Chapter 6. Of God's works, and his decree.
WILLIAM PERKINS
Chapter 6. Of God's works, and his decree.
Thus far concerning the first part of Theology. The second follows, of the works of God.
The works of God are all those which he does out of himself, that is, out of his divine essence. These are common to the Trinity, the particular manner of working always reserved to every Person. The end of all these is the manifestation of the glory of God. Rom
11.36, For of him are all things; to him be glory forever.
The work, or action of God, is either his decree, or the execution of his decree.
The decree of God is that by which God, in himself, has necessarily, and yet freely, from all eternity determined all things. Eph 1.11, In whom also we are chosen when we were predestined, according to the purpose of him who works all things after the counsel of his own will; and verse 4, As he has chosen us in him before the foundation of the world. Mat 10.29, Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing, and not one of them falls on the ground without your Father? Rom 9.21,
Does the potter not have power on the clay, to make of the same lump, one vessel to dishonor, and another to honour?
Therefore the Lord, according to his good pleasure, has most certainly decreed both every thing and action
— whether past, present, or to come — together with their circumstances of place, time, means, and end.
Indeed, he has most justly decreed the wicked works of the wicked. For if it had not so pleased him, they would never have been at all. And though, of their own nature, they are and remain wicked, yet in respect to God's decree, they are to be accounted good. For there is nothing absolutely evil. 1Pe 3.17, For it is
A GOLDEN CHAIN
better (if the will of God be so) that you suffer for well doing, than for evil doing.
The thing which in its own nature is evil, in God's eternal counsel, comes in place of a good thing — in that it is an occasion and way to manifest the glory of God in his justice, and his mercy.
God's foreknowledge is conjoined with his decree; indeed, it is naturally before it. Yet this is not in regard to God, but us — because knowledge goes before the will, and the effecting of a work. For we do nothing but those things that we have willed beforehand; nor do we will anything which we do not know beforehand.
God's foreknowledge in itself is not a cause why things are, except as it is conjoined with his decree. For things do not therefore come to pass because God foreknew them; but because He decreed and willed them, therefore they come to pass.
The execution of God's decree is that by which all things in their time are accomplished, which were foreknown or decreed — and that is even [or exactly] as they were foreknown and decreed.
The same decree of God, is the first and principal working cause of all things; it is also before all other causes, in order and time. For with God's decree, his will is always annexed, by which he can willingly effect what he has decreed. And it would be a sign of impotence to decree anything which he could not willingly compass. And with God's will is conjoined an effectual power, by which the Lord can bring to pass whatever he has freely decreed.
This first and principal cause, however necessary it is in itself, does not take away freedom of will in election, nor the nature and property of second causes.
It only brings them into a certain order; that is, it directs them to the determinate end, upon which the effects and events of things are as contingent or necessary as the nature of second causes. So Christ, according to his Father's decree, died necessarily, Act
17.3;
yet willingly, [Joh 10.17-18]. And if we regard
WILLIAM PERKINS
the temper [state] of Christ's body, he might have prolonged his life — and therefore, in this respect, he may be said to have died contingently.
The execution of God's decree has two branches: his operation, and his operative permission.
God's operation is his effectual producing of all good things, which either have being or moving, or which are done.
God's operative permission is that by which he alone permits one and the same work to be done by others, as it is evil; but as it is good, he effectually works it. Gen
50.20, You indeed had purposed evil against me, but God decreed that for good, that he might, as he has done this day, preserve his people alive. And Gen 45.7,
God has sent me before you to preserve your posterity in this land. Isa 10.5-7, Woe unto Ashur, the rod of my wrath; and the staff in their hands is my indignation. I will send him to a dissembling nation, and I will give him charge against the people of my wrath, to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them under feet like the mire in the street. But he does not think so, nor does his heart esteem it so — rather, he imagines to destroy and to cut off a few nations.
God permits evil by a certain voluntary permission, in that he forsakes the second cause in working evil.
And he forsakes his creature, either by detracting the grace it had, or not bestowing that which it lacks. Rom
1.26, For this cause God gave them up to vile affections. 2Tim 2.25-26, Instructing with meekness those who are contrary-minded, proving — if God at any time will give them repentance — that they may know the truth, and that they may come to amendment out of the snare of the devil, who are taken by him for his will.
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Neither must we think God unjust, who is indebted to none. Rom 9.15, I will have mercy on him to whom I will show mercy. Indeed, it is in God's pleasure to bestow however much grace upon whomever he will.
Mat 20.15, Is it not lawful for me to do as I will with my own?
That which is evil has some respect of goodness with God.
First, in that it is the punishment of sin; and punishment is accounted a moral good, in that it is the part of a just Judge to punish sin.
Secondly, as it is a mere action or act.
Thirdly, as it is a chastisement, a trial of one's faith — martyrdom, propitiation for sin — as is the death and passion of Christ. Act 2.23 and 4.27, 28.
And if we observe these caveats, God is not only a bare permissive agent in an evil work, but a powerful effector of the same. Yet, this is such that God neither instills an aberration into the action, nor yet supports or intends the same — but that he most freely permits evil, and best disposes of it to his own glory. We may see it in this simile: let a man spur forward a lame horse. In that the horse moves forward, the rider is the cause; but that the horse halts, the horse is itself the cause. And again, we see the sunbeams gathering themselves into a sun glass;
they burn whatever things they light upon. Now, that they burn, the cause is not in the sun, but in the glass. The same may be said of God's action in an evil subject.