Introduction
Introduction
Throughout the history of the church, Christians have discussed the nature and content of God's foreknowledge. For instance, one finds Augustine wrestling with this question in part three of his famous work Freedom of the Will. In recent years, the debate over the foreknowledge of God has come to be one of the most controversial theological issues disputed among evangelicals. Indeed, some claim it is the most heated controversy to hit evangelicalism since the inerrancy debate of the 1970s. One distinctive aspect of this contemporary debate is that it is taking place not only in elite theological circles, but also in churches, on campuses, at denominational conferences and in popular Christian magazines.
To understand why this debate has assumed the proportions it has within contemporary evangelicalism, one must realize that the question is not simply about the nature of divine foreknowledge. Rather, for many this issue has become a theological lightning rod, largely due to the implications this question has for other areas of theology. At least three fundamental theological areas are involved in this debate. First, and most immediately, there is the question of the nature and mode of God's foreknowledge. Second, in the eyes of many, there are important implications for the question of the nature of divine sovereignty (i.e., whether God's sovereignty operates in a general or in a particular and meticulous fashion). Finally, there are direct implications for the question of the nature of human freedom (i.e., whether humans possess compatibilistic or libertarian freedom). Further, each of these theological questions plays an essential role in the articulation of a stance on the "problem of evil."
The primary catalyst for the contemporary discussion has been the recent debate concerning what has come to be called open theism. According to its adherents, God knows the future partly as a realm of possibilities, not exclusively as settled facts. Much of the contemporary foreknowledge debate remains centered on the openness controversy, but this controversy has also fueled the debate that has existed for centuries among more traditional Christian theologians. Though many laypersons remain unaware of this fact, Christian theologians throughout church history have entertained a diversity of opinions on the nature and content of God's foreknowledge. This book has been written to bring clarity to the contemporary discussion by presenting the four major views that scholars in the evangelical community embrace. These four views are the open view, the simple-foreknowledge view, the middleknowledge view and the Augustinian-Calvinist view.
Gregory Boyd begins by defending the open view. This view has been relatively rare in church history, but it is gaining popularity today in certain sectors of evangelicalism. Unlike the other three views represented in this book, the open view holds that the future is partly open to God, for God cannot foreknow the decisions that free agents shall make. God is omniscient, this view insists, for he perfectly knows all reality. But the reality God perfectly knows is partly composed of possibilities, "maybes." Hence, while God knows much of the future as settled-for he can sovereignly decide to settle whatever he wishes-he knows some of the future as a "maybe." Boyd argues that only this view can make good sense out of passages in the Bible in which God changes his mind, regrets decisions he makes, speaks of the future in conditional terms, expresses surprise or disappointment over what transpires, or tests people's hearts "to know" what they shall do.
The second essay is by David Hunt, who defends the simple-foreknowledge view. Scholars debate how traditional or nontraditional the simple-foreknowledge view is, but unquestionably it has a number of learned advocates today. Those who believe in simple foreknowledge maintain that God "simply" knows what is going to come to pass. Unlike the open view, the simple-foreknowledge view rejects the notion that any aspect of the future is open from God's perspective. Unlike the middle-knowledge view, this view does not hold that God chose which future to bring about based on his knowledge of how free agents would act in any "possible world." And unlike the Augustinian-Calvinist view, this view doesn't hold that God knows the future because he preordains it. God simply knows what free agents shall do, not what they would do in different circumstances or what he ordains them to do. According to Hunt, this view is consistent with what Scripture says about God's foreknowledge and is the most philosophically defensible position to hold.
The third essay is by William Lane Craig, who defends the middle-knowledge, or Molinist, view. Scholars debate the extent to which this view was presupposed by various theologians in church history (some interesting current research suggests that Jacobus Arminius held a position similar to Molinism), but the view was first formalized by Luis de Molina in the sixteenth century, hence the name Molinism. In the middle-knowledge view, God knows not only what shall come to pass, he knows what would have come to pass if he had chosen to create any other world-this is his "middle" knowledge. Indeed, God chose to create the world he did because he foresaw that this exact world best attained his objectives for creation while preserving the freedom of creatures. Unlike the open view, therefore, this view allows no open-ended possibilities. Unlike the simple-foreknowledge view, this view maintains that God knows counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (namely, what agents would do in other circumstances). And unlike the Augustinian-Calvinist view, this view does not hold that God knows what agents do because he preordains their behavior. He simply has an innate eternal knowledge of how free agents would behave in all possible circumstances. Craig believes that this perspective has scriptural warrant and is able to incorporate both the insights about God's sovereignty held by Calvinists and insights about human freedom and responsibility held by Arminians.
The final essay, by Paul Helm, defends the Augustinian-Calvinist, or Reformed, view. Though this view is commonly traced back to Calvin, most scholars believe it was closely anticipated by Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and other noteworthy theologians. In this view, God knows all that shall come to pass because he preordains all that shall come to pass. Unlike the other three views presented in this book, this view denies that agents possess self-determining (or libertarian) freedom. Agents are free to do as they want and are morally responsible for the choices they make. But all their choices nevertheless fall within the sovereign plan of God, which governs all things. Helm argues that those who want to hold to God's exhaustive foreknowledge while embracing libertarian freedom (e.g., Hunt and Craig) are logically inconsistent. Moreover, Helm argues that only the Reformed view squares with passages in Scripture which assert God's meticulous sovereign control of the world and that only this view is consistent with the Christian understanding that salvation is exclusively by God's grace.
We have sought to make this book accessible to educated laypeople and college students who have had a first course in theology or philosophy. That being said, some of the issues raised in this book are quite technical. This is simply unavoidable; questions about divine foreknowledge are by their nature very complex. Wherever possible, the contributors have tried to use technical terminology sparingly and provide examples to explain complex arguments. We have also included a glossary that provides definitions of the technical terms used in this book. As a whole, however, we think that one does not need a specialist's level of knowledge to follow the central arguments in this book.
This book is structured as follows: Each contributor presents an essay that serves to articulate his view. This essay is then followed by a series of three responses from the other contributors. Whatever understanding of divine foreknowledge one adopts in this present controversy, it is vital that we in the Christian community understand what other Christians believe and why they believe it. Our hope and prayer is that this book will help us to understand and learn from one another, and serve to facilitate healthy dialogue on this controversial topic within the evangelical community and beyond.
We would like to express our appreciation to our four contributors to this project-Gregory Boyd, William Lane Craig, Paul Helm and David Hunt. Working with them has been as enjoyable as it has been fruitful. We also want to express our gratitude to our InterVarsity Press editor, Dan Reid, for his ongoing support of this project. A special word of thanks is offered to Chelsea DeArmond for her invaluable assistance in preparing the manuscript and to Michael Kukuska for compiling the index. Finally, we want to thank our wivesMichelle Beilby and Kelly Eddy-for their unwavering love and support throughout our various ventures, academic and otherwise. It is to them that we dedicate this book.
James K. Beilby
Bethel College
Paul R. Eddy
Bethel College