The Gnostic Polemic Ii: Determinism 25
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
man and at the same time left him free to commit acts of folly persisted from Homer to Hellenistic times.t Oedipus was the classic example. The Iranian—Chaldean religious element fostered the belief that human destiny was subject to a fate governed by, or at least inextricably bound up with, the planets. This form of sidereal piety was the most natural development from the observable rhythm of terrestrial existence.? Finally, in Christianity there was much that smacked of determinism. Paul's tripartite division of man into body, soul, and spirit readily suggested the possibility of three distinct classes of men.3
When these different elements were fused in the hands of the Gnostics, they gave them their own characteristic stamp. They declared that only certain men were saved; they alone had the divine spark within them. It is with this in mind that the Naassenes are reported by Hippolytus as saying, 'We alone of all men are Christians.' Similarly, in the Basilidian system, men were categorized by nature into the 'saved' and the 'lost' according to a supra-cosmic election.5 Like their perhaps less sophisticated
1 e.g. Homer, Odyssey iil. 269; Plato, Apol. 33 c. For a comprehensive study of Fate in classical thought, see Greene, Moira.
2 See Jonas, Gnostic Religion, pp. 254 ff. ('Destiny and the Stars'). For a good account of Christian polemic against astrology, cf. U. Riedinger, Die heilige Schrift im Kampf der griechischen Kirche gegen die Astrologie von Origenes bis Johannes von
Damaskos (Innsbruck, 1956). It is the widespread recognition of fatalist astrology which underlies D. Amand's study, Fatalisme et liberté dans Vantiquité grecque
(Louvain, 1945). Dom David Amand's aim is not so much to write a history of antifatalist polemic in Hellenistic and Christian antiquity as to demonstrate the survival of the moral argumentation of Carneades and its use by other writers.
He is on very shaky ground (as he readily admits, i, p. 274.) when he applies this hypothesis to Clement of Alexandria (i, pp. 258-74). For a more recent and excellent review of the Patristic polemic against astral determinism, see H. O.
Schréder, art. 'Fatum (Heimarmene)', Reallexikon fiir Antike und Christentum (Leipzig,
1967), no. 52, cols. 524-636. Such astrological belief was also popular in the Renaissance; e.g.
But when the planets In evil mixture to disorder wander, What plagues and what portents! what mutiny!
What raging of the sea! shaking of earth!
Commotion in the winds! frights, changes, horrors, Divert and crack, rend and deracinate The unity and married calm of states Quite from their fixture!
(Troilus and Cressida, 1. iii. 94 ff.) 3 Cf. 1 Thess. 5: 23; 1 Cor. 2:14; Jas. 3:15. It is not necessarily to be assumed from this, however, that Paul knew Gnosticism.
4 Ref. v. 9. 22.
5 Str. ii. 10; iv. 89; v. 3. 2, 3. Cf. Str. ili. 3. 3, where their innate election provides an excuse for licentiousness.
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
predecessors, the Valentinians also regarded men as saved by nature through the advantage of a germ of superior excellence.
Recalling the Pauline texts, they recognized three classes of men: the pneumatics (zvevjarixot), who were fashioned by the Creator according to the real nature; the psychics (#uvxuxot), who were
'after the likeness'; and the earthy (yoixol), who were made solely 'in the image'.2 The numerical distribution of these types among men varied: 'many are material, but not many are psychic,.and few are spiritual'.s It was in this manner that the destiny of individuals was charted. The pneumatics, with whom the Valentinians naturally identified themselves, were wholly destined to gain complete salvation (¢vcer owfduevov) and reentry into the Pleroma; the psychic (from their point of view, the ordinary members of the Christian Church) had free will (ad7efovowv) and the capacity for both faith and incorruptibility ; while the earthy were doomed by nature (ro 6€ bAuKdv ducer dmddAvrat).4 'It is quite evident that in such a scheme no place is left for human responsibility. The gifts of the Spirit are not to be sought and won, nor is the prize to him who fights life's battle best. The world-order determines man's spiritual qualities, as absolutely as it fixes the courses of the stars.'5
It was for this very reason that the 'spiritual aristocracy" advocated by the Gnostics became subject to Clement's attack.
In strong terms, Clement objects that determinism invalidated the authenticity of forgiveness, baptism, and the divinity itself,' as well as making the precepts of the Old and New Testaments superfluous.' None the less, Clement did not forget that there was much in the New Testament, particularly in those texts dealing
1 Str. ii. 10.
2 Exc. ex. Theod. 54. 2; cf. ibid. 50. 1, 2. Cf. Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. i. 6. 1, 7. 5,
8. 3, etc.
3 Exc. ex. Theod. 56. 2; cf. Matt. 22:14, 7:13.
4 Exc. ex. Theod. 56. 3. Wilson observes that accounts vary as to whether there were explicitly three classes of men or whether the three natures were combined in each individual and the classification depended upon the dominant element. Yet, he says, 'In contrast to the Ophites, for whom it was possible for men to pass from one class to another, Valentinus appears to have made the distinction one of essence.'
(Gnostic Problem, p. 146, n. 162.) 5 Tollinton, Clement of Alexandria, ii. 51.
© Ibid. p. 46; cf. V. White, God and the Unconscious (London: Fontana Library, 1960) : 'Gnosticism is essentially esoteric and sectarian and (in the Greek sense) aristocratic' (p. 210).
7 Str. ii, 11. 2.
8 Str. v. 3. 3.
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
with predestination, that could conceivably be interpreted by the Gnostics as supporting their case. These passages he cites with little embarrassment or comment.! (Perhaps, like Plotinus after him, Clement thought that by simply reminding his audience of the Christian view, the absurdities of their own position would be at once apparent.)? However, if pressed for an answer, it is clear what Clement understands by the doctrine of predestination. Underlying his thoughts all the time is the firm conviction that although God's eternal decree had appointed man's ultimate goal from the beginning of time, this in no way destroyed the value of man's good actions, nor did they necessarily bind
God to fix man's destiny accordingly.
In coming to an understanding of predestination, Clement distinguishes first of all between the knowledge and the power of God. God's knowledge is such, Clement says,3 that he knows all things from eternity, not only those things which presently exist, but also those which shall be and even how they shall be; in short, God is 'all ear and all eye'.* He sees things individually and as part of a whole pattern. Consequently, God intends some things primarily and others follow upon this primary intent as a logical antithesis. Martyrdom is a case in point. Even before the martyr's birth, God knew his heroic choice,® but the divine foreknowledge did not impair the martyr's freedom to elect another alternative.
The second major factor which governs Clement's speculation about predestination is the importance of the role played by man.
From Clement's reading of the New Testament as well as his sympathy with the Middle Platonist dictum—'all things are in Fate, but all things are not fated'7—he does not see man as determined irrespective of his own personal behaviour, as the Gnostics
1 e.g. Rom. 8: 28-30 (cited in Str. iv. 46. 1; vii. 37. 5); Rom. 9: 11 (= Str. vii.
37. 5); Eph. 1: 4-5 (= Str. vi. 76. 3; vii. 107. 3, 5); Rev. 17: 14 (= Sir. vii. 6. 6).
The key terms xara mpd0eow and mpoopitw have a different history. The former was in common classical usage long before it acquired its peculiarly N.T. connotation ; the latter is of particularly N.T. coinage. For a complete discussion of the use of mpé0ecs in Patristic literature, see G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, fasc. 4 (Oxford, 1965).
2 Enn. ii. g passim.
3 Str. vi. 156. 5-7.
4 Str. vii. 37. 6; cf. Str. vii. 5. 5.
5 Str. vi. 156. 7.
6 Str. iv. 14. I.
7 Albinus, Didask., ch. 26: mdvra pév dnow év efuappérn etvar, od pny mdvra Kaeydpba.
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
had suggested. On no account are men mere puppets, or, to change the metaphor, subject to the gods 'as flies to wanton boys'.
Instead, in language which comes remarkably close to the attitude summed up by the maxim fost praevisa merita,! Clement considers human co-operation as a necessary prerequisite for predestination. It is with this in mind that Clement can say that God as the cause of all good things? naturally predisposes some to greater virtue than others.3 By this he does not mean, as did the Valentinians, that man is irrevocably cast into a class which dictates his eternal destiny, for Clement continues by noting that the ill disposed with suitable training attain virtue and those more naturally disposed to excellence become evil through neglect.*
Therefore, Clement insists that one's fate is not sealed according to one's God-given natural disposition. Another text reiterates the subjective and objective qualities involved in predestination :
'Man is predestinated through what he shall do and what he shall obtain; so also has he predestinated himself by reason of what he knew and whom he loved', namely God. Predestination, then, as Clement views it, is in a very real sense a dialogue between man and God. 'Many things in life', he says,° 'take their rise in some exercise of human reason having received the kindling spark from God'. Expressed differently, it means that man is only 'determined' when his will is conformed to the will of God."
In this way Clement seems to sail smoothly between the Scylla of human freedom and the Charybdis of divine predestination.
None the less, we must admit that this argument is not totally satisfactory and Clement is 'more convincing in his proof that extreme determinism of the Gnostics cannot be consistently maintained than in his own solution of the problem under discussion'. But the subject of predestination was one of those inevitable side issues. His main attack on gnostic determinism was his stress on the freedom of the human will. This topic was
Clement of Alexandria's trump card.
1 See art. 'Prédestination'
(II. La prédestination d'aprés les péres grecs), D.T.C. 12, cols. 2815-32. The post praevisa merita interpretation seems to have been common among the early Greek Fathers.
2 Str. i. 28.2; vi. 156. 3.
3 Str. i. 34. 3.
4 Str. i. 34.
5 Str. vi. 76. 4.
© Str. vi. 157. 1.
7 Str. vi. 157. 3.
8 Tollinton, op. cit. il. 55.
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
Free will had not escaped the notice of earlier Christian thinkers, but it first gains its deserved stature in his writings. God endowed man with 'this free and sovereign power' (rijv e€ovciav
. €Aevfépav Kal xupiav) to live as he chooses and by acts of choice and rejection to avoid becoming enslaved and subjected to necessity.! This sums up Clement's attitude to gnostic fatalism. His comments on human free will may be conveniently divided into (1) its nature and operation in general, and (2) its role in the moral life. However, before proceeding along these lines of discussion, a preliminary remark is required on the subject of Clement's terminology.
Throughout Clement's writings, zpoaipeois ('choice') and ro adrefovovov ("in one's own power, free') are, for all intents and purposes, synonymous." Yet, to the educated Alexandrian ear, they were loaded terms with very different philosophical overtones. The first was an Aristotelian term which is defined as follows: "Choice may be called either thought related to desire or desire related to thought; and man, as an originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect.'3 mpoaipeois describes moral purpose or will in the fullest sense and involves both an element of desire for an ultimate end and an element of deliberation in a choice of the means—means which lie within our power.* The second term (rd adrefovo.ov) was unknown to Aristotle and emerged into common Greek usage with the Stoics, specifically
Chrysippus (c. 208-281 B.c.),5 to suggest a similar moral responsibility. Since there was no established patristic tradition on this issue,© Clement used the two terms indiscriminately. This is another instance of his eclectic approach to ancient philosophy.
At creation man was gifted with a ruling faculty of the soul,7 the supreme power, under which all the others were marshalled.®
I Str. iii. 41. 1. (Note, however, that Clement uses dvayxn instead of etwappeévy ; the latter term is noticeably absent from Clement's text. On this point, see Amand, op. cit. i. 270, and cf. Stahlin, vol. iv, pp. 101, 366.)
2 The best illustration of this is Str. ii. 62. 1. On this text, see below, p. 30.
3 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. vi. 2, 1139°5-7. For a full discussion of free will and moral responsibility, see Eth. Nic. iii. 1, 1109>30-11153.
4 Eth. Nic. iii. 3, 1113210-12: T&v ed' Hiv.
5 Cf. Greene, Moira, ch. 11, for further details.
6 Cf. Tertullian, De an. 21: liberam arbitrit potestatem, quod atrefova.ov dicitur ;
Justin, Apol. i. 43; Dial. 88, éhevOdpa mpoaipeas.
7 Str. vi. 134. 2: 70 Hyepovixoy Tis puyis; cf. Str. ii. 50. 3 f.; Philo, Mut. 110.
8 Str. vi. 135. 4.
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
It is by this capacity that man lives and lives in a certain way.
Now choice (1) mpoarpertxy}) or free will belongs to this faculty and has as its auxiliaries investigation, study, and knowledge. Of all these 'departments of the soul'? which comprise the psychological make-up of man, the power of choice is, to Clement's way of thinking, the most valuable of all.3 It is because of this essential faculty of human nature that man is the most noble of created beings. Mere animals are moved by impulse and appearance, inanimate objects by transference or manipulation.' Man, however, as a rational animal with the reasoning power of the soul, is able to discriminate and choose between alternatives.® These wilful acts of choice, moreover, characterize his personality, for the individual man is stamped according to the impression produced in the soul by the objects of his choice.?
As to the exact relation and subordination of the faculties within the human soul, Clement is not always lucid or even totally consistent. R. B. Tollinton rightly observes that 'sometimes he will so far depart from the traditional Greek view as to push back the source of human virtue behind the intelligence to the will, and knowledge is said to depend on choice rather than choice on knowledge'.8 In one instance, Clement opines that wisdom arouses our free will (76 adre€ovo.ov) to action,' while in another he presumes the opposite : the intellectual powers are ministers of the will, and volition (76 BovAeoPar) takes precedence ofall.1° Clement is equally out of step with his Hellenistic heritage when he seems to maintain that voluntary acts are identical with actions elicited by choice.!! Aristotle firmly declares that choice belongs to the genus of voluntary action, but every voluntary action is in no sense chosen. If one is disturbed by such imprecisions in Clement's thought, one may gain some consolation from his more orthodox t Str. vi. 135. 4.
2 Str. i. 167. 3.
3 Str. vi. 135. 43 cf. Q.D.S. 14.
4 Paed. i. 63. 1.
5 Str. ii. 110. 4; cf. Chrysipp. Fr. phys. 714 Arnim; Philo, Leg. Alleg. ii. 22 f.;
Heres 1373; Origen, Orat. vi. 1.
O Streit E22:
7 Str. iv. 150. 2. Cf. Eth. Nic. iii. 5, 111427 f. This view is untenable for Jung, who says that the soul brings with it instinctive conditions which are as real as the stimuli of the somatic life (White, op. cit., Foreword by C. G. Jung, p. 18, n. 1).
8 Tollinton, op. cit. ii. 244.
9 Str. v. 83. 5; cf. Str. iv. 22. 4.
10 Str. ii. 77. 5. Cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. iii. 2, 1112815-18, where zpoaipeais by its very definition denotes intellectual deliberation before the act of choosing. tr Str. ii. 62. 1. Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. iii. 2,
1111>7-g: 'Choice is manifestly a voluntary act. But the two terms are not synonymous, the latter being the wider.'
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
ideas on the relationship between desire and will. He discourages actions performed exclusively from desire or impulse! without reflection or considered choice, condemning them with evangelical authority—'We are children not of desire but of will.'
Although it can hardly be said that Clement has thought out fully the relationship between the cognitive and initiative faculties in man's nature, he is certain that the power of free will is man's most divine gift, and perhaps because of this its exact manner of operation must needs remain a mystery.
When Clement turns his attention from the theoretical to the particular operation of free will, he speaks with more clarity and conviction. Undoubtedly this is a tacit awareness that the human faculty of free will has little meaning when analysed under artificial conditions abstracted from the existential situation.3 This freedom of man's spirit is expressly directed to a choice of life,+ that we may live as we choose.5
This 'choice of life' is primarily directed towards the ultimate good, salvation,® and union with God.7 Yet there appears to be some ambiguity in Clement's thought as to whether God's drawing® or man's choosing is the stronger element in man's progress towards the divine.? Regardless of the impetus (which is properly matter for a discussion of grace),!° Clement asserts that the true Gnostic is fixed to one unchanging course of life both by choice and by practice, owing to his uniform stability of purpose.'! At the same time, however, choice for Clement (like
Aristotle) is more immediately concerned with acts of virtue— proximate good—which further man in the pursuit of his ultimate goal. Man is presented with genuine alternatives : he who wishes virtue must choose it ;!? one is equally free to consort with wickedness.!3 Man was not born virtuous nor is it a natural aftergrowth
(as are some parts of the body), for then it would cease to be voluntary and praiseworthy. None the less, God made all things i Str. iii. 58. 1.
2 Thid.; cf. John 1: 13.
3 See A. Camus's interesting remarks on 'abstraction' in The Plague (Penguin, 1960), pp. 74-6.
4 Str. vii. 15. 2.
5 Str. ili. 41. 13 cf. Str. vi. 135. 4.
6 Str. vii. 6. 3 (cf. Plato, Rep. 620 de), ro. 1, 20. 8, 42. 4; Q.D.S. 10. 1.
7 Sir. vi. 72. 1.
8 Cf. John 6: 44.
9 Str. v. 83. 1, 141. 3; Q.D.S. 10. 2: 'salvation is begged for'.
10 See below, Ch. V, pp. 88 ff.
11 Str. vii. 46. 7; cf. Str. iv. 146. 1.
12 Str. vii. 9. 43 iv. 124. I.
13 Str. vii. 10. I.
14 Str. vii. 19. 3; cf. Chrysipp. Fr. mor. 224 Arnim; Str. vi. 96 ff. and the whole discussion, 'Whether Adam was created perfect' (see below, pp. 45 ff.).
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
helpful for virtue in so far as he might without hindering the freedom of man's choice.! Paradoxically, God assists but does not compel. This is epitomized in the evangelical precept 'if thou wilt be perfect?*—a divine declaration of the free will (70 adrefovo.ov) of the soul, illustrating that choice (7) aipeous) rests with man as a free being (cis éAevOépw), though the gift is with God as Lord.3
Regarding the morality of individual behaviour, sin and culpability are directly proportionate to the extent to which an action is freely willed. This is the essence of Clement's moral philosophy concerning human action. It is akin to the Platonic axiom airia éAopévov: beds dvairvos,* and is directly derived from it.' Therefore, blame and guilt for misdeeds rest solely with the individual ;° the deity, who is in no way accountable, remains the just judge of the soul's choice.? This subjective emphasis was a logical and effective antidote to the fatalistic determinism of the Gnostics.
Clement considered man by virtue of his freedom as approaching a situation unopposed,$ with an infinite number of alternatives between good and evil from which to choose.? However, because of the Fall, man's psyche has been impaired, leaving him equally capable of reacting negatively to the divine mandates"? by revolt, distraction, and disobedience, as well as positively by obedience."!
Hence ideally, man is attracted by choice of what is good; evil as a privative cannot be directly desired. No one prefers evil as evil. One is enticed by the pleasure that is in a thing and, imagining that to be good, considers the object desirable.!2 From SU Sir. vil. 12. 3.
2 Matt. 19:21; Mark 10:21.
3 Q.D.S. 10. 1.
4 Plato, Rep. 617 e (= Sir. v. 136, 4); cf. Str. i. 4. 1; Paed. i. 69. 1.
5 Tollinton, op. cit. ii. 244.
© Cf. Str. iii. 65. 1.
7 Str. i. 84. 1.
8 Str. iv. 96. 2.
9 Str. vii. 101. 6. On good and evil, see Paed. i. 2. 2; Q.D.S. 14. 4. Deut. 30:
15-19 is the classic biblical passage used by the Fathers for exemplifying free will: e.g. Justin, Apol. i. 443; Origen, Princ. iii. 1.6; Clement, Str. vi. 48. 7.
10 Str. vii. 42. 5; the Commandments are normative.
11 Str. ii. 59. 6; cf. Philo, Det. 122. H. A. Wolfson comments that 'the essential rationality of the mind does not preclude the possibility of its acting by mere power of its free will against the dictates of reason' (Philo (Cambridge, Mass., evised edn. 1948), i. 432). See also Euripides' Medea (1078 f.) :
'And I am aware what evils I am to perpetrate But passion is stronger than my resolutions,' cited in Str. ii. 63. 3; cf. Rom. 7:19.
12 Str. i. 84. 4.
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
this point of view, evil is in a sense involuntary (dxovotos), for the will is primarily attracted by the good aspects, temporarily abstracting from its concomitant ills.' Moreover, because of this deception (good appears evil and evil good),? Clement insists on the importance of knowledge, which alone has the power to transcend the immediate allurements of pleasure and objectively choose what is good. Nevertheless, failure to choose what is best according to the light of one's conscience is one's own fault.4
Therefore, Clement says,' free choice and inclination originate sin. However, where constraint or force, either through ignorance or necessity, warps the power of volition, sin,® culpability, and human responsibility are rescinded." 'Neither praises nor censures, neither rewards nor punishments are right when the soul has not the power of inclination and disinclination.'® Hence, mutatis mutandis, one wonders whether good actions performed unwillingly also go unrewarded. On this Clement offers no opinion.
In the sphere of morality, the power of free will functions not only to choose good and reject evil, but also to temper the objectively good for the rewards of virtue. Once again, Clement is a direct heir of the Greek schoolmen. The Hellenic instinct for moderation as expressed by the proverb pydev ayay set the pace for a rationalized restraint in human life which became the cornerstone for most subsequent ethical systems. This sentiment from Clement's lips differs only in verbal expression. 'What a man wants to do is not harmful if it is done with self control
(weTa owpoatrvys)' ;? what is more, this is common to all human beings who have chosen it.!° In sexual matters Clement is somewhat more specific. In the eyes of the Greeks sex was seen as hampering those coveted powers of reason and will which I Str. i. 84. 3-4.
2 Str. iv. 22. 2 ff., but Stahlin brackets this text.
3 Str. i. 5. 2. For a brief, but full, history of cvveiSnors in classical writing, see
F. Zucker, Semantica, Rhetorica, Ethica (Berlin, 1963), ch. 8, pp. 96-118.
&) Str. is 4. 1.
5 Str. i. 84. 2; vi. 98. 2.
6 Str. ii. 64. 3. For voluntary and involuntary sins in Philo, see Fuga. 76; Post. C.
10 f.; Agr. 176.
7 Str. ii. 60.
1: 'what is involuntary is not a matter for judgement'. Cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. iii. 1, 111122 f. Clement only acknowledges external force and not unconscious motivation as obstructing the natural operation of the will.
8 Str. i. 83. 5; cf. Str. ii. 59. 6 (voluntary actions are judged), 61. 2 (things that depend on choice are subjects for judgement).
9 Str. iii. 67. 1; cf. Paed. ii. 16. 4.
10 Str. iv. 58. 4.
826707X D
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
characterized the dignity of the ideal man, while for the Christian it was by virtue ofthese intellectual powers that man was most godlike.
In both circles, then, sexual intercourse was considered degrading behaviour. In reaction to this Clement insists that one test one's love for the opposite sex to insure against mere infatuation."
Similarly, he exhorts that one must beget children with a chaste and controlled will ;? marriage is not a licence for lust.
Just as obedience to the moral precepts is subject to our wilful acceptance, so faith is a matter of free choice.* In contrast to the Gnostics (particularly the Basilidians), whose determinism led them to believe that faith was a natural possession of the soul,5
Clement maintains that it is a rational assent of the soul exercising free will.6 In all fairness to the Gnostics, however, it must be admitted that Clement does seem to admit of a quasiinherent faith in man." He approves a 'double faith theory',® by which he means that some sort of initial faith is instilled by God at creation, upon which a 'second faith' is built and perfected by the free intellective process of the individual. For the progress from faith to knowledge,® Clement states that faith is a desire for something, in this instance an intellectual object. Since choice is the beginning of action, faith as the foundation of rational choice is the inauguration of moral action.!° Furthermore, continuous choice is the basis for knowledge, a habit which cannot be overthrown by reason." In this manner, then, Clement argues for freedom as the most important feature of human existence.
It is by virtue of this capacity that man is 'human' and can ¥ Str. iii. 71. 4.
2 Str. ii. 58. 2.
3 Cf. A. Graham, The Love of God (London, 1939), p. 124: in the conjugal act, 'there are involved a submergence of the spirit and an abandonment to a powerful but merely natural instinct which, though human and therefore good, cannot be said to represent man at his noblest and best'. This is very much what Clement has in mind.
4 Str. vii. 8. 1, 16. 2.
5. Sev 7 1iNIO. Ds VerSar2 te © Str. v. 3. 2, 86. 1. Similarly, the unbeliever is one to whom voluntary falsehood is agreeable: Sir. ii. 18. 1; cf. Plato, Laws 730 be.
7 Str. v. 2 ff.
8 Str. v. 2. 4, where Clement interprets Rom. 1: 17: "The righteousness of God is revealed from faith to faith.' On this see H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church
Fathers (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), i. 120-7.
9 Str. ii, 8. 4-9. 2.
10 Cf. Str. ii. 8. 4, 'faith as a voluntary preconception: apdAnyus Exovatos'.
11 Str. ii. 9. 4. This discussion has strong Stoic overtones: cf. Str. ii. 47. 76; vi. 543 vii. 17; Zeno, S.V.F. i. Fr. 68 Arnim ; Sextus Empiricus, Pyr. ii. 214, Adv. Math. vii.
151; Diogenes Laertius, vii. 47, 165; Philo, Congr. 140.
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
conduct his natural and moral life so as to attain the goal which God has established.
But man's autonomy does not exclude God. 'Side by side with all this discussion of the idealized possibilities of man's nature and of his liberty to achieve the highest if he will, there runs through all Clement's teaching a different and complementary strain.
No less insistent than his assertion of man's freedom is his doctrine of God's Providence.'! For Clement, the co-existence of the two is not a contradiction. He finds no cause either for embarrassment, as was the case with Lucian's Zeus when cross-examined on this matter," or for bewilderment, like Milton's angels, who reasoned high Of providence, foreknowledge, will and fate,
Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute, And found no end, in wandering mazes lost.3
One reason for Clement's unashamed acknowledgement of a theology of providence (mpévo.a)* was because of its almost universal popularity among serious and educated persons in the Graeco-Roman world of his day; even that 'barbarian philosophy' adopted it.5 In short, it was one of those rare issues on which paganism and Christianity basically agreed. All types of thinkers adopted it: Philo, Paul, Cicero,® Seneca, Epictetus,
Marcus Aurelius, and others. Even Plato and Aristotle had some acquaintance with this notion, though-their emphasis was different. In view of this strong philosophical evidence in favour of such a doctrine, it would have been exceedingly bold and very uncharacteristic of Clement to question it. In fact, it was, in his opinion, the crowning scandal that the Epicurean school denied it." t Tollinton, op. cit. 1. 244.
2 Lucian, Zeus Catechized; especially Zeus' rebuke of Cyniscus (19).
3 Milton, Paradise Lost 11. 558-61.
4 This term was used by both tragedian and non-tragedian for 'providence'
(e.g. Sophocles, Oed. Col. 1180; Euripides, Phoen. 640; Herodotus, Hist. iii. 108 ;
Plato, Tim. 44.c; Xenophon, Mem. i. 4. 6).
5 Str. v. 134. 1.
6 De Nat. Deor. ii (see the response by the Stoic Balbus to the Epicurean objections presented by Velleius). There is much in this theological treatise, even though it is pagan, which rings a bell with Clement: e.g. ii. 82 (providence derived from an argument of design), 164-7 (care for the individual) ; iii. 80-4. (the wisdom of the gods' care questioned by men), 86-8 (gods bestow external goods), etc.
7 Protr. 66. 5 (cf. Epicurus, Fr. 368 Usener); Str. i. 50. 6; ii. 4. 2; v. 6. 1; vi. 123. 2.
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
With this weighty evidence, how could the Gnostics deny that God worked for man's best good ?
Clement's 'proof' for the existence of divine providence, if proof is needed, is a teleological argument based on order and design in the universe. This is so evident, he argues,! even from the most superficial glance at the world, that to deny it is an attack on the true doctrine.? God is not utterly transcendent, with little interest or concern in his creation, as dualism had supposed.
This would obviate his providence. Admittedly, he is difficult to comprehend} and remote by nature and essence,* but none the less the words of Jeremiah still ring true: 'I am a God who is near, and not a God afar off. Shall a man do anything in secret, and I not see him? Do not I fill the heavens and the earth? saith the Lord.'s Thus, God's proximity is that power which holds all things in its embrace, namely his providence.7
Because of this proximate—remote dichotomy, pordenes has both an active and a passive facade. God is depicted as surveying® the cosmos from his private watch-tower,? awaiting the tempus acceptabile.° Then he acts, exposing, say, evil affections and striking at the roots of irrational lust.!! This enlightened action of God in the universe is the essential characteristic of mpévora and distinguishes it from pagan tvyy, which was nothing more than the occurrence of the unexpected.!2 Moreover, this action of God is good, for being Absolute Goodness he does nothing else but good,'3 even to the extent of making that calamitous crisis, the Fall, a 'fortunate' event.'4 Providence, then, is a manifestation of God's hesed or beneficence.!5 What is more, this divine benefaction, which is eternal and emanates from an unbeginning principle,'® is justly distributed,!7 for God is the 'only just measure, uniformly
Le Sin. Vi102)22 Cf. Str. vi. 147. 2.
3 Str. ii. 5. 3.
4 Str. ii. 5. 4: moppw pev Kat' ovolay ... éyyutdtw dé duvaper.
5 Jer. 23: 23 f., quoted in Protr. 78. 1; Sir. i. 5. af.
6 Str. ii. 5. 43 cf. Philo, Conf. 132.
7 This is primarily attributed to the Logos, cf. Sér. vii. 8. 4.
8 Str. vi. 156. 5 f. (even the innermost recesses of the soul) ; Paed. ii. 99.
9 Protr. 68. 33 cf. Str. vii. 5 (Plato, Polit. 272 e).
10 Str. vi. 44. 23 cf. Is. 49: 8.
15 Paed. 19100. 1s 12 Protr. 102. 3-103. 13; cf. Thucydides, Hist. i. 140. 1: (Pericles' speech) 'We are accustomed to blame chance for everything that happens unexpectedly.'
13 Paed. i. 63; cf. Chrysipp. Fr. log. 1116 Arnim; Str. i, 28. 2; vi. 158. 2.
14 (Prot ett ake 15 Cf. Str. vii. 22. 2.
16. SHAVMIAL. Te
17 Str. vii. 15. 4; cf. Plato, Laws 885 b, 907 a, 908 be.
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
and unchangeably impartial',! and no respecter of persons.? This is best instanced by the fact that the good and the wicked do not share the same eternal destiny.3 Finally, God's active love governs universally throughout the world.* Like the showers which rain down similarly on the 'good land, the dung hill, and the houses', so God's divine care is for the just and the unjust alike,° for Greeks and barbarians as well as the faithful and the elect.7 In language that is highly reminiscent of those gnostic syzygies,
Clement sees providence as hierarchical, emanating from superior to inferior,' rank subordinated to rank, down to the very smallest atom.? In the naive imagery of the Psalmist, providence
. Is like the precious oil upon the head, running down upon the beard, upon the beard of Aaron, running down on the collar of his robes !!°
Hence, the progressive scope of providence considers the universe at large, communities of men, and finally the individual.™!
With respect to the divine plan of the universe as a whole, Clement regards zpdvo.a as another way of speaking of the laws of nature. God's design insures the equilibrium of the elements, !" a hidden harmony among the irrational creatures,'3 and the preservation of the species.'* The appeal of this interpretation for Clement was undoubtedly enhanced by the sanction it had received from Plato and Aristotle centuries before. For Plato there was no such thing as individual providence.!5 In the beginning
God established the unalterable laws of the universe,!® as one might wind a clock; the pattern once set runs of its own accord.
Similarly, 'the God of Aristotle is a monarch who reigns, but does I Protr. 69. 3; cf. Plato, Phaedo 78 d.
2 Str. vi. 63. 5 (Acts 10: 34).
3 Str. vi. 45. 3.
4 Str. vi. 93. 43 cf. Wisd. 14: 2 f.
S Simin 7et6 Paed. i. 72. 3.
7 Str. vii. 6. 6.
8 Str. vii. 8. 3, 12. 3, 42. 79 Str. vil. 9.
10 Ps, 133: 2 (= Str. vi. 153. 4). Tollinton finds this image 'quaint' (op. cit. ii.
245).
1 Str. vii. 6. 1.
12 Cf. Str. iv. 88. 3, implanted in substances along with their origin.
13 Paed. ii. 14. 5 (cf. Matt. 6: 26), 102. 4 (cf. Luke 12: 24).
14 Str. iii. 97. 1.
15 Wolfson, Philo, i. 434. For Plato's treatment of providence, see Laws 899 d—- 05 d.
: ie Protr. 69. 4; Plato, Laws 715 €, 716 a (cf. Str. ii. 132; vii. 100).
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
not rule'.! It must have been somewhat less encouraging, however, that certain gnostic sects (like the Carpocratians)? shared this view. Consequently, Clement insists that providence is not merely to be equated with the natural law. It does not only extend as far as the moon (as Aristotle thought) ,3 but beyond, to include humanity as a whole, and individuals in particular.*
Clement has little to say about providence's supervision over groups of men organized in society other than that it is a fact. To his mind, perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this divine concern for the 'people of God' was the Covenant with Israel.
Providence directs the history of nations, but even more so the history of salvation.® When Clement treats of providential concern for the individual, his comments are profuse. Since man is God's most noble creation, but none the less a finite creature, God, out of pity for this weakness," sympathizes with the nature of each man.' By his omniscience and omnipotence he knows the needs of every person? and like a king for his people or a shepherd for his flock'? dispenses his beneficence accordingly.'! Nothing that matters to man is too petty for God's concern, for 'even the very hairs of his head are numbered' and the most minute movements are surveyed.!?
Following the dominical sayings, Clement classifies the effects of God's providence as affecting the body, the soul, and external things.!3 It is the source for what is salutary to the body, both health in general" and food and clothing as necessary externals.'5
Regarding spiritualia, Clement sees the 'true gnostic' qualities of holiness, perfection, and virtue (which even Plato acknowledged) '®
1 Greene, Moira, p. 322.
2 Str. ii. 6-8.
3 Cf. Str. v. go. 3.
4 Str. iv. 16. 2.
5 Str. vii. 34. 2.
SU Sivan 25 7 Str. vil. 42. 7.
8 Paed. i. 62. 2; by the Incarnation God knows from personal experience the suffering and weakness of human flesh; cf. Heb. 4:15 f.
9 Str. vii. 7. 3.
10 Str. vii. 42. 7.
ESI, 20. Dg Vil, Boal Ala 5. Ol. 5 sb oS. toe 12 Str. vi. 153. 2 (cf. Luke 12:7; Matt. 10: 30), 156. 3. Clement uses this same
Scriptural idea in Paed. iii. 19. 4-20. 1 to argue that men must not beautify themselves by depilatories.
13 Paed. ii. 102. 3.
™ Paed. i. 98. 3; cf. Str. i. 123. 43; it was Providence which preserved Daniel from the lions. ts Re food, Paed. ii. 14. 5 (cf. Matt. 6:25); iii. go. 1. Both food and clothing,
Luke 12: 22, 24, 27; Paed. ii. 102. 3-5.
16 Meno 100 b (= Str. v. 83. 2).
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
as bound up with divine providence.! Indeed, 'the holiness of the gnostic is, as it were, a return back on itself of providence and a responsive feeling of loyalty on the part of the friend of God'.?
In addition, even those intellectual tools (like Scripture? and Philosophy*) which further the true Gnostic in his progress towards God are also products of his providential design.
All these manifestations of divine concern for the individual (both material, spiritual, and intellectual) are conferred in an undramatic way, through normal human agency rather than spectacular divine intervention.' Providence neither contravenes nature nor negates the power of human free will. Consequently,
Providence does not preserve the drunken skipper from his own undoing. The 'miraculous' (strictly speaking) plays little part in Clement's thought.® But this is no excuse for the apathy that the Gnostics had assumed.? God knows and_acts according to our needs and his will; yet he both wants and waits to be asked? as evidence that we are in earnest.!° However, lest it appear from this that God's power is limited by us, Clement adds that 'if request were made by unworthy persons he would often refuse to give it, but would give unasked provided they were worthy'.!!
I Str. vii. 42. 2.
2.-Str. Vil. 42. 3.
3 Str. vi. 128. 3; cf. Str. v. 6. 2, on prophecy.
4 Against the remonstrances of the less sophisticated Christians, Clement staunchly defends the view that philosophy is the work of divine providence and not of an 'evil inventor' (Str. i. 18. 4). His reasons are: (1) whatever is true is a prompting of God, even though it might be somehow mixed up with pagan philosophy (Sir. i. 37. 6, 80. 6); (2) the error results from a false exegesis of john
10: 8 (Str. i. 81) ; (3) philosophy is a valuable preparatory discipline (Str. vi. 153.
1) which can be of considerable assistance in discovering the truth about God (Sér. vi. 123. 1), and leading men to virtue (Str. vi. 159. 6) ; (4) therefore, since it is the work of God to do what is good, and philosophy furthers that end, it too must be an instrument of God (\Str. vi..159. 7).
5 Str. i. 16. 33 cf. Str. vi. 148. 6 on divine providence through secondary causes.
6 One must distinguish two senses of the miraculous: the presence of the divine being and dramatic natural phenomena. The sanatoria dedicated to Asclepius throughout the ancient world show that the pagan Greeks thought of miracles in the first sense. In the second sense, however, Clement (like most) thought that comets, thunderbolts, and other such celestial portents were purely physical phenomena and must be given an entirely naturalistic explanation (see, e.g., Protr.
26. 1, 63. 1, 102).
7 Cf. Str. i. 82 (causality as non-intervention) : 'to prevent a thing happening is to be the cause of its happening'. See also, Str. viii. 27 f.; iv. 86 f.; Chrysipp. Fr. phys. 353 Arnim.
8 Str. v. 141. 3.
9 Str. vii. 42. 4.
10 Q.D.S. 10. 2f.; cf. Q.D.S. 4. 2.
11 Str. vii. 41. 5.
THE GNOSTIC POLEMIC II: DETERMINISM
But besides this rosy picture of providence which depicts God as the merciful provider, Clement is not blind to its shadows.
Providence is also a disciplinary art! which chastens man both for his own benefit and as an example to others.? This view is confirmed by revelation:
For the Lord reproves him whom he loves, as a father the son in whom he delights, but it also made sense on purely natural grounds. Thus, there is no inconsistency with the saving Word administering rebuke, since it is dictated by solicitude.* Censure is the mark of goodwill, not ill will;5 it is for the good advantage of those on whom it is inflicted.6 Thus, the Lord is good despite the rod, threatening, and fear.? As Clement says :8 'It is essential that the providence which manages all be both supreme and good. It is the power of both which dispenses salvation—the one correcting by punishment, as supreme, the other showing kindness in the exercise of beneficence, as a benefactor.'
Granted, then, God's concern for the cosmos, there remain, nevertheless, the ugly facts of the world of animals and men: natural catastrophe, pain, starvation, disease, cruelty, crime, mutual destruction—in short, the problem of evil. Somehow these serve a purpose. Thus, in refuting the fatalism of the Gnostics by emphasizing human free will as the source of virtue and vice, Clement opened the door to evil without implicating
God; however, a providence which did not pander to man's instinctive love for pleasure permitted evil out of his goodness, rather than at the expense of it.
1 Str. iv. 87. 2, 1543 cf. Str. vi. 52. 1 (ro O€Anwa Tod Beod wardevTiKdv).
2 Str. vi. QQ. I.
3 Prov. 3:12 (= Sir. il. 4. 4).
4 Paed. i. 74. 2.
5 Paed. i. 66. 1; cf. Str. i. 171. 1.
6 Paed. i. 70. 3; cf. Str. i. 168. 1 (= Plato, Protag. 324 b).
7 Paed. i. 62. 1. Types of salutary correction catalogued in Paed. i, chs. 8 and 9 passim; e.g. reproof, admonition, rebuke, anger, invective, fear, denunciation, and accusation.
8 Str. i. 173. 5.
9 It is not quite clear how Clement reconciles Hell and eternal punishment with divine providence. His optimistic outlook prevents his discussing it in any detail.
However, it does seem that in the life to come God's discerning (not devouring) fire will purify all polluted souls in the baptism by fire (Str. vii. 34; Protr. 53; Paed. iii.
44; Ecl. Proph. 25. 4; Q.D.S. 42) in preparation for the final restoration or apocatastasis (Str. vii. 56). Controversy with Marcion had given great prominence to the question how the wholly good God can fail to save all his rational creatures: cf.
Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. iv. 33.2 (quare bonitas eius deficit, non omnes salvans?) and Tertullian, Adv. Marc. i. 24 (C.S.E.L. xlvii. 323).