the power of the Holy Spirit and is led into the Kingdom of God.'

67 Klebba considered this argument settled in 1894 when he declared, 'Möchte doch nunmehr die Behauptung von einem Trichotomismus des hl. Irenaeus für immer aus den Büchern verschwinden!' (Klebba 1894: 166).

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit

6.3 THE LIFE-GIVING ACTIVITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

We may now consider the activity of the Spirit in the giving of temporal and eternal life to human beings. In this section I will argue several points. First, all human beings receive temporal life by the instrumentality and not the presence of the Holy Spirit. Second, while the presence of the Spirit is the basis for its activity in believers, Irenaeus highlights the instrumentality of the Spirit in the giving of the power or grace that renders temporal life eternal. Third,

Irenaeus conceives of one kind of life that modulates between temporal and eternal according to a power/grace dynamic. Fourth, the instrumentality, not the presence, of the Spirit guarantees the existence of one Source of life.

Prior to entering deeper into this discussion it will be helpful to locate the addition and attendant work of the Spirit in the timeline of redemption. We will take a moment, then, to consider Irenaeus' understanding of the divine economy. As I mentioned above, Behr has discerned that Irenaeus conceives of the divine economy as being 'a movement from animation to viviﬁcation.'68

Thus, 'as Adam was animated by the breath of life, so (the resurrected) Christ was viviﬁed by the Spirit, as also will be those who, as adopted sons in him, presently have the pledge of the Spirit.'69 Adam and Eve enjoyed immortality as a result of their possession of the 'order and strength' of the breath of life:70 as long as they remained obedient to the command of God, they preserved the strength and order of the breath of life, and kept the 'robe of sanctity' given to them by the Spirit. The Fall ruptured the relationship of Adam and Eve with God, including the communion they enjoyed with the Word and Spirit, and caused them to lose the immortality proper to the 'strength and order' of the soul.71 As a result, the eternal life they enjoyed was reduced to temporal life, their likeness to God was lost, and as I have shown earlier, the presence of the Word and Spirit once experienced by all of humanity, since righteousness prevailed prior to the Fall, became the exclusive domain of those who possessed the proper relationship with God. Such was the state of the human race until the completion of the redemptive work of Christ, which is brought to humanity by his sending of the Holy Spirit.72

68 Behr (2000: 86).

69 Ibid. 9. As I have previously noted, Irenaeus identiﬁes the breath of life with the soul (e.g.

AH 5.7.1).

70 Ibid. 107, 111–15. Koch, long ago, preceded Behr in recognizing that the immortality of Adam and Eve depended upon their maintenance of the 'order and strength' of the breath of life

(1925: 206–8). Both base their positions on Prf 14–15: '[14] and while the breath remains in [its] order and strength, it is without comprehension or understanding of what is evil . . . [15] And He

(God) placed certain limits upon him (Adam), so that, if he should keep the commandment he would remain always as he was, that is, immortal.'

71 Prf 15; for their communion with the Word and Spirit, see Prf 12 and AH 3.23.5.

72 For more on the sending of the Spirit by Christ and the consequent work of the Spirit, see my earlier comments on the Unction of Christ and the Unction of the Church in chapter 3.

The Salviﬁc Spirit

As I have mentioned several times now, Behr argues that every human being enjoys 'the continual nourishing presence of the Spirit,' a presence of the Spirit that 'was bestowed (on those adopted as sons) in a new manner in Christ at the end of time.'73 While Behr attempts to substantiate the presence of the Spirit to every human being throughout time by means of the texts already covered in this study, his assertion ﬂows out of the following determination: 'if one holds that the life-creating Spirit was not present to the human race during the course of the apostasy, then one must also postulate a separate source of life, a breath of life, which is merely physical and has nothing to do with communion with God.'74

This determination is itself intended to sustain two valid and important readings of Irenaeus, each of which will factor into the following portion of this examination. First, Irenaeus conceives of just one type of life: a physical or biological life.75 And second, Irenaeus conceives of just one source of life: the Spirit.76 Despite the validity of these two readings, the determination itself is misguided because the afﬁrmation of one source of life does not logically require the continual presence of God, namely, the Holy Spirit, but just the continual instrumentality of the Holy Spirit. And, I contend, this latter understanding best represents Irenaeus' thought.

Irenaeus' discussions with regard to both the bestowal of temporal life, which involves the creation of the breath of life, by the Spirit, and the bestowal of eternal life by the Spirit, bear out my contention that in his mind life depends upon the instrumentality, not the presence, of the Spirit. We will

73 Behr (2000: 97).

74 Ibid. 97. Steenberg (2008: 131–4) follows Behr (to whom he refers, p. 130 n. 103) in placing too strong an emphasis on the presence of the Spirit in his discussion of the animation of the soul.

75 Behr (2000: esp. pp. 93–7). For instance, he writes: 'there is no suggestion (speaking of AH

5.3.3) that they (the temporal life all human beings enjoy and the eternal life which viviﬁes in the resurrection) are two different types of life: physical/biological and spiritual/the presence of the Spirit' (pp. 96–7). Behr ﬁrst supports this position with a reading of AH 2.34.3–4 that interprets

Irenaeus' references to 'life' in that passage to refer to physical or biological life, a life lived in the ﬂesh, which has the potential to continue forever (pp. 92–6). This reading of AH 2.34.3–4 stands against that of Rousseau, NRT 99 (1977: 842–3, 854); SC 293 (1987: 345–9, esp. 347). While

I follow Behr's reading of Irenaeus as referring to only one type of life, refusing a spiritualphysical division, I agree with Rousseau that the soul does not live by its own nature and that the condemned are not annihilated, the arguments which are the context for his statements about supernatural life, SC 293 (1982: 346); NRT 99 (1977: esp. p. 843, 847–8); Rousseau is arguing against Lassiat (1974: 165–6); and NRT 100 (1978: 399–417, esp. 405, 411–12). Behr offers a necessary clariﬁcation of Rousseau's reference to the 'natural immortality' of the soul, when he states that the endurance of the soul after death can occur without life, i.e. when not immortal, as it does with the condemned (2000: 95). According to Irenaeus, eternal life belongs only to the righteous who are united to God; those who experience eternal punishment do not possess 'life', because they are separated from God.

76 Behr (2000: esp. 97, 105–8 where he works from AH 5.12.1-2). In making this argument, he seeks to stay true to Wingren's earlier work which demonstrated that all life ﬂows from God and is communion with God. Behr notes Wingren (1989: 14, 54 n. 36, 108, 120).

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit consider ﬁrst the role of the Spirit in the bestowal of temporal life, and then his role in the bestowal of eternal life. AH 5.12.2 contains his clearest comments on the creation by the Spirit of the breath of life, or soul, which is the means by which the Spirit gives temporal life to the human being. The passage is of particular signiﬁcance to my reading because Behr utilizes it to afﬁrm that there is one Source of life.77 Hence, it is important to show that in this passage, the instrumentality of the Spirit alone, and not its presence, is the basis for the afﬁrmation of one Source of life. AH 5.12.1–2 reads:

Moreover, the ﬁrst life (temporal life) has been expelled, because it had not been given by the Spirit but by the breath. For the breath of life, which makes man animated,78 is one thing, and the vivifying Spirit, which makes him spiritual, is another.79 And because of this Isaiah says, 'Thus says the Lord, who made heaven and established it, who founded the earth and the things which are in it, and gave breath to the people upon it, and Spirit to those walking upon it' [Isa. 42:5].

Saying, indeed, the breath has been given in common80 to each person on the earth, but the Spirit exclusively81 to these who trample under earthly desires. And because of which the same Isaiah, distinguishing the same things already mentioned, again says, 'for the Spirit shall go forth from me, and I have made every breath' [Isa. 57:16]. Indeed, he regards the Spirit as belonging in the rank of God,82 which in the last times he has poured out on the human race by the adoption of sons, but the breath [he has given] in common to creatures, and proclaims it a thing made. Now what has been made is other than the one who has made it. Therefore, the breath is transitory, while the Spirit is eternal.

This selection from AH 5.12.1–2 contains several points I wish to bring forward, but beforehand, a note. By the ﬁfth book of Against Heresies the language of animation and viviﬁcation ought to be considered technical:83 that which viviﬁes is the Spirit, and that which animates is the breath of life or the soul. Animation refers to the bestowal of temporal life, while viviﬁcation refers to the bestowal of eternal life.84 So, in the opening line of this pericope, the one

77 Behr (2000: 105–8).

78 łıåØŒe IæªÆÇ Å e ¼Łæø ; animalem efﬁcit hominem.

79 —FÆ Çø Ø F . . . ıÆØŒe ÆPe I º F; Spiritus viviﬁcans . . . spiritalem eum efﬁcit.

80 ˚ ØH; communiter.

81 ø; proprie.

82 e b —FÆ N ø Kd F ¨ F Æ; Spiritum quidem proprie in Deo deputans.

83 I brieﬂy trace the language of animation and viviﬁcation present in AH 5 in the Excursus located after chapter 4 of this work.

84 AH 5.3.3 contains Irenaeus' key discussion with regard to the terminology of 'temporal' and 'eternal' life; a portion of this passage is printed below. I prefer the terms 'temporal life' and 'eternal life' because they are easy to understand, and because they indicate that Irenaeus has in mind two modalities of the one life. A point of clariﬁcation with regard to my usage of this terminology is necessary: by 'eternal life' I am referring to immortality, incorruptibility, the eternal life that comes to those who please God and which they live with him; not included in this

'eternal life' is the continual existence experienced by the souls relegated to punishment. On this

The Salviﬁc Spirit

who is animated possesses temporal life, while the one who is spiritual possesses eternal life. This discussion, then, concerns the different ways in which these two modalities of life come to a human being.

In the course of his explanation, Irenaeus makes three points relevant to this present study. First, the breath of life has been given 'to each person on the earth.' Second, in contrast to the breath of life, the Spirit has been given to a select group of people: those 'who trample under earthly desires,' those who have experienced the 'adoption of sons.' Third, the Spirit creates the breath of life: 'Now what has been made is other than the one who has made it.

Therefore, the breath is transitory, while the Spirit is eternal.'

It is clear from these points that Irenaeus associates the temporal life of animation with the presence of the breath of life, and the eternal life of viviﬁcation with the presence of the Spirit. The only connection he makes in this passage between the Spirit and the existence of temporal life in each human being is the Spirit's creation of the breath of life. Insofar as the Spirit creates the breath of life, we can say that the Spirit is the ultimate source of temporal life,85 as the breath is the immediate source of temporal life for the human being. The Spirit is not, then, the ultimate source of temporal life because of its presence in each animated person, but because of its activity in creating the breath. Irenaeus' careful restriction of the presence of the Spirit to those who experience the adoption of sons underscores this reading: while the Spirit creates the breath of life that is present in all people, the Spirit itself is only present to a select group of people.

While in AH 5.12.1–2 Irenaeus associates temporal life with the presence of the breath of life and eternal life with the presence of the Spirit, he does not detail the dynamic involved in the reception of either temporal or eternal life. We gain insight, however, into the process whereby eternal life follows from the reception of the Spirit from his discussion in AH 5.6.2 through

AH 5.8.1:86

(AH 5.6.2) . . . that our bodies are raised not from their own substance (substantia), but by the power (virtute) of God, he says to the Corinthians, 'Now the body is not for fornication, but for the Lord, and the Lord for the body. And God has raised the Lord and will also raise us up by His own power (virtutem)' [1 Cor.

6:13–14]. type of continual existence, see Rousseau, NRT 99 (1977: 834–64) and SC 293 (1982: 346); and Behr (2000: 95).

85 In AH 2.34.4 Irenaeus says the soul, the breath of life, itself partakes in life: 'But as the animal body is certainly not itself the soul, yet has fellowship with the soul as long as God pleases; so the soul herself is not life, but partakes in that life bestowed upon her by God' (ANF translation). I will soon argue that the bestowal of temporal life upon the soul belongs to the agency of the Holy Spirit.

86 I treated aspects of this discussion with regard to the gloriﬁcation of Jesus in chapter 4, pp. 68–70, 73, 75–7.

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit (AH 5.7.2) He has taught, beyond all doubt, that neither of the soul nor of the Spirit is he speaking,87 but of the bodies that are dead. For these are animal bodies

(corpora animalia), that is, [bodies] which partake of a soul, which when they have lost, they die; then, rising by means of the Spirit, they become spiritual bodies (corpora spiritalia), so that by the Spirit they may have an ever-lasting life.

(AH 5.8.1) But we do now receive a certain portion of his (the Lord's) Spirit, [disposing us] towards perfection and preparing us for incorruption, being little by little accustomed to receive and bear God; which also the apostle terms 'an earnest,' that is, a part of the honor which has been promised to us by God. .. If, then, this earnest is dwelling in us, it renders us spiritual even now, and the mortal is swallowed up by immortality [2 Cor. 5:4]. .. If therefore, at the present time, having the earnest, we cry out, 'Abba, Father,' what will happen when, on rising again, we will see him face to face; when all the members shall burst out into a continuous hymn of exultation, glorifying Him who raised them from the dead, and gave the gift of eternal life? For if the earnest, gathering man into itself, even now causes him to say,

'Abba, Father,' what will the complete grace of the Spirit (universa Spiritus gratia) effect, which will be given to human beings by God? It will render us like unto Him, and will accomplish the will of the Father; for it will make a human being after the image and likeness of God.

In AH 5.6.2 Irenaeus states the 'power of God' will raise the bodies of believers from the dead, just as his power resurrected Jesus. In AH 5.7.2 he clariﬁes that the resurrection, which will occur by the power of God in AH 5.6.2, will be the work of the Spirit.88 In AH 5.8.1 he transitions from speaking of the future resurrection alone to include the effect of the reception of the Spirit during this present time. The Spirit renders believers 'spiritual even now' as the 'mortal is swallowed up by immortality.' This is not the simple result of the presence of the Spirit as the ﬁrst sentence of AH 5.8.1 suggests, but rather, as Irenaeus explains, it is caused by the grace imparted to the believer by the Spirit who is present in that person. This is clear from the leading question he asks his readers: 'what will the complete grace of the Spirit effect, which will be given to human beings by God

(at the resurrection)?'89 The idea being that if a portion of the Spirit's grace results in the believer's adoption as a son of God ('even now causes him to say, "Abba,

Father"'), which entails the swallowing up of mortality by immortality even now, then the complete grace of the Spirit will resurrect the dead to eternal life.90

87 Referring to 1 Cor. 15:43–4.

88 In fact, Irenaeus makes this point earlier in AH 5.7.1, when he quotes Rom. 8:11, 'But if the Spirit of him who raised Christ from the dead dwell in you, He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies' (ANF translation).

89 Contra Daniélou and Jaschke. Daniélou (1975: 363) states that the grace the Father gives to the Son, and the Son pours out on the Church, is the Spirit. Jaschke says the Spirit and grace cannot be differentiated in Irenaeus (Der Heilige Geist 1976: 299, 299 n. 23).

90 In AH 4.20.5, we see that the resurrection of the dead to eternal life involves granting to the resurrected believer 'immortality for eternal life.'

The Salviﬁc Spirit

When we read all of these passages together, as is proper since they belong to the same lengthy discussion, we see that it is not the presence of the Spirit but the agency of the Spirit that is responsible for the resurrection to eternal life and for the present participation in eternal life experienced by the believer.

Moreover, it is clear that the 'power' mentioned in AH 5.6.2 and the 'complete grace' spoken of in AH 5.8.1 refer to the same 'thing'—that which the Spirit gives to the believer in the process of viviﬁcation.

Even more clariﬁcation on this process comes from AH 5.3.3:

But if this temporal life,91 which is much weaker92 than eternal life,93 is nevertheless sufﬁciently able to vivify our mortal members, why should not eternal life, which is more effective,94 vivify the ﬂesh, which is already exercised and accustomed to bear the life?

In this crucial text we ﬁnd what I have already mentioned with reference to Behr, that Irenaeus conceives of temporal life and eternal life as two modalities of the same life.95 As such, there is only one type of life—the life lived by the human being. We should not, however, stop with the observation that Irenaeus has in mind two modalities of one life, for grasping what it is that causes life to modulate from temporal to eternal provides the thread that ties together all of the passages we have just been discussing.

Irenaeus declares that life is either 'much weaker,' that is temporal, or 'more effective,' that is eternal. The question as to what causes life to go from being

'much weaker' to being 'more effective' ﬁnds a ready answer in the passages from AH 5.6.2 through AH 5.8.1 which we have just discussed. We have seen that in those passages, Irenaeus says believers receive even now a portion of the grace (gratia) or power (virtus) that, when it comes in full at the time of the resurrection, produces eternal life. That is to say, the person who has temporal life, which is 'much weaker' according to AH 5.3.3, is given a certain amount of grace or power upon the reception of the Spirit that renders them 'spiritual even now.' That same person is then given the complete grace or power at the time of the resurrection, at which time he or she will experience eternal life, which is 'more effective' according to AH 5.3.3. It is, then, the degree of power or grace inhering in or sustaining one's life that determines whether that life is temporal or eternal.

91 e æŒÆØæ ÇB; temporalis vita.

92 — ººﬁH IŁ æ ; multo inﬁrmior.

93 B ÆNø Æ ÇøB; aeterna vita.

94 ı æÆØŒø æÆ; tantum potens.

95 Behr offers a good discussion with regard to how the argument in this passage would fall apart if we understood Irenaeus to be referring to two different types of life (2000: 96–7). See also my discussion of the destruction that follows from the combination of contrary natures and the increase that follows from the combination of similar natures (chapter 5, pp. 138–40).

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit We can say, then, that Irenaeus conceives of the temporal and eternal modalities of life to be points on the 'line of life' which correspond to the degree of power or grace given to an individual. The temporal life possessed by all human beings corresponds to the minimal possession of power/grace, the eternal life experienced even now by believers corresponds to a life empowered/

'engraced' more than temporal life but less than the eternal life experienced at the resurrection, and the eternal life at the resurrection entails the reception of the 'complete grace' or full empowerment.96 Since Irenaeus states the Holy

Spirit creates the breath of life (AH 5.12.2), and since the Holy Spirit bestows on the believer power/grace for eternal life in part now and in fullness at the resurrection (AH 5.6.2, 5.8.1), it seems reasonable to conclude the Spirit also bestows the degree of power/grace that results in the temporal life that comes through the reception of the breath of life.97 Therefore, it is the instrumentality and not the presence of the Holy Spirit that guarantees the existence of only one

Source of life, for the Spirit creates the breath of life and bestows the appropriate amounts of power or grace which correspond to temporal and eternal life.

Moreover, while this discussion has referred to the post-lapsarian modalities of life, it accords well with Irenaeus' description of the pre-lapsarian eternal life experienced by Adam and Eve as due to the continuance of the breath of life in its 'order and strength.'98 It makes sense to understand the transition from the pre-lapsarian breath of life, characterized by 'order and strength' (eternal life), to the post-lapsarian breath of life, characterized by the loss of that 'order and strength' (temporal life), to have occurred according to the same dynamic that governs the transition from the post-lapsarian temporal life to eternal life.

The Fall, then, entailed the loss of the degree of power/grace that had sustained the 'order and strength' of the breath of life. This is conﬁrmed by a statement in AH 4.38.4, 'But since we (i.e. the human race as represented by Adam and Eve) could not bear the power (potestatem) of divinity, [God] says, "But you will

96 We can represent this scheme according to the following line graph:

Complete Power/Grace Minimal Power/Grace Temporal Life Eternal Life Experienced Now Eternal Life At Resurrection The line of Life 97 In this way, we would read AH 2.34.4, noted above, as referring to the agency of the Spirit.

98 Prf 14; see p. 166 n. 70 for the relevant quotation.

The Salviﬁc Spirit

die like men."' Since the salvation made possible by Christ entails the immediate addition of a degree of power/grace and the eventual addition of the complete power/grace at the resurrection, we may characterize the divine economy as the means by which God restores the degree of power/ grace necessary for eternal life that the human race lost by the Fall.99

6.4 PERFECTION, LIKENESS, ETERNALITY

Having identiﬁed the dynamic by which the life-giving activity of the Holy Spirit operates in the believer, I would like to ﬁnish this chapter by considering the terminology Irenaeus uses to describe the state of the believer who has received the Spirit and its concomitant gift of power/grace. Examining Irenaeus' description of the human being who possesses the Holy Spirit as 'perfect' or 'like unto God' will both give us additional insight into the effect of the presence of the Spirit in the believer, and insight into the ultimate state of the believer as 'perfect,' 'eternal,' 'like' God.100 The most fundamental passage in this regard is AH 5.6.1; and as such, I will include a lengthy quotation:

For by the Hands of the Father, that is, by the Son and the Holy Spirit, the human being, and not merely a part of the human being, was made in the likeness of God.

Now the soul and Spirit can be a part of the human being, but by no means the human being; for the perfect (perfectus) human being is the commingling and union of the soul receiving the Spirit of the Father, and the admixture of that ﬂesh which was formed after the image of God. And because of this the apostle says,

'We speak wisdom among them that are perfect' [1 Cor. 2:6], calling 'perfect' those who have received the Spirit of God, and who through the Spirit speak in all languages, as even he himself used to speak, and just as we hear many brothers in 99 In so saying, I do not mean to equate pre-lapsarian eternal life with eternal life in Christ.

Such an equation would suggest that Irenaeus conceived of eternal life in Christ as returning believers to the status quo ante—the pre-lapsarian state of being. But such an understanding would not suit his conception of the divine economy as a progression from animation to viviﬁcation (Behr 2000: 95) provides two other reasons in addition to this one), nor would it suit his understanding of humanity as undergoing continual increase or growth (as I have already discussed in chapter 2 of this work). Rather, I am just arguing that according to Irenaeus, the addition or subtraction of power/grace is the dynamic by which life ﬂuctuates between the modalities of temporal and eternal.

100 J. Fantino has distinguished two senses of similitudo in Irenaeus' writing. First, when similitudo translates › ØÅ, it refers to the human free will which makes a person similar to his

Creator, the Father; this likeness to God has remained unsullied by the Fall of Adam. Second, when similitudo translates øØ, Fantino believes it refers to the presence of the Holy Spirit, which in contrast to free will is lost at the time of the Fall (Fantino 1986: 110–18). My discussion in this section of the human being's likeness to God concerns this second sense, that which was lost and will be restored in full at the resurrection. It may be beneﬁcial to point out that Irenaeus locates the image of God in the physical form of each human being (AH 2.7.6, 2.19.6, 5.12.4, Prf

11 and 22; see Fantino 1986: 87–9, 99–106).

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit the Church, who have prophetic gifts, and who through the Spirit speak all kinds of languages, both making known the secrets of humanity for their beneﬁt and exposing the mysteries of God. Who the apostle also calls 'spiritual,' being spiritual by partaking of the Spirit and not by a deprivation and removal of the ﬂesh (and this stripping alone). For if any one take away the substance of ﬂesh, that is, of the handiwork [of God], and understand that which is purely spiritual, such then would not be a spiritual man but would be the spirit of a man, or the Spirit of God. But when this Spirit commingled with the soul is united to the formation, because of the outpouring of the Spirit the human being is rendered spiritual and perfect (perfectus), and this is he who was made after the image and likeness of God. But if the Spirit is lacking from the soul, such a one, remaining in fact animal and carnal, will be imperfect (imperfectus), possessing indeed the image in the formation, but certainly not receiving the likeness through the Spirit.

Moreover, just as this one is imperfect (imperfectus), so too, if someone takes away the image and rejects the formation (plasma), one can no longer perceive a human being, but rather some part of a human being, as we have said, or even something other than a human being. For neither the formation of the ﬂesh itself, by itself, is the perfect (perfectus) human being, but the body of a human being and a part of a human being; nor is the soul itself, by itself, a human being, but the soul of a human being and part of a human being; nor is the Spirit a human being, for it is called the Spirit and not a human being. But the commingling and union of all of these constitutes the perfect (perfectum) human being.

Here Irenaeus is discussing the reception of the Holy Spirit by believers following the sending of the Spirit by Jesus after his resurrection.101 In the course of this discussion Irenaeus says several times that the person who possesses the Spirit is 'perfect.' Yet it appears that perfection is not determined by just the presence or absence of the Spirit, for the 'commingling and union of all of these (the body, soul, and Spirit) constitutes the perfect human being.'102 This suggests that 'perfection' depends equally upon the possession of the body, soul, and Holy Spirit.

101 This is clear from the reference to the 'outpouring of the Spirit' which Irenaeus ties to the sending of the Spirit by Jesus in AH 3.17.1–2, as I discussed in chapter 4. It is conﬁrmed by the references in AH 5.6.1 to the possession of the Spirit at the time of 1 Corinthians, and the possession of the Spirit by members of the Church in Irenaeus' time: 'just as we hear many brothers in the Church . . . '.

102 Behr (2000: 99–100) offers a good discussion of this passage insofar as he makes it clear that Irenaeus is speaking of the addition of the Holy Spirit and not a human spirit to the body and soul of the human being, 'the body and soul can be called "parts" of man in a way in which the Spirit cannot—for it is the Spirit, something other than man'. Yet, he errs when he says this passage discusses the 'eschatologically "perfect" man, made spiritual by the full bestowal of the Spirit in a manner newly made possible by Christ, and so made in the image and likeness of God.'

For as the reader can see, this passage never speaks of differing degrees of the Spirit's presence, so that it is proper to speak of a 'full bestowal of the Spirit.' According to Irenaeus, the Spirit is either present rendering a person 'spiritual and perfect,' or the Spirit is not present, rendering a person

'imperfect.'

The Salviﬁc Spirit

According to Irenaeus, the individual who possesses a soul and body is 'animal,' while the individual who possesses a soul, body, and Spirit is 'spiritual and perfect.' In this way, the believer possesses the Holy Spirit in a manner that is analogous to the possession of the body and soul.103 Irenaeus uses both of the terms 'spiritual' and 'perfect' earlier in the pericope when he says the apostle terms '"perfect" those who have received the Spirit of God . . . just as we hear many brothers in the Church . . . whom the apostle also calls "spiritual," being spiritual by partaking of the Spirit and not by a deprivation and removal of the ﬂesh (and this stripping alone).' Here we see that by deﬁning the 'spiritual and perfect' person as one who has received the addition of the Spirit,

Irenaeus is combating the Gnostic suggestion that a spiritual person is one who sheds the ﬂesh and soul, becoming only Spirit.104 It is this anti-Gnostic polemic, then, that leads him to emphasize the possession by the spiritual person of the body, soul, and Spirit, all three. The 'perfect' human being, then, is the one who possesses, in addition to the body and soul, the Holy Spirit.

The simple reception of the Holy Spirit, however, does not fully explain what Irenaeus means by the term 'perfect.' In AH 5.6.1 he identiﬁes the perfect human being as 'he who was made after the image and likeness of God.'105 Since Irenaeus associates the possession of the image of God with the physical formation of the human being, then Ireneaus is saying the 'likeness of God' comes to a human being by means of the reception of the Spirit.106 That 103 That the possession of the Spirit is not the same as the possession of the body and soul is clear from Irenaeus' identiﬁcation of the body and soul as 'parts' of the human being, a term he does not apply to the Spirit: 'but the body of a human being and a part of a human being; nor is the soul itself, by itself, a human being, but the souls of a human being and part of a human being; nor is the Spirit a human being, for it is called the Spirit and not a human being.'

Nevertheless, the believer does possess the Holy Spirit, as is clear from Irenaeus' quotation of 1 Thess. 5:23 ('Now may the God of peace sanctify you perfect (perfectos), and may your Spirit, and soul, and body be preserved whole without reproach to the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ'), in which he says 'your Spirit.' See Rousseau, SC 152 (1969: 233): 'the Spirit of God who has been given to you and has thus become in some manner your own Spirit;' and also, SC 293 (1982:

339–40), where his comments are well stated, though they do not apply to AH 2.33.5, which is the occasion for them.

104 See for instance, AH 2.29.1.

105 In her attempt to afﬁrm the pre-lapsarian presence of the Spirit, de Andia reasons that if the spiritual and perfect person who possesses the Spirit is made in the image and likeness of God, then Adam, who was made in the image and likeness of God, must have possessed the Spirit

(de Andia 1986: 71). In so doing, she fails to recognize that Adam and Eve were not created perfect, for human beings grow in perfection throughout the divine economy (as I will soon discuss). She cannot, then, reason backwards from Irenaeus' description of the spiritual and perfect person to Adam and Eve's original state of being.

106 Here it is important to note that while the reception of the Spirit is the means by which the likeness of God is restored to human beings, the basis for this restoration is the person and work of Jesus Christ. On this latter point, AH 5.16.2 is instructive: 'When, however, the Word of God became ﬂesh, he conﬁrmed both of these (the original creation in the image and likeness): for he both showed forth the image truly, since He became himself what was his image; and he reestablished the likeness in a sure manner, by assimilating (ı ØÆ) the human being to the invisible Father through the Word made visible (º ı).'

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit the 'likeness' cannot be the simple possession of the Spirit is evident from the fact that Irenaeus never refers to the possession of the Spirit by Adam and Eve, just to their communion with the Holy Spirit.107

Returning to AH 5.8.1 grants additional insight into Irenaeus' understanding of 'perfection:'

But we do now receive a certain portion of his (the Lord's) Spirit, [disposing us] towards perfection and preparing us for incorruption, being little by little accustomed to receive and bear God; which also the apostle terms 'an earnest,' that is, a part of the honor which has been promised to us by God . . . For if the earnest, gathering man into itself, even now causes him to say, 'Abba, Father,' what will the complete grace of the Spirit effect, which will be given to human beings by God? It will render us like unto him, and will accomplish the will of the Father; for it will make a human being after the image and likeness of God.

The possession of the Spirit by the believer, and the grace the Spirit bestows upon its reception, begins to accustom the believer 'to receive and bear

God'—a process Irenaeus describes as '[disposing us] towards perfection' or 'preparing . . . for incorruption.' He gives more details about this period of accustomization in AH 5.8.2, where he writes:

Those, then, who have the earnest of the Spirit and are not enslaved to the desires of the ﬂesh, but are themselves subject to the Spirit and are living according to reason in all things, does the apostle rightly call 'spiritual,' because the Spirit of God dwells in them: indeed, incorporeal spirits will by no means be spiritual human beings,108 but our substance, that is, the union of soul and ﬂesh,109 receiving (assumens) the Spirit of God, makes up the spiritual man (spiritalem hominem perﬁcit110).

Here, the 'spiritual' person is not just an individual who has received the Spirit of God, for the reception of the Spirit entails the subjection of oneself to the Spirit, so that one is freed from the 'desires of the ﬂesh' and walks 'according to reason.' In this way, believers conform to the character of God with whom they are united by means of the Spirit even now. So, with the future resurrection in mind, Irenaeus can say in AH 5.8.1 that believers are now being disposed

'towards perfection,' 'preparing . . . for incorruption,' or, as he says a little later in that passage, 'the mortal is swallowed up by immortality.' Each of 107 As discussed earlier, pp. 161–2.

108 As the Gnostics held, cf. AH 2.29.1.

109 The ANF translator does the English readers of Irenaeus a disservice by rendering this phrase, animae et carnis adunatio, as 'the union of the ﬂesh and spirit.' While Irenaeus clearly states the Spirit is received by the human substance, the soul and body, the ANF translation misleads readers into thinking spirit is a constituent part of the human substance.

110 Rousseau, SC 152 (1969: 244) suggests I º as the original.

The Salviﬁc Spirit

these phrases refers to the transformative effect of the grace of the Spirit in the life of the believer, which renders the believer spiritual or perfect in the present. In the same way Irenaeus can say at the end of AH 5.6.1 that 'the perfect (are those) who both have the Spirit of God remaining always in them, and have preserved their bodies and souls without blame.' Therefore, 'perfection' also refers to the process by which the believer conforms to the character of God at this present time by means of the presence of the Spirit and the concomitant reception of grace.

We have yet, though, to determine what Irenaeus means in AH 5.6.1 when he says the perfect person 'is he who was made after the image and likeness of God.'

AH 5.8.1 makes a similar statement. There, Irenaeus describes the present moment in the believer's life as being disposed 'towards perfection,' the time in which the believer is 'being little by little accustomed to receive and bear God.' If believers are on the way toward perfection now, then at the end of this present period of the believer's life, at the resurrection, the believer arrives at the state of 'perfection' which coincides with the time at which the believer is now able 'to receive and bear God.' Both of these, the state of 'perfection' and the ability 'to receive and bear God,' correspond to the effect of the complete grace of the Spirit to which Irenaeus refers at the end of AH 5.8.1: 'It will render us like unto him, and will accomplish the will of the Father; for it will make a human being after the image and likeness of God.' Therefore, in another sense, the perfect person is the one who at the resurrection is able 'to receive and bear God' and the one who has been rendered 'like unto' God, that is, made 'after (both) the image and likeness of God.' Irenaeus makes a similar statement prior to this in AH 5.1.3: the Word of the Father and the Spirit of God, having been united with the ancient substance of the formation (plasmationis) of Adam rendered (effecit) man living

(viventem) and perfect (perfectum), receptive (capientem) of the perfect Father, in order that as in the animal we all die, so in the spiritual we may all be made alive

(vivicemur). For at no time did Adam escape the Hands of God, to whom the Father speaking, said, 'Let us make man after our image and likeness' [Gen. 1:26].

And on account of this, in the last times, not by the will of the ﬂesh, nor by the will of man [John 1:13], but by the good pleasure of the Father, his Hands have rendered man living (vivum perfecerunt hominem), in order that Adam might be made (ﬁat) after the image and likeness of God.

This passage has, as its proper subject, the Incarnation. Yet, the perfection achieved by the humanity united to the Word in the Incarnation and anointed by the Spirit is both the basis for and the goal of the perfection of the believer.111

Indeed, many of the themes we have encountered in this chapter occur in this passage. As we have seen, the reception of the Spirit (and, here, the 111 We discussed Jesus' ﬂesh as the saving principle for other human beings in chapter 4, esp. pp. 75–7.

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit Word) viviﬁes the human being, granting eternal life. As in AH 5.8.1,

Irenaeus refers to the will of God as the impetus behind the restoration of the likeness to humanity. And as we have just been discussing, union with the Spirit (and Word) renders the human being perfect. Here, though, we ﬁnd a crucial piece of information that Irenaeus does not mention in AH 5.8.1. AH 5.8.1 refers to the state of being at which the believer arrives after the period of accustomization, the state of being at which the believer is able 'to receive and bear God,' that is, the state of being in which the believer is 'like unto' God. According to AH 5.1.3, this state of being corresponds to the state of being of the Father: 'perfect.' The perfect human being is able to receive the perfect Father.

In order to understand this correlation, we must return for a moment to the discussion of AH 2.28.1–3 located in chapter 2 of this study. There,

I observed that one of the keys to distinguishing the divine and human, the Creator from the creature, lies in whether that nature is complete, perfect, or incomplete, perpetually increasing. In comparison to the perfection of the Word and Spirit, human beings are inferior (minores) since creatures experience perpetual increase, and more recent (novissimi) since they are created. As I noted in chapter 2, the discussion of perfection in AH

2.28 has a parallel in AH 4.38.1; we now have the occasion for a closer examination of that passage along with AH 4.38.3. In 4.38, Irenaeus is explaining why God did not create human beings perfect from the start.112

He writes:

(AH 4.38.1) Those which were created by him, insofar as they have a beginning, they would be necessarily inferior to that one who created them. Indeed, it is impossible for uncreated things to be those which are recently created. Moreover, because they are not uncreated, for this reason they fall short of the perfect (º ı/ perfecto). Because as they are newer, so are they infantile, and as they are infantile, so are they unaccustomed to, and unexercised in, perfect discipline . . . (AH 4. 38.3)

For insofar as they have been created, they are not uncreated; but insofar as they continue throughout a long course of ages, they will receive the power of the Uncreated, through the gratuitous bestowal of eternal existence to them by God . . . By this arrangement, therefore, and these rhythms, and this discipline/ movement, the human being, created and formed, is rendered after the image and likeness of the uncreated God—the Father deciding and commanding, the Son

112 Though I disagree with several aspects of his article, including the notion that two mutually incompatible theological systems exist within Irenaeus' writing, Brown does offer a succinct summary of the argument of AH 4.38, in SJT 28 (1975: 17–25, esp. 21–4). On the ideas of perfection and growth in Irenaeus, see Wingren (1959: 26–38). Wingren writes, 'When

Irenaeus refrains from saying that the man whom God created was perfect . . . [there is] no suggestion that there was any weakness, want, or mortality in Adam' (p. 28). And, 'When he says that man lacks perfection he is simply giving expression to the fact that man is created, and therefore, he "grows," he "becomes," but he does not create like God' (pp. 28–9 n. 85).

The Salviﬁc Spirit

executing and forming, the Spirit nourishing and increasing, and the human being slowly making progress and ascending toward perfection (e ºØ ), that is, drawing near to the uncreated One. For the Uncreated is perfect, and this one is God.113

As in AH 2.28.1–3, here perfection is tied to being uncreated. God is perfect because he is not created; human beings are not perfect because they are created. That is to say, God is perfect because he is eternal; human beings are not perfect because they have a beginning in time. Moreover, since human beings are created and, so to speak, younger than the Uncreated, they are

'unaccustomed to, and unexercised in, perfect discipline (c º Æ Iªøª; perfectam disciplinam).' And yet, given the proper amount of time, which allows for the unfolding of the divine economy, including the redemptive work of Christ and the reception of the Spirit as discussed in AH 4.38.2, human beings 'will receive the power of the Uncreated, through the gratuitous bestowal of eternal existence' and will be 'rendered after the image and likeness of the uncreated God,' once again tying together the reception of power and grace with eternal life and the restoration of the likeness of God. He concludes by characterizing this process as a gradual ascent114 to the perfect, which, he is careful to say, does not result in human beings being as perfect as God, but rather results in their approximation to God, the uncreated One, the perfect One.

Believers then experience an unending ascent in which, as human beings, they grow increasingly more perfect, ever closer to the nature of God, but never arriving. Perfection or the state of being uncreated is, in the simplest of terms, eternality. Strictly speaking, the Creator alone, the one who has no beginning or end, is perfect or uncreated—eternal. As a result, human beings, as creatures, will never be as perfect/eternal as the Uncreated. Yet, human beings can by the power/grace of God, inasmuch as it is possible for a creature, become perfect, eternal. In so becoming, human beings are 'like'

God, but just 'like' God, for the perfection or eternal life acquired by human beings is one that suits the creature, that which has a beginning and remains ever increasing.

When we combine AH 4.38.1 and 4.38.3 with AH 5.1.3, AH 5.6.1 and AH 5.8.1–2 it becomes clear that Irenaeus envisioned the life of the human being as having the potential to go from imperfection to perfection. We can speak of a growth in perfection that corresponds to the movement of the divine economy from animal to spiritual. No human beings, as creatures, are perfect at the time of their creation.115 This includes Adam and Eve, who, nevertheless, prior to the Fall possessed a soul characterized by 'order and strength' which afforded them

113 Cf. AH 2.34.2.

114 Cf. AH 5.8.1: 'being little by little accustomed to receive and bear God.'

115 AH 4.38.1.

Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit eternal life as long as they remained obedient, maintaining this quality of the soul.116

As I argued earlier, it makes sense for us to understand the 'order and strength' of the soul as being due to the power/grace of the Spirit, but the Fall disrupted the communion of Adam and Eve with the Spirit, which resulted in the loss of the power/grace that sustained the 'order and strength' of their souls.117 The post-lapsarian status of Adam and Eve as possessors of temporal life alone carried over into their progeny; so that following the Fall, all human beings possess just the minimal amount of power/grace, granted by the Spirit to the soul, that results in temporal life.118

Yet, some human beings, those who choose to believe in Christ, receive the Holy Spirit and the attendant increase in power/grace.119 At the time of the reception of the Spirit, these human beings ﬁrst qualify to be called 'perfect' or 'spiritual,' not because they are as perfect as they can be, but because they have an 'earnest' of their future perfection in their possession of the Holy Spirit120 and because they are increasing in perfection.121

These human beings, who have received the Holy Spirit, will receive at the time of their resurrection the fullness of the Spirit's power/grace, which will result in the possession of perfection or eternal life inasmuch as it is possible for the creature. This ﬁnal state of being of the believer entails the highest approximation of the human being to God. In possessing eternal existence or perfection as much as it is possible for the human being, the believer is made in the likeness of God.122 In so becoming, the likeness, the eternal life that once belonged to the progenitors of the race prior to their Fall, is restored to human beings.123 And yet, the fact that these human beings can now be termed

'perfect' indicates that this state of being is not a simple restoration to the original state. Increase has occurred. Perfection includes the restoration of eternal life, but the growth which has occurred in perfect discipline means that believers now approximate the perfection of God—a point never made

116 Prf 14–15.

117 AH 4.38.4, Prf 15.

118 AH 5.8.1 and 5.3.3.

119 AH 5.8.1.

120 AH 5.6.1, 5.8.1.

121 The accustomization of the believer to God which entails the increase in 'perfect discipline' (AH 4.38.1, AH 5.8.1), which itself involves subordination to the Spirit and freedom from lusts of the ﬂesh, so that the body and soul are blameless (AH 5.6.1, AH 5.8.2).

122 AH 4.38.3, 5.1.3, 5.8.1.

123 De Andia (1986: 72) identiﬁes the likeness with incorruptibility; Behr says, 'the truly living man is the glory of God, and this is the one who was fashioned in the image and likeness of God'

(Behr 2000: 115; author's emphasis).

The Salviﬁc Spirit

about Adam and Eve.124 It is this perfect human being, the one who 'approximates the uncreated One,' that is able to receive the perfect God.125

Chapter Conclusion Several conclusions have emerged from the sections of this chapter. First,

Irenaeus understands the Holy Spirit to be present in believers only. Second, the human being is composed of body and soul alone. Third, the life-giving activity of the Spirit functions according to a dynamic of grace/power, whereby the reception of an additional amount of grace/power modulates life from temporal to eternal. Moreover, the Holy Spirit is the source of all life because of its instrumentality, not its presence. Fourth, Irenaeus' idea of 'perfection' includes (a) the composition of an individual as body, soul, and Holy Spirit;

(b) the period of growth or accustomization which begins upon the reception of the Holy Spirit by the believer; and (c) the ﬁnal state of being, in which the human being approximates the uncreated One by possessing eternal existence, inasmuch as it is possible for a created being, and so, as eternal, is 'like' God.

We have also seen that the Holy Spirit becomes more closely united to believers over the course of the divine economy. This aligns with the movement of the economy from animation by the soul to viviﬁcation by the Spirit.

Prior to the Fall, Adam and Eve enjoyed unbroken communion with God, including the Holy Spirit, as is seen in their reception of the robe of sanctity.

After the Fall and prior to the coming of Christ, the patriarchs, prophets, and righteous ones, the followers of God, were growing accustomed to receiving and bearing God. They enjoyed the presence of the Holy Spirit in them—a presence which gave them hope for salvation. After the completion of the Christological mission, believers in Christ receive, in a new manner, the Holy Spirit sent to them by the resurrected Christ. They possess the Holy

Spirit as the 'earnest' of their future inheritance, and thereby become even now spiritual, mortality being swallowed up by immortality, in anticipation of their future reception of the complete grace/power of the Spirit, which will render them like unto God, the possessors of eternal life.

In summary, prior to the Fall, the Spirit was present to—but not present or dwelling in—Adam and Eve. After the Fall, the Spirit was present in the righteous, but not in such a way that they can be said to have possessed the Spirit. After the redemptive work of Christ, the Spirit is present in and possessed by believers: as the Spirit of the believer, the Holy Spirit is an essential element in the composition of the perfect human being.

124 In so saying, I have joined together the ideas of the restoration of humanity to the pre-Fall status and of the perfection of humanity beyond the state of the original creation. Brown, SJT 28

(1975: 17) incorrectly declares that each of these 'themes . . . generates a separate theological system, and that the two systems are mutually incompatible on a number of important issues'.

125 AH 5.1.3.

Trinitarian Convictions, Trinitarian Logic We began this study by examining Justin Martyr's theology of the Holy Spirit.

Our analysis led to the determination that Justin's account often fails to distinguish the activity of the Holy Spirit from that of the Word, and twice fails to distinguish their identities. We saw that his failure to maintain the distinct identities of the Holy Spirit and the Word is linked to his incorporation of Spirit-Christology, the identiﬁcation of the Holy Spirit with the preexistent Christ, which obscurs the distinction between the Word and Spirit.

Moreover, Justin founded his Spirit-Christology upon the classiﬁcation of both the Word and Spirit as irreducible Powers, a certain category of angelic beings. An angelomorphic pneumatology and Christology, then, are the grounds for his Spirit-Christology. As a result, though his Trinitarian convictions are beyond doubt, the binitarian logic that pervades his thought jeopardizes his Trinitarianism because he fails to adequately distinguish both the activity and identities of the Word and Holy Spirit.

Previous scholars have on occasion found similar tendencies in Irenaeus.

These scholars have argued that both Spirit-Christology, and angelomorphic pneumatology and Christology exist within Irenaeus' work. In this chapter

I will show that Irenaeus does not appropriate Spirit-Christology in the strict sense (the identiﬁcation of the pre-existent Christ as the Holy Spirit), nor does he utilize angelomorphic pneumatology or Christology. This will permit us to conclude that Irenaeus' logic is not susceptible to the binitarian tendencies that follow from the incorporation of these patterns of thought. His theological account is ﬁrmly Trinitarian.

7.1 SPIRIT-CHRISTOLOGY

In order for Spirit-Christology1 to jeopardizethe Trinitarianlogic of his theology,

Irenaeus must identify the Holy Spirit as the pre-existent Christ. That is to say, in his Christology, Irenaeus must identify the Holy Spirit with the Word/Son, or substitute the Holy Spirit for the Word/Son as that which is incarnated. It is not 1 For a deﬁnition of Spirit-Christology, see p. 10 n. 2.

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