Behave Honorably, Refuting Slanders
Behave Honorably, Refuting Slanders
1 Peter 3:13–17
Better to Suffer Unjustly than Justly (3:13–17)
3:13
Now, who’s going to wrong you if you become zealous for good?
3:14
But even if you suffer because of righteousness, it’s well with you. “Don’t fear what scares them or be shaken,
3:15
“but consecrate” Christ as “Lord” in your hearts. Always be ready to provide a defense to anyone who questions you about your expectation.
3:16
But make sure you do it with graciousness and respect. Likewise, keep a clear conscience, so that when your abusers slander you for your good behavior in Christ, they may be shamed.
3:17
For it is better to suffer for doing good, if this is God’s will, than to suffer for doing wrong.
3:13
In 3:13, Peter expresses the norm (albeit not an inflexible rule, 3:14) that others are less likely to do wrong (kakoō) to believers if believers are eager1 to do good.2 This passage revisits and slightly qualifies the idea of 2:14, in which authorities should punish those who do wrong and praise those who do right.3 Here, however, Peter qualifies the previous general statement. He remains aware that some authorities do wrong (from kakoō) to those zealous for good, and he expects those who do such wrong (poieō kakoi) to face divine punishment (3:12).
3:14
When believers are known for doing good, they are less likely to arouse hostility (1 Pet. 3:13) and more likely to win others over (3:1); even so, sometimes they will face persecution (3:14). In such cases, they must recognize that it is God’s will (2:15; 3:17; 4:19). Believers must do righteousness (2:24)—that is, act justly and do what is right; but they must also be ready to suffer for it, and are blessed if they do so (Matt. 5:10).
I loosely render the Greek term makarioi as it’s well with you because “blessed” does not capture its full sense. Makarios is the term usually used in Greek versions of Jewish beatitudes. The literary form of the beatitude4 appears throughout the Hebrew Bible and Septuagint5 and continued in use in early Judaism afterward.6 Although most pervasive in Jewish sources, the form also appears in Greek sources.7 For example, “How happy you kings are,” due to their advantage;8 or, the one “is blessed [makarion] who dies not late but well.”9
Peter uses the term twice, both times in reference to being persecuted with Christ (3:14; 4:14). Both instances correspond to Matthean beatitudes: it is well with those who suffer for righteousness (Matt. 5:10) and with those reproached for Christ (Matt. 5:11);10 at least the second of these cases probably reflects Q material (Luke 6:22). It is thus likely that Peter evokes some widely known material from Jesus’s teachings again, as he sometimes quotes Scripture. It is even possible that he still thinks in terms of Ps. 34, which he has cited in 1 Pet. 2:3 and 3:10–12; the psalm’s line after Ps. 34:8a (cited in 1 Pet. 2:3) is, “It’s well with the man whose expectation is in him” (Ps. 34:8b, which could also inform the hope, or expectation, in 1 Pet. 3:15).
Lack of fear of authorities (3:14) should be the norm, under normal (nonpersecution) circumstances. In general, the idea makes sense; a defendant who trusts (or pretends to trust) the fairness of a judge can conclude, “I can safely respect your decision rather than fear your power.”11 Some rabbis believed that fear of the government helpfully restrains evil;12 but a later rabbi insisted that if one’s conduct is good, one need not fear even a frightening ruler.13 A philosopher declared that philosophy made him unintimidated before any human authority.14
Here, however, his encouragement against fear (cf. 3:6) draws directly on the language of LXX Isa. 8:12. Not coincidentally, the Greek version of 8:13 is echoed in Peter’s next verse (1 Pet. 3:15), and Peter has already quoted Isa. 8:14 in 1 Pet. 2:8 regarding Christ as a stumbling stone. The passage seems fresh on his mind. The imperatives at the end of LXX Isa. 8:12 correspond closely to those in 1 Pet. 3:14.15
Thus Peter’s point is that, even if one faces unjust treatment, one should revere the rock (Isa. 8:13–14; 1 Pet. 2:8), Christ the Lord (1 Pet. 3:15), rather than fearing the persecutors (cf. Matt. 10:28 // Luke 12:5). In light of that stone’s contextual role as a sanctuary for the righteous (Isa. 8:14a), the righteous need not fear when they face crisis.16
3:15
Isaiah 8:12, which Peter quotes in 1 Pet. 3:14, encourages the righteous not to fear what those under judgment fear. “Instead,” LXX Isa. 8:13 continues (roughly translated), “consecrate the Lord himself, and he shall be the one whom you fear.” In 3:15, Peter quotes the first line of Isa. 8:13 (“consecrate the Lord”) and applies it to Christ, even though Isaiah referred to YHWH.17 This is not the only place where Peter applies biblical language about YHWH to Christ (see esp. 2:4a).18
Summons to God’s people to consecrate or sanctify themselves are common in Peter’s Bible,19 as for example, in Lev. 11:44, one of the verses behind the quotation in 1 Pet. 1:16. God would be consecrated or shown holy in the priests who drew near to him (Lev. 10:3),20 who must consecrate themselves (i.e., set themselves apart) for God (Exod. 19:22). This should also apply to believers as a consecrated priesthood (1 Pet. 2:5) who live as holy because God is (1:16).
Peter is counseling believers who may face slanderous accusations as members of this minority faith (3:14–16), and thus speaks of a defense (apologia).21 Rather than being intimidated (3:14), they should boldly offer a defense of their faith (cf. Mark 13:9–11).22 In such a context, the external questioning might be hostile or at least suspicious, and Peter might think of their answer as an “accounting” (as NRSV renders logos in this case; cf. 1 Pet. 4:5) for their hope.23 Since any believer might be questioned, and how any believer presented their faith could affect views toward all the others, it was important for believers to know how to explain their faith appropriately. Expectation, or hope, is how believers would see it; outsiders might view Christian eschatology less favorably (cf. Acts 17:7). This hope is literally “in you” or (since “you” here is plural) “among you.” This is the hope they share in Christ (1 Pet. 1:3, 13, 21; 3:5).
But the appropriate Christian defense was not a matter only of appropriate intellectual content (3:15); it was also a matter of a gracious attitude (3:16, though some translations include this line instead at the end of v. 15). Having noted that believers must be ready to offer a defense, Peter adds a warning with a strong adversative conjunction: but [alla] . . . do it with graciousness and respect. Here Peter echoes the very language used for servants (2:18) and wives of nonbelieving husbands (3:2, 4): as a minority faith, believers held a subordinate position, and respecting others was valuable not only as a matter of principle but also as a prerequisite for survival. (Although it is highly unlikely that Peter would have imagined Christians being a majority faith anywhere, he surely would have still commended the same advice, given its rooting in Jesus’s example in 2:21–23.)24
Peter’s language of a clear conscience (lit., suneidēsis agatha, “good conscience”; also in 3:21) would have been a familiar expression (Acts 23:1; 1 Tim. 1:5, 19; 1 Pet. 3:16, 21; cf. Heb. 13:18), including (in the Western empire) in its equivalent Latin form.25 One orator thus claimed to be conscious that he had never committed any dishonorable or criminal behavior.26 Some averred that a guilty conscience was itself a punishment.27 For some, it might be a person’s only guide.28 The term “conscience” is rarer in the Septuagint, becoming common only in the first century BCE.29 Josephus uses the term generally for moral awareness;30 Philo, in nearby Alexandria, uses it in a manner resembling that of Greek philosophers.31 The conscience also appears in other Hellenistic Jewish texts;32 its guilt might seem unbearable.33
Believers’ consciences must remain “good” (i.e., they must know that they are innocent) so they will be ready when they are slandered for what is actually their “good” behavior. The depiction of their abusers (hoi epēreazontes) may recall Jesus’s teaching also recalled in 1 Pet. 3:9: “Bless those who curse you; pray for those who abuse [tōn epēreazontōn] you” (Luke 6:28). Earlier in the letter, those who trust in the cornerstone will not be shamed (LXX Isa. 28:16 in 1 Pet. 2:6), but here those who misrepresent God’s servants will be shamed. Again, this reversal of shame comes not through retaliation, but through humility and respect that expose the falsehood that Jesus’s followers are wrongdoers.
Their honorable conscience could become a matter of life and death. In general, slander against someone of good character was harder to believe.34 Judges and juries decided cases partly on the basis of character (ēthos).35 In rhetorical theory, the speaker’s character thus was important for persuasion.36 Orators and judges could infer probable ēthos from a person’s status as a “respectable” citizen (i.e., of noble birth;37 probably irrelevant for most of Peter’s audience; cf. 2:18; 3:1) or from their past behavior; Peter must focus on the latter. Likewise, as in much popular discourse today, it was common to slander an opponent based not only on the charges, but also by smearing their character as viciously and thoroughly as possible.38 Exceptions could be made; when one orator learned that the defendant whom he must prosecute was Caesar’s friend, he promised not to invent additional accusations.39 When Josephus wishes to counter Apion’s anti-Jewish history, he also attacks his lexical work as a grammatikos, since this will help undermine the scholar’s credibility.40
Negative character made charges believable,41 whereas positive character made them difficult to accept.42 One who had led a life above reproach was more difficult to convict,43 especially if one had never been previously charged44 (or at least convicted).45 The burden of proof rested more heavily on someone who was frequently charged than on someone who had rarely been brought to court.46
The shaming of one’s accusers made good sense biblically47 and in the wider culture. The issue in 1 Pet. 3:16 is not rhetoric but behavior; if one is shown virtuous, one’s accusers and slanderers will have to recognize that they have spoken amiss. This is common wisdom, but in lawcourts the principle was developed by way of more deliberately embarrassing accusers.48
Rhetorical handbooks had long suggested that it was ideal to shift the very charges of which one was accused to one’s adversaries, whenever possible.49 The handbooks simply reflected ancient practice; returning charges was good rhetoric.50 Thus one might concede that an offense was deserving of death, and then explain that it was one’s accuser, and not oneself, who was guilty of such an offense.51 Sometimes an ancient Greek orator would express surprise at the audacity of an accuser charging a client with the very offense of which the accuser was guilty.52 Thus Aeschines, charged by Demosthenes with taking bribes, counters that Demosthenes is the real bribe-taker.53 Having presented evidence, Aeschines questions “whether . . . it is I whom Demosthenes has accused, or whether on the contrary he has accused himself in my name.”54 One man, once acquitted, charged his accusers with a different offense and got them all convicted.55 While the prospect of returned accusations did not always deter frivolous prosecutions, those who entered litigation voluntarily often did so at their own peril!
More recent Roman orators also went on the offensive, attacking the character of those who charged their clients.56 If, for example, Sestius’s abusers now charge him with the violence they inflicted on him, they so charge him only “because he is alive. But that is not his fault.”57 Counterclaims could involve ēthos; thus when Cicero prosecuted Verres, Verres tried to circulate a story that Cicero had taken a bribe to falsify his prosecution.58 In Nero’s reign, when a false accuser denounced Seneca, the latter effectively returned the charge against his accuser.59 The practice of returning charges also appears in early Jewish Christian narrations of Judean debates (Matt. 12:24, 45; John 8:37–51).
The present case is not bound to legal settings, nor is it a deliberate reversal of charges. The pattern observed in forensic rhetoric, however, underlines the frequent understanding in ancient Mediterranean honor-shame culture that false accusers and those who circulated their slanders could end up regretting their accusations.
3:17
In 3:17, Peter again allows that believers’ suffering for doing good may be in God’s will (2:15; 4:19);60 God is sovereign even when believers suffer (5:6–7; cf., e.g., Matt. 10:28–30 // Luke 12:4–7). As often, Peter urges doing right (agathopoieō) and opposes doing wrong (kakopoieō). Yet the value of Peter’s counsel for Christians to refute slanders and stereotypes will be reduced to the extent that some Christians actually play into those stereotypes. Peter again (cf. 1 Pet. 2:21–23) goes on to ground Christians’ suffering for doing right in Jesus’s example (3:18).
As noted earlier (and see in more detail comments on 4:13–16), Peter reflects the widespread moral understanding that it is better to suffer for doing good than for doing wrong. When his wife or a close friend protested that Socrates was about to die an innocent man, he allegedly responded, “What? So you think it would be better for me to die a guilty one?”61 Stoics concurred with the principle: doing a wrong is terrible, but, in the view of the gods and just persons, suffering a wrong is not.62 “While the one, consoled by the thought that he is suffering hardship for the sake of right, turns his eyes from his suffering to its cause, the other, jaded with pleasures and struggling with too much good fortune, is harassed less by what he suffers than by the reason for his suffering.”63
1. For discussion of the range of meaning for zēlōtēs and cognates in the same semantic domain, see Keener, Acts, 3:3224–25. For such zeal to perform good, see also Titus 2:14.
2. An echo of LXX Isa. 50:9 (tis kakōsei; cf. a clearer echo of a different aspect of the verse in Rom. 8:31) in Peter’s tis ho kakōsōn would remind believers also of God’s help (Elliott, Peter, 14). Two such common terms constitute a slender basis for inferring an allusion, but if there is any allusion, it must be to Isa. 50:9.
3. Cf. again Rom. 13:3; see Winter, Welfare, 21.
4. On which, see further Aune, Rhetoric, 37–38, 75–78.
5. See, e.g., LXX Pss. 39:5 (ET 40:4); 40:2 (41:1); 64:5 (65:4); 83:5–6, 13 (84:4–5, 12); 93:12 (94:12); 111:1 (112:1); 118:1–2 (119:1–2); 127:1 (128:1); Isa. 56:2; Dan. 12:12; Bar. 4:4; with a different term, Jer. 17:7; Jdt. 13:18; 14:7; 15:10. The term makarios appears 68 times in the LXX, including 25 times in Psalms, 11 times in Sirach (14:1–2, 20; 25:8–9; 26:1; 28:19; 31:8; 34:15; 48:11; 50:28), and 4 times in Proverbs (3:13; 8:34; 20:7; 28:14).
6. E.g., 1 En. 99:10; 2 En. 42:6–14; 44:5; Pss. Sol. 4:23; 5:16; 6:1; 10:1; 17:44; 18:6; 4 Macc. 7:15, 22; 10:15; 17:18; 18:9; Jos. Asen. 16:14/7; 19:8, MSS; Sipra V. D. Dehob. par. 5.44.1.1; b. Ber. 61b; b. Ḥag. 14b; b. Hor. 10b, bar. At Qumran, see 4Q525 (see de Roo, “4Q525”; Brooke, “Beatitudes”; Viviano, “Beatitudes”; Viviano, “Qumran”; Viviano, “Publication”). In early Christianity, makarios appears about 50 times in the NT and 40 times in the Apostolic Fathers.
7. E.g., Contest of Homer and Hesiod 322; Hom. Hymns 25.4–5; Euripides, frg. 1057 (from Stobaeus, Anth. 4.22.72); Pindar, Dirges frg. 137 (in Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 3.3.17, using oblios); Polybius, Hist. 26.1.13; Musonius Rufus, 35, p. 134; Apoll. K. Tyre 31; Babrius, Fab. 103.20–21; Philostratus, Her. 4.11; Porphyry, Marc. 16.276–77; cf. Aune, Prophecy, 61, 64; Guelich, Sermon, 63–66. For some philosophic consideration of makariotēs (although the article focuses primarily on eudaimonia), see Hossenfelder, “Happiness.” For makarios in Stoic and Christian literature, see Vorster, “Blessedness.”
8. Polybius, Hist. 26.1.13.
9. Musonius Rufus, 35 (p. 134; trans. Lutz, “Musonius,” 135), though this does not conform closely to the conventional beatitude form (cf. also Musonius Rufus, 16, p. 104.26; Porphyry, Marc. 16.276–77). Stoics highly emphasized happiness or blessedness (see Vorster, “Blessedness”).
10. See also Estrada, “Beatitude.”
11. Apuleius, Apol. 103 (trans. Hunink, in Apuleius, Rhetorical Works, 121).
12. m. ʾAbot 3:2 (Danby, Mishnah, 450), attributed to R. Hanina the Prefect.
13. Lev. Rab. 9:8 (a much later source, citing a much later Amoraic rabbi).
14. Apuleius, False Pref. 2.106.
15. For the value of both literary and historical approaches here, see Rensburg and Moyise, “Isaiah”; Moyise, “Intertextuality.”
16. Be shaken reflects the Greek word tarassō, something philosophers in particular strove to avoid (e.g., Seneca Y., Dial. 9; Arius Didymus, Epit. 2.7.5k, p. 34.1–3); but Peter’s interest is less speculative about emotional states and more in keeping with Isaiah’s emphasis on crisis.
17. The potential theological incongruity may account for variant readings here. “Consecrate the Lord” sounds strange; Kuykendall and Collins (“1 Peter 3:15a”) suggest “Revere Christ the Lord as holy.”
18. Such application of OT YHWH language appears at various points in Paul’s letters; cf., e.g., Rom. 10:9–13; 1 Cor. 1:8; 2:16; 8:6; Phil. 1:6, 10; 2:11, 16; 1 Thess. 3:13.
19. See, e.g., Lev. 20:7; Num. 11:18; Josh. 3:5; 7:13; 1 Sam. 16:5; 1 Chron. 15:12; 2 Chron. 29:5; 35:6; see also 4 Macc. 13:13 (cf. 17:20); b. Yoma 39a, bar.
20. Applied more broadly in Philo, Flight 59.
21. Cf. discussion of 3:15’s apologetic function in Gubler, “Rechenschaft”; Miller, “1 Peter 3:13–17.” The language of a defense naturally fits law courts (cf. 4:15–16 and perhaps 4:6), but it was also applicable figuratively for a reasonable argument; see, e.g., Arius Didymus, Epit. 2.7.8, pp. 50.36–52.1.
22. Cf. Michaels, Peter, 188; Goppelt, Peter, 243. 1 Pet. 3:15b recalls material in Luke 12:2–12, esp. 12:4–5 (to fear God rather than humans) and 12:11–12 (during trials), now adapted for a new situation.
23. Again potentially legal language, but not implying that one’s answer here be limited to a court setting. Cf. the idea in m. ʾAbot 2:14: “R. Eleazar said: Be alert to study the Law and know how to make answer to an unbeliever” (trans. Danby, Mishnah, 449).
24. Rhetorically, discrediting adversaries gently also would appeal more to the ordinary audience (Rhet. Alex. 37, 1445b.17–19).
25. In its Latin equivalent bona conscientia, Seneca Y., Lucil. 43.5; 97.12; Dial. 7.20.5; cf. a “true” conscience in Pliny Y., Ep. 5.1.10. I borrow this material from Keener, Acts, 3:3267–68.
26. Fronto, Nep. am. 2.8. The Greek and Latin terms translated as “conscience” involved “consciousness of right and wrong” (Versnel, “Sin,” 1410).
27. Publilius Syrus, Sent. 194; for the terrors of a guilty conscience, see Juvenal, Sat. 13. Even if others do not know one’s shameful deeds, one’s conscience would know (Isocrates, Demon. 16); conscience was worth a thousand witnesses (Quintilian, Inst. 5.11.41). Malina (Anthropology, 51) treats the ancient Mediterranean role of conscience in terms of internalized social approval.
28. Seneca Y., Ben. 4.21.5. For “conscience” in Seneca, see also Lucil. 97.15; fuller discussion in Sevenster, Seneca, 84–92.
29. Lane, Hebrews, 225. Greek thinkers had, however, often emphasized accurate self-knowledge (Keener, John, 236–37).
30. Cf. Josephus, Ant. 16.103, 212; J.W. 4.189, 193. He claims that the reward for keeping the laws is his conscience (technically, Josephus uses only the cognate suneidos here; but this performs the same function [cf. Selwyn, Peter, 177]), testifying to one’s fidelity (Josephus, Ag. Ap. 2.217–18).
31. Cf. Wallis, “Conscience” (though noting his lack of “a coherent metaphysical theory” [9]). Something like conscience could function as both accuser and judge of the person swearing falsely in Philo, Decalogue 87 (cf. comment in Klauck, “Accuser”); cf. Seneca Y., Lucil. 28.9–10. Philo normally uses it negatively, for a “guilty” conscience (Bosman, “Conscience”).
32. E.g., T. Jud. 20:2.
33. T. Reu. 4:3. For “bad” conscience in Hellenistic Jewish texts, see also Dunn, Romans, 101 (citing Wis. 17:11; Philo, Worse 146; Spec. Laws 2.49; Virtues 124; T. Reu. 4:3; Josephus, Ant. 16.103).
34. Borrowed from Keener, Acts, 4:3372–73.
35. Rhet. Her. 4.50.63. The rational concept of ēthos formulated by Aristotle and the terminology was less in use by Paul’s day (Aune, Rhetoric, 169–73, esp. 170–71; cf. Anderson, Glossary, 61–63; for ambiguity in Aristotle’s use, cf. Woerther, “Origines”; for ēthos and emotion in Aristotle, see also Hall, “Delivery,” 232), but character remained a crucial issue in forensic rhetoric (Crook, Advocacy, 34); Perdue (“Rhetoric,” 191) finds it emphasized even in Wisdom of Solomon.
36. Isaeus, Nicost. 27; Sallust, Catil. 5.1; Quintilian, Decl. 338.4; see further McTavish, “Priest.”
37. Lysias, Or. 30.1–2, §183; Aeschines, Tim. 42; cf. Chariton, Chaer. 2.10.7. On the importance of noble birth, see further Euripides, Heracl. 302–3; Demosthenes, Funeral §4; Aristotle, Rhet. 2.9.11, 1387a; Aelius Theon, Progymn. 9.15; Musonius Rufus, 9, p. 68.25; Plutarch, Educ. 2, Mor. 1AB; Dio Chrysostom, Ep. 1; Byron, “Noble Lineage.” The same terminology applied to noble birth and noble character (e.g., Dio Chrysostom, Or. 77/78.17; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.6.34; 1.9.32; 4.6.33; 4.10.11; Acts 17:11), distinguishable as the ideas were (e.g., Aristotle, Rhet. 2.15.3, 1390b; Rhet. Alex. 35, 1440b.17–19; Philo, Abraham 251, 265; Virtues 187–91, 200; 1 Cor. 1:26).
38. Isaeus passim, e.g., Astyph. 16; Lucian, Runaways 18; Tacitus, Ann. 3.12 (cf. the attack on a defendant’s previous career in Tacitus, Ann. 3.10). In one case, a litigant complained that had the defendant accused him merely of killing the defendant’s father rather than the litigant’s own, he would not be taking him to court (Lysias, Or. 10.2, §116). Rhetoricians also learned to multiply existing charges by subdividing them into component elements (Hermogenes, Inv. 1.2.101–2).
39. Fronto, M. Caes. 3.3. Marcus Aurelius replied that this would win Fronto more favor from those sympathetic to the accused (M. Caes. 3.5). An advocate might have to knowingly charge someone falsely, but might manage to reduce harshness to the level necessary to his role (Quintilian, Decl. 333.8).
40. See Dillery, “Apion Historian.” Character assassination offered a simple “argument,” and Apion made an easy target (Jones, “Apion”).
41. E.g., Quintilian, Decl. 313.15; 322.3; 331.intro.; 331.21–22.
42. E.g., Aeschines, Tim. 49; Quintilian, Decl. 314.2; 322.3; 351.8; 377.2–3; Apuleius, Apol. 90.
43. E.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Rom. Ant. 7.58.2. A prosecutor might need to imaginatively depict this defendant’s progressive moral deterioration (Libanius, Topics 1.24–25; 2.18).
44. Sus. 27; Isaeus, Aristarch. 1 (though pleading especially that he is a less experienced speaker); Cleon. 35; Lysias, Or. 5.2–3, §§102–3; 16.10, §146; Dio Chrysostom, Or. 46.7; Chariton, Chaer. 5.7.2. Lucian likes to parody this claim (Phal. 1.14; Par. 56). Prosecutors looked for past wrongdoing to cite a pattern (Hermogenes, Inv. 2.5.117–19).
45. Fronto, Amic. 2.7.5.
46. Cf., e.g., Isaeus, Aristarch. 1; Lysias, Or. 5.2–3, §§102–3; 7.24–29, §§110–11; 16.12, §146; Cicero, Sest. 30.64. Apuleius charged that his accuser had “already been convicted of lying before the city prefect in a highly important case” (Apol. 3).
47. E.g., Pss. 6:10; 25:3; 31:17; 35:4, 26; 40:14–15; 53:5; and passim; esp. 71:13; 109:29.
48. The following material is borrowed from Keener, Acts, 4:3414.
49. E.g., Rhet. Alex. 36, 1442b.6–9; Cicero, Or. Brut. 40.137; De or. 3.204; cf. Cicero, Cat. 2.3; turning an opponent’s argument against him in Hermogenes, Inv. 3.3.138.
50. Euripides, Cret. frg. 472e.33–35; Thucydides, Hist. 3.61.1; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Lysias 24 (advising that this be done “at the outset” [trans. Usher, LCL, 1:67]). Another form of counteraccusation involved admitting an offense but blaming the victim for deserving it (Hermogenes, Issues 39.1–5).
51. Xenophon, Hell. 2.3.37.
52. Lysias, Or. 3.1, §96. At least in declamations, those guilty of some kinds of offenses could not bring suit against anyone else (Quintilian, Decl. 250.intro.; 265.intro.).
53. Aeschines, Leg. 3; Ctes. 113, 156, 259; also that he offers bribes as well (Ctes. 69). Likewise, Philocrates (convicted of treason) used not Aeschines but Demosthenes as his advocate (Aeschines, Leg. 14), and Demosthenes rather than Aeschines was his business partner (Leg. 56). Aeschines elsewhere objects to this frequent practice of countercharging accusers (Tim. 179), but does it himself. Demosthenes, however, uses it more successfully (Libanius, exercise in Encom. 5.14).
54. Aeschines, Leg. 69 (trans. Adams, LCL, p. 211).
55. Thucydides, Hist. 3.70.3–4.
56. E.g., Cicero, Quinct. 3.11–9.33 (i.e., the entire narratio); Rosc. Amer. 30.82–45.132; Pliny Y., Ep. 3.9.29; 4.9.20; 6.22.2, 4; 7.33.7. Although Apuleius gets around to denouncing his accuser (e.g., Apol. 56), he initially excuses himself from this necessity by pointing out that his accuser was so obscure, lowly, and worthless that Apuleius had never had occasion to get to know him (Apol. 16).
57. Cicero, Sest. 37.80 (trans. Gardner, LCL, 12:145).
58. Cicero, Verr. 2.1.6.17.
59. Tacitus, Ann. 14.65.
60. Note the alliteration: theloi to thelēma tou theou.
61. My paraphrase; see Xenophon, Apol. 28; Valerius Maximus, Mem. 7.2.ext. 1d; Aelius Theon, Progymn. 3.105–6; Diogenes Laertius, Lives 2.35; cf. Plato, Gorg. 508B, in Kelly, Peter, 145. Technically, Socrates answered a different question than his interlocutor asked.
62. Musonius Rufus, 9, p. 76.5–11, esp. 10.
63. Seneca Y., Dial. 1.3.10 (trans. Basore, LCL, 1:21).