Chapter Nine
Chapter Nine
Josephus
Because a large part of Antiquities covers Old Testament history, it is worth observing not only how often Josephus adheres to the sovereignty-responsibility tension in Old Testament passages, but also some of his remarkable lapses. He usually preserves the tension as found in the Old Testament passages closely examined in chap. 2 (supra). Ant. ii. 161–4 (cf. ii. 8) maintains the tension of Genesis 45 and 50; but in An ii. 169, he remarks that Jacob ‘reflected on God’s mighty power and his benevolence towards him, albeit for a while suspended’. God’s hand in Samson’s marriage (Judg. 14:4a) is preserved in An v.286, as likewise in the events surrounding the revolt under Rehoboam in An viii.223. Yet on the other hand a notable whitewash is found in An vii.38 where David is said to forget the injunctions of Moses (cf. 2 Sam. 24:1). Josephus puts in additions to stories in order to bolster his heroes (e.g. An i.166–8; ii.238–53); conversely, he omits certain shameful episodes (e.g. the golden calf, An iii.95ff.). At other times his touches are far more subtle. What prompts these changes?
Josephus is primarily an apologist. In Bellum he defends the Romans, in Antiquities the Jews, and always the proposition that God in his providence rewards virtue. Only with the Zealots is he bitingly sarcastic (e.g. BJ vi.4). In a sense, he is no theologian—at least, not in any self-conscious, systematic sense; but it is difficult to resist the conviction that he holds set theological convictions which he wishes to communicate by his personal retelling of the Old Testament (and other) history, and this he does by literary means. Yet when the constraints of following (in a midrashic fashion) the biblical narrative are removed from him, as at the end of An xi, he makes far fewer references to God and his activity than when he is re-narrating the biblical material.
In An i.14f. Josephus says that the ‘main lesson’ to be learned from history is ‘that men who conform to the will of God … prosper in all things beyond belief, and for their reward are offered by God felicity, whereas in proportion as they depart from the strict observance of these laws … imaginary good things they strive to do end in irretrievable disasters’ (cf. also i.20; xv.60). This succinct statement of a basic tenet of merit theology is worked out in all of Josephus’s writings. After all, ‘it is surely madness to expect God to show the same treatment to the just as to the unjust’ (BJ v.407). Moses himself taught the people that their life would be blissful if they but followed the laws (An iii.88). The one source of felicity is the gracious (sic) God, for ‘He alone has power to give good things to those who merit them and to take them away from those who sin against Him’ (An iv.180–83; cf. iv.190; vi.21f.; xx.82f.).
Examples abound. Both Elisha and Onias died as men ‘renowned for righteousness and manifestly held in honour by God’ (An ix.182; xiv.22). Josephus attributes his deliverance from John and his men to God, ‘for His eye is upon those who do their duty’ (Vit. 82f.). ‘God loved Noah for his righteousness’ (An i.72) and therefore answered his prayers (99) while he condemned others ‘for their wickedness’ (An i.72). One of the reasons for the longevity of the ancients was their merits (aretē Ant. i.106). God told Abraham to move, for Abraham was a man who entertained ‘more lofty conceptions of virtue than the rest of mankind’ and therefore he (Abraham) ‘determined to reform and change the ideas universally current concerning God’ (An i. 154–7). Indeed, God commended Abraham for his virtue and assured him he would not lose his reward (An i.183). When Jacob died, it is said of him that he came behind ‘none of his forefathers in piety towards God and … [he] met with the recompense which such virtue deserved’ (An ii.196). Asanos and his army received great victory from God ‘because they had shown themselves righteous and pure and had always acted in accordance with the will of God’ (An viii.295). Ezra planned a lot of things, ‘but that they turned out well for him was, I think, due to God, who judged him worthy of obtaining his desires because of his goodness and righteousness’ (An xi.139). To say that repentance may be accepted as a virtue (An ix.175f.) presupposes merit theology. The Pharisees are said, in effect, to hold to such a theology (An xiii.288–90); and it forms the basis of Mattathias’s dying charge to his sons (An xii.280ff.).
Merit theology is sufficiently developed in Josephus to produce statements attributing assorted blessings to the merits of the patriarchs or of Moses. The signs of the Sinai theophany ‘signified the advent of God propitious to the desires of Moses’ (An iii.80); ‘even our enemies’, Josephus says, ‘admit that our constitution was established by God himself, through the agency of Moses and of his merits’ (An iii.321). Only rebels mock the belief (An iv.4). Elsewhere, we learn that ‘the merits of the fathers should be a palliation of the sins of their children’ (An viii.278), while Nehemiah is made to declare: ‘Fellow Jews, you know that God cherishes the memory of our fathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and because of their righteousness does not give up his providential care for us’ (An xi.169).
The occasional, mildly mitigating passages do not really dent the structure of Josephus’s merit theology. For example, Josephus says that Moses himself wrote that he died, ‘for fear lest [the people] should venture to say that by reason of his surpassing virtue he had gone back to the Deity’ (An iv.26; cf. also An viii.111f.). Yet the fact that Moses should, in Josephus’s perspective, feel the need to avoid potential misunderstanding on this point, is already a reflection of considerable merit theology.
Such theology elsewhere evokes some whitewashing (e.g. An i.205; ii.270–75; v. 146). It produces even more bragging. Moses ‘for grandeur of intellect and contempt of toils … was the noblest Hebrew of them all’ (An ii.229); and he, in his defence of the fact that it was really God who had appointed Aaron High Priest, insists: ‘For my part, had the weighing of this matter been entrusted to me, I should have adjudged myself worthy of the dignity, alike from that self-love that is innate in all, as also because I am conscious of having laboured abundantly for your salvation. But now God himself has judged Aaron worthy of this honour and has chosen him to be the priest, knowing him to be the more deserving among us’ (An iii.190–92; cf. iv.22–5, 54–7). Josephus himself repeatedly brags (e.g. Vit. 2, 82f., 174.; Ap. i. 47ff.; BJ iii.143f.).
God stands as the guarantor behind the merit theology system, for he knows all and judges exhaustively and impartially (e.g. BJ i.595, 630f.; vii.33, 271; An ii.320; ix.3). But he does not set aside man’s freedom. ‘God has a care for men, and by all kinds of premonitory signs shows His people the way of salvation, while they owe their destruction to folly and calamities of their own choosing’ (BJ vi.310). Josephus declares: ‘Other legislators, in fact, following fables, have in their writings imputed to the gods the disgraceful errors of men and thus furnished the wicked with a powerful excuse; our legislator, on the contrary, having shown that God possesses the very perfection of every virtue thought that men should strive to participate in it … (An i.22f.).’ As a reaction against a degenerate and/or fatalistic form of paganism, by a monotheistic Jew, the statement is commendable; but Josephus has tied merit theology in with it.
With this sort of background it is not surprising that there is nothing of gracious election in Josephus, and little enough of any kind of election. The Jews are spoken of as those whom the Deity favours (An ii.331–3), ‘God having regard for none among men but you and lavishing on you the means whereby you may become the happiest of all the peoples beneath the sun’ (An iv.114; cf.117). But this does not refer to the reasons for God’s favour, which, as we have already seen, rest on the merits of the patriarchs. Kings, however, are frequently said to be elected by God (e.g. An vi.312; vii.27, 53, 198, 289, 338f., 376, 384f.; viii.276; ix.106, 108, 111) and in at least one case the choice itself is used as an encouragement to piety and a brave endeavour to be ‘worthy of providence’ (An vii.338f.).
That brings us to consider the nature and scope of divine sovereignty according to Josephus. God is creator of all (Ap. ii.191f.; BJ iii.369f.; An i.272). A large number of things are attributed to his providence: rescue at sea (Vit. 15), the frustrating of someone’s plans for his (Josephus’s) own welfare (Vit. 48), circumstances which save Josephus from death (Vit. 301), the turning of Vespasian’s mind to thoughts of empire (BJ iii.404), the death of Aaron’s sons (An iii.208f.), peace (BJ v. 278), the successful acquisition of Canaan (An v. 93, 107), the birth of Samson (v. 277), and the successes of David (An vi.196). Not all of these are attributed to divine providence (pronoia), but that idea is present in every case. Hence, in the last-cited example, Josephus writes, ‘David, being everywhere attended by God whithersoever he went, achieved success …’ Similarly, in An viii.42 we read: ‘Now so great was (sic) the prudence and wisdom which God granted Solomon that he surpassed the ancients, and even the Egyptians.…’
Certain things are repeatedly attributed to God. Success is one of them, especially military success (e.g. Ap. ii.48, 55; BJ iii.6f., 144; An viii.295; x.40; xii.316, xiii.80; xiv.462f.; xvi.318; xviii.308f.; xx.48). Sometimes the bluntest of this language constitutes part of Josephus’s apologetic: the Romans are bound to win because God is on their side. ‘God, and no other, it was who made a present to the Romans of the wretched Galileans …’ (BJ iii.293). The providence of God standing behind Rome is a constant motif (e.g. BJ ii.390; iii. 494f.; v. 2, 367, 378–419; vi. 38–40, 108–10, 370f., 399–401, 411; vii.319). Not only success, however, but judgment, is attributed to God (e.g. Ap. ii.143; BJ i.81–4=An xiii.314f.; BJ iii.539; iv.103f., 190, 288, 323; v.19f., 39, 342f.; vi.108–10, 250f.; vii.325–35, 358f.; An vi.307, 312; viii.241; xii.357). Most of the references in Bellum refer to the judgment of God on Jerusalem, even on the Temple: Jerusalem is ‘no longer God’s place’ (BJ v.19f.). As for the defenders, God blinded their minds because of their transgressions (BJ v.342f.), making a Cassandra out of Josephus and his pleadings (BJ vi.108–10). In the Antiquities judgments often come upon individuals. Alcimus died by ‘a sudden stroke from God’ (An xii.413); while ‘Herod’s illness became more and more acute, for God was inflicting just punishment upon him for his lawless deeds’ (An xvii.168–70). Especially is Josephus attracted to punishments which seem to be peculiarly appropriate. Hence he writes, ‘I cannot … but regard the penalty which Apion paid for maligning his country’s laws as just and appropriate. An ulcer on his person rendered circumcision essential; the operation brought no relief, gangrene set in, and he died in terrible tortures’ (Ap. ii.143). Moreover, God’s ultimacy behind the most appalling judgment may be so strongly phrased as to provide a shield for the human instruments—even Titus and Caesar (BJ v.519; An vi.214).
It is essential that people recognise that they owe all their blessings to God’s benevolence (An i.111f., 115; iv.212). Failure to do this was Sodom’s sin (An i.194f.); indeed, it is the custom for all who lack virtue to dismiss the possibility of the Deity’s intervention in their crimes; but when they are caught they call for his help (An xvii.129f.). This is not a blind confidence which Josephus is advocating, for he tells of a number of cases in which Jews appealed to God’s care and providence and were disillusioned (e.g. BJ iii.28; iv.297; vi.98). The final ‘proof’ of divine providence is success.
If the final proof of the operation of providence is success, then historical success and historical judgment actually testify to God’s providence. Hence, the terrible death of Catullus provides a striking demonstration of ‘how God in his providence inflicts punishment on the wicked’ (BJ vii.425f.). Onias took up arms against the usurper, Ptolemy Physcon, and ‘the justice of his action was signally attested by God’ (Ap. ii.52f.). A roof collapsed and failed to kill anyone, and from this incident ‘one may see how well disposed God was toward the king [Herod]’ (An xii.455). (For other examples, see Ap. ii.160, 163; BJ i.215; v.367; An ii.60; xviii.127ff., 284.)
All of these aspects of divine sovereignty are perfectly consonant with rigorous merit theology. One suspects that Josephus pictures divine omnipotence only in its positive implications (cf. An v.312), for he does not sense any tension when he writes, ‘What more beneficial than … to be convinced that everything in the whole universe is under the eye and direction of God?’ (Ap. ii.294).
Josephus actually introduces the sovereignty-responsibility tension into a few passages, but these never have to do with salvation. For example, Judas tells his father Jacob he might as well send Benjamin to Egypt, ‘for nothing could be done to him save what God might send, and that was bound to befall even if he stayed with his father’ (An ii.116). In fact, the thought is somewhat naive; for if God’s sovereignty is here taken absolutely, the statement is a non-comforting truism. Does not what befalls Benjamin under God’s sovereignty embrace where Benjamin is, and therefore what decision his father makes? An analogous problem arises in An x.34.
One other piece of evidence demands attention, viz. the many apparently pagan expressions in Josephus which parallel terms like ‘providence’. No easy classification seems possible. The following list is simply a representative selection:
Vit. 17: Josephus reminds the Jews that they are inferior to the Romans, ‘not only in military skill, but in good fortune’ (alla kai kat’eutychian).
Vit. 27: ‘I merely allude to them [the rising tide of events] here from a desire to convince my readers that the war with the Romans was due not so much to the deliberate choice of the Jews as to necessity’ (alla to pleon anankē).
Vit. 138: ‘but I, committing my fate to God …’(egō de tō theō ta kat’ emauton epitrepsas …). The English translation is misleading.
Vit. 402: ‘My success on that day would have been complete, had I not been thwarted by some evil genius (mē empodōn genomenou daimonos tinos). My horse stumbled on a marshy spot.…’
BJ i.11f.: Of all cities under Roman rule ‘it was the lot of ours’ to attain the highest felicity and plunge to the lowest depth of calamity.
BJ i.233: Malichus dreamed of raising a national revolt. ‘But Destiny (to chreōn) derided his hopes’, and Herod had him assassinated.
BJ i.275: ‘Fate (to chreōn) … proved to have outstripped (Herod’s) zeal …’
BJ i.370: ‘But while he [Herod] was punishing his enemies, he was visited by another calamity—an act of God’ (epipiptei symphora daimonios allē—the English translation is again misleading): an earthquake.
BJ i.373–9: Herod seeks to encourage his troops. ‘To be disheartened by the visitations of heaven was natural’ (pros men ge tas daimonious plēgas athymein eikos ēn). He goes on to say that he views this catastrophe as a ‘snare which God has laid’ to trick the Arabs into thinking the Jews are done in. In any case, ‘no disaster, whether inflicted by God or man’ (out’ anthrōpeion ti kakon oute daimonion) will ever reduce the valour of the Jews. In the parallel passage, An xv. 144–46, Herod insists that what happened was not ‘a sign of God’s wrath, as some believe. These are only accidents and casual misfortunes (alla tauta symptōmata ginetai kai pathē tina); and if they have been inflicted in accordance with God’s will, it is clear that they have also come to an end in accordance with God’s will …’ He also observes that none of the soldiers was hurt in the earthquake and concludes that God must want the war to go on.
BJ i.665: ‘In [Herod’s] life as a whole, he was blessed, if ever man was, by fortune’ (tychē dexia).
BJ iii.144: Vespasian considers that the entry of Josephus into Jotapata is the greatest luck (megiston eutychēma), ‘God’s providential ordering’ (pronoia theou).
BJ iii.389–91: Josephus draws lots with others in a suicide pact: ‘fortune’ (tychē) will decide. As it turns out, he is left alive alone with one other—‘shall we say by fortune or the providence of God?’ (eite hypo tychēs chrē legein, eite hypo theou pronoias [v. 1] ).
BJ iv.297f.: Fate (heimarmenē) lulled some of the guards to sleep.
BJ iv.622: Fortune (tychē) was everywhere furthering Vespasian’s wishes.
BJ v.367: Fortune (tychē) had passed to the Romans; and God, who passes empire around the nations, gave it to them.
BJ v.572: Jews were blinded by Fate (hypo tou chreōn).
An iv.113f.: Balaam saw concerning Israel ‘the indications of inflexible fate’ (atropos).
An viii.409: It was Fate (to chreōn), I suppose, that prevailed and made the false prophet seem more convincing to Achab than the true one, in order to hasten Achab’s end.
An viii.412–14: Fate (to chreōn) got Achab killed by an arrow shot at random.
An viii.418f. Nothing is more beneficial than prophecy, for it gives us foreknowledge of what to avoid. Yet, with Achab’s history before us, we ought to ‘reflect on the power of Fate (to chreōn), and see that not even with foreknowledge is it possible to escape it.’ Note: Josephus is really stretching here. Prophecy gives us foreknowledge of what Fate will bring about so we may avoid it; but Fate is so powerful that we cannot avoid what it brings about!
An x.76: Destiny (tēs peprōmenēs) urged Josiah to fight Nechao, ‘in order to have a pretext for destroying him.’
An xv.144–146: See on BJ i.373–379, supra.
An xvi.76: Of Herod: ‘In truth, a divine power (to daimonion) had given him a great many instances of good fortune (eutychia), even more than he had hoped for, in external affairs, but in his own home it was his sad fate (symbainein) to meet with the greatest misfortunes (dystychēs) and such as he had never expected.’
An xvi.210: ‘For what man, except one who like this son of mine happened to be guided by good angels … (tis gar an, ei mē daimonōn agathōn etychen, hōsper houtos ho pais …)’
An xvii.122: Fortune (tychē) delivered Antipater up to his enemies.
It is worth noting that several of these expressions can refer to both good and bad events (e.g. tychē, to chreōn). Even daimōn can refer to the help of heaven (An xvi.210) as well as to ‘fate’ in the sense of ‘misfortune’ (Vit. 402). G. F. Moore has argued convincingly that Josephus’s use of these terms is still within a monotheistic framework: that to chreōn, the ‘must-be’, is in reality neither fortune, tychē, nor fate, heimarmenē, as conceived by Greek writers, but the will of God revealed by the prophets. Similarly for the other pagan terms he uses. His opinion gains support from the fact that pagan terms are considerably more frequent in Bellum, which has open imperial support, than in the Antiquities.
Where, then, shall we place Josephus himself in those four famous passages in which he distinguishes among the Pharisees, Sadducees and Essenes (BJ ii.119–66; An xiii.171–3; 288–98; xviii.11–25; the last of which also adds the Zealots)? The Pharisees are alleged ‘to attribute everything to Fate and to God’ (heimarmenē te kai theō prosaptousi panta), holding ‘that to act rightly or otherwise rests, indeed, for the most part with men, but that in each action Fate (heimarmenē) co-operates’ (BJ ii.162f.). In this passage men and providence co-operate, according to the Pharisees; but in An xiii.171–3, the division is in the events themselves: some are the work of Fate, but others depend on ourselves whether they take place or not. An xviii.11ff. appears to revert to the idea of a ‘fusion’ of the will of man and Fate. Uniformly are the Essenes said to ascribe everything to Fate. The Sadduceans do away with Fate; men are responsible for their own well-being, while they ‘remove God beyond not merely the commission, but the very sight, of evil’ (BJ ii.164f.). According to his own classification, Josephus himself seems to fit more into the Pharisaic group than into any other—which is, of course, where one would expect to find him.
To sum up: With lip service Josephus pays considerable respect to divine providence; but closer examination limits such providence to the convenient cases. Although he professes to believe in ‘Fate’, in the last analysis the important personal and moral decisions belong to men, and God acts as Judge. Inherent in this pattern is the thought that God’s rewards and punishments are distributed on the same principle: men get what they themselves deserve. Hence history itself can at one and the same time be used to testify to God’s providential ordering and to pronounce the moral rightness of the forces behind long-term success.