Second Section A Detailed Survey Of Man'S Return To God
SECOND SECTION
A DETAILED SURVEY OF MAN'S RETURN TO GOD
I. OF THE SPECIES OF GOOD AND BAD ACTS CONSIDERED IN DETAIL AND ACCORDING TO THE CONDITIONS HABITUALLY FOUND AMONG MEN; AND OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES
What virtues are of the greatest import?
The theological virtues.
Why are these of the greatest import?
Because they are those whereby man attains his final end as far as he can and ought to attain it in this life so as to merit the possession of his final end in heaven.
It is then impossible for man to perform any supernaturally good act without the theological virtues?
Yes, it is quite impossible.
What are the theological virtues?
The theological virtues are faith, hope, and charity.
II. OF FAITH AND ITS NATURE: OF THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR AN ACT OF FAITH; OF THE "I BELIEVE" AND THE FORMULA OF AN ACT OF FAITH; OF THE SINS OPPOSED TO FAITH: VIZ., INFIDELITY, HERESY. APOSTASY, AND BLASPHEMY
(A)
What is faith?
Faith is a supernatural virtue which makes our mind, even though it understand not, adhere most firmly and without fear of deception to what God has revealed principally about Himself, and of His will to give Himself to us some day as the object of our perfect happiness
How can our mind not understanding what God has revealed adhere firmly thereto and without fear of deception?
By relying on the authority of God who can neither deceive nor be deceived (I. 1).
Why is it that God cannot deceive nor be deceived?
Because He is Truth itself (I. 1; IV. 8).
(B)
But how do we know that God has revealed truths?
We know this through them to whom He has revealed these truths, and through them to whose care He has confided the deposit of His revelation (I. 6-10).
Who are they to whom God has revealed these truths?
First of all God revealed them to Adam to whom He manifested Himself directly; subsequently to the Prophets of the Old Testament; and lastly, to the Apostles at the time of Jesus Christ (I. 7).
How do we know that God thus revealed Himself to Adam, to the Prophets, and to the Apostles?
We know this through history which narrates this fact, and which speaks also of prodigies or miracles done by God to convince men of His supernatural intervention.
(C)
Does the miracle prove absolutely the intervention of God?
Yes, for it is proper to God only, no creature being able to perform a miracle by its own power.
(D)
Where is the history of these supernatural interventions of God and of His revelation to be found? In particular this history is to be found in the Holy Scriptures or the Bible.
What is meant by the Holy Scriptures or the Bible?
It is a collection of books divided into two groups, which are called the Old and the New Testaments.
Do these books resemble other books?
No, for other books are written by men, whereas these were written by God.
What is meant by saying that these books were written by God?
By this is meant that God is the principal author of these books, and that He chose certain men, as so many instruments, to write them.
Of whatever then is contained in these books God is the author?
Yes, God is the author of all that is contained in these books, that is if we speak of the original autograph written by the holy writers; whereas all copies of this autograph are only divine in their authorship in so far as they conform with the original.
Whenever then we read these books, it is as though we heard God Himself speaking to us?
Yes.
But is it not possible for us to misunderstand the sense of this word of God?
Yes, for there are passages that are obscure.
Why is it that there is obscurity in the Holy Scriptures?
This obscurity is due first of all to the mysteries contained therein, since the Bible treats essentially of truths that God Himself alone knows, such as are beyond the reach of every created mind; this obscurity also arises from the antiquity of these books, which were written primarily for people whose tongue was other than ours and whose lives and customs differed from ours; and, lastly, this obscurity arises from mistakes that have crept either into the copies of the original language, or into the translations made thereof and into the copies of these translations.
(E)
Is there anyone who unerringly interprets the right sense of the word of God whether contained in the Scriptures or elsewhere?
Yes, the Sovereign Pontiff, and through him the Catholic Church in its universal teaching (I. 10).
Why cannot the Sovereign Ponisif and through hzm the Catholic Church in its universal teaching be deceived as to the sense of the word of God in the Holy Scriptures or wherever it is to be found?
Because God Himself has wished that they should be infallible.
And why did God wish that they should be infallible?
Because, otherwise, men would not have the necessary means of reaching, without fail, the supernatural end to which He has called them (I. 10).
Is this what is meant by saying that the Pope and the Church are infallible in matters of faith and morals?
Yes, this is the precise sense of these expressions; the Pope and the Church can never be deceived, nor can they deceive us, when they give or interpret the word of God, in matters that treat of the essential truths which regard faith or conduct.
(F)
Is there a résumé of these essential truths which treat of faith and conduct?
Yes, it is the Apostles' Creed or the "I believe" (I. 6).
What is the Apostles' Creed?
It is the following, such as the Catholic Church recites every day:
I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of Heaven and earth; And in Jesus Christ, His only-begotten Son, our Lord, Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost; was born of the Virgin Mary; suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried; He descended into Hell; the third day He arose again from the dead; He ascended into Heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty; He shall come to judge the living and the dead. I believe in the Holy Ghost; The Holy Catholic Church, the communion of Saints, the forgiveness of sins the resurrection of the body, and life everlasting. Amen.
Is the recitation of the Apostles' Creed an act of faith "par excellence"?
Yes, indeed it cannot be sufficiently recommended to the faithful for their daily practice.
Is it possible to make a short and concise act of faith?
Yes; the following in the form of an act of homage to God is excellent: "O my God, I believe, on Thy word, all that Thou hast revealed to us, because of Thyself who hast promised to be some day our perfect happiness."
(G)
Who are able to make this act of faith?
Those only who have the supernatural virtue of faith (IV., V.).
Then unbelievers cannot make this act of faith?
No, for they do not believe what God has revealed with a view to their supernatural happiness; and this either because they are ignorant thereof, or do not trust in the will of God, who is able to give to them the good that He thinks fit; or because having known His revelation they refuse to give their assent to it (X.).
Can the impious make this act of faith?
No, because even though they may hold to be true what God has revealed by reason of the authority of God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived, their assent is not the effect of a supernatural love for the word of God; on the contrary, the word of God is hateful to them, although in spite of themselves they are forced to admit its truth (V. 2, ad 2).
Are there men who believe the word of God, and yet do not make an act of the supernatural virtue?
Yes, and in this they imitate the devils (V. 2).
Can heretics make an act of faith?
No, for even though in their minds they assent to such and such a point of revealed doctrine, they do not give this assent on the word of God, but on their own private judgment (V. 3).
As regards the act of faith are heretics more to be blamed than the impious or the devils?
Yes, because the word of God or His authority is not the motive of their assent
Can apostates make an act of faith?
No, because their mind rejects entirely what formerly they believed on the word of God (XII.).
Can sinners make an act of faith?
Yes, provided they actually have this virtue; and they can have it, although imperfectly, when they have not charity, that is when they are in the state of mortal sin (IV. 1,4).
Every mortal sin then is not a sin against faith?
No (X. 1,4).
(H)
In what consists precisely a sin against faith?
A sin against faith consists in not wishing to submit one's mind to the word of God through homage or through love for God's word (X. 1-3).
Is it always man's own fault if he does not thus submit his mind to the word of God through homage or through love for God's word?
Yes, it is always man's own fault, because he resists the actual grace God offers inviting him to make this act of submission (VI. 1, 2).
Is this actual grace offered to all men on earth?
Yes, all men always have this grace, although in different degrees and as it pleases God to distribute it according to the designs of His Providence.
Is it a great grace of God to have the virtue of supernatural faith?
Yes, to have the supernatural virtue of faith is in some sense the greatest grace of God.
Why is the gift of faith the greatest grace of God?
Because, without supernatural faith one can do abso- lutely nothing towards salvation; moreover, heaven is lost unless one receive the gift of faith from God before death (II. 5-8, IV. 7)
(I)
Would it then be a great sin to expose oneself to the danger of losing the happiness of its possession by reading books or by listening to conversations opposed thereto?
Yes, it would be a great sin to place oneself knowingly in this danger; and even when it is not one's own fault, it is a deplorable thing to have to run such danger.
It is then an extremely important thing to choose our acquaintances and our reading with prudence so as not to expose ourselves to this danger, but, on the contrary, so as to preserve and to increase the great gift of faith?
Yes, this is extremely important, especially seeing that in the world, what with the liberty of the press and so forth, one meets so many things that are dangerous to faith.
(J)
Is there any other sin against faith?
Yes, the sin of blasphemy (XIII.).
Why is blasphemy a sin against faith?
Because it militates directly against the exterior act of faith which is the confession of faith by words; all blasphemy, in fact, consists in the uttering of some word that dishonours God or His saints (XIII. 1).
Is blasphemy a great sin?
Blasphemy is always of its nature a great sin (XIII. 2-3).
Does the habit of blaspheming excuse or lessen the gravity of the sin?
On the contrary, this habit aggravates the sin somewhat, for instead of endeavouring to correct oneself of the habit, the grave evil is allowed to become rooted firmly (XIII. 2, ad 3).
III. OF THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST THAT CORRESPOND TO FAITH: OF UNDERSTANDING, AND KNOWLEDGE: OF THE SINS OPPOSED TO THEM, NAMELY, OF IGNORANCE, OF BLINDNESS OF MIND, AND OF HEBETUDE OF THE SENSES
Does this virtue of faith suffice to attain to the knowledge of God such as is necessary in this life?
Yes, it suffices provided there are present also certain gifts of the Holy Ghost which aid faith (VIII. 2).
What gifts of the Holy Ghost aid the virtue of faith?
They are the gifts of understanding and knowledge
(A)
How does the gift of understanding succour the virtue of faith in knowing God?
The gift of understanding succours the virtue of faith in knowing God, by making our mind, under the direct action of the Holy Ghost, discern the sense of the words which express the divine messages, and of all propositions pertaining thereto, so as, provided they are not beyond the reach of our minds, to understand them in their full meaning; or if it is a question of mysteries this gift helps us to hold them securely in spite of all difficulties.
This gift of understanding then is "par excellence" a gift of enlightenment?
Yes; and all the intellectual lucidity that we have concerning supernatural truth and the joy resulting therefrom, are due primarily to this gift of understanding (VIII. 2).
Does the gift of understanding also help us in the matter of behaviour?
Yes, the gift of understanding helps us in the greatest degree in the matter of behaviour, because it throws light on the reasons of supernatural good that are contained in the revealed truth that we hold by faith; thus does the gift of understanding enlighten the mind, in order that man's will made divine by charity may be drawn to act well as it behoves (VIII. 3, 4, 5).
Can it be shown how the gift of understanding is distinguished from faith and from the other gifts, such as the gifts of wisdom, knowledge, and counsel?
Yes, in a few words thus: Faith proposes to man's mind under the form of propositions uttered by God certain truths of which the principal surpass his understanding. Some of these truths have reference to God alone, others to creatures, and others to man's conduct. If man by faith assents to these truths as it behoves, he can never live these truths by good behaviour unless he fully understand them; and it is the proper office of the gift of understanding to make man's mind understand these truths fully, whereas the gift of wisdom enlightens the mind with regard to truths that have reference to the things of God, the gift of knowledge to truths relating to creatures, and the gift of counsel to truths relating to man's behaviour (VIII. 6).
(B)
What is the importance and the rble of the gift of knowledge in relation to the virtue of faith?
By the gift of knowledge, the faithful soul, under the direct action of the Holy Ghost, judges with absolute certainty and infallibly, not by the natural process of reasoning, but by instinct as it were and intuitively, the true character of created things in their relation to faith according as they are to be believed, or according as they are directive of our conduct. Thus immediately man sees in creatures what is and what is not, in harmony with the First Truth which is the object of faith and the last end of our acts (IX. 5-3).
(C)
Is this gift of special importance to the faithful in these days?
Yes, for it carries with it the remedy par excellence for one of the greatest evils that has afflicted humanity since the Renaissance.
Of what evil is there question?
It is the prevalence of false science which fails to understand the true relation between creatures and God, who is the First Truth and the last end of man: in the speculative order it has made the study of creatures an insurmountable obstacle to the truths of faith; and in the practical order it has renewed the old pagan depravity which is all the more pernicious seeing that it succeeded the peerless lives of virtue practised by the saints.
Is this one of the principal causes of the evil that is rife in the world and is the bane of modern society?
Yes, without doubt.
The virtue of faith then with the accompanying gifts of understanding and knowledge is one of the most powerful remedies against the impiousness and the aloofness from God of modern society?
Yes, the virtue of faith with these gifts is one of the most powerful remedies against this evil.
(D)
What are the vices opposed to the gifts of understanding and knowledge?
They are ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge, and blindness of mind, and the hebetude of the senses, which are opposed to understanding (XV. 5, 2).
What are the causes of these vices, and of the last two in particular?
The causes of these vices are, in particular, sins of the flesh which stifle the life of the mind (XV. 3).
IV. OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO FAITH -- OF THE CATECHISM, AND OF THE SUMMA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
(A)
Are there in God's law any precepts relating to faith?
Yes, in God's law there are certain precepts relating to faith, especially in the New Law (XVI. 1, 2).
Why especially in the New Law?
Because in the Old Law there were no precepts treating in detail the things to be believed; God thought it not yet necessary to impose these truths in their details on the faith of all people (XVI. 1).
These truths that are now expanded in detail, at least those that regard the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. and are imposed on the faith of all, why were they not imposed on all in the Old Testament?
Because in the Old Testament the mysteries relating to Jesus Christ existed only in the state of promise as it were or of figure, and it was reserved to Jesus Christ Himself to reveal to men in their plenitude the two essential mysteries of our faith, namely, those of the Trinity and the Incarnation.
What then were the people under the Old Law bound to believe?
As regards these two mysteries they were not bound to believe anything explicitly; but they believed them in an implicit way by believing in the perfection of God and in His repeated promises of salvation (XVI. 1).
Was this sufficient for them to be able to make an act of supernatural faith?
Yes.
Is our state to be preferred to that of the people under the Old Law?
There is no comparison between our state and that under the Old Law.
In what does this superiority consist?
It consists in this, that these mysteries are now manifested to us directly as they are in themselves, although in a way that is veiled and obscure; whereas under the Old Law they were unknown except implicitly, and in a vague and figurative sense.
(B)
Have we not then, under the New Law, a special duty to live in the thought of these great mysteries, and to endeavour to understand them more and more by the use of the gifts of knowledge and understanding?
Yes, this is a duty incumbent on all the faithful under the New Law; it is to help them to this end that the Church endeavours with so much care to instruct the faithful in the things of faith.
What form of teaching that is within the reach of all does the Church use in particular?
It uses that form of teaching known as the Catechism.
It is then a duty of all the faithful to learn the teaching of the Catechism as far as lies in their power?
Yes, this is a strict duty for all the faithful.
Has the Catechism any special value and authority?
Yes, the Catechism brings within the reach of all, all that is sublime and enlightening in the greatest truths which are the food of our minds.
Who is the author of this teaching?
The Church in the person of its learned Doctors.
May one say that this Catechism is the first "par excellence" of the gifts of knowledge and understanding in the Church?
Yes, for it is the reproduction in a lesser or greater degree of the most marvellous of these fruits, which is the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas.
Has the "Summa Theologica" any special authority in the Church?
Yes, for the Church ordains that all who teach in her name should be imbued with its teaching (Code, Canons 589, 5366).
There is then nothing more profitable than to live in this doctrine?
There is nothing more profitable, for one is sure to live in the full light of reason and faith.
V. OF HOPE AND ITS NATURE -- OF THE VICES OPPOSED THERETO, NAMELY, OF PRESUMPTION AND OF DESPAIR -- OF THE FORMULA OF AN ACT OF HOPE, AND OF THOSE ABLE TO MAKE THIS ACT
(A)
What is the second theological virtue?
The second theological virtue is the virtue of hope.
What is the virtue of hope?
It is one of the three theological virtues, which effects that our will, relying on the help of God, is drawn towards Him revealed by faith, as towards the one who is to be some day our perfect happiness (XVII. 1,2).
Is hope possible without faith?
No, it is impossible to have the virtue of hope without faith which is its necessary basis (XVII. 7).
Why is it impossible to have hope without faith?
Because only faith gives to hope its object and the motive upon which it relies (XVII. 7).
(B)
What is the object of hope?
First, and above all, it is God Himself according as He is Himself His own happiness, and according as He deigns to give Himself to us one day in heaven to make us happy (XVII. 1, 2).
Can there be anything else other than God which can be the object of hope?
Yes, every true good can be the object of hope, provided it be subordinated to the principal object, which is God Himself (XVII. 2, ad 2).
What is the motive upon which hope relies?
The motive upon which hope relies is nought but God Himself, who Himself comes to our help or uses His creatures to this end that we may one day possess Him in heaven in token of reward (XVII. 2).
Does hope then necessarily imply virtuous and meritorious actions performed with God's help that we may approach Him in the way that He desires, namely, that He might give Himself to us in heaven?
Yes, hope necessarily implies these virtuous and meritorious actions.
(C)
Is it a sin against hope to count upon the possession of God one day, and to hold that such is possible without taking the trouble to prepare ourselves by a life of supernatural virtue?
Yes, this is a sin against hope.
What is this sin called?
It is called presumption (XXI.).
Is this the only sin that can be committed against hope?
No, there is another that is called despair (XX.).
What is the sin of despair?
The sin of despair consists in this: by reason of the high excellence of God, who is to be won as He is in Himself, or by reason of the difficulties of practising supernaturally a virtuous life, one does God the injury to think it impossible to practise this life of virtue and so gain happiness; a virtuous life is therefore renounced and no longer does one seek God's help (XX. 1, 2).
Is the sin of despair a very grave sin?
In some sense it is the gravest sin of all, for of itself it makes all supernatural effort impossible, and the sinner in some sort damns himself (XX. 3).
No matter then how great are man`s miseries and his sins he should never despair?
No, man ought never to despair no matter how great his sins; for the mercy of God is so great and He is so good that He will always help him by His grace.
What then should man do when he feels the weight of his troubles and of his sins?
He should turn to God immediately corresponding to the grace God always gives, and trust that God will give him strength to live a virtuous life, and so gain heaven.
(D)
What is the formula of an act of hope?
The following: "O my God, I trust that. by Thy mercy and power Thou wilt grant me the grace to lead a virtuous life, so that one day I may possess Thee in the glory of heaven."
(E)
Who is able to make an act of hope?
All the faithful who are still on earth.
Can the blessed in heaven make an act of hope?
No, for they have no longer the virtue of hope since they possess God (XVIII. 2).
Have the lost in hell the virtue of hope?
No, for God, who is the object of hope, is separated from them for ever (XVIII. 2).
Have the souls in purgatory the virtue of hope?
Yes; but for them an act of hope is not quite the same as for the faithful on earth; for although they do not yet possess God they no longer have need of His grace to merit heaven since they are sure of heaven, all sin henceforth being impossible to them (XVIII. 3).
VI. OF THE GIFT OF FEAR WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE VIRTUE OF HOPE OF SERVILE FEAR, AND OF FILIAL
(A)
Only the faithful on earth then require that the virtue of hope should strengthen their will lest excessive fear prevent them from possessing God one day?
Yes (XVIII. 4).
Is there a fear attaching to the virtue of hope that is essentially good?
Yes.
What is this fear called?
This fear of God is called filial fear (XIX. I, 2).
What is meant by filial fear?
By this is meant that one's attitude towards God is that of a holy respect because of His excellence, or of the goodness of His infinite majesty, and that one fears only what displeases Him or keeps us away from Him in such wise as to prevent us from possessing Him eternally in heaven (XIX. 2).
Is there any other fear of God beside this filial fear?
Yes; it is called servile fear (XIX. 2).
What is meant by servile fear?
By this is meant a disposition of an inferior order such as is proper to slaves whereby one fears a master because of the penalties and punishments He is able to inflict (XIX. 2).
(B)
Has the fear of the punishments which God can inflict always the nature of servile fear?
Yes, except that it need not always have a sinful character such as is proper to sin (XIX. 4).
When does servile fear have a sinful character such as is proper to sin?
It has this character when punishment, or the loss of a created good whatsoever (which is the object of this fear) is a thing one fears as if it were the supreme evil (XIX. 4).
If then one fears this evil, not indeed as the supreme evil, but as wbordinate to the loss of God loved above all, is servile fear an evil thing?
On the contrary, it is even a good thing, albeit of an inferior order and of much less worth than filial fear (XIX. 4, 6).
Why is this fear of less worth than filial fear?
Because filial fear recks not at all the loss of all created goods, provided that the possession of the Uncreated Good which is God Himself remains assured (XIX. 2, 5).
It is then only the loss of the Infinite Good which is God Himself, or of whatsoever compromises perfect possession of it, that filial fear dreads?
Yes, it is only the loss of the Infinite Good which is God Himself, or of whatsoever compromises perfect possessioa of it, that filial fear dreads (XIX. 2).
(C)
Has filial fear any relation to the gift of the Holy Ghost which is called the gift of fear?
Yes, filial fear is most intimately related to this gift of the Holy Ghost (XIX. 9).
Does then the gift of the Holy Ghost which is called the gift of fear, belong in a special manner to the theological virtue of hope?
Yes (XIX.).
In what precisely consists that gift of the Holy Ghost which is called the gift of fear?
It consists in this, that by its means one subjects oneself to God and to the action of the Holy Ghost, resisting Him not, but rather revering Him in all, lest one lose Him (XIX. 9).
(D)
In what precisely does the gift of fear differ from the virtue of hope?
It consists in this, that the virtue of hope views the infinite good of God to be gained by the help which He Himself gives, whereas the gift of fear views rather the evil of being separated from Him and of losing Him in withdrawing ourselves by sin from that help which He gives in order to lead us to Him (XIX., ad 2).
Is the virtue of hope of a higher order than the gift of fear?
Yes, as indeed are all the theological virtues superior to the gifts; also because the virtue of hope views the good to be possessed, whilst the gift of fear views the evil which is the lack of such good.
Is the fear which is proper to the gift of the Holy Ghost inseparable from charity or the perfect love of God?
Yes, since charity or the perfect love of God is the cause of this fear (XIX. 10).
Can this fear co-exist with servile fear, such as is, of course, free from fear that is sinful?
Yes, it can exist at the commencement, together with servile fear that is not sinful, and for this reason it is called initial fear; but according as charity grows it also grows, until at length it has only the name of fear taking on the most pure character of filial or chaste fear which is wholly penetrated with the love of God, Who is the one and only truth, and Whose loss would be for us the greatest evil and in some sort the only evil (XIX. 8).
(E)
Will this fear still exist in heaven?
Yes, but in its highest perfection; moreover, its effect will not be entirely the same as here on earth (XIX. 11).
What will be the effect of filial fear in heaven?
In some sort its effect will be a holy trembling in the presence of the infinite greatness and majesty of God's goodness; but no longer will it be the trembling of fear as if it were possible to lose God, it will be the trembling of wonderment in so far as God is seen to be infinitely above all that is possible to nature, since for evermore the blessed will have the most intimate consciousness that their eternal happiness comes from God alone (XIX. 11).
VII. OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE
(A)
Are there in God's law any precepts relating to the virtue of hope and the gift of fear?
Yes, in God's law there are certain precepts relating to the virtue of hope and the gift of fear; but like the precepts relating to faith, these precepts in their primary notion have a special character distinct from the precepts properly so-called that are contained in God's law (XXII. 1,2).
In what consists this special character of the precepts of faith and of hope as regards what is primarily essential to them?
It consists in this: they are not given in the manner of precepts; but under the form of propositions in the case of faith; and under the form of promises or threats in the case of hope and fear (XXII. 1).
Why are these precepts given under this special form?
The reason is because of necessity they precede the precepts properly so-called such as are contained in the law (XXII. 1).
Why should these precepts attaching to faith, hope, and fear necessarily precede the precepts properly so-called that are contained in the law?
It is because the act of faith makes man's mind ready to acknowledge that the author of the law is such as to whom one is in duty bound to submit; and the hope of reward or the fear of chastisement makes man ready to observe the precepts (XXII. 1).
What are the precepts properly so-called which constitute the substance of the law?
They are those which are given to man thus subject and ready to obey, whereby he may order and regulate his life, especially in regard to the virtue of justice.
(B)
Are these latter precepts those which make up the Decalogue?
Yes, they are these very precepts.
Then the precepts relating to faith and hope are not, properly speaking, precepts in the Decalogue?
No, they are not, properly speaking, precepts of the Decalogue; for, first of all, they precede and make the latter possible; and then in the unfolding of the law of God, such as the Prophets or Jesus Christ and the Apostles have made, they take on a new form, developing in their turn the character of counsels or of complementary formal precepts (XXII. 1, ad 2).
Nothing then is more necessary nor more ardently desired by God and ordained by Him than that man's mind should be wholly submitted to Him by faith and by hope, which relies on His help for attaining unto Him through the means of a life altogether supernatural?
No, there is nothing more necessary nor more ardently desired and ordained by God than this.
Is there a special virtue which has precisely the rôle of making man lead a wholly supernatural life with a view to the possession of God?
Yes, and this virtue is called charity.
VIII. OF CHARITY AND ITS NATURE; OF ITS PRINCIPAL ACT AND THE FORMULA OF THIS ACT
(A)
What then is charity?
Charity is a virtue which raises us to a life of intimacy with God for His own sake, in so far as He is His own happiness and has deigned to wish to communicate His happiness to us (XXIII. 1).
What does this life of intimacy with God to which the virtue of charity raises us imply in us?
This life of intimacy with God implies two things in us: first of all a participation of the divine nature which divinizes our nature and elevates us above every natural order (whether human or angelic) to the order which is proper to God, making us gods and members of His family; secondly, it implies in us principles of activity proportionate to this divine existence which enable us to act as true children of God even as God Himself acts -- knowing Him as He knows Himself, loving Him as He loves Himself, and enabling us to enjoy Him as He enjoys Himself (XXIII. 2).
Are these two things indissolubly connected with the presence of charity in the soul?
Yes, and charity itself is their consummation or perfection.
Is it then true always that whoever has charity has also sanctifying grace together with the virtues and the gifts?
Yes, of necessity he must have all these (XXIII. 7).
Is charity the queen of all the virtues?
Yes, charity is the queen of all the virtues (XXIII. 6).
Why is charity the queen of all the virtues?
Because charity rules them all and causes them to act with the view of possessing God, who is the proper object of charity (XXIII. 6).
How does charity cleave and unite itself to God, its proper object?
It is by love that charity cleaves and unites itself to God (XXVII.).
In what precisely consist this cleaving and union of charity to God, its proper object?
It consists in this, that man by charity desires for God the Infinite Good which is God Himself, and for himself he desires the same good, which is God, precisely as constituting his own happiness (XXV., XXVII.).
(B)
What is the difference between these two loves?
This: one is a love of complacency in God in so far as He is Himself happy; the other a love of complacency in God in so far as He is our own happiness.
Are these two loves inseparable in the virtue of charity?
Yes, they are absolutely inseparable.
Why are they inseparable?
Because each rules the other, and they are reciprocally cause and effect.
How can it be shown that they rule each other, and are reciprocally cause and effect?
By this: if God were not our good we would have no reason at all for loving Him; and if there were not in Him, as in its fount, the good that He is for us, we would not love Him by the love with which we love Him (XXV. 4).
Are both these loves pure and perfect?
Yes, in very truth.
Is each one of them a love belonging to the virtue of charity?
Yes.
Is there not, however, some order between these two loves; and which of the two holds the first place?
Yes, there is here a certain order; and that love holds the first place which is complacency in God, because of the infinite good which He is to Himself.
Why does this love hold the first place?
Because the good that God is to Himself outbalances the good that God is to us: not that this good is really different, for it is always God Himself in so far as He is in Himself; but because this good is in God in an infinite manner and as it were in its source; whereas it is in us in a finite manner and by participation.
Does the love of charity embrace others besides God and us?
Yes, the love of charity reaches to all those who already possess the happiness of God or who hope to possess it one day (XXV. 6-10).
Who are those who already possess the happiness of God?
The angels and the elect in heaven.
Who are those who hope to possess it one day?
All the souls of the just in purgatory and all living on earth.
Must one then love all men on earth with the love of charity?
Yes.
(C)
Are there degrees in this love of charity which we must have for others as well as for ourselves?
Yes, there are degrees in this love of charity; for first we must above all love ourselves, and then others according as they approach in nearness to God in the supernatural order, or according as they are more or less near to us in the divers relations that bring us into touch with them, such relations, for instance, as ties of blood, friendship, life in common, etc. (XXVI.).
What is meant by saying as to the order of the love of charity that we must above all love ourselves after the love of God?
By this is meant that we must wish for ourselves the happiness of God above all things else excepting God, to whom we must wish this happiness first and in preference to all other.
Is it only the happiness of God that we must wish for ourselves and for others also by virtue of charity?
It is the happiness of God before all and above all; but we must or may also wish for ourselves and for others, by virtue of charity, all that is ordained to the happiness of God or that is dependent upon Him.
Is there anything that is directly ordained to the happiness of God?
Yes, the acts of the supernatural virtues (XXV. 2).
Should we therefore desire for ourselves and for others the acts of the supernatural virtues immediately after the desire for the happiness of God and by reason of this happiness?
Yes.
May we also by virtue of charity desire temporal goods for ourselves and for others?
Yes, we may and sometimes we ought to desire for ourselves and for others temporal goods in virtue of charity.
When ought we to desire this kind of goods?
When they are indispensable to our life on earth, and for the practice of virtue.
When may we desire them?
When they are not indispensable but may be useful.
If they were hurtful to the good of virtue, would it not be possible to desire them for ourselves and for others without detriment to the virtue of charity?
No, for if these temporal goods become an obstacle to a life of virtue and are a cause of sin, we cannot desire them neither for ourselves nor for others without prejudicing the virtue of charity.
(D)
How may one formulate accurately the act of love which constitutes the principal act of the virtue of charity?
In this wise: "My God, I love Thee with all my heart and above all things; I desire no other happiness but Thyself, wishing this same happiness before all and above all to Thyself; further, I desire this happiness for all those who already possess Thee or who, by Thy bounty, are called to possess Thee one day."
IX. OF THE SECONDARY ACTS, OR THE EFFECTS OF CHARITY; OF JOY, PEACE, MERCY, KINDLINESS, ALMSDEEDS AND FRATERNAL CORRECTION
(A)
When the soul has the virtue of charity and performs in truth the principal act of charity, what is the result in the soul?
The result is the first effect of charity which is called joy (XXVIII. 1).
Is this joy, which is the proper effect of charity, perfect without any trace of sadness?
Yes, this joy is perfect, without trace of sadness, when it reaches towards the infinite happiness that God is to Himself or towards the elect in heaven; but it is mingled with traces of sadness when it reaches to the happiness of God which is not as yet possessed by the souls in purgatory, or by us and all those who are still on earth (XXVIII. 2).
In the latter case why is the joy belonging to charity mingled with sadness?
The mingling of sadness in this joy is due to the presence of physical or moral evil which affects or can affect those who are in the divers states mentioned (ibid.).
But then even in these cases ought not joy to predominate by the very virtue of charity?
Yes, by the very virtue of charity joy should always predominate, because this joy has for its principal object and for its first cause the infinite happiness of the Divine Friend, Who enjoys eternally the infinite good which is no other than Himself, and which He essentially possesses secure from all evil (ibid.).
(B)
is there any other effect in us consequent upon the principal act of charity?
Yes; and this other effect is called peace (XXIX. 3).
What is peace?
Peace is the tranquillity of order or perfect harmony resulting in us and in all things from the fact that all our inclinations and the inclinations of all other creatures are turned towards God, who is the supreme object of our perfect happiness (XXIX. 11).
(C)
Is there any other effect which attends the principal act of charity besides these two interior effects?
Yes, there is another interior effect which follows this act which is called mercy (XXX.).
What is meant by mercy?
By mercy is meant a special virtue distinct from charity, and of which it is the fruit, whereby we sorrow for the misery of our neighbour as something possible to ourselves, or at least as if the misery in some sense were our own, and this by reason of the friendship which unites us to our neighbour (XXX. 1-3).
Is this virtue of mercy a great virtue?
Yes, for it is a virtue which belongs to God par excellence, not indeed in so far as there is any feeling of sorrow or of sadness (which cannot be in Him), but as regards the effects which this feeling moved by charity produces (XXX. 4).
Among men, does this feeling belong above all to the most perfect?
Yes, for the nearer one approaches to God, so much the more must mercy have root in him, inclining him to give help to all around him according to the extent of his means, whether they be spiritual or temporal (XXX. 4).
Would the practice of this virtue be a great help towards the establishment and the strengthening of social peace among men?
Yes, indeed this would be so.
(D)
Are there also any exterior acts which are the proper effect of the virtue of charity by reason of its principal act?
Yes; and one of the first is kindliness (XXXI. 1).
What then is kindliness?
Kindliness, as its very name implies, consists in doing good (ibid.).
Is this act always an act proper to the virtue of charity?
Yes, provided one understands it in the precise sense of doing good to others (ibid.).
Can it also be the act of other virtues distinct from charity that are, however, dependent upon charity?
Yes, it can also be the act of other virtues distinct from, yet dependent upon charity, when to the general reason of doing good is added some special and particular reason, as, for instance, when a thing is due, or necessary, or is a thing of which one has need (ibid.).
What virtue is implied in an act of well-doing when to this is added the particular reason of a thing as due?
In this case the virtue of justice is implied (XXXI. 1, ad 3).
And when in the same act of well-doing, there is found added to the general reason of well-doing the particular reason of something that is necessary or of which one has need, what virtue is implied?
The virtue of mercy (ibid.).
(E)
What is that act of charity called which consists in doing good through the means of mercy?
It is called almsdeeds (XXXII. 1).
Are there divers kinds of almsdeeds?
Yes, there are two great kinds of almsdeeds: those that are spiritual and those that are corporal (XXXII. 2).
What are corporal almsdeeds?
Corporal almsdeeds are the following: To feed the hungry; to give drink to him that thirsts; to clothe the naked; to give hospitality to the stranger; to visit him who is ailing; to set at liberty those in captivity; and to bury the dead (XXXII. 2).
And what are spiritual almsdeeds?
Spiritual almsdeeds are prayer, teaching, counsel, consolation, correction, and the forgiving of an offence (XXXII. 2).
Are all these almsdeeds of great worth?
Yes, and indeed we see by the Gospels that at the day of judgment the sentence of eternal damnation or eternal reward will depend upon them.
When is there a strict and grave obligation of performing an almsdeed?
Always when our neighbour is in pressing need, whether spiritual or corporal, and when we only are able to help him (XXXII. 5).
Although there may be no pressing need for helping our neighbour, is there any strict and grave obligation to make use of the spiritual and temporal goods one has received in superabundance from God with the view of bettering our neighbour or society?
Yes, one who has received spiritual and temporal goods in superabundance from God is in duty bound to act in this way (XXXII. 5, 6).
(F)
Is there a certain kind of almsdeed which is in particular important and of a delicate nature?
Yes, it is called fraternal correction (XXXIII. 1).
What is meant by fraternal correction?
It is a spiritual almsdeed which is, properly speaking, directed to the healing of sins evil in the sinner (XXXIII. 1).
Is this almsdeed an act of the virtue of charity?
Yes, it is eminently an act of charity, through the medium of mercy and the help of prudence, which should choose the proper means for this end, which is as excellent as it is delicate and difficult (XXXIII. 1).
Is fraternal correction of precept?
Yes, it is of precept and is obligatory, but only in the case when owing to circumstances it is imperative upon us to help our neighbour out of some evil which endangers his salvation (XXXIII. 2).
Who are those bound to make use of fraternal correction?
Everybody who is animated by the spirit of charity and who, consequently, is free himself from the evil he perceives in his neighbour, is bound to point out the fault in his neighbour whoever the latter may be, even if a superior, provided, of course, proper respect is preserved and there is hope of amendment; otherwise there is no obligation, and one should abstain therefrom (XXXIII. 3-6).
X. OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY AND THEIR ACTS: OF HATRED; DISTASTE FOR SPIRITUAL THINGS AND LAZINESS; ENVY; DISCORD; STRIFE; SCHISM; WAR; QUARRELLING (THE DUEL); SEDITION; SCANDAL
(A)
What feeling, above all, should be banished from man's heart in his dealings with his fellow-men?
It is the feeling of hatred (XXXIV.).
What then is hatred?
Hatred is the greatest of all the vices opposed directly to the principal act of charity, which is an act of love of God and of one's neighbour (XXXI V. 2-4).
Is it possible that God should be hated by any one of His creatures?
Yes, it is even possible for God to be hated by one of His creatures (XXXIV. 1).
How is it possible to explain that God, who is the Infinite. Good, and from whom comes all good for the benefit of His creatures, whether in the natural or the supernatural order, can be hated by one of His creatures?
It is explained by the moral depravation of some of His creatures, who no longer consider God as the Infinite Good and the source of all good things, but as the Legislator who forbids the evil one loves, or as the judge who condemns and punishes the evil one commits, and of which one is unwilling to repent or to ask pardon (XXXIV. 1).
It is then a sort of diabolical obstinacy in doing evil which causes rational creatures to hate God?
Yes, it is a sort of diabolical obstinacy in evil.
Is hatred of God the greatest of all sins?
Yes, it is by far the greatest of all sins (XXXIV. 2).
Is it ever permitted to hate any one of our fellow-men?
No, this is never permissible (XXXIV. 3).
But has not one the right to hate men who do evil?
No, one never has the right to hate evildoers; but one should detest the evil they do, because of the love one must have towards them (XXXI V. 3).
May one never wish them evil?
No, one may never wish them evil; but in view of the good which one wishes to them, or to society, and still more to God, one may wish them to suffer certain evils to the end that they might be drawn to a good life, and thus safeguard the good of society and the glory of God (XXXI V. 3).
May one ever wish that a man on earth, no matter how bad he may be, may suffer eternal damnation?
No, one may never wish this of any man living; for this would be an act directly opposed to the virtue of charity, which makes us wish for all in the end the happiness of God, with the sole exception of the devils and the lost who are already in hell.
(B)
Is there a vice which is specially opposed to the second act of charity which is called joy?
Yes; and this is the vice of sadness touching spiritual and supernatural good which is the proper object of charity, and which we know to be God Himself, our perfect happiness (XXXV.).
How is such sadness possible?
It is possible because man by reason of his distaste for spiritual things esteems the divine good, which is the object of charity, as something not good, and as baneful and oppressing.
Is this always a mortal sin?
Yes, it is always a mortal sin when it passes from the lower or sensitive part of our nature and infects the rational and higher part of our soul (XXXV. 1).
Why is it then a mortal sin?
Because it is directly opposed to charity which makes us in duty love God above all things, and as a consequence makes us bound to seek in Him the first and ultimate peace and joy of our soul (XXXV. 3).
Is this sadness one of the capital sins?
Yes, it is a capital sin, because on its account men do many evil things and commit numerous sins either to avoid and get rid of it, or because its oppressiveness makes them take refuge in evil acts (XXXV. 4).
What is this evil sadness which is a capital sin called?
It is called spiritual laziness, or distaste for spiritual things.
What are the sins which flow from this sin, or what are the daughters of this spiritual laziness?
They are despair, pusillanimity, sluggishness as regards the precepts, spite, malice, and the wandering of the mind among unlawful things (XXXV. 4, ad 2).
Is this laziness the only vice opposed to the joy of charity?
No, there is another called envy (XXXVI.).
What is the difference between these two vices?
There is this difference: spiritual laziness is opposed to the joy of the divine good in so far as this good is in God and ought to be in us; whereas envy is opposed to the joy of the divine good in so far as this good belongs to our neighbour (XXXV., XXXVI.).
(C)
What then is envy?
Envy is sadness because of the good of another, not because this good is a cause of evil to us, but merely because it is another's and not ours (XXXVI. I, 2; 3).
Is this sadness of envy a sin?
Yes, because one is sad when one ought to have cause for joy, namely, at the good of another (XXX VI. 2).
Is envy always a mortal sin?
Yes, it is always of its very nature a mortal sin, since it is essentially opposed to the joy of charity; but it may be venial if it be a question of an imperfect voluntary act (XXXVI. 3).
Is envy a capital sin?
Yes, because it carries men to numberless sins, either in the endeavour to avoid it or to follow its commands (XXXVI. 4).
What are the daughters of envy?
They are obloquy, detraction, gladness in the adversities of our neighbour, affliction at his prosperity and hatred (XXXVI. 4).
(D)
Are there any vices opposed to the peace of charity?
Yes, there are several.
What are they?
They are discord within the soul, wrangling and fighting, schism, strife, sedition, warfare (XXXVII.-XLII.).
(E)
What precisely is discord, which is a sin against charity?
It consists in not wishing purposely what others wish when they manifestly desire the good, that is what is for the honour of God and our neighbour's good, and precisely for this very reason; or, to take part in this disagreement without a direct bad intention, except that it has reference to things that belong essentially to God's honour and our neighbour's good; or to be unduly obstinate and stubborn in disagreeing no matter what the object may be and no matter how right be our intention (XXXVII. 1).
(F)
What is wrangling?
Wrangling is to contend with another in words (XXXVIII. i).
Is wrangling a sin?
Yes, if one thus contends with the sole desire to contradict; and the more so if one does this in order to hurt a neighbour or contaminate the truth which our neighbour defends by his words; it would also be a sin if, in defending the truth oneself, one's manner or speech wounds our neighbour's feelings (XXXVIII. 1).
(G)
What is schism?
Schism is the separating oneself intentionally from the unity of the Church, either by refusing to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff as to the head of the Church, or by refusing to have communication with the members, as such, of the Church (XXXIX. 1).
(H)
Why is war counted among the sins opposed to charity?
Because when war is unjust it is one of the greatest evils that can be inflicted on our neighbour.
Is it ever permissible to make war?
Yes, when there is a just cause, and no injustice is committed in the course of the war (XL. 1).
What is meant by a just cause?
By this is meant the hard necessity of making respected even by force of arms the essential rights among men, when these rights have been violated by a foreign nation which refuses to make reparation (XL. 1).
Is it then permitted to make war in this case only?
Yes (XL. 1).
Do those who fight in a just war, and who commit no act of injustice in the course of the war, perform an act of virtue?
Yes, they perform a great act of virtue, since they expose themselves to the greatest of perils for the welfare of their fellow-men or for the good of God.
(I)
What is understood by faction, the sin that is opposed to peace?
By faction is understood strife between individuals without any sanction whatsoever of the public authority; and it is always of itself a grave sin in him who is the author thereof (XLI. 1).
(J)
Is the duel related to this sin?
Yes, but with this difference, that the duel is a thing calculated and is in a sense not fought in the heat of passion; and this circumstance adds to its gravity.
Is the duel, in itself, always essentially bad?
Yes, because therein one jeopardizes one's own life or that of one's neighbour contrary to the law of God, who alone is the master of life.
(K)
What is sedition, a sin that is also opposed to charity and to peace?
Sedition is a sin whereby parties of the same people conspire or rise up tumultuously one against the other, or against the established and legitimate authority, whose office it is to guard the well-being of the whole people (XLII.).
Is sedition a great sin?
Yes, it is always a great sin, because humanly speaking there is nothing more excellent and more to be desired than the maintenance of public order, hence the crime of unjust war, and perhaps sedition even more so, is the greatest crime against the well-being of our fellow-men (XLII. 2).
(L)
Is there any special kind of sin which is directly opposed to charity as regards the external act which is called beneficence?
Yes, and the sin is called scandal (XLIII.).
What is scandal?
Scandal is that sin which through some word or deed offers to another an occasion of sinning; or the fact of taking occasion to sin because of what is said or done by another: in the first instance one gives scandal; in the second, one is scandalized (XLIII. 1).
Is it only weak souls that are scandalized?
Yes, that is those that are not as yet proof against evil; although many sensitive souls cannot help but be painfully affected when they see or hear something that is bad (XLIII. 5).
Are good and virtuous souls incapable of giving scandal?
Yes, because in the first place they never do or say anything bad that could really scandalize; if perchance scandal is ever given to others, this is due to the malice of the latter only (XLIII. 6).
May it not sometimes happen that virtuous souls are under an obligation to forego certain things lest weaker souls be scandalized?
Yes, provided of course it is not a question of things necessary for salvation (XLIII. 7).
Is one ever bound to forego some good thing in order that the wicked may not be scandalized?
No (XLIII. 7, 8).
XI. OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO CHARITY
Is there in the law of God any precept relating to the virtue of charity?
Yes (XLIV. 1).
What is this precept?
This precept is the following: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, with thy whole mind, with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength" (XLIV. 4).
What do these words mean precisely?
They mean that in all our actions our intention should be directed towards God; that all our thoughts should be subject to Him; and that all our affections should be regulated according to His will; and that all our external acts should be performed in fulfilment of His will
Is this precept of charity a great precept?
Yes, it is indeed the greatest of all the precepts, since it contains virtually all other precepts, for these are ordained to it (XLIII. 1-3).
Is this precept of charity one and single, or does it embrace several other precepts?
This precept taken in its fulness is both one and many; and this means that understood in its proper sense it alone is sufficient in the order of charity; for in very truth one cannot love God without loving one's neighbour whom we must love for God's sake; but in order that the precept may be properly understood by all, to this first precept is added a second, which is really not distinct from the first, viz., "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (XLIV. 2,3,7).
Are these precepts of charity contained in the Decalogue?
No, for these precepts of charity precede, and as it were dominate, the Decalogue; indeed, the precepts contained in the Decalogue were only given in order that the carrying out of the precepts of charity might be assured (XLIV. 1).
Are these precepts of charity in the supernatural order manifest of themselves without any need of their being promulgated?
Yes, for just in the same way as there is a law of nature inborn in all which commands that in the natural order God must be loved above all and all things else for His sake; so it is a law essential to the supernatural order that God, who is the fount of all in this order, must be loved with a supernatural love above all and all things else for His sake.
Then, not to love God above all, and not to love one's neighbour as oneself, is to run counter to what is essential in the order of the affections?
Yes, this is so.
XII. OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM WHICH CORRESPONDS TO CHARITY; AND OF THE SIN TO WHICH IT IS OPPOSED
(A)
Is there a gift of the Holy Ghost that corresponds to the virtue of charity?
Yes; and it is the gift of wisdom which is the most perfect of all the gifts (XLV.).
What is the gift of wisdom?
The gift of wisdom is that gift of the Holy Ghost which effects that man, under the direct action of the Holy Spirit, judges of all things by reference to the highest and most sublime of all causes, which is the wisdom itself of God in so far as it is made manifest to us by faith (XLV. 1).
How is this gift of wisdom distinguished from the intellectual virtue of the same name, or from the gifts of intuition or insight, of knowledge and of counsel, and in so far as these latter are distinguished from the intellectual virtues which are also called intuition or insight, knowledge and prudence?
In a few words these differences may be summed up thus: On the part of the intellect, in things of faith, there are several acts essentially distinct to which correspond the virtues or their respective gifts which are themselves distinct from each other.
The very essence of faith is the act that assents to things revealed by God. Upon this act of assenting, which is the principal act, there ensue certain secondary or complementary acts that perfect the intellect in the same order of the things of faith; and these acts are understanding and judging. The act of understanding or perceiving is, generically speaking, one only, and to it corresponds the intellectual virtue of insight or intuition, and in a higher scale of perfection the gift of understanding. The act of judging is manifold, for it is threefold: this act may judge of things, in general, according to divine reasons or according to human; or it may judge of things by the application of its knowledge to things themselves in particular. In the first case, the intellectual virtue which corresponds to the act of judging is called the intellectual virtue of wisdom; and, in a higher scale, the gift of wisdom. In the second case, it is called the intellectual virtue of knowledge; and, in a higher scale, the gift of knowledge. In the third case, it is called the intellectual virtue of prudence; and, in a higher scale, the gift of counsel.
(B)
Is there anything worthy of note in this doctrine?
Yes; we owe this teaching to St. Thomas Aquinas. He himself tells us that he did not perceive the harmony and the beauty of this doctrine except after many years of study and reflexion (VIII. 6).
Among these virtues and gifts that perfect the mind in its knowledge of the truth, is there one which, in perfection, holds the first place?
Yes, and it is the virtue of faith upon which all the others depend; indeed, it is the rôle of the other virtues and gifts to assist in the knowledge of this truth.
Which is the most perfect after the virtue of faith?
After the virtue of faith the most perfect is the gift of wisdom.
In what does this perfection of the gift of wisdom consist, in particular with regard to the gift of knowledge?
It consists in this, that by the gift of knowledge we judge of things divinely by referring them to their immediate and created causes; whereas by the gift of wisdom we judge of all things divinely by referring them to the highest of all causes, that, namely, which itself is independent of all causes and from which all other causes depend.
It is then by the gift of wisdom that one attains to the highest degree of knowledge to be had on earth?
Yes.
(C)
Is there any sin which is opposed to this gift that is so supreme and beautiful?
Yes, and it is that lack of wisdom which consists in judging finally of a thing without taking into account, or perhaps even by contemning, the sovereign counsels of God.
What ought this sin to be called?
There is only one fitting name for this sin: it is abject stupidity or supreme folly (XLVI. 1).
Is this sin often found among men?
Yes; for, practically speaking, it is the sin of all those who lead a life apart from or in defiance of the things of God.
Is there an insuperable opposition between the wisdom of the world and the wisdom of God?
Yes, for each regards the other as folly.
In what does the opposition consist?
It consists in this, that the world esteems those wise who arrange their life in such a way as to lack none of the things of this world, and such people seek their last end in the good things of this life in contempt of the Good of God which is promised us in another life; whereas the wisdom of the children of God consists in subordinating all the things of the present life to the possession of God in heaven.
Are these two kinds of life distinct necessarily in every way?
Yes, because the last end of each is absolutely different; and it is the last end which rules all in a life.
It is then only by practising the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity and cultivating the corresponding gifts that man can tend towards his true final end, and is able as it behoves to view that last end in all the acts of his life?
Yes, of a truth this is so.
XIII. OF THE MORAL VIRTUES: OF PRUDENCE, ITS NATURE AND ELEMENTS, AND OF ITS ATTENDANT VIRTUES; OF THE SPECIES OF PRUDENCE, NAMELY, INDIVIDUAL, DOMESTIC, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY
(A)
What is the first of the moral virtues?
The virtue of prudence (XLVII .).
What is prudence?
Prudence is a principle of moral action that perfects man's practical reason, so that in every action he dispose and order all things as it behoves, by commanding himself and those under him to do at each moment what is necessary for the perfect realization of every virtue (XLVII. 1-9).
Is this virtue of great importance in man's life?
Yes, for without it there could be no virtuous act in man's life at all (XLVII. 13).
If man has this virtue in its perfect state, can he lead a perfectly virtuous life?
Yes (XLVII. 14).
Why can prudence effect this?
Because in prudence all the other virtues are united, each single one being dependent upon prudence just as prudence is dependent upon them.
In order for this virtue of prudence to be perfect, are certain conditions necessary as regards its proper act?
Yes.
What are these conditions?
They are, first of all, the elements which constitute it, without which it cannot exist at all; secondly, certain other virtues which are ordained to prudence and which prepare the way for its proper act are necessaiy and lastly, the division of prudence according to the diversity of objects to be governed or ruled (XLVIII.-LI.).
(B)
What are the elements which constitute prudence?
They are these: Memory of past things; insight into the principles of action whether in general or in particular; docility and respect for what has been determined by the wise; astuteness in order to discover a right course of action at a time when recourse to another is not possible; the healthy exercise of the reason applying, as is meet, the principles of the action to be performed to the manifold individual conditions of the action itself; foresight at the moment of acting as regards the substance of each act in particular; circumspection as regards all the accompanying circumstances of the act; precaution against obstacles or against whatsoever might endanger the happy result of the act (XLIX. 1-8).
(C)
What are the virtues ordained to prudence and which prepare the way for its proper act?
They are these: The virtue of good counsel; and the two virtues which ensure a right judgment: the one which regards the ordinary events of life and respects the established laws; the other which regards extraordinary events, and in this case recourse must be had to the higher sources of the natural law alone (LI. 1-4).
(D)
What is the act proper to prudence called?
It is called the command (XLVII. 8).
But does it not seem that the virtue of prudence is not so much the virtue that commands but rather that counsels, since a man is called "prudent" who takes counsel before acting?
A man is called "prudent" by reason of the counsel he takes before accepting the command; but prudence proper is in the act itself of giving a command with decision at a time when one has to act (XLVII. 8, Obj. 2).
(E)
Are there several species of prudence?
Yes, there are as many species of prudence as there are species of commanded acts; acts, that is, that present some special difficulty in the order of virtue.
How many species are there of acts of command?
There are four: the act of command as regards oneself, the act of command in a family; in a society; and in the army (L. 1-4).
What are these different species of prudence called?
They are called individual prudence, domestic, political, and military (ibid.).
(F)
What is individual prudence?
It is that necessary to each individual person for the leading of a virtuous life for his own individual good.
(G)
What is domestic prudence?
It is that necessary to every member of a family, so that each, under the head of the family, concur in the common welfare of the family (L. 3).
(H)
What is political prudence?
It is that necessary to the head of a society, whether an independent city or a nation, for the governing thereof as it behoves.
Is it sufficient for the well-being of a city or of a nation that he or those that govern be prudent?
No, there must be a proportionate prudence also in the people governed (L. 2).
In what does this prudence of the governed consist?
It consists in this, that each member of a society should strive by his correspondence to the orders of the government to further the common interests of the society (L. 2). (I)
Is the object of military prudence also for the furtherance of the interests of the common good?
Yes, military prudence is of great importance for the well-being of the society, since it is through the able commanding of the officers and the perfect discipline of the rank and file that the country defends its rights and repels the unjust invasions of an enemy (L. 4).
XIV. OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL WHICH CORRESPONDS TO PRUDENCE
What is the gift of the Holy Ghost that corresponds to prudence?
The gift of counsel (LII.).
What is this gift?
It is a supernatural perfection of man's practical reason that makes him docile and ready under the action of the Holy Ghost to take counsel and to sift well everything that in life relates to salvation; this gift is therefore of the greatest help to man, for even though he possess all the acquired and the infused virtues he cannot do without this gift, which helps him to make a perfect judgment and act of command, since he is for ever liable to err. amidst the complexity of circumstances that accompany every human act (LII. 1, 2).
Will the gift of counsel exist also in heaven?
Yes, but in a way much more perfect (LII. 3).
In what more perfect way will it exist there?
In this way: the minds of the blessed in heaven will be wondrously enlightened by God as regards all human activity in so far as it harmonizes with the final end which is already in their possession; and this, whether there be question of those acts which, for evermore, shall be produced in virtue of the actual possession of the final end; or there be question of the help the blessed are destined to give until the last day, to those on earth that they also may gain heaven (LII. 3).
XV. OF THE SINS THAT ARE OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE, VIZ., OF IMPRUDENCE; HASTINESS; LACK OF THOUGHT; INCONSTANCY; NEGLIGENCE; FALSE PRUDENCE; PRUDENCE OF THE FLESH; SLYNESS; DECEIT; FRAUD; FALSE SOLICITUDE
(A)
Are there any sins opposed to prudence?
Yes, and some of them are opposed to prudence on account of defect, whereas others are opposed on account of excess.
What are those sins called that are opposed to prudence on account of defect?
They go under the general name of imprudence (LIII.).
What is imprudence considered in this general way?
Imprudence, in general, is every act of the practical reason which runs counter to the rules of prudence (LIII. 1).
Can an act of imprudence be a mortal sin?
Yes, this can be so whenever man's reason acts contrary divine laws; such a one who spurns the laws of God acts with rashness (LIII. 1).
When is the sin only venial?
When man acts contrary to God's laws but without contempt and without peril to what is necessary for his salvation (ibid.).
Is any other sin linked up with the sin of imprudence?
Yes, indeed every other sin, for no sin would ever come to be if there were no act of imprudence; the latter sin, however, is distinct from and can exist apart from other sins (LIII. 2).
In what case does this sin of imprudence exist apart from other sins?
In every case when, without doing anything in itself bad or even when doing something that is good, one acts with hastiness, or with lack of thought, or with inconstancy, or with negligence (LIII. 2).
(B)
What is hastiness?
Hastiness is a sin against prudence, which consists in not making sufficient enquiry before acting as regards when one should act and in what manner one should act (LIII. 3).
(C)
What is lack of thought?
It is a sin against the rectitude of judgment; and it consists in despising or in neglecting to consider what is necessary to ensure a right judgment in conduct (LIII. 4).
(D)
What is inconstancy?
Inconstancy is a defect in the very act of commanding which is the proper act of prudence; and in very fact the inconstant man is he who for lack of a firm command does not effect what he had resolved upon after enquiry and the taking of counsel (LIII. 5).
(E)
Is this the only defect which touches the principal act of prudence?
No, there is also another called negligence, which is opposed to the principal act of prudence on the side of solicitude which this act entails (LIV.).
What is negligence?
It is the want of readiness in putting into execution, by way of command, the resolutions of the judgment, made after due enquiry and counsel, as regards the attainment of the end of virtue (LIV. 1).
Is negligence a great sin?
Yes; for it paralyzes all virtuous action; at times it hinders a virtuous act altogether, or it effects that the act is done only half-heartedly, in such wise that it loses most of its worth and merit (LIV. 3).
When negligence reaches also to the external act by enervating it, what is it called?
It is called laziness or torpidity (LIV. 2, Obj. 1).
Are these two sins distinct from negligence properly so-called?
Yes, for strictly the sin of negligence consists in the want of readiness and energy in the act of command in so far as this defect is due to the interior weakness of the will (LIV. 2).
Is it important to keep careful watch over the sin of negligence?
Yes, it is of extreme importance, for negligence attacks the very root of virtuous action and is opposed to the principal act of the practical reason from which the realization of every virtuous act depends.
Is negligence sometimes a mortal sin?
It is always a mortal sin when it affects whatever is of precept that concerns salvation; even when it is not a mortal sin, unless one is on one's guard, it causes a spiritual sickness that leads inevitably to spiritual corruption and death (LIV. 3).
(F)
What are the sins that are opposed to prudence by excess?
They are called false prudence and false solicitude (LV.).
What is false prudence?
It is that complexity of sins which vitiate the true character of prudence by seeking an end that is bad, or by exceeding the limits of prudence in choosing wrong means to an end (LV. 1-5).
What is that which vitiates the true character of prudence by seeking an end that is bad?
It is called the prudence of the flesh (LV. 1).
In what does it consist?
It consists in disposing our life in the interests of the flesh which is served as an end (ibid.).
Is this a mortal sin?
Yes, whenever the interests of the flesh are looked upon as the last end; if, however, these interests are not looked upon as the last end and as not ordained to the last true end of human life, then the sin is only venial (LV. 2).
(G)
The sins that exceed prudence as to the means employed, what are they?
They are the sins of slyness, with which are connected deceit and fraud (LV. 3-5).
What is slyness?
It is that false prudence which consists in using false and deceitful means whether it be question of a good or of a bad end for which they are used (LV. 3).
What is deceit?
Deceit consists in effecting by words or by deeds the projects suggested by slyness (LV. 4).
What is the difference between deceit and fraud?
The difference comes to this, that although both are concerned with the projects suggested by slyness, deceit puts into execution these projects whether it be by word or by deed, whereas fraud is confined to the execution of some project by deed only.
Are slyness, deceit, and fraud the same as lying?
No, for the lie takes falsehood as its end; whereas the three sins above mentioned take it as a means. If by chance the latter deceive, this is only to gain some end in view.
What follows from this difference?
It follows that lying is a special sin in the order of the moral virtues, a sin that is in opposition to the virtue of telling the truth only; whereas slyness, deceit, and fraud can be in divers genera of sins, not that they constitute any one sin in particular in the order of the moral virtues, but only in the order of prudence whose characteristic it is to be included in all the other virtues.
(H)
What is the sin of false solicitude?
By this is meant that solicitude the sole object of which is the seeking after temporal things, or after some empty vanity, or that which makes one fear inordinately the loss of these things (LV. 6).
Is there a solicitude for temporal things that is good?
Yes, it is that solicitude for temporal things that seeks them in a moderate way, by ordaining them to the end of charity, and by trusting to the providence of God (LV. 6).
What is to be said of that solicitude which regards the future?
This solicitude is always bad when it usurps what should be left to the future (LV. 7).
When is solicitude for the future good?
That solicitude is good when it contents itself to provide for the future in so far as the future depends upon those things which should occupy the attention here and now; leaving alone for future consideration the things that are future (LV. 7).
XVI. OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO PRUDENCE
Is there any precept among those of the Decalogue which corresponds to the virtue of prudence?
No; for the precepts of the Decalogue formulating what has reference to the natural reason should bear upon the ends of human life which are the proper object of the virtues, and not upon the means which are the proper object of the virtue of prudence. But all the precepts are related to prudence in that the latter directs all the acts of the virtues (LVI. 1).
Since then the precepts are directly related to the virtue of prudence, are they as it were complementary and of later origin?
Yes; and they are to be found in other places in the inspired books, even in the Old Testament; and later on in the New Testament (LVI. 2).
Are there not even in the Old Testament certain precepts of particular consequence that forbid certain sins opposed to the virtue of prudence?
Yes; they are the precepts relating to slyness, deceit, and fraud (LVI. 2).
Why are these sins particularly prohibited?
Because in their external application they militate against justice, which all the precepts of the Decalogue safeguard (LVI. 2).
XVII. OF JUSTICE AND ITS NATURE; OF LAW; OF NATURAL LAW; OF POSITIVE, PRIVATE, PUBLIC, NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, CIVIL, AND ECCLESIASTICAL LAW -- OF LEGAL JUSTICE AND OF PARTICULAR -- OF THE SINS OPPOSED THERETO
(A)
After the virtue of prudence, is the virtue of justice the most important of the other virtues?
Yes, after the virtue of prudence, which occupies a place apart in the order of the moral virtues and without which no one single virtue can exist, the most important among the other virtues is the virtue of justice (LVII.-CXXI.).
What is the virtue ofjustice?
It is that virtue which has for its object right or the just (LVII. 1).
What is meant by this?
By this is meant that the object of justice is to make respected among men those relations which are founded upon the respect due to existence and possession, which are legitimately the privilege of every human being (LVII. 1).
But how does one know that the existence or the possession of any one particular person is legitimately of such a nature or should be of such a nature?
One knows this by what natural reason tells concerning each man; also by that which, by common consent, is determined by the reason of different men; and also by the reason of those who are in authority whose office it is to regulate such matters (LVII. 2-4).
What is that law called which is founded upon what the natural reason dictates?
It is called the natural law (LVII. 2).
And that law which is determined by the common accord of different men, or that which is determined by those in authority whose duty it is to make regulations concerning the relations between men?
It is called positive law, which is divided into private law and public law; the latter is further divided into national and international according as there is question of private conventions or of the laws of a country, or of the laws agreed upon and established between different nations (LVII. 2).
What is the civil law and ecclesiastical law?
Civil law treats of the relations between men in so far as they are determined by the civil authority; ecclesiastical law in so far as they are determined by the ecclesiastical authority.
(B)
Does the right upon which the virtue of justice bears confine itself only to the relations of individuals of a society among themselves; or does it refer also to the relations of individuals with the society?
It embraces both species of relations (LVIII. 5-7).
What law is the first called?
It is called particular justice (LVIII. 7).
And the second?
Legal justice (LVIII. 5).
(C)
What is precisely the virtue of justice?
It is that perfection of man's will which inclines him to desire in all things, spontaneously and unceasingly, the good of the society of which he is a part; and also to desire that each should have what is his due (LVIII. 1).
What is the sin that is opposed to this virtue called?
It is called injustice; which, now, is in opposition to legal justice, spurning the common good which legal justice seeks to promote; and, now, is in opposition to particular justice which seeks to maintain what is right and just among individuals (LIX.).
In what does the sin of injustice precisely consist?
It consists in this, that with full knowledge one attacks the right of another; that is to say, that one acts contrary to what a rational will should naturally desire (LIX. 3).
XVIII. OF THE ACT OF PARTICULAR JUSTICE, VIZ.,JUDGMENT
Has the virtue of justice an act which is particularly proper to it, especially in so far as it is particular justice?
Yes, and this act is called the judgment, which consists in determining precisely what is due to each person; whether this judgment be given in an official capacity between two parties at law, or whether for love of right in itself the judgment be given for all and for all time in the desire to appreciate even within the soul the rights of everyone to existence and possession (LX.).
Ought this judgment, which is the act of the virtue of justice, to interpret doubtful things in a good sense?
Yes, whenever it has reference to our neighbour and his'acts justice should never either internally or externally judge in a bad sense so long as there remains any doubt about the motives of our neighbour and his acts (LX. 4).
But if, however, there is doubt with regard to things that might be hurtful to oneself or to others, may not one be suspicious and take precautions?
Yes, legal justice, and prudence, and charity demand that when there is question of some evil to ourselves or to others we should be on our guard even though our suspicions may arise from conjecture only (LX. 4, Obj. 3).
But even in this case is no reservation to be made?
Yes, even when it is right to take precautions one must not either in words or in thought pronounce a formal judgment which is prejudicial to another (ibid.).
XIX. OF PARTICULAR JUSTICE, AND OF ITS SPECIES: OF DISTRIBUTIVE AND OF COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE
Does particular justice comprise several species?
Yes, it comprises two species: distributive justice and commutative justice (LXI. 1).
What is distributive justice?
It is that species of particular justice which safeguards fairness in the relations that exist between the society and the individuals of which the society is composed (LXI. 1).
What is commutative justice?
It is that species of particular justice which safeguards fairness in the relations of men with each other in the same society (ibid.).
If one considers the individual members of a society as parts ordained to the whole, what kind of justice safeguards fairness between the individuals and the society?
This is the great virtue called legal justice (LXI. 1, Obj. 4).
XX. OF THE ACT OF COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE, VIZ., OF RESTITUTION
(A)
What is the proper act of commutative justice?
It is called restitution (LXII. 1).
What is restitution?
It is that act whereby the right relation between one man and another is re-established, whenever this relation has been broken by the fact that one of the two has not received his due (LXI. 1).
Restitution then does not always imply an act of injustice?
No, for also the virtuous man may make restitution, by restoring what belongs to another immediately and with scrupulousness when such thing ought to be restored.
(B)
What are the essential rules of restitution?
The following, and they are those which natural equity dictates. By restitution, that which another lacks or might lack unfairly is given to him or restored to him. That which is restored must be the thing itself or its exact equivalent, neither more nor less, in so far as the person possessed it previously, whether actually or virtually: further, one must take into account whatever change may have taken place in the thing restored and make proper restitution as the case may be; and further, one must take into account the consequences that are or were prejudicial to the owner of the object due to the detention thereof. An object to be restored must be given back to the owner and not to any other person unless the latter be acting for the owner. He, whosoever he may be, who is in possession of an object to be restored is the one who must make restitution thereof, or whosoever is the one who is responsible for the act which was an offence against justice. Restitution must be made without delay, except in the case when the immediate restoration of an object is impossible (LXII. 2-8).
XXI. OF THE SINS OPPOSED TO DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: OF THE RESPECT OF PERSONS; OF THE SINS OPPOSED TO COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE; OF HOMICIDE; OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT; OF MUTILATION; OF FLOGGING; AND OF IMPRISONMENT
(A)
What is the sin opposed to distributive justice ?
It is the sin of the respect of persons (LX III.).
What is meant by this sin?
It is the fact of giving something or of refusing to give to a person what is for his good, or to impose something on a person that is burdensome or difficult, and this not by a consideration of his merits or demerits but merely because the person is such and such a one (LXIII. 1).
(B)
What sins are opposed to commutative justice?
These sins are divided into two groups (LXIV.-LXXVIII.).
What are those of the first group?
They are those which touch our neighbour in which his own will has no part (LXIV.-LXXVI.).
What is the first of these sins?
It is homicide, which affects our neighbour by deed, as regards his greatest good, viz., by taking his life (LXIV.).
Is this a great sin?
It is the greatest sin against our neighbour.
Is it ever permitted to attempt our neighbour's life?
No, never.
Is it never permitted to take away a man's life?
It is never permitted to take away a man's life, unless through some crime, he has merited death (LXIV. 2, 6).
When a man through crime merits to lose his life, who alone has the right to deprive him of life?
Only the public authority has the right to do this (LXIV. 2).
Whence does the public authority derive this right?
It derives this right from the duty incumbent upon it of guarding over the common good of the society (ibid.).
Does the common good of the society sometimes demand that a man be put to death?
Yes, because there may be no other efficient way of putting a stop to the crimes committed within the society; or because the public feeling demands such satisfaction for the expiation of certain crimes that are hateful and revolting (LXIV. 2).
Is it only for crime that a man can be put to death by the public authority?
Yes, for this reason only (LXIV. 6).
May public interest sometimes justify the putting to death of an innocent person?
No, never, because the supreme good in a society is always the good of virtue (LXIV. 6).
(C)
Has an individual, in order to defend himself, or his belongings, the right to take the life of the one who attacks him?
No, an individual has never the right to do this unless there be question of losing his own life or the life of those in his charge, and there be absolutely no defence other than that which entails the death of his assailant; further, in thus defending himself he must in no way whatever intend the death of his assailant, but only intend to defend his life or that of others in his charge (LXIV. 7).
What are the other sins against our neighbour that touch his person?
They are mutilation, which attacks the integrity of his person; flogging, which inflicts pain on his body; and imprisonment, which deprives him of the freedom of his person (LXV. 1-3).
When are these acts sinful?
Whenever they are done by those who have no authority, or who, having authority, exceed the just bounds (ibid.).
XXII. OF THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY, AND OF THE DUTIES IT ENTAILS -- OF THE VIOLATION OF THIS RIGHT, VIZ., OF THEFT AND ROBBERY
(A)
Besides the sins that attack the person of our neighbour, what is the greatest sin that can be committed against him by deed?
It is the sin which touches what belongs to him (LXVI.).
Has man the right to possess anything?
Yes, and to use it as he wills, without the interference of anyone else (LXVI. 2).
Whence comes this right?
It comes from the very nature of man himself; for since he is a rational being and made to live in society, his own good, the good of his family, and the good of society absolutely demand that the right of property be safeguarded (LXVI. 1, 2).
But why do these divers goods demand the safeguarding of the right of property?
It is because the right to possess is a condition of man's liberty, it is, moreover, for the family, the way par excellence whereby it is upheld in all its rights and is the guarantee of its existence in the society; further, this right of property effects that in the society itself more care is taken of things to the exclusion in a great measure of disagreements and litigations (LXVI. 2).
(B)
Does the right of property entail certain duties?
Yes, it entails certain grave duties.
What are these duties?
They are, first of all, the duty of taking care of one's belongings and of doing one's best to promote their productiveness. Then, according to the productiveness of these things, one must in due measure, after supplying one's own wants, use these things for the good of others who are in the society. There is indeed a duty in social justice of giving to those who are in need the superfluity of one's possessions, or of employing the labour of others, or of giving facilities for such labour to those who by this means earn their livelihood, and this one must do for the love of the public good generally. The state in the interests of the public good has the right to make levies on the goods of individuals as regards whatever it judges necessary or useful for the good of the society, and individual members are bound to conform to the laws made by the state for this end; there is indeed for them an obligation to comply therewith in strict justice. But the good of individuals and the need of supplying their necessities does not oblige with the same rigour, for there is no positive human law constraining one to this. On the other hand, the natural law demands this in all rigour. Not to succour the needy with the superfluity of one's possessions is to act in direct opposition to the natural law; this obligation enforced by the natural law takes on a sacred character through divine positive law, especially through the law contained in the Gospels. God Himself preached this personally in order to impress more on the minds of men what He had already graven on their hearts (LXVI. 2-7; XXXII. 5, 6).
If such are the duties of those who possess towards their fellow-men, what are the duties of the latter in relation to the former?
They must respect the property of those who possess and never take anything against their owner's will (LXVI. 5, 8).
(C)
What is that act called which consists in taking the property of another against his will?
It is called theft or robbery (LXVI. 3, 4).
What is theft?
Theft is to appropriate the property of another secretly (LXVI. 3).
And what is robbery?
Robbery is the appropriation of another's property by violence (LXVI. 4).
Which is the graver of these two sins?
Robbery is more grave than theft; but theft, in itself, is always a mortal sin unless the thing taken is of small consequence (LXVI. 9).
XXIII. OF THE SINS AGAINST JUSTICE BY WORDS; OF THE JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED BY A JUDGE; OF THE SINS ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED AND OF THE ACCUSER; AND ON THE PART OF THE WITNESS AND OF THE ADVOCATE
(A)
Are there any sins against justice that are committed by words?
Yes, and these are twofold: those that are committed in the solemn act of judgment; and those that are committed in the ordinary course of life (LXVII.-LXXVI.)
What is the first sin that can be committed in the solemn act of judgment?
It is the sin of the judge who judges unjustly (LXVII.).
What is required of a judge that he may judge justly ?
He should consider himself as it were a living justice, whose duty it is to restore in the name of the society which he represents the injured right to whosoever has recourse to his authority (LXVII. 1).
(B)
What then is the duty of a judge in the fulfilment of his office?
It is his duty to judge those only who come under his jurisdiction: moreover, in drawing up his judgment he must take as his basis the facts of the case as set forth by the parties in litigation, it being allowable for him to interfere only if one of the parties lodges a complaint; but he must always dispense justice in its integrity, not showing to the culprit pity falsely so-called, whatever be the penalty in the name of the law established by God or by men he may have to pronounce against him (LXVII. 2-4.).
(C)
What is the second sin which may be committed against justice in the solemn act of judgment?
It is the sin of those who are wanting in their duty as accusers, or who accuse unjustly (LXVIII.).
What is meant by the duty of accusing?
By this is meant that duty incumbent upon every man living in a society who knows of some evil that assails the society itself; he is thereby bound to bring to the notice of the judge the author of the evil so that justice may be done; he is free from this obligation only if he is unable to establish the truth of the fact juridically (LXVIII. 1).
When is an accusation unjust?
Accusation is unjust when from simple malice one falsely imputes crimes to another; or if when one is called upon to give evidence one does not follow up the accusation according as justice demands, either by making overtures to the opposite party or by unreasonably declining to follow up the accusation (LXVIII. 3).
(D)
What is the third sin committed against justice in the act of judgment?
It is the sin of the accused who refuses to conform to the rules of the law (LXIX.).
What are these rules to which the accused must conform, under pain of sin against justice?
They are that he is bound to tell the truth to the judge when the latter, in virtue of his authority as judge, interrogates him; and that he must never defend himself by fraudulent means (LXIX. 1, 2).
If he is condemned, may not the accused decline to accept the judgment by making an appeal?
The accused, who is not allowed to defend himself by fraudulent means, has no right to make an appeal from a just judgment with the sole object of retarding the putting into execution of the judgment. He may make an appeal only when he is the victim of manifest injustice. Even then he must use his right within the limits established by the law (LXIX. 3).
Has one who is condemned to death the right to resist the sentence of condemnation?
The man who is unjustly condemned to death can resist even by violence provided no scandal is given. But if he be justly condemned, he is bound to submit to the penalty without resistance whatsoever; it is, however, permissible to make good his escape should he find the means, for no one is bound to concur in one's own punishment (LXIX. 4).
(E)
What is the fourth sin that is opposed to justice in the act of judgment?
It is the sin of the witness who is wanting in his duty (LXX.).
How may a witness be wanting in his duty?
He may be wanting in his duty either by abstaining from giving evidence when he is required to do so by the public authority, which he is bound to obey in things that belong to justice; or whenever his evidence may prevent loss to someone; or by adducing false testimony (LXX. 1, 4).
Is false testimony always a mortal sin? Yes, it is always a mortal sin, if not always on account of the lie, which may be venial, it always is mortal by reason of perjury, and also by reason of injustice if one give such testimony against a just cause (CXX. 4).
(F)
What is the last sin against justice in the act of judgment?
It is the sin of the advocate who refuses to defend a just cause such as can be defended by him only; or who defends an unjust cause particularly in civil causes; or who demands an exorbitant sum for his fee (LXXI. 1,3,4).
XXIV. OF THE SINS OF SPEECH COMMITTED IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LIFE, VIZ., OF INVECTIVE, OF DETRACTION (AND CALUMNY), OF WHISPERINGS, OF MOCKERY, OF THE CURSE
(A)
What are the sins of injustice committed against our neighbour by speech in the ordinary course of life?
They are invective, detraction, whisperings, mockery, and the curse (LXXII.-LXXVI.).
What is understood by invective?
Invective is that sin which wounds another, in the honour or in the respect due to him, by words (LXXII. 1).
Is it a mortal sin?
Yes, whenever such words attack the honour of another in a grave way. The sin is venial only if our neighbour's honour is not seriously injured, or if one has no intention of seriously injuring another (LXXII. 2).
Is one bound in justice to treat others with the reverence due to them?
Yes, one is strictly bound in justice to do this, for the harmony of all living in a society is dependent upon this (LXXII. 1-3).
Upon what is this duty founded and what is its importance?
It is founded upon this, that the honour of each one is a thing which men cherish most. Even the least among men has a right to be treated with the respect due to his own particular status in life: to be lacking towards him in respect, whether by word or deed, is to wound him in what he holds most dear (ibid.).
One ought then with the greatest care to avoid saying or doing anything whatsoever which may bring disconsolation or humiliation upon our fellow-men?
Yes, one must do this at all cost (ibid.).
Is it ever permitted to act otherwise?
This is only permitted in the case of a superior whose duty it may be to correct one under his charge when the latter merits such correction; with this condition, however, that a superior do not do this in the heat of passion, or in a manner that is indiscreet or uncalled for (LXXII. 2, Obj. 2).
What should be done with regard to those who are lacking in respect?
With such as these charity, and sometimes justice, demands that their boldness be punished. But in this case it is necessary to be on one's guard lest, in punishing them, one exceed the right bounds imposed by the law and so bring injury to oneself (LXXII. 3).
(B)
What is understood by detraction?
Detraction, in its strict sense, implies the intention of attacking the reputation of our neighbour, or of taking away wholly or in part the esteem in which he is held by others, whensoever there is no just cause for so doing (LXXIII. 1)
Is this a great sin?
Yes, since it is to take away unjustly from our neighbour a good that is more precious than riches which are taken from him by theft (LXXIII. 2, 3).
In how many ways may one commit the sin of detraction?
In four ways: in imputing to our neighbour things that are false or in exaggerating his defects; or in making known things unknown about him and which prejudice him in the eyes of others; or in attributing to him intentions that are of a doubtful and perhaps of an evil character, whereby all that he does with the best intention becomes vitiated (LXXIII. 1, Obj. 3).
Is there any other sin of detraction that is hurtful to our neighbour?
Yes, in an indirect way, by refusing to acknowledge the good in him, or by keeping silence maliciously concerning his good points, or by lessening their worth (LXXIII. 1, Obj.3).
(C)
What is the sin called whispering?
It is that sin which attacks our neighbour by seeking directly through dishonest and insidious speech, to sow discord and create misunderstanding between those who are united by the bonds of friendship (LXXIV. 1).
Is this a grave sin?
This is a most odious sin against our neighbour, and merits perhaps more than other sins that can be committed against our neighbour the just reproval both of God and men (LXXIV. 2).
(D)
What is mockery?
Mockery is a sin of the tongue against justice which consists in reviling our neighbour by bringing to his notice his defects and shortcomings, which fact makes him lose confidence in himself as regards his relations with others (LXXV. 1).
Is this a grave sin?
Yes, of a truth, for it implies contempt for the person of our neighbour; and this is a most detestable thing and well merits chastisement (LXXV. 2).
Is irony also a kind of mockery and is it also a grave sin?
Irony may be only slightly culpable if it touch only the small faults or defects of our neighbour, and it may exist without contempt for our neighbour's person. Sometimes irony may be no sin at all, whenever, for instance, one taunts another for the sake of innocent amusement and no risk be run of bringing depression or humiliation upon him who is the object. This manner of amusement is, however, of a delicate nature and should be used with much prudence (LXXV. 1, Obj. 1).
May not irony sometimes be an act of virtue?
Yes, if one employ it as it behoves, by way of correction. A superior may advantageously correct an inferior in this manner, or even those on an equal footing may employ it with advantage and with charity by way of fraternal correction.
In such case what does the use of irony demand?
It demands that it be used with great discretion. For if it is good for those who have too good an opinion of themselves to be brought to acknowledge in a truer measure their proper worth, one has to take care lest, by exceeding the bounds of irony, a person become so depressed as wholly to lose confidence in himself; and without this praiseworthy self-confidence all spontaneity of action would be paralyzed.
(E)
What relation is there between the sin called the curse, and the four sins of invective, detraction, whispering, and mockery?
All these sins have in common this, that they are sins of the tongue which attack the good of our neighbour; but whereas the four latter do this by the words of a proposition which formulate evil, or deny the good of our neighbour, the curse attacks our neighbour's good by wishing him evil (LXXVI. 1, 4)
Is the curse then essentially bad?
Yes, whenever one wishes evil to another for evil's sake; and such a wish is, of itself, always a grave sin (LXXVI. 3).
XXV. OF THE SINS THAT DECEIVE OUR NEIGHBOUR, AND OF THOSE THAT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIM, VIZ., OF FRAUD AND OF USURY
What is the last kind of sins which are committed against commutative justice?
They are those sins whereby our neighbour is induced to agree to things that are prejudicial to him (LXXVII., Prologue).
What are these sins called?
Theyare called fraud and usury (LXXVII., LXXVIII.).
(A)
What is fraud?
It is an act of injustice, which is committed in buying and selling whereby our neighbour is deceived and is led to will what is to his loss (LXXVII.).
In how many ways can one commit the sin of fraud?
This sin may be committed: by reason of the price which is more than the thing is worth; by reason of the thing sold in so far as it is not what it appears to be, the seller knowing this and the buyer ignoring it; by reason of the seller who conceals a defect in the object sold; and by reason of the end in view (LXXVII. 1-4.).
Is it never permitted knowingly to sell a thing for more than it is worth or to buy a thing for less than it is worth?
No, for the price of a thing bought or sold must always correspond to the worth of the thing itself; to ask more or to give less knowingly is of itself essentially unjust, and obliges to restitution (LXXVII. 1).
Is it against justice to sell a thing for what it is not, or to buy a thing which is other than what the seller believes it to be?
Yes, to sell or to buy a thing which is other than it appears to be, whether there be question of its substance, or its quantity or quality, is contrary to justice, and is a sin if one do this knowingly; moreover, one is bound to make restitution. Further, this obligation of making restitution exists even when there has been no sin, as soon as ever one discovers the disproportion between the price and the thing sold or bought (LXXVII. 2).
Is the seller always bound to bring to the notice of the buyer the defects of his wares in so far as he knows them?
Yes, he is bound to do this whenever the defects are hidden, and might be a cause of danger or loss to the buyer (LXXVII. 3).
Is it allowable to take up buying and selling as a form of trade for the sake of gaining money?
Trading for the sake of trading is a shameful thing and contrary to justice; because of itself it promotes the love of lucre, which knows no limits, but seeks to acquire without end (LXXVII. 4).
What then is necessary that trading may become licit and honest?
Lucre should not be sought after for its own sake but for some good end. In this way one may seek a moderate gain by trading in order to maintain one's household, or to give help to the needy, or one may do this for the public benefit to the end that one's fellow-men may not lack the things necessary for daily life, and one may seek such gain not as an end in itself but as the recompense for one's work (LXXVII. 4).
(B)
What is usury?
Usury is an act of injustice which consists in taking advantage of the need of our neighbour by lending him money, or any other thing that has a money value (whose only use is the consumption thereof which is destined to meet present necessities), and in return obliging him to give back the money or the thing lent by a fixed date with an addition as the price of the use (LXXVIII. 1, 2, 3).
Is usury the same thing as lending out at interest?
No; for although all usury is lending out at interest, all lending out at interest is not usury.
In what does lending out at interest differ from usury?
It differs from usury in so far as money is considered as productive, by reason of the social and economic circumstances in which we live to-day.
What is necessary in order that lending out at interest may be allowable and may not run the risk of becoming usury?
Two things are necessary: first, the amount of interest charged must not exceed the legal charge, or the charge fixed by reasonable custom; and second, those who are well off should not be exacting towards the poor who have need of borrowing, not in order to trade in money but with the object of immediate consumption and the succouring of their needs.
XXVI. OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE: OF DOING GOOD AND AVOIDING EVIL -- OF THE SINS OPPOSED THERETO: OF OMISSION, AND OF TRANSGRESSION
In speaking of the virtue of justice, apart from its divers species, may not one consider the elements which constitute the virtue, just in the same way as was said of prudence?
Yes; and these elements are none other than what are described as doing good and avoiding evil (LXXIX. 1).
Why are these two elements proper to the virtue of justice?
Because in the other moral virtues, as, for instance, in fortitude and temperance, not to do evil is identified with to do good; whereas in the virtue of justice, to do good consists in so acting that fairness in the relations between us and our neighbour be maintained; and not to do evil consists in avoiding anything which upsets the justness of these relations (LXXIX. 1).
What is that sin called which is contrary to "doing good?"
It is called the sin of omission (LXXIX. 3).
And what is that sin called which is opposed to "avoiding evil"?
It is called the sin of transgression (LXXIX. z).
Of these two sins which is the more grave?
Considered in itself the graver sin is that of transgression; although a particular kind of omission may be more grave than a particular kind of transgression. For instance, it is more grave to insult someone than not to pay him the respect due to him; but if it be question of a high superior, to be lacking in due respect to him by not paying him the homage that such respect demands, particularly in public, would be more grave than a slight sign of contempt for, or a resentful word that may wound, a person in a lower scale of society (LXXXIX. 4).
XXVII. OF THE VIRTUES ATTACHING TO JUSTICE: OF RELIGION; OF FILIAL RESPECT; OF REVERENCE; OF GRATITUDE; OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE; OF TRUTHFULNESS; OF FRIENDSHIP; OF LIBERALITY; OF NATURAL EQUITY
Are there also certain virtues that refer to justice and are, as it were, parts attaching thereto?
Yes (LXXX. 1).
In what are these other virtues distinct from justice properly so-called?
They are distinct in this, that the object of justice properly so-called is to render to another exactly what is his due; whereas the object of these other virtues, although having reference to one's neighbour (and this they have in common with justice) is: to give to another something which is not due to him strictly but in a wide sense only, but such as could be exacted in the name of the law before a tribunal; or only to give a thing which is strictly due in a way that falls short of the strict justness demanded (LXXX. 1).
How many virtues attach to justice, and what are the
There are nine, and they are religion, filial respect, reverence, gratitude, retributive justice, truth, friendship, liberality, and natural equity (LXXX. 1).
Is it possible to justify the above order among these virtues?
Yes, in this wise. The first eight refer to particular justice, the ninth to general or legal justice. Of the first eight, three -- religion, filial respect, and reverence -- have something in common, for they are outside the domain of strict justice, not because there is no debt to be paid, but because of the impossibility of attaining justness in the acquittance of the debt: religion with regard to God, filial respect with regard to parents and one's country, reverence with regard to the good and to those in high places. The other five virtues are defective on the part of the debt; for they do not refer to something which is legally due to another, such as could be exacted in justice before a tribunal, but only to something which is morally due, the payment of which is left to the good will of each; such payment is, however, necessary for the well-being of human life and the harmony of the relations between men, either necessarily as truthfulness, gratitude, and retributive justice, or for the betterment of human relations as friendship and liberality (LXXX. 1).
XXVIII. OF RELIGION AND ITS NATURE
What is the virtue of religion?
The virtue of religion (so-called because it constitutes the bond par excellence which unites man to God, who is the source of all man's good) is a perfection of the will inclining man to acknowledge as it behoves his absolute dependence upon God, who is the first beginning and last end of all (LXXXI. 1-5).
What are the acts of religion?
Every act which, of itself, makes man recognize his dependence upon God is the proper object of the virtue of religion. But this virtue also may ordain to this same end all the acts of the other virtues; and in this case it makes the whole of man's life an act of the worship of God (LXXXI. 7, 8).
In the latter case what is it called?
It is called sanctity. For the saint is precisely he whose whole life is transformed into an act of religion (LXXXI. 8).
Is the virtue of religion most excellent?
Yes, for after the theological virtues it is the most excellent of all the virtues (LXXXI. 6).
Whence does the virtue of religion derive this excellence?
It comes from this, that among all the moral virtues whose object is to perfect man in every order of conscious activity in his striving after heaven, such as faith, hope, and charity, there is no other virtue whose object approaches so nigh to this end. The other virtues direct man, either in regard to his own conduct or in regard to other creatures, whilst religion directs him towards God: it effects that he look to God, as it behoves, by recognizing His Sovereign Majesty, serving and honouring Him by his acts as the one whose excellence infinitely surpasses every created thing (LXXXI. 6).
XXIX. OF RELIGION AND ITS INTERIOR ACTS: OF DEVOTION; OF PRAYER, ITS NATURE AND NECESSITY; OF THE "OUR FATHER" OR THE LORD'S PRAYER, AND ITS EFFICACIOUSNESS
(A)
What is the first act of religion?
It is that interior act which is called devotion (LXXXII. 1, 2).
What is devotion?
Devotion is a certain movement of the will whereby it gives itself and all dependent on it to the service of God, and this always and with a holy zeal (LXXXII. 1, 2).
After devotion, what is man's first act in the service of God?
It is the act of prayer.
(B)
What is prayer?
Prayer, understood in its widest sense and in so far as it is addressed to God, is an act of the practical reason by which, under the form of supplication, we desire to lead God to grant what we ask (LXXXIII. 1).
But is this a reasonable thing?
Yes, of a truth it is; for there is nothing more reasonable and more in harmony with our nature than to do this (LXXXIII. 2).
How can this be shown?
By the following considerations: since we are by nature rational beings, we have need of considering in the greatest degree what God is and what we are. But we are filled with miseries; and He is the source of all good. The more intimately we know then our own misery in all its details, and that God only is capable of succouring our needs, the more we shall come to know what we ought to be, that is to know what our very nature has need of; and this is precisely what prayer effects. It is, moreover, the more perfect when it makes us the more conscious of our misery and of the goodness of God, which is the remedy of that misery. It is for this reason that God in His mercy wishes us to pray, and He has even determined that certain boons shall not be conferred upon us unless we ask Him for them (LXXXIII. 2).
It is then God's will that we are fulfilling when we endeavour by prayer to lead Him to grant what we ask?
Yes, it is God's will that we should do this; that is of course whenever what we ask of Him is for our own true good.
(C)
Does God always hear our prayers then?
Yes, God always hears our prayers when we ask of Him, under the very impulse of the Holy Ghost, what is for our true good (LXXXIII. 15).
Is there a form of prayer whereby we may be assured of asking always for what is for our good?
Yes, there is a form of prayer par excellence of this kind which is called the "Our Father" or the Lord's Prayer (LXXXIII. 9).
What is meant by the words: the Lord's Prayer?
It is that prayer which was taught us by Jesus Christ Himself in the Gospel.
What are the words of this prayer?
The following: Our Father, who art in heaven; Hallowed be Thy name; Thy Kingdom come; Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven; Give us this day our daily bread; Forgive us our offences as we forgive them that trespass against us; And lead us not into temptation; But deliver us from evil. Amen.
(D)
Does this prayer contain all the requests we may ask and ought to ask of God?
Yes; for whatever we ask of God can be reduced to one or other of the petitions expressed in the "Our Father," provided, of course, that our request is for some good (LXXXIII. 9).
Has this prayer any other excellence which is proper to it alone?
Yes; and this excellence consists in this, that this prayer puts upon our lips in the very order that they should be in our hearts, all the desires that ought to be ours (LXXXIII. 9).
Can this order of the petitions in the "Our Father" be shown?
Yes, in a few words thus. Of all our desires the first must be that God should be glorified, since the glory of God is the end of all things; and in order that we ourselves might co-operate in the best way towards this glory, we must desire to be admitted one day to a participation of that glory in heaven. Such is the sense of the first two petitions of the Our Father when we say: "Hallowed be Thy name; Thy Kingdom come." This glorification of God in Himself and of us in Him will one day be the final term of our life. On earth and during the present life we have to strive to be admitted to the glory of God in heaven. To attain this end there is only one thing to be done: to accomplish in all things the will of God as perfectly as possible. And this we ask when we say: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." But in order to fulfil the will of God in the most perfect way possible, we have need of God's life to strengthen our weakness whether as regards temporal needs or spiritual. We ask for this help when we say: "Give us this day our daily bread." This indeed would be sufficient were it not necessary to avoid or get rid of evil which can be an obstacle either as regards our attainment of the Kingdom of God, or the accomplishment of His will, or the sufficiency of things of which we have need in the present life. Against this threefold evil we say: " Forgive us our offences as we forgive them that trespass against us; and lead us not into temptation; but deliver us from evil" (LXXXIII. 9).
Why do we say at the beginning of this prayer: "Our Father, who art in heaven"?
We say these words in order that we may inspire our hearts with the liveliest confidence,, since He to whom we address our prayer is our Father whose kingdom is heaven itself (LXXXIII. 9, Obj. 5).
Ought we to recite the "Our Father "frequently?
We should live continually in its spirit, reciting it from time to time, and indeed as often as we can according as the conditions of our life permit (LXXXIII. 54).
No matter what our condition of life be, is it not the least we can do to recite this prayer once every day?
Yes, this is the only fitting thing to do.
(E)
Should we address our prayers to God only?
Yes, to God alone must we pray, from whom all good things come; but we may also pray to certain creatures that they may intercede for us before God (LXXXIII. 4).
To what creatures may we pray for such end?
To the angels and saints in heaven; and the good who are still on earth (LXXXIII. 11).
Is it good to recommend oneself to the prayers of souls that are saintly?
Yes, it is an excellent thing to do this.
(F)
Of all creatures is there not one in particular to whom we should have recourse in our prayers?
Yes, and this one is Mary, ever a virgin and the Mother of the incarnate Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ.
What name has been given to our Blessed Lady by reason of the special mission she has of interceding for us?
She has been called the All-Powerful.
What is meant by these words?
By these words is meant that all those for whom she has interceded before God have been heard by Him in their prayers.
Is there any special form of prayer for soliciting our Blessed Lady to intercede for us before God?
Yes, it is called the "Hail Mary."
What are the words of this prayer?
The following: Hail Mary, full of grace; The Lord is with Thee; Blessed art Thou among women; And blessed is the fruit of Thy womb, Jesus: Holy Mary, Mother of God, pray for us sinners, Now, and at the hour of our death. Amen.
When is it a good thing to recite this prayer?
It is a good thing to recite it as often as possible, and especially to recite it after saying the" Our Father."
(G)
Is there any excellent manner of prayer in which these prayers are united together?
Yes, in that form of prayer known as the Rosary.
What is the Rosary?
It is a prayer which consists in bringing to mind the fifteen mysteries of our redemption, and of reciting with the memory of each mystery the "Our Father" followed by ten "Hail Marys," after which is added: "Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost, as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end. Amen."
XXX. OF THE EXTERNAL ACTS OF RELIGION: OF ADORATION; OF SACRIFICE; OF OBLATION; OF TITHES; OF VOWS; OF OATHS; OF CALLING ON THE NAME OF GOD
(A)
After the internal acts of devotion and prayer, what are the other acts of the virtue of religion?
They are all those external acts which, of themselves, are directed to the honouring of God (LXXXIV.-XCI.).
What are these acts?
They are, first of all, certain movements of the body, such as the inclination of the head, genuflexion, and prostration, and all those acts which are comprised under the general name of adoration (LXXXIV.).
In what does the excellence of these acts consist?
It consists in this, that even the body is made to contribute towards the honouring of God; and when these acts are performed in a fitting manner they help much towards the better performance of the internal acts (LXXXI V. 2).
Is it only the body we should make use of to honour God in the virtue of religion?
No, for there are also certain things we can offer to God in homage under the form of sacrifice or of pious contribution (LXXXV.-LXXXVII.).
(B)
Is there in the New Law oniy one kind of sacrifice, understood in its strict sense, which implies the immolation of a victim?
Yes, it is the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, in which is immolated under the sacramental species of bread and wine He who since His sacrifice on the Cross is the only victim offered to God, and the only one that is agreeable to Him (LXXX. 4).
Is it an act of religion pleasing to God to contribute according to one's means towards the upkeep of His external worship by giving the wherewithal for the maintenance of its ministers?
Yes, this is an act of religion and is especially pleasing to God (LXXXVI.-LXXXVII.).
(C)
Is it only thus in giving to God for the upkeep of His worship and His ministers that one performs an act of religion?
No, for one can also perform an act of religion by promising to God something which of its nature is pleasing to Him (LXXXVIII.).
What is such a promise called?
It is called the vow (LXXXIII. 1, 2).
If one makes a vow is one obliged to keep it?
Yes, if one makes a vow one is bound to keep it except in the case of impossibility or dispensation (LXXXIII. 3, 10).
(D)
Is there any other kind of acts of religion?
Yes; there are those acts performed in order to honour God by using something that touches God Himself (LXXXIX.).
What are those things touching God which we can utilize for His honour and homage?
They are holy things; and also the holy name of God.
What is understood by holy things?
By holy things is meant whatsoever has received from God through the medium of His Church some consecration or particular blessing: as, for instance, persons consecrated to God; the sacraments; and the sacramentals, such as holy water or objects of piety; and also places of worship (LXXXIX., Prologue).
(E)
In what way may one use the Holy Name of God as a homage rendered to Him?
One may use the Holy Name of God for this purpose by calling it as witness to the truth of what one says, or by invoking it in praise (LXXXIX.-XCI.).
If one calls on the Holy Name as witness to the truth of what one says or of what one promises, what is this invocation called?
It is called the oath (LXXXIX. 1).
Is an oath a good thing in itself, and to be commended?
The oath is good only when grave necessity demands it; and it should be used with extreme reserve (LXXXIX. 2).
And to adjure or to swear, what is that?
To adjure or to swear is an act which consists in calling on the name of God or upon some holy thing in order to induce someone to act or not to act in the way we wish (XC. 1).
Is this act allowable?
Yes, provided it be done with respect and according to the condition of those whom we adjure (ibid.).
Is it good to invoke often the name of God?
Yes, provided one do this with the greatest respect and in the form of praise (XCI. 1).
XXXI. OF THE SINS OPPOSED TO RELIGION: OF SUPERSTITION, AND OF DIVINATION; OF IRRELIGION: OF TEMPTING GOD, OF PERJURY, AND OF SACRILEGE
(A)
What are the sins opposed to the virtue of religion?
They are of two kinds: those of excess, which come under the name of superstition; and those of defect, which are comprised under the name of irreligion (XCII., Prologue).
What is meant by superstition?
By superstition is understood that complexity of sins which consists in paying worship to God such as cannot be pleasing to Him; or to pay to things other than God the worship that belongs to Him alone (XCII., XCIII., XCIV.).
Is there not some form of the latter which is particularly prevalent?
Yes, it is the inordinate desire to learn the future or to bring to light things that are hidden, which effects the giving up of oneself to the manifold kinds of divination, or to what are called superstitious practices (XCV., XCVI.).
(B)
What does the sin of irreligion comprise?
It comprises two things: the fact of not treating with due respect things that belong to the service and worship of God; or the fact of abstaining altogether from acts of religion.
Is the last sin particularly grave?
Yes, it is of extreme gravity, because it implies contempt or the scornful disregard of Him whom we are bound in the strictest sense to honour and to serve.
Under what special form does the latter exist at the present day?
Under the form of what may be called secularism.
What is understood by secularism?
It is that system in which God is put out of one's life completely: whether in a positive manner, in getting rid of Him in every way and in persecuting both Him and everything that has to do with Him; or in a negative way, in taking no account of Him at all in our life, individual, domestic, or social.
Whence arises this sin of secularism both in its positive and negative form?
In its positive form it arises from hatred or from some fanatic sectarianism; in its negative form it arises from a sort of intellectual and moral obtuseness, particularly with regard to the supernatural order.
Ought one to combat secularism with all one's strength?
There is no more pressing duty than to do this by all the means in one's power.
(C)
What are the other sins of irreligion?
They are to tempt God and perjury, which are committed against God Himself and His Holy Name; also sacrilege and simony, which are committed against things holy (XC VII.-XCIX.).
What is understood by tempting God?
It is that sin against the virtue of religion which consists in want of respect towards God in making appeal to His intervention; or to make appeal to Him in circumstances that forbid His intervention (XCVII. 1).
Is it tempting God to count upon some special help from Him when one does not do oneself all that is possible to be done?
Yes, to do this is to tempt God; and this one should avoid with the utmost care (XCVII. 1, 2).
(D)
What is understood by perjury?
By this is understood a sin against the virtue of religion that consists in calling on God to witness a thing that is false, or calling on God as witness to a promise which we do not fulfil (XCVIII. 1).
(E)
Is it also a sin, akin to perjury, to call on God by the invocation of His Holy Name at every turn?
Yes, for although this is not properly speaking perjury, it shows a great lack of respect towards the Holy Name of God; and such disrespect one must scrupulously avoid.
(F)
What is sacrilege?
Sacrilege is the violation of person, thing, or place consecrated to God, which are dedicated to His service and worship (XCIX. 1).
Is sacrilege a great sin?
Yes, it is a great sin; for to touch things that belong to God is in some sort to touch God Himself; and even on this earth God sometimes severely punishes this sin (XCIX. 2-4).
(G)
What is simony?
Simony is a sin of irreligion which consists in imitating the impiousness of Simon the Magician by offering insult to things holy in treating them as ordinary material things, of which men dispose as though they belonged to them, and which they buy or sell for a sum of money (C. 1).
Is simony a great sin?
Yes, and the Church punishes this sin with the most severe penalties (C. 6).
XXXII. OF FILIAL RESPECT TOWARDS ONE'S PARENTS, AND TOWARDS ONE'S COUNTRY
After the virtue of religion, which is the greatest of the other virtues relating to the virtue of justice?
It is the virtue of filial respect (CI.).
What is filial respect?
It is that virtue whose object is to give to parents and to the fatherland the honour and the respect that is due to them; and this because of the existence that, together with all the benefits thereto attached, they have bestowed upon us (CI. 1-3).
Are these duties towards our parents and country particularly sacred?
Yes, after our duties towards God there are none more sacred than these (CI. 1).
What are the duties of filial respect towards our parents?
They are: always respect and deference; obedience when living under their authority; and assisting them in case of need (CI. 2).
What are the duties of filial respect towards one's country?
They are respect and reverence towards those who represent it; obedience to its laws; and one's service even to the sacrifice of one's life in the case of just war against enemies.
XXXIII. OF REVERENCE TOWARDS SUPERIORS
Is there any virtue other than the virtues of religion and filial respect which demands obedience?
Yes, it is the virtue of reverence towards superiors (CII.).
What is understood by this reverence?
By reverence is understood that virtue whose object it is to regulate the relations of inferiors with regard to superiors, which is over and above the reverence due to God, to parents, and to authorities representing our country (CII., CIII.).
Is it the virtue of reverence which safeguards the right relations between pupil and master, between apprentice and master, and, in short, between all inferiors and superiors?
Yes (CIII. 3).
Does reverence always imply the virtue of obedience?
No, except when it is a question of superiors having authority over inferiors.
Is there any order of superiority beside the orders that imply authority over inferiors?
Yes, as, for instance, a superiority in talent, in riches, in age, in virtue, and so forth (CIII. 2).
Do all these orders lend themselves to the practice of the virtue of reverence?
Yes, for this virtue effects that man pays to every kind of superiority the honour due to it; and he does this in such order that first of all he pays honour to superiors that are in authority (ibid.).
Is this important for the good of society?
Yes, it is most important, for every society implies a certain multiplicity and in some sort a certain subordination, and every subordinate should practise the virtue of reverence, without which the harmony of the relations between men is impossible.
Is it possible for everybody without exception to practise the virtue of reverence?
Yes, for there is no one, in whatsoever order he himself may be superior, that is not in some other order inferior to some other person (CIII. 2, Obj. 3).
XXXIV. OF GRATITUDE
What is the first of the other virtues annexed to justice that has for its object, not indeed a strict debt that it is impossible to acquit fully, but a certain debt of the moral order such as one is able to pay, and the payment of which is necessarily ordained to the well-being of society?
It is the virtue of gratitude (CVI.).
What is the rôle of this virtue?
The rôle of this virtue is to make us recognize rightly as it behoves, and to give payment as it were in return for, all the boons we have received from another (CVI. 1).
Is this an important virtue?
Yes, for the opposite sin, which is ingratitude, is extremely odious and well merits reproof from all (CVII.).
In gratitude ought one to strive to give in return even more than one has received?
Yes, so as to imitate oneself the goodness of a benefactor (CVI. 6).
XXXV. OF REVENGE OR OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
From the point of view of virtue can anything be done against evildoers?
Yes, there is a special virtue called retributive justice, whose office it is to see that an evildoer does not go unpunished whenever justice demands such retribution (CVIII.).
XXXVI. OF TRUTHFULNESS -- AND OF THE SINS OPPOSED THERETO: OF LYING; OF PRETENCE; AND OF HYPOCRISY
(A)
What other virtue of the same order is necessary (not indeed for the sake of others precisely, but for the sake of him who acts) for the well-being of society?
It is the virtue of truthfulness (CIX.).
What is meant by truthfulness?
By this is meant that virtue which inclines us to manifest ourselves in all things both in words and in deeds, such as we really are (CIX. 1-4).
What are the sins opposed to this virtue?
They are lying, pretence, and hypocrisy (CX.-CXIII.).
What is lying?
It is the fact of speaking or of acting in such wise that knowingly one expresses or signifies what is not (CX. 1).
Is it evil to do this?
Yes, for it is essentially bad, and under no pretext whatsoever can it become good (CX. 3).
But is one always bound in word and deed to say or to signify what is the truth?
No, one is not always bound to say or to signify what is the truth; but one may never knowingly say or signify what is not the truth (CX. 3).
(B)
How many kinds of lies are there?
There are three kinds: the jocose lie, the officious, and the pernicious (CX. 2).
In what are these three distinguished?
In this: the jocose lie is told for amusement's sake; the officious lie in order to help another; and the pernicious lie in order to do another harm (ibid.).
Is the last kind of lie the worst of all?
Yes; for whereas the first two kinds may be only venial sins, the third is of itself always a mortal sin, unless the injury done is only slight (CX. 4).
What is understood by pretence and hypocrisy?
Pretence consists in showing oneself externally in one's life what one is not interiorly; and hypocrisy is pretending to be holy when one is not (CXI. 1, 2).
Is one bound, so as not to commit these sins, to show forth exteriorly the bad that is in one?
In no wise; on the contrary, it is a duty to let nothing that is bad in us appear externally so as to avoid harming oneself in the opinion of others, or so as to avoid disedification and scandal. What the virtue of truthfulness demands is that we let nothing appear externally, whether good or bad, which does not correspond to our inner life (CXI. 3,4).
Is one bound by the virtue of truthfulness to abstain from word or deed which might lend itself to a false interpretation?
No; one would not be bound to do this except in the case when such false interpretation might cause some evil which it is our duty to prevent (CXI. 1).
Is it possible to commit the sins of lying, pretence, and hypocrisy in several ways so that they constitute sins that are specifically distinct?
Yes; one can sin by exceeding the truth, and this is called boasting; or by deficiency, that is in falling short of the truth, when, for instance, a person makes out that he is lacking in some good which he really has, and this sin is called the belittling of oneself unduly (CXII., CXIII.).
XXXVII. OF FRIENDSHIP; AND OF THE OPPOSITE SINS, NAMELY, OF DISPUTE AND FLATTERY
Is there any other debt that binds only morally, the acquittance of which helps in a great degree towards the welfare of society, although not with the same rigour as that of gratitude, retributive justice, and truthfulness?
Yes; and this is the debt of friendship (CXIV. 2).
What is friendship?
It is that virtue which makes man endeavour by the whole of his exterior, both in word and deed, to treat his fellow-beings as it behoves in order to bring mutual pleasantness and charm to their lives (CXIV. 1).
Is this a virtue of great price?
Yes, this is a social virtue of great worth; and it might fittingly be called the flower of the virtues of justice and of charity.
In what way is it possible to sin against this virtue?
In two ways: by defect, in troubling ourselves little or not at all with what may bring pleasure or annoyance to others; or by excess, and this is the sin of flattery, which fails in disapproving externally the words or deeds of those with whom we live that deserve reproval (CXV.-CXVI.).
XXXVIII. OF LIBERALITY; AND OF THE SINS OPPOSED THERETO, VIZ., OF AVARICE, AND OF PRODIGALITY
(A)
What is the last virtue relating to particular justice that acquits a debt, such as binds only morally, as regards the relations between men?
The last virtue is that of liberality (CXVII. 5).
What is liberality?
Liberality is a disposition of soul which effects that man is attached to external goods only in such ordered measure as ever to be ready to give them and especially to give money for the well-being of others (CXVII. 1-4.).
Is this a great virtue?
If one considers the immediate object of this virtue, which is riches, it is the least of the virtues; but considered in its consequences it is lifted up to the perfection of the others, for liberality is able to help and sustain each of the other virtues (CXVII. 6).
(B)
What are the sins opposed to this virtue?
They are avarice and prodigality (CXVIII.-CXIX.).
What is avarice?
Avarice is the inordinate love of riches (CXVIII. 1, 2).
Is this a grave sin?
If one considers this sin as regards its object, namely, money, it is the least of sins, for it vitiates man's love with regard to exterior goods only, namely, riches; but if one considers the disproportion between the soul, which is spiritual, and riches, to which it is inordinately attached, it is the most degrading of all sins; since therein the soul subjects itself to what is beneath it (CXVIII. 4, 5).
Is this sin particularly dangerous?
Yes, because there is no end to this inordinate love of riches; for to gain riches one may be induced to commit all sorts of crime against God, one's neighbour, and oneself (CXVIII. 5).
Is avarice a capital sin?
Yes, it is one of the capital sins, because it carries with it one of the conditions necessary for happiness which everyone desires, namely, the abundance of goods to which everything is subservient (CXVIII. 7).
What are the daughters of avarice?
They are hardness of heart which knows no pity, disquietude, violence, deceit, perjury, fraud, and treachery; for the inordinate love of riches may lead to excess: as regards the effort to retain them; or as regards the effort to acquire them: on the part of the desire to have riches; or on the part of the endeavour to obtain them: by violence, or by guile: or in words expressed under oath or otherwise; or by deed: as regards things; and as regards persons (CXVIII. 8).
(C)
Is prodigality, which is the other sin opposed to liberality, also opposed to avarice?
Yes; for whereas avarice exceeds in the love of riches without being drawn to make good use of them by giving to others, prodigality does not properly estimate riches and distributes them with too ready a hand (CXIX. 1, 2)
Of these two sins which is the more grave?
Avarice, because it is more opposed to the virtue of liberality, which gives rather than retains (CXIX. 3).
(D)
Is it possible by a consideration of their objects to sum up and to show the order between the virtues that are related to particular justice?
Yes, in a few words thus. In the first place comes religion, which refers to God as regards the service and worship due to Him by reason of His being the Creator and Lord of all things; then comes filial respect, which refers to parents and country to whom we owe our life and benefits; then reverence, which refers to superiors in authority, dignity, and excellence in no matter what order this be; then gratitude, which refers to benefactors; then retributive justice with regard to evildoers or those who do us harm, who merit the punishment meted out to them; and lastly come truthfulness, friendship, and liberality, which we owe to all for our own sakes.
XXXIX. OF NATURAL EQUITY (OR EPIKEIA)
Is there not also a virtue annexed to legal justice?
Yes, it is that virtue which may be called natural equity or fairness, and which also goes under the name of epikeia (CXX.).
What is the rôle of this virtue?
Its rôle is to incline the will to seek justice in all things and in all orders, as it were, outside of and above the established laws among men, whenever the natural reason in virtue of its very first principles shows that in a given case the established laws cannot and should not be applied (CXX. 1).
Is this a virtue of great worth?
In the order of justice and indeed among all the virtues which regulate man's relations with his neighbour, this virtue is the most important, dominating all in some sort and aiding them towards the betterment of the social good as regards its very essentials (CXX. 2).
XL. OF THE GIFT OF PIETY WHICH CORRESPONDS TO JUSTICE AND ITS PARTS
Which is the gift of the Holy Ghost which corresponds to the virtue of justice?
It is the gift of piety (CXXXI.).
In what does the gift of piety exactly consist?
It consists in an habitual disposition of the will which makes man ready to receive the direct and personal action of the Holy Ghost, inclining him to treat God, considered in the highest mysteries of His divine life, as a Father tenderly and filially revered, served, and obeyed; and to treat all men in the way the divine and supernatural good demands which unites all to God as to the Father of one great divine family (CXXI. 1).
Must one say that the gift of piety is as it were the seal that sanctifies the relations that should exist between men, and between them and God?
Yes, the gift of piety is as it were the seal of this sanctification; it is the crowning of the virtue of justice and of all the virtues thereto annexed; and if by means of this gift everyone corresponded perfectly to the impulses of the Holy Spirit, men's life on earth would be the life of a divine family, and as it were a foretaste of the life of the blessed in heaven.
XLI. OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO JUSTICE WHICH ARE THOSE OF THE DECALOGUE: OF THE THREE FIRST; AND OF THE LAST FOUR
(A)
Are there any precepts that relate to the virtue of justice and the virtues thereto annexed together with the gift of piety which crowns them?
Yes; they are the precepts of the Decalogue (CXXII. 1).
Do the precepts of the Decalogue relate only to these virtues?
Yes; for those precepts which relate to other virtues are of later origin and are determinations or unfoldings of the former precepts (CXXII. 1).
Why is this so?
This is so because the precepts of the Decalogue, in so far as they are the first precepts of the moral law, should refer to what for all and at first sight manifestly has the nature of a thing that is due; and further, this perception of a thing as due should include relations towards others such as the virtue of justice with its virtues annexed demand (ibid.).
(B)
How are the precepts of the Decalogue divided?
They are divided into two parts, which are called the two tables of the law.
What do the precepts of the first table comprise?
They comprise the first three precepts relating to the virtue of religion which regulates man's dealings with God.
What order is there between these three precepts?
The order among them is of such sort that the first two put aside the two principal obstacles to the worship of God, viz., superstition or the worship of false gods, and irreligion or the lack of respect towards the true God; then the third precept determines positively the worship of the true God (CXXII. 2,3).
What does the third precept of the Decalogue comprise?
It comprises two things: abstaining from servile works; and the occupying oneself with the things of God (CXXII. 4, Obj. 3).
What is meant by abstaining from servile works?
By this is meant the obligation of putting aside for one day in the week (which is now Sunday) and on days of obligation (which are for the entire Church the feast of Christmas, the Circumcision, the Epiphany, the Ascension, Corpus Christi, the Immaculate Conception, the Assumption, the feast of St. Joseph, of St. Peter and St. Paul, and All Saints) manual work which is not necessary for the maintenance or welfare of our material life, or which urgent necessity does not demand (CXXII. 3, Obj. 3; Code, 1247).
And what does the occupying ourselves with the things of God comprise?
It comprises in a most express way and under penalty of grave sin, the obligation to assist at the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass on Sundays and on the feast days above mentioned (CXXII. 3, Obj. 4).
If one is unable to assist at Mass on the above days is one bound to perform some exercise of piety?
One is not bound to any exercise of piety that is in any way determined; but one would be certainly wanting in the positive obligation of keeping holy the above days if one let them go by without any act of religion at all.
(C)
What do the precepts of the second table comprise?
They comprise the precepts relative to the virtue of filial respect towards parents and to the virtue of strict justice towards our neighbour whoever he may be (CXXII. 5, 6).
XLII. OF THE VIRTUE OF FORTITUDE AND ITS ACT; OF MARTYRDOM; OF THE SINS OPPOSED THERETO: OF FEAR; OF INSENSIBILITY TO FEAR; OF RASHNESS
(A)
What is the virtue that comes after justice and holds the third place among the cardinal virtues?
It is the virtue of fortitude (CXXIII.-CXL.).
What is fortitude?
It is that perfection in the moral order of the sensitive appetite whose object is to make man hold firm in the presence of the greatest fear, or to keep within bounds the most daring boldness as regards peril of death that presents itself in the course of just war, in order that man might never fail in his duty (CXXIII. 1-6).
(B)
Is there any special act of this virtue in which all its excellence is shown forth?
Yes, it is martyrdom (CXXIV.).
What is martyrdom?
It is that act of the virtue of fortitude which sustains man in accepting death in testimony of the truth from the hands of those who persecute the name of Christian and all that pertains thereto (CXXIV. 1-5).
(C)
What are the sins opposed to the virtue of fortitude?
They are, on the one hand, fear, which lacks courage in the presence of dangers of death, or insensibility to fear in the presence of peril, which is the lack of shunning peril when one ought to; and on the other hand, rashness which rushes towards danger imprudently (CXXV.-CXXVII.).
Can then one sin by excess of bravery?
One never sins by excess of bravery; but one may, under the impulse of excessive courage which is unrestrained by reason, be so carried away as to perform acts that are not really acts of true courage, but have only the semblance of bravery (CXXVII. 1, Obj. 2).
XLIII. OF THE VIRTUES ANNEXED TO FORTITUDE; OF MAGNANIMITY; OF THE SINS OPPOSED TO MAGNANIMITY; VIZ., OF PRESUMPTION; OF AMBITION; OF VAINGLORY; AND OF PUSILLANIMITY
(A)
Are there any virtues relating to the virtue of fortitude in that they imitate the act or manner of acting of this virtue, but in matters of less difficulty?
Yes, and they are, on the one hand, magnanimity and I magnificence; and on the other, patience and perseverance (CXXVIII.).
In what are these two kinds of virtue distinguished?
In this, that the two first relate to fortitude by reason of an act which attacks what is most difficult and arduous; whereas the two others relate thereto by reason of an act which stands firm in presence of the greatest fear (CXXVIII.).
What is the proper object of magnanimity?
It is to strengthen one's soul in its effort to accomplish great acts in so far as great honours or great glory result therefrom (CXXIX. 1, 2).
Everything then that pertains to magnanimity is great?
Yes, all is great in this virtue; and it is the virtue par excellence of great souls.
(B)
Are there any sins opposed to this virtue?
Yes, there are a number of sins which are opposed thereto either by excess or defect.
What are the sins opposed to magnanimity by excess?
They are presumption, ambition, and vainglory (CXXX.-CXXXII.).
How are these different sins distinguished from each other?
In this, that presumption inclines one to the performance of acts that are too much for one's capabilities; ambition seeks honours greater than one deserves; and vainglory seeks some glory that has either no object, or that has an object of little worth, or which is not directed to the one true end which is the honour of God and the welfare of men (ibid.).
Is vainglory a capital sin?
Yes, for it implies the showing off of one's own excellence which one seeks in everything, and which may lead one to commit all manner of sins (CXXXII. 4).
What are the daughters of vainglory?
They are boasting, hypocrisy, stubbornness, discord, strife, and disobedience (CXXXII. 5).
(C)
What sin is opposed to magnanimity by defect?
It is the sin of pusillanimity (CXXXIII.).
Why is pusillanimity a sin?
Because it is contrary to the natural law which inclines every being to act according to its capabilities (CXXXIII. 1).
It is then indeed blameworthy not to make use of the powers and the means God has given us by the mistrust of oneself, or by taking up an unseemly attitude with regard to honours and glory?
Yes, this is indeed blameworthy and should not be confounded with true humility, about which we shall speak later (ibid.).
XLIV. OF MAGNIFICENCE; AND OF THE SINS THERETO OPPOSED, VIZ., OF STINGINESS AND OF EXTRAVAGANCE
In what does the virtue of magnificence consist?
It consists in a disposition of the sensitive appetite, which strengthens the soul in its effort to fulfil what is arduous as regards the expenses demanded by the undertaking of great works (CXXXIV. 1, 2).
Does this virtue presuppose great riches and great opportunities of dispensing them for the public welfare?
Yes, this virtue presupposes great riches and the opportunity to dispense them, especially as regards the worship of God or the public welfare of a city or state (CXXXIV. 3).
Is it then a virtue belonging, properly speaking, to the rich and the great?
Yes.
What are the sins opposed to this virtue?
The sin of stinginess, which makes man begrudge and be unwilling to give even what is necessary for the undertaking of some work; and the sin of extravagance, which inclines one to expend unreasonably over and above what is necessary for some work undertaken (CXXXV. I, 2).
XLV. OF PATIENCE -- OF LONGANIMITY AND OF CONSTANCY
What is the essence of the virtue of patience?
The essence of patience consists in supporting, for the sake of the future life, all the troubles that come to us unceasingly in the present life, whether they be caused by life's own whims or by the actions of others in their dealings with us (CXXXVI. 1).
Is patience the same as longanimity and constancy?
No; for although all three help us to bear the miseries of this life, patience helps us to bear especially the troubles which come about daily in our dealings with others; whereas longanimity bears us up against those troubles which arise from the delay of the realization of something for which we have to wait; and constancy buoys us up against the troubles which we encounter in the struggle to do good (CXXXVI. 5).
XLVI. OF PERSEVERANCE; AND OF THE SINS OPPOSED THERETO, VIZ., OF EFFEMINACY AND OF OBSTINACY
What relation has perseverance to the virtues aforementioned?
Perseverance does not refer to the bearing up under troubles; it refers rather to the fatigue occasioned by the sustained effort of practising a virtuous life (CXXXVII. 1-3).
Are there any sins opposed to this virtue?
Yes, they are the lack of resistance or effeminacy, which makes one give way to the least difficulty or to the least fatigue; and obstinacy, which makes one persist in not giving way when it is reasonable to do so. (CXXXVIII. 1,2).
XLVII. OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE VIRTUE OF FORTITUDE
Is there a gift of fortitude which corresponds to the virtue of fortitude?
Yes, it is the gift which bears the same name and is called the gift of fortitude (CXXXIX.).
In what precisely does the gift of fortitude differ from the virtue of fortitude?
In a few words it differs in this wise: Like the virtue, the gift has to do with fear and in some sort with courage. But whilst fear and courage, which the virtue of fortitude regulates, only refer to dangers which it is in the power of man to overcome, fear and courage, which the gift of fortitude excites, refer to perils or evils which it is absolutely impossible for man to overcome; death separates us from all the goods of the present life without it itself being able to give the only one good superior to all and, indeed, such as is infinitely above them all, carrying with it all good to the exclusion of all evil, viz., the actual possession of eternal life. This substitution of eternal life for all the miseries of the present life, in spite of all its difficulties and dangers and even of death itself, which is the complement of them all, is exclusively due to the action of the Holy Spirit Himself. This is the reason why it belongs to Him only to move the soul of man effectively towards this supreme acquisition, in such way that a strong and unfailing confidence takes hold of man, making him steadfast in the presence of the greatest fear and even to approach death itself fearlessly, not indeed to be conquered thereby, but to triumph: and it is by the gift of fortitude that man is thus moved by the Holy Ghost. In truth one may describe the proper effect of this gift as the victory over death (CXXXIX. 1).
XLVIII. OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO FORTITUDE
Are there any precepts in the divine law that refer to the virtue of fortitude?
Yes, there are precepts of this kind as is meet. For especially in the New Law, in which everything is done in order to make man fix his mind on God, man is forbidden under the form of a negative precept to fear temporal evils; and under the form of a positive precept he is commanded to fight unintermittingly his worst enemy, who is the Devil (CXL. 1).
Are the precepts relating to the other virtues which are annexed to fortitude equally given in the divine law?
Yes; with regard to the other virtues only precepts (and these positive) are given that have reference to patience and perseverance that bear upon the ordinary occurrences of life; but as regards magnificence and magnanimity which bear upon things that belong rather to the order of perfection, no precepts are given but only counsels (CXL. 2).
XLIX. OF TEMPERANCE; OF ABSTINENCE, AND OF FASTING: AND OF THE SIN OPPOSED THERETO, VIZ., OF GLUTTONY
(A)
What is the last of the great moral virtues which perfects man's life in his journey towards God?
It is the virtue of temperance (CXLI.-CLXX.).
What is understood by the virtue of temperance?
It is that virtue which keeps man's sensitive appetite within the bounds of reason so that it may not be carried away by pleasures, particularly those that refer to the sense of touch in those acts that are necessary for the conservation of bodily life (CXL. 1-5).
Of what kind of pleasures is there question?
Of the pleasures of the table and of marriage (CXLI. 4).
What name is given to the virtue of temperance when it refers to the pleasures of the table?
It is called abstinence or sobriety (CXLVI., CXLIX.).
What precisely is abstinence?
It is that which regulates the sensitive appetite with regard to eating and drinking so that this be done in conformity with what reason demands (CXLVI. 1).
Under what special form may one practise the virtue of abstinence?
Under the form that is called fasting (CXLVII.).
What is fasting?
Fasting is doing without a part of what is normally required for each day's food (CXLVII. 1, 2).
But is it not wrong to do this?
No; on the contrary to fast may be a most excellent thing, for it serves to keep concupiscence under control; to make the mind more free to occupy itself with the things of God; and to make satisfaction for sin (CXLVII. 1).
What conditions are required for fasting to be a good and excellent thing?
In this matter one must always be ruled by discretion and prudence, and there must be no danger to health, and it must not prove an obstacle to duty (CXLVII. 1, Obj. 2).
Is everyone who has attained the use of reason bound to fast?
Yes, everyone who has attained the use of reason is bound to some sort of fasting or of some privation proportionate to the demand of the virtue; but not to the fasting prescribed by the Church (CXLVII. 3, 4).
What is understood by the fasting that is prescribed by the Church?
It is a form of fasting specially fixed by the Church for those who have attained a certain age that has to be undertaken on certain days of the year (CXLVII. 5-8).
In what does this special form of fasting consist?
It consists in this, that only one full meal is allowed during the day (CXLVII. 6).
Is the time or the hour of this meal absolutely fixed?
No; for this repast may be taken at midday or in the evening.
May one take anything outside this repast?
Yes; in the morning one may take some little food, and in the evening also by way of collation (Code, 1251).
Who are bound to the fast prescribed by the Church?
All baptized Christians who have attained their twenty-first year until they have attained the fifty-ninth year completed (Code, 1254).
Given these conditions may one yet have the right not to fast?
Yes, whenever health or work manifestly forbid that one should fast; or if there be doubt on this point whenever legitimate authority dispenses from fasting (CLXVII. 4).
Who may give such dispensation?
In practice it is sufficient to ask for it from our immediate ecclesiastical superior.
What are the days on which one is bound to the Church fast?
They are all the days of Lent except Sundays; Wednesdays, Fridays, and Saturdays of the Ember weeks; the vigils of Pentecost, of the Assumption, of All Saints, and of Christmas. If these vigils fall on Sunday one is not bound to anticipate them (Code, 1252).
Is there a law of the Church concerning abstinence distinct from the law of fasting?
Yes; and the law obliges abstaining from flesh meat and its products on all Fridays of the year, and during Lent on Ash Wednesday, and on all Saturdays to the midday of Holy Saturday inclusively; and lastly, on the Wednesdays and Saturdays of the Ember weeks (Code, 1250, 1252).
Who are bound to the law of abstinence?
All the faithful who have reached the age of seven years (Code, 1254).
(B)
What is the sin opposed to the virtue of abstinence?
It is gluttony (CXLVIII. 1).
Are there several species of this sin?
Yes; for the inordinate desire to eat and drink may bear upon the nature and the quality of food, or upon its quantity, or upon its preparation, or upon the actual consumption of the food by not waiting for the proper time of eating, or by eating with greediness (CXLVIII. 4).
Is gluttony a capital sin?
Yes, because it bears upon one of those pleasures which of its nature incites man to desire things of sense and to act in accordance with them (CXLVIII. 5).
What are the daughters of gluttony?
They are dulness of mind with regard to things intellectual, inept mirth, immoderate speech, buffoonery, and impurity (CXLVIII. 6).
Are these sins particularly gross?
Yes; for they imply more than other sins the absence and almost total lack of reason; and these sins are the outcome of gluttony because thereby the reason becomes sluggish and almost paralyzed, and can no longer guide man in the way he should go (ibid.).
L. OF SOBRIETY AND OF THE SIN OPPOSED TO IT, VIZ., DRUNKENNESS
(A)
Is there in addition to abstinence any other virtue which helps man to avoid such sins?
Yes, it is the virtue of sobriety (CXLIX.).
What is the virtue of sobriety?
It is that virtue the object of which is only to take intoxicating drink as it behoves (CXLIX. 1, 2).
(B)
What sin is opposed to this virtue?
It is the sin by which man passes the just measure in drinking and becomes drunk (CL.).
Is drunkenness always a sin?
Yes, whenever it comes about through one's own fault by not ceasing to drink when one should and not taking into account the intoxicating character of the drink one takes (CL. 1).
What is necessary for this sin to be mortal?
One should be able to foresee that an excess of such drink may lead to the state of drunkenness, and that one has chosen this consequence rather than be deprived of the pleasure that the drink offers (CL. 2).
Is drunkenness a particularly gross and debasing sin?
Yes, because by it man knowingly deprives himself of the use of his reason and puts himself lower than brute beasts, for these at least always keep their instinct to guide them (CL. 3).
LI. OF CHASTITY AND OF VIRGINITY; AND OF THE SIN OPPOSED THERETO, VIZ., OF VOLUPTUOUSNESS
(A)
Is there any other great virtue besides abstinence and sobriety that is a species of temperance?
Yes; and it is the virtue of chastity (CLI.).
What is meant by the virtue of chastity?
It is that perfection of the sensitive appetite which makes man master of all the impulses that bear him towards the things of marriage (CLI. 1).
Is there in the order of chastity any special virtue which is its crowning and highest perfection?
Yes; and this virtue is called virginity (CLII.).
What is virginity?
It is the firm and absolute purpose, made holy by a vow, of renouncing for ever the pleasures of marriage (CLII. 1-3).
(B)
What is the sin opposed to the virtue of chastity?
It is the sin called voluptuousness (CLIII.).
In what does the sin of voluptuousness consist?
It consists in using things on account of the pleasure attached thereunto which nature has ordained for the conservation of the human species, whether this be by deed, or desire, or thought willed, in which pleasure is taken; for this is contrary to the natural order whose office it is to control the use of such things (CLIV.).
Are there several species of voluptuousness?
Yes, there are as many species as there are distinct subversions of order in the things concerned with voluptuousness (CLIII. 1-3).
What are these distinct subversions of order in the matter of voluptuousness?
They are simple fornication, which is directly opposed to the good order of the things of marriage as regards the end of marriage, which is the welfare and the education of offspring; or, and this is the most grave of all, the sin against nature which is opposed directly and wholly to the first and essential end of marriage, which is the birth of offspring; or incest, adultery, the ravishing of a ward, and rape, which relate to the sexual abuse of those near to us by blood ties, or of those married, or of those in the guardianship of their protector, or of those against whom violence is performed; and lastly, sacrilege, which is the abuse of persons consecrated to God (CLIV. 1-12).
(C)
Is voluptuousness a capital sin?
Yes; and this on account of the extraordinary attraction of these matters which carries men away by its extreme vehemence (CLIII. 4).
What are the daughters of voluptuousness?
They are blindness of mind, rashness, unmindfulness, inconstancy, self-love, hatred of God, cleaving to the present life, and horror of the world to come (CLIII. 5).
Have all these sins a character in common such as is particularly grave?
Yes, they have this in common, although in different degrees, that the mind is absorbed by the flesh; moreover, there is a special gravity attaching to each of these sins and to voluptuousness, which is the mother of them all, for man falls from his high estate even below the estate of the brute beast which is without reason (CLIII. 5, 6).
LII. OF THE VIRTUES ANNEXED TO TEMPERANCE, VIZ., OF CONTINENCE, AND OF INCONTINENCE WHICH IS THE SIN OPPOSED THERETO
(A)
Besides these virtues which are species of temperance, are there not other virtues which are annexed to temperance?
Yes; and they are those virtues which imitate its act or manner of acting (which is the controlling of what by its nature carries us away) but in matters that are of less difficulty; or which do not attain to the perfection of the act of temperance (CLV.).
What are these other virtues?
They are continence, clemency and meekness, and modesty (CLV.-CLXX.).
(B)
What is continence?
It is that virtue, in some sort imperfect in the order of virtue, which consists in choosing not to follow the violent movements of passion, and this for some motive of reason (CLV. 1).
Why is there in continence something imperfect in the order of virtue?
Because perfect virtue presupposes that the movements of passion are held in check, whereas continence does no more than resist them (ibid.).
(C)
Is there a sin opposed to continence?
Yes; and it is called incontinence (CLVI.).
In what does it consist?
It consists in this, that man gives way to the violence of passion and becomes its slave (CLVI. 1).
Which is the more grave sin, that of intemperance or that of incontinence?
Intemperance; for just as continence is less perfect than temperance in the order of virtue, so, in the order of sin, incontinence is less evil than intemperance (CLVI. 3).
LIII. OF CLEMENCY AND OF MEEKNESS; AND OF THE SINS OPPOSED THERETO, VIZ., OF ANGER, AND OF CRUELTY OR SAVAGENESS
(A)
What are clemency and meekness?
They are two virtues: the first of which moderates the degree of external punishment to be meted out to someone so that it does not exceed the right limits of reason; the second virtue controls the interior movement of the passion which is called anger (CLVII. 1).
Are clemency and severity opposed to each other, and are meekness and retributive justice also opposed?
In no wise, for they are all different in motive, and in some sense they are the same in that they all seek what is in accordance with right reason (CLVII. 2, Obj. 1).
(B)
What sins are opposed to clemency and meekness?
Anger in the bad sense of the word, and cruelty or savagery (CLVIII.-CLIX.).
What is anger?
It is a movement of the irascible appetite which seeks unjust avengement, or an avengement which is just but which is sought with too much temper (CLVIII. 2).
Are there several kinds of anger?
Yes, there are three species of anger: the anger of those who are fretful and who become angry at the slightest cause; the anger of those who are bitter, who forget with difficulty an injury done to them; and the anger of those who are revengeful, who without ceasing seek the punishment of those by whom they have been wronged (CLVIII. 5).
Is anger a capital sin?
Yes, because men are particularly borne towards the seeking of revenge in satisfaction for an injury done them (CLVIII. 6).
What are the daughters of anger?
They are indignation, excitement of the mind, contumely, clamour, blasphemy, and quarrelling (CLVIII. 7).
Is there any sin opposed to the sin of anger?
Yes, it consists in the lack of anger when reason demands it, for there is a just anger which is the result of the right will to punish when punishment is due (CLVIII. 8).
(C)
What is understood by cruelty which is opposed to clemency?
It is a kind of crudity or rawness of soul owing to which one seeks to increase punishment beyond the just limits fixed by reason (CLXI. 1).
And what is savageness?
It is something absolutely inhuman which delights in the infliction of punishment, taking pleasure therein merely because it is an evil. Savageness is directly opposed to the gift of piety (CLIX. 2).
Is such a thing possible?
Yes, of a truth, for depraved human nature can reach even to this excess; in former times there were whole nations apparently in the highest degree of civilization which took supreme delight in the spectacles of the amphitheatres.
LIV. OF MODESTY: OF HUMILITY AND OF ITS OPPOSITE SIN PRIDE; OF THE SIN OF ADAM AND EVE; OF SECULARISM
(A)
What is the last of the virtues annexed to temperance?
It is modesty (CLX.-CLXX.).
What is modesty?
Modesty is that virtue which restrains the sensitive appetite in things that are less difficult to regulate than those which are the object of temperance, continence, clemency, and meekness (CLX. 1, 2).
What are these things of less difficulty which are kept under control by the virtue of modesty?
They are the desire of one's own excellence; the desire to know; the exterior actions of the body; and lastly, one's exterior as regards the manner of dress (CLX. 2).
What are those virtues called which regulate the sensitive appetite with regard to these divers things?
They are called humility, the virtue of the studious, and modesty in its strict sense (CLX. 2).
(B)
What is humility?
It is that virtue which makes man repress or regulate whatever touches his own worth in such wise that he does not seek more than is in accordance with the degree of his excellence as fixed by God (CLXI. 1, 2).
What follows from this as regards man's dealings with others?
It follows that man does not esteem anything as due to him considered in himself, but that all he has and is comes from God; for of himself he has nothing at all, except sin; as regards his neighbours, he esteems that their worth is due to them according to the state of perfection in which God has placed them; and as regards the rest of creation, he wishes only that things should have the place and order such as God has disposed (CLXI. 3).
Humility then seeks always the strict truth?
Yes, humility seeks always and acknowledges the exact truth (ibid.).
(C)
What is the sin opposed to humility?
It is pride (CLXII.).
What is pride?
It is that special and in some sort general sin which, in despisal of God and of the order He has established in His work, strives to dominate all and to make one place oneself before all others by esteeming oneself superior to all (CLXII. 1, 2).
Why is it said that pride is a special and in some sort a general sin also?
Because this esteeming of oneself and one's worth in despisal of God and the rules established by Him, leads man to commit all manner of sins (ibid.).
Is this a grave sin?
It is the gravest of all sins by reason of the contempt of God which it directly implies; and owing to this it aggravates the gravity of all other sins no matter how grave these may be in themselves (CLXII. 6).
Is pride the first of all sins?
Yes; for there can be no grave sin that does not presuppose the sin of pride, although such sin in itself, or by reason of the motive which makes it a specific sin, is not itself a sin of pride; for it is pride, by reason of the contempt it implies for God, that completes as it were the essence of other sins in so far as they make man turn away from God (CLXII. 7).
Is pride a capital sin?
Yes, and it is even more than this, for it is the head and the king as it were of every sin and vice (CLXII. 8).
(D)
Was the first sin of Adam and Eve a sin of pride?
Yes, their first sin was a sin of pride; and the sin of the bad angels was also a sin of pride (CLXIII. 1).
But was not the first sin of Adam and Eve rather a sin of gluttony, or of disobedience, or an empty curiosity with regard to knowledge, or a lack of faith in the word of God?
All these sins here mentioned were the consequence of the sin of pride, without which no other sin could exist at all (CLXIII. 1).
Why could no other sin be committed by Adam and Eve without the sin of pride?
Because their state of integrity made all within them to be perfectly under control so long as their mind remained subjected to God; but their mind could only turn away from God for some motive of pride by wishing themselves some excellence which was not their due (CLXIII. 1, 2).
Is not the sin of secularism which is so prevalent in these days also a sin of pride?
Yes, and it is of exceptional gravity; for it is an imitation of the contempt and of the revolt of Satan and of the bad angels, and afterwards of our first parents.
LV. OF THE VIRTUE OF THE STUDIOUS; AND OF ITS OPPOSITE SIN, VIZ., OF CURIOSITY
What is understood by the virtue of the studious, which is the second of those virtues annexed to temperance?
It is that virtue which makes man control in conformity with right reason the desire to know and to learn (CLXVI. 1).
What is the sin opposed to this virtue?
It is called curiosity (CLXVII.).
What is curiosity?
It is the inordinate desire to know what one has no right to know, or to know what may prove a source of danger to virtue owing to one's weakness (CLXVII. 1, 2).
Does one easily commit the sin of curiosity?
Yes; it is frequently committed, whether this be as regards knowledge in general, or as regards that knowledge which effects the senses and the passions (CLXVII. 1, 2).
Does the inordinate desire to read daily papers and novels also belong to this sin; or further, to be present at spectacles of all sorts, such as the theatre, the cinematograph, and other such things?
Yes; all these things belong to the sin of curiosity, and perhaps also to the sin of sensuality or of voluptuousness; indeed, one cannot do too much to overcome the inordinate desire for such things.
LVI. OF EXTERNAL MODESTY
What is the last of the virtues annexed to temperance under the general name of modesty?
It is the special virtue of modesty understood in the strict sense (CLXVII.-CLXX.).
What is this virtue?
It is that perfection in the sensitive appetite which makes everything in a person's exterior as regards his movements, gestures, words, the tone of his voice, and of his general attitude, to be what it ought to be according to the status of the person, and this in such way that nothing whatever is offensive in his conduct; and on this head modesty is akin to friendship and truthfulness (CLXVIII. 1).
Must one attribute to the virtue of modesty whatever has reference to games and recreation which are part of the economy of human life?
Yes; and this virtue then goes by another name, which is that of eutrapelia; and this virtue effects that a person plays, amuses, or recreates himself as it behoves, avoiding both excess and defect (CLXVIII. 2-4).
Does modesty also have reference to one's manner of dress?
Yes; and this is what is implied by modesty understood in its strictest sense (CLXIX.).
What does modesty do with regard to dress?
It effects that the sensitive appetite is exactly what it ought to be with regard to dress to the exclusion of unseemly fashion or disorderly negligence (CLXIX. 1).
Is it against this virtue of modesty that many sin in that they do not keep a just measure as regards the excesses of what is called fashion, and which may prove an occasion of sin to others?
Yes, to exceed in this way is against the virtue of modesty and at the same time against the virtue of chastity; and indeed such excess cannot be sufficiently reproved (CLXIX. 2).
LVII. OF THE GIFT THAT CORRESPONDS TO THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE
Is there a gift of the Holy Ghost that corresponds to the virtue of temperance?
Yes, the gift of fear (CXLI. 1, Obj. 3).
But was it not said above that the gift of fear corresponds to the theological virtue of hope?
Yes, but the gift of fear corresponds also to the cardinal virtue of temperance, not, however, under the same aspect (ibid.).
In what does this difference consist?
In this, that the gift of fear corresponds to the theological virtue of hope in so far as man reveres God directly by reason of His infinite greatness and avoids offending Him; and it corresponds to the virtue of temperance in so far as the respect that it inspires with regard to God's greatness makes man avoid those things which are more offensive to God, and these are the pleasures of the senses (ibid.).
But does not the virtue of temperance make one avoid those things already?
Yes, but in a way that is in every sense less perfect; for temperance puts these things aside only in that measure of which man is able of himself by the light of reason or of faith; whereas the gift of fear makes him avoid them according to the personal action of the Holy Ghost, moving him and leading him by reason of the reverence which the infinite majesty of God inspires to hold the pleasures of the senses as so much rottenness.
LVIII. OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO TEMPERANCE AND ITS PARTS
(A)
Is there any precept in the divine law referring to temperance?
Yes, there are two precepts in the Decalogue that refer to temperance (CLXX.).
What are these two precepts?
They are the sixth and the ninth precepts: "Thou shalt not commit adultery," and "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife."
Why is only adultery spoken of? and why in the matter of adultery are there two distinct precepts in the Decalogue?
Because of the things that have to do with temperance, adultery brings man more into relation with his neighbour especially from the point of view of justice, which is precisely that of the precepts of the Decalogue; and the reason of the two distinct precepts with regard to this matter is due to the importance of preventing at its very source the great evil of adultery (CLXX. 1).
(B)
Are there any precepts among those of the Decalogue that have reference to the parts of temperance?
No, there is no precept which refers directly to the parts of temperance, because these of themselves do not refer to man's dealings with God or his neighbour. Nevertheless these divers parts are referred to indirectly by reason of their effects, and this either by the precepts of the first table or by those of the second table. It is for instance through pride that man does not give to God or his neighbour the respect due to them; and it is through anger that man assails the person of his neighbour even to the attempting of his life (CLXX. 2).
Would it not have been fitting to speak in the Decalogue of the positive side of the precepts that relate to temperance and its parts?
No, because the Decalogue should contain only the first precepts of the divine law such as are applicable to all men and to all times; but whatever belongs to the positive side of these virtues, as abstinence, the manner of speaking, acting, etc., can vary with different peoples, in different places, in different times, etc. (CLXX. 1, Obj.3).
To what particular authority in the New Law does it belong to determine such things?
It belongs to the Church to determine these things for the right behaviour of the faithful.
LIX. OF THE TWO KINDS OF LIFE, VIZ., OF THE ACTIVE AND THE CONTEMPLATIVE; OF THE STATE OF PERFECTION-OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE; AND OF THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN THE CHURCH
(A)
Have we now a sufficient knowledge of all the virtues that man must practise in order to get to heaven, and of the sins he must avoid so as not to lose heaven and gain hell?
Yes. For we have learnt about the three great virtues of faith, hope, and charity, whereby man can attain his last supernatural end in the way that he must attain it in this life, so that it might direct his steps aright and command as it were his life of virtue. We have learnt also about the four great moral or cardinal virtues, which are prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, with all the virtues annexed to them; and we have considered them not only in the natural order in so far as they are called the acquired virtues, but also in the supernatural order in which they are called the infused virtues, and on this head they are on a level with the theological virtues. We have seen that these virtues effect that man is able to direct his moral life with regard both to himself and his neighbour as it behoves in order that his life may be in harmony in all things with his supernatural end. If man practises all these virtues, connected as they are with the corresponding gifts of the Holy Ghost, they are sufficient for the attainment of the vision of God which we know must be his eternal happiness in heaven. If, however, man sins against any one of the above virtues he must by means of another virtue which is called penance (and of which we shall speak in the Third Part) make satisfaction for his sin in union with the satisfaction of our Lord Jesus Christ.
Can such a thing be found anywhere on earth as the putting into practice of the whole of the virtues and the coming into play of all the gifts which truly constitute man's life on earth?
Yes, such a life is found under two forms which are distinct, and in some sense separate; these two forms are called the contemplative and the active life (CLXXIX.-CLXXXII.).
(B)
What is meant by the contemplative life?
It is that kind of life, in which man finds peace in his soul as a result of the subjection of his sinful passions, and of his withdrawal from the external affairs of life; under the impulse of the love of God, he passes his time in the contemplation of God in Himself and in His works in so far as this is possible on earth; rejoicing in the vision of God whom he loves, and finding in this enjoyment of God his highest perfection, such as makes him live a life detached from all things on earth and to cleave to God alone (CLXXX. 1-8).
Does the contemplative life presuppose all the virtues?
Yes, it presupposes all the virtues, and it helps to make them perfect; but in itself it consists in a certain activity wherein all the intellectual and theological virtues come into play, remaining always and entirely subject to the personal action of the Holy Ghost through the instrumentality of the gifts (CLXXX. 2).
(C)
What does the active life entail?
The active life entails all the acts of the moral virtues, and most especially the acts of the virtue of prudence; and the reason is because the precise object of the active life is to regulate, as it behoves, all things of the present life (CLXXXI. 1-4).
Of these two lives which is the more perfect?
Incontestably the contemplative life is the more perfect, because even on earth it brings with it a foretaste of heaven (CLXXXII. 1).
Is it possible for anyone to live both these kinds of lives at the same time?
Yes, it is possible to lead both the contemplative and active life in what is called a state of perfection.
What is understood by a state of perfection?
It is a certain condition of life in which man lives in a fixed and permanent way, apart from the ties which make him a slave to the necessities of the present life, making him free to occupy himself exclusively with the things of God (CLXXXIII. 1, 4).
(D)
Is this state of perfection the same thing as perfection itself?
No, for perfection consists in something that is internal; whereas the state of perfection, of which we are speaking, consists in a condition of life which should be considered rather as the assemblage of external acts (CLXXXIV. 1).
Can one have the perfection of the virtues and gifts, or the perfection of the life of charity, without being in a state of perfection; and, conversely, can one be in a state of perfection without having the perfection of charity?
Yes, both these are possible (CLXXXIV. 4).
Why then should one enter a state of perfection?
Because, of itself, it facilitates in a great degree the acquisition of perfection itself; and generally speaking it is in a state of perfection that perfection is found.
What then constitutes a state of perfection?
It is the fact of obliging oneself for ever, under a certain solemn form, to things which are of perfection in so far as they relate to the external organization of one's life (CLXXXI V. 4).
(E)
Who are they who live in a state of perfection?
Those who are bishops and those who are religious (CLXXXIV. 5).
Why are bishops in a state of perfection?
Because bishops at the moment when they take upon themselves the pastoral office, oblige themselves to give their lives to the service of their flocks; and this assumption of office is attended with the solemnity of consecration (CLXXXIV. 6).
What makes religious to be in a state of perfection?
The fact that under the form of perpetual vows they oblige themselves to give up the things of the world of which they might lawfully have made use, in order to occupy themselves more freely with the things of God; and they make these vows with a certain solemnity of profession or of blessing (CLXXXIV. 5).
Of these two states of perfection which is the more perfect?
That of bishops (CLXXXI V. 7).
Why is the state of bishops more perfect than that of religious?
Because bishops in virtue of their state must possess the perfection which religious by their state strive to acquire (CLXXXIV. 7).
How do religious by their state tend toward perfection?
Religious by their state tend to acquire perfection in so far as by the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, they are placed outside the danger of committing sin and are happily constrained to act virtuously in all things (CLXXXVI. 1-10).
Are the three vows essential to the religious state?
Yes; and in such way that without them there could be no religious state at all (CLXXXVI. 2-7).
(F)
Can there be a diversity of religious communities, all having the essential conditions of the religious state?
Yes (CLXXXVIII.).
In what does this diversity consist?
It is according to the diversity of things as regards which man may devote himself wholly to the service of God; and according as one may attain this in different ways and by different exercises (CLXXXVIII. 1).
What are the two great species of religious communities?
They are the contemplative and the active (CLXXXVIII. 2-6).
What is understood by the community which devotes itself to the active life?
It is that religious community which devotes itself for love of God to the service of man in order to bring him to God (CLXXXVIII. 2).
And what is the religious community which devotes itself to the contemplative life?
It is that which devotes itself wholly to the service of God in Himself (CLXXXIII. 2, Obj. 2).
Of these two kinds of religious communities which is the more perfect?
The contemplative; but the most perfect of all are those religious communities the principal part of whose life is given up to the contemplation of divine things or to the worship and service of God in Himself, but with the object in view of giving to others the benefit of their contemplation in the endeavour to lead them to the service and the greater love of God (CLXXXVIII. 6).
Is not the existence of the divers religious communities in the Church a very great blessing?
Yes, for apart from the fact they are the chosen homes of those who seek to practise virtue in all its perfection, they contribute towards the greatest good of society by their works of charity or the apostolate, and by their life of immolation to God.
Whence arises this excellence of religious communities?
This excellence arises from the fact that they seek openly and by their very vocation to walk in the way in which every man whosoever he be should walk in order to practise the same virtues and reach the happiness of heaven.
What is this way without which it is impossible to practise the virtues and reach to the happiness of God?
This way is no other than Jesus Christ or the mystery of the Word made flesh. It is of Jesus Christ now that we must speak; and the consideration of Him will form the subject-matter of the Third Part of this work.
The Third Part
Of Jesus Christ
(The Way Whereby Man Returns to God)
The Incarnation; Christ's life on earth;
the part taken therein by Our Blessed Lady.
The Sacraments: Baptism; Confirmation; Holy Eucharist;
Penance; Extreme Unction; Holy Orders; Matrimony.
The Last Things. Purgatory; Heaven; Hell.
The Resurrection; the Last Judgment.